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Abstract 
Social dominance orientation (SDO) is one of the most powerful predictors of intergroup 
attitudes and behavior.  While SDO works well as a unitary construct, some analyses suggest that 
SDO might consist of two complementary dimensions – SDO-Dominance (SDO-D), or the 
preference for some groups to dominate others, and SDO-Egalitarianism (SDO-E), a preference 
for non-egalitarian intergroup relations.  Using five samples from the U.S. and Israel, we confirm 
factor analytic evidence and show predictive validity for both dimensions.  In the U.S., SDO-D 
was theorized and found t  be more related to old-fashioned racism, zero-sum competition, and 
aggressive intergroup phenomena than SDO-E; SDO-E better predicted more subtle legitimizing 
ideologies, conservatism, and opposition to redistributive social policies. In a contentious 
hierarchical intergroup context (the Israeli-Palestinian context), SDO-D better predicted both 
conservatism and aggressive intergroup attitudes.  Fundamentally, these analyses begin to 
establish the existence of complementary psychological orientations underlying the preference 
for group-based dominance and inequality. 
Keywords: SDO, social dominance orientation, group dominance, anti-egalitarianism, hierarchy-
enhancing and attenuating social policy. 
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Social Dominance Orientation: Revisiting the Structure and Function of a Variable 
Predicting Social and Political Attitudes 
To “illegal immigrants”: “If you commit a crime while you're here, we should hang you and 
send your body back to where you came from, and your family should pay for it." 
- Joyce Kaufman, Tea Party member and Florida radio show host 
 As this recently publicized statement from Tea Party member and popular Florida radio 
host Joyce Kaufman illustrates, aggressive discourse surrounding American intergroup politics 
remains all too common (Wing, 2010).  The recent passage of an immigration law in Arizona 
allowing the police to stop and detain anyone suspected of being an undocumented immigrant 
shows that aggressive anti-immigration sentiments are not confined to rhetoric.  We argue that 
such aggressive intergroup attitudes and behaviors are an outgrowth of a distinct psychological 
orientation, which constitutes one component of social dominance orientation (Pratto, Sidanius, 
Stallworth, & Malle, 1994).   
The overt force and punitiveness prescribed by Kaufman contrast with contemporary 
apologies opposing affirmative action or limiting international reconciliation. In such rhetoric, 
other priorities, such as “fairness, meritocracy,” or “national security” are deployed rather than 
overt references to the inferiority of outgroups or the rightness of dominance (e.g., Essex, n.d., 
Heller, 2010). We argue that such intergroup attitudes and behaviors, although not as openly 
forceful and hostile, rely on a psychology of group separation and opposition to group equality. 
This psychological orientation is also an aspect of social dominance orientation. In this article, 
we explore the implications of both dimensions of social dominance orientation (SDO) for 
intergroup relations, how ideologies justify inequality, and the psychology of group prejudice.  
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Since its introduction two decades ago (see Sidanius, Pratto, Martin, & Stallworth, 1991, 
p. 693), SDO has proven to be one of the most versatile and useful constructs for understanding 
socio-political ideologies, the psychology of prejudice, and intergroup behavior within social 
psychology.  SDO is defined as an individual’s preference for group-based hierarchy and 
inequality, and has been consistently found to undergird an impressive array of intergroup 
phenomena that serve to either enhance or attenuate group-based hierarchy (Pratto, Stallworth, 
Sidanius, & Malle, 1994).  For example, SDO has been found to be a powerful predictor of 
generalized prejudice against, and persecution of, a wide array of denigrated groups such as poor 
people, Latinos, Asians, foreigners, gays, women, Arabs, Muslims, Blacks, Jews, immigrants, 
and refugees (e.g., Altemeyer, 1996; Esses, Veenvliet, Hodson & Mihic, 2008; McFarland & 
Adelson, 1996; Sidanius, Pratto & Mitchell, 1994; Thomsen, Green & Sidanius, 2008).  Further, 
SDO is related to the endorsement of a broad spectrum of group-relevant social ideologies, 
including political conservatism, noblesse oblige, just world beliefs, nationalism, patriotism, 
militarism, internal attributions for poverty, sexism, rape myths, endorsement of the Protestant 
work ethic, and other consequential hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing ideologies across a range 
of cultures (Pratto, Liu, Levin, Sidanius, Shih, Bachrach & Hegarty, 2000; Sidanius & Pratto, 
1999).  In addition, SDO is related to attitudes towards group-relevant social policies such as 
support for wars of aggression, punitive criminal justice policies, the death penalty and torture, 
and opposition to humanitarian practices, social welfare, and affirmative action (Federico & 
Sidanius, 2002; Green, Thomsen, Sidanius, Staerkle, & Potanina, 2009; Haley & Sidanius, 2006; 
Pratto & Glasford, 2008; Pratto, Stallworth, & Conway-Lanz, 1998; Sidanius & Liu, 1992; 
Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Sidanius, Mitchell, Haley, & Navarrete, 2006). People’s SDO level not 
only influences endorsement of social policies and ideologies, but also how they live their lives - 
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for instance, the kinds of jobs they seek and obtain, the kinds of subjects they choose to study, 
and how well they perform in these areas (Pratto, Stallworth, Sidanius & Siers, 1997, for a 
review see Haley & Sidanius, 2005). 
The generality of SDO is also shown in its ability to predict intergroup attitudes in new 
situations.  For example, in addition to correlating with prejudice toward familiar groups (e.g., 
ethnic groups), SDO predicts affect towards both minimal groups and novel social policies (e.g., 
Amiot & Bouris, 2005; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth & Malle, 1994; Pratto & Shih, 2000; 
Reynolds, Turner, Haslam, Ryan, Bizumic, & Siubasic, 2007; Sidanius, Pratto, & Mitchell, 
1994).  SDO has also been shown to predict people’s future intergroup attitudes and behavior 
across extended periods of time (Kteily, Sidanius, & Levin, 2011; Sibley, Wilson, & Duckitt, 
2007; Thomsen, Green, Ho, Levin, van Laar, Sinclair, & Sidanius, 2010).  Altogether, empirical 
evidence from many countries and concerning many different intergroup contexts has shown that 
the SDO scale is a powerful index of generalized prejudice, group relevant social ideologies, 
socio-political policy preferences and future career choices (see Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006 
for a review). 
One or Two Dimensions of SDO? 
When the 14-item SDO scale was initially developed, it was found to be uni-dimensional 
(Pratto et al., 1994, Appendix A, later referred to as the SDO5 scale in Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).  
Care was taken to ensure that the item set did not produce response acquiescence (Christie & 
Cook, 1958) by including both pro-trait and con-trait SDO items. In addition, work was done to 
ensure that the SDO scale captures the full expression of the SDO construct, and demonstrates 
convergent and discriminant validity (e.g., Loevinger, 1957). However, subsequent factor 
analytic research and experimental research by a number of scholars suggest that the pro-trait 
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and con-trait sections of the 16-item SDO6 scale – the most commonly used SDO scale, 
published in Appendix D of Pratto et al., 1994 - may actually produce two distinct yet strongly 
related, substantive subdimensions of SDO (e.g., Jost & Thompson, 2000). One may reflect 
support for group-based dominance hierarchies (SDO-D) and the other opposition to group-
based equality (SDO-E; see Table 1).  
To date, the question of whether SDO6 consists of one dimension or two related 
dimensions has not been theoretically or empirically resolved.  The proposed dimensions are 
composed entirely of either pro-trait items (SDO-D) or con-trait items (SDO-E).  As such, any 
factor analytic evidence for two dimensions could simply reflect differences in the direction in 
which items are worded, rather than differences in substance between the two dimensions. Thus, 
even though our early unpublished analyses of the SDO6 scale showed that two dimensions often 
emerged, it was not clear whether these dimensions were substantively distinct.   
The present paper reviews evidence that the SDO6 scale consists of two related 
dimensions and, importantly, empirically tests whether the two dimensions differentially predict 
outcome variables concerning group based dominance and opposition to equality.  If our research 
finds that two subdimensions empirically differentiate among theoretically-relevant measures, 
this would demonstrate predictive validity for this distinction and suggest the need for newly 
balanced measures of each dimension. As SDO6 is so widely in use in both experimental and 
survey research around the world, the results may prove of great theoretical and practical use in 
understanding prejudice, discrimination, and intergroup relations more broadly.  
Dominance and Egalitarianism 
Why might support for group dominance and opposition to group equality reflect two 
distinct psychological orientations?  SDO-D is defined as support for group-based dominance 
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hierarchies in which dominant groups actively oppress subordinate groups.  It reflects an early 
definition of SDO as a generalized imperial imperative (Sidanius & Pratto, 1993).  These items 
specifically tap support for overtly hierarchical intergroup relations (e.g., “Inferior groups should 
stay in their place”).  As such, we hypothesize that SDO-D will be related to phenomena such as 
support for aggressive intergroup behavior, support of overtly negative intergroup attitudes, 
support for negative allocations to outgroups, and the perception of group-based competition.  
These attitudes, behaviors, and cognitions all support dominance hierarchies that involve the 
active subjugation of some groups by other groups.  Indeed, since the SDO-D items encompass 
the approval of groups that “use force” and “step on other groups,” we expect SDO-D to be 
especially related to support for aggressive behavior in intergroup competition (e.g., ethnic 
persecution).  SDO-D also expresses the belief that some groups are “superior” or “more 
worthy,” and thus should be related to overt or old-fashioned prejudice.  For example, Sears, 
Haley, and Henry (2008) have found that SDO-D correlates with overtly negative feelings 
toward Blacks among Whites, the belief that Blacks are biologically inferior, and the belief that 
Blacks are trying to take resources away from other groups.  Similarly, given that SDO-D 
reflects a preoccupation with maintaining the relative power difference between groups, we 
expect SDO-D to be related to perceptions of zero-sum group competition.  Importantly, these 
aspects of SDO-D should also make it predict the legitimization or justification of extremely 
hierarchical systems of group-based dominance. 
SDO-E is defined as opposition to group-based equality.  This includes an aversion to the 
general principle of equality and to reducing the level of hierarchy.  Opposition to equality 
translates psychologically into support for exclusivity.  People who want groups to be unequal 
wish to exclude certain groups from access to resources that could elevate their social position.  
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Therefore, SDO-E should be related to a wide array of subtle, insidious hierarchy-maintaining 
legitimizing myths, such as symbolic racism or the Protestant work ethic, that imply that it is 
legitimate for certain groups to be excluded from access to resources.  It should further be related 
to opposition to redistributive social policies because they increase equality, and to policies that 
would break down group boundaries such as support for affirmative action.  Given the nature of 
SDO-E, it should predict the justification and legitimization of social systems that are socially 
stratified.  However, unlike SDO-D, it should not relate as strongly to support for active 
domination or extreme subjugation of subordinate groups.  Although the two subdimensions 
should strongly relate to one another, once this overlap is taken into account, they should 
differentially predict a variety of group-relevant outcomes. 
Existing Evidence for the Predictive Validity of Two Dimensions 
Empirical studies from several research groups have shown that SDO-D and SDO-E 
differentially correspond with group-relevant variables such as endorsement of prejudicial 
ideologies and political attitudes, and may respond differently to experimental manipulations 
aimed at promoting fairness between groups. The SDO-E dimension, or some variant of it, 
accounts for variance in conservatism, opposition to international diplomacy, anti-Black attitudes 
(not including old-fashioned racism), just world beliefs, and opposition to redistributive social 
policies (Cohrs, Moschner, Maes, & Kielmann, 2005; Eagly, Diekman, Johannesen-Schmidt, & 
Koenig, 2004; Freeman, Aquino, & McFerran, 2009; Jost & Thompson, 2000; Reyna, Henry, 
Korfmacher, & Tucker, 2006; Kugler, Cooper, & Nosek, 2010; Sears et al., 2008; Wakslak, Jost, 
Tyler, & Chen, 2007; Yoshimura & Hardin, 2009).   
Some studies have shown that SDO-D differentially accounts for other variables. For 
example, Eagly et al. (2004) found that SDO-D predicted discrimination against women and 
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homosexuals.  Because their index of discrimination combined the belief in traditional gender 
roles with opposition to gay/lesbian rights, it is not clear exactly which aspects of gender and 
sexual orientation beliefs corresponded to SDO-D.  Peña and Sidanius (2002) examined 
relationships between the two subdimensions and patriotism, or love for one’s nation. Contrary 
to the notion that U.S. patriotism reflects love for an inclusive, egalitarian society, they found 
that patriotism was more related to SDO-D than to SDO-E.  However, Peña and Sidanius used 
abbreviated SDO-D and SDO-E scales, and did not partial out the effects of SDO-E when 
examining the effects of SDO-D.  Kugler et al. (2010) found that SDO-D uniquely predicted 
ingroup bias (explicit and implicit), anti-Black bias, opposition to economic redistribution, belief 
in a just world and symbolic racism among U.S. Whites.  However, due to their use of partial 
rather than semi-partial correlations, we do not know how each SDO dimension, net of the effect 
of the other dimension, relates to the total variance of each intergroup attitude of interest.1  In 
addition, a few research teams have found that SDO-D appears to have a stronger relationship 
with RWA than does SDO-E (e.g., Cohrs et al., 2005; Del Prado Silvan-Ferraro & Bustillos, 
2007; Kugler et al., 2010).  Freeman et al.’s (2009) analysis of the proposed dimensions was 
particularly compelling. It showed that the effect of SDO-D on donations to a minority 
organization among dominants was attenuated by invoking examples of good moral behavior, 
but the effects of SDO-E were unchanged.  They attributed this divergent pattern of moderation 
to their intuition that the attitudes expressed by SDO-D are less acceptable, especially under 
circumstances in which people have been primed with moral virtues.  As such, SDO-D no longer 
predicts reduced donations to a minority organization among dominants primed to consider 
moral virtues. 
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Other studies have found no difference in how the two subdimensions predict intergroup 
attitudes.  For example, Guimond, Dambrun, Michinov, and Duarte (2003) found that SDO-D 
and SDO-E equally predicted prejudice, though their measure of prejudice was a hybrid of 
positive views of an outgroup and the desire to actively discriminate against an outgroup. Kugler 
et al. (2010) also found no significant difference between SDO-D and SDO-E’s relationships 
with implicit and explicit ingroup bias and anti-Black attitudes; both subdimensions of SDO 
were related to race prejudice among Whites against Blacks and other groups, but the IAT 
confounds positive ingroup bias and derogatory outgroup bias that may differentially relate to 
each of the subdimensions of SDO. Finally, others considering the dimensions separately have 
been primarily interested in the antecedents of SDO (e.g., Foels & Pappas, 2004) or in 
interpersonal rather than intergroup competition (e.g., Cozzolino & Snyder, 2008).   
Social Structure May Moderate the Differential Effects of SDO-D and SDO-E 
Due to the rather dramatic decline in explicit and old-fashioned racism within American 
society (e.g., Schuman, Steeh, Bobo & Krysan, 1997), Sears and his colleagues have argued that 
SDO-D is no longer a relevant dimension in intergroup relations and/or socio-political attitudes 
(see e.g., Sears et al., 2008, p. 83).  Sears, Henry, and Kosterman (2000) found that SDO-D does 
not predict symbolic racism as well as SDO-E, is weakly related to political orientation and 
racial policy preferences, and does not relate to legitimizing ideologies such as attributions for 
poverty, crime and structural explanations for racial disadvantage (see also Sears & Henry, 2005; 
Sears et al., 2008).  However, because most of this research has used highly abbreviated versions 
of the SDO-D and SDO-E scales, and has not considered the full spectrum of intergroup attitudes 
and behavior, more research is warranted to test whether SDO-D predicts other intergroup 
variables in American samples.   
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Previous research has also failed to consider the extent to which the differential effects of 
SDO-D and SDO-E are dependent upon the socio-structural context.  In contexts such as the 
contemporary U.S., where equality is the predominant apology, SDO-E may be more potent. 
That is, in political-cultural contexts in which people actively consider and debate about equality, 
people are likely to be primed on this general concept and use it to gauge their views on a variety 
of social and political issues, especially domestic ones. However, in societies where the 
predominant apology is about group segregation, difference, the necessity of force, and 
dominance, SDO-D may be more potent, and may be the lens through which people in such 
societies, regardless of whether they endorse or reject dominance, view many of their social and 
political issues.  
To test the idea that political cultures can vary as to whether SDO-D or SDO-E is more 
active, we analyze data from both the U.S. and Israel. Although the U.S. has been engaged in 
many violent international conflicts in recent decades, nearly all of these conflicts have been 
outside the U.S. and unrelated to domestic conflicts among American groups (e.g., ethnic 
groups). Furthermore, despite its international dominance, the U.S.’s internal political rhetoric 
since the modern civil rights era and women’s rights era is decidedly egalitarian, as many 
scholars have noted (e.g., Roth, 1994; Thernstrom & Thernstrom, 1997). Hence, SDO-E may 
have potency in the U.S., especially when non-overt domestic conflict is under consideration 
(e.g., ethnic conflict). In contrast, Israel has been and continues to be actively engaged in violent 
conflict with its Palestinian neighbors. Hence, support for the active and potentially violent 
subordination of other groups reflected by the SDO-D items may have system-justifying potency 
in Israel, especially when overt group boundaries and conflict with Palestinians are under 
consideration. Of course, our theoretical reasoning concerning how social structure may 
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moderate the differential effects of SDO-D and SDO-E should extend to cultures other than the 
U.S. and Israel, but as an initial test of this reasoning, we selected these two countries due to the 
contrast in their predominant political rhetoric. In sum, we expect that in hierarchical intergroup 
contexts such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, SDO-D will be positively related to support for 
hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing ideologies that both reinforce group-based dominance (e.g., 
nationalism) and maintain the unequal status quo (e.g., political conservatism). 
The Present Research 
Although previous studies have examined the proposed dimensions of SDO separately, 
more evidence is needed to establish the unique predictive validity of each dimension, net of the 
effects of the other dimension.  Furthermore, the operationalizations of these dimensions have 
been inconsistent across studies, with some researchers using a shortened scale and others 
augmenting SDO6 items with novel items, including items that conflate group-based 
egalitarianism with interpersonal egalitarianism.  Finally, previous findings have been 
inconsistent, partly because of the operationalization of variables presumed to be related to SDO.  
The present study aims to fill these lacunae.  Using data from four American samples and one 
Israeli sample, we test five hypotheses: 
1) In all samples, the SDO6 scale should be composed of two subdimensions, reflecting 
the preference for group-based dominance hierarchies (SDO-D) and opposition to 
egalitarian intergroup relations (SDO-E). 
2) In all samples, the SDO6 subdimensions should be strongly correlated.  Although we 
hypothesize that each dimension should be uniquely related to a preference for 
qualitatively different relations between groups, both dimensions support group-based 
social stratification and as such should overlap considerably. 
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3) In all samples, SDO-D will be positively related to perceptions that intergroup 
conflict is zero-sum, aggressive intergroup attitudes and behavior (e.g., immigrant 
persecution), and overt, or “old-fashioned” prejudice.   
4) In contested hierarchical intergroup contexts, such as the Israeli-Palestinian context, 
SDO-D should be positively related both to support for ideologies that reinforce 
group dominance (e.g., nationalism) and to support for ideologies that reinforce 
unequal status relations with subordinate groups (e.g., political conservatism). 
5) In less contested hierarchical intergroup contexts, such as the Ashkenazi-Mizrachi 
Jewish ethnic context in Israel and the ethnic context in the United States, SDO-E 
should be related to support for insidious hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing ideologies 
such as system legitimacy beliefs, negative affect toward subordinate groups, and 
opposition to redistributive social policies. 
We test these hypotheses using the full 16-item SDO6 scale in five large surveys 
administered in the U.S. and Israel.  As large surveys do not typically use the full SDO scale, the 
presence of the full scale in these samples, including one general population survey, represents a 
rare opportunity to test these hypotheses using large datasets.  In the American samples, only the 
responses of Whites were analyzed, as the responses of non-Whites to some of our criterion 
variables should relate differentially to SDO.  Similarly, in the Israeli sample, only the responses 
of Ashkenazi Jews, the dominant Jewish ethnic group, were analyzed.   
Method 
Participants 
Four American samples. In all four samples, we only analyzed data from respondents 
who indicated that the United States was their native country.  Our data for Sample 1 were drawn 
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from a survey of University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) undergraduates given in 1993.  
The sample consisted of 186 White participants (51.6% females; one respondent did not report 
gender; average age = 21.40, SD = 3.76).  Respondents were offered the chance to win one of 
four $50 prizes.   
Samples 2 and 3 were also drawn from a university, but in a different region in the United 
States.  These samples consisted of participants from the psychology department participant pool 
at Harvard University. Participants completed the survey for course credit and/or eligibility for 
studies in the participant p ol.  The study pool consisted of university students, staff, and 
members of the local community.  Sample 2 completed the survey in 2007.  The sample 
consisted of 491 Whites (66.7% female).  A few participants (0.4% of the sample) indicated they 
were younger than 18 years old, 45.8% were between 18-21, 15.9% were between 22-25, 12.6% 
were between 26-30, and the remainder were above 30.  Sample 3 completed the survey in 2009.  
The sample consisted of 1,711 Whites after excluding those who also participated in Sample 2.  
The sample was 76.6% female.  A few participants (0.2% of the sample) were under 18, 24.7% 
were 18-21 years old, 15.1% were 22-25, 17.1% were 26-30, 12.4% were 31-35, and the 
remainder were over 36.   
Sample 4 was from the 1996 Los Angeles County Social Survey, which is a large, 
omnibus survey of Los Angeles County residents recruited using a probability sampling 
procedure.  The survey was administered by telephone using a random digit dialing procedure.  
This sample included 182 Whites (52.7% female), and the average age was 47.12 (SD = 15.61).   
Israeli sample. Our data for Sample 5 were collected from undergraduate students 
surveyed in 1994 at Hebrew University, Bar-Ilan University, and the Technion. The sample 
consisted of 220 Ashkenazi Jews, who are the dominant Jewish ethnic group in Israel.  Of this 
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sample, 59.1% were female, and the average age was 23.84 (SD = 2.98).  The survey was 
administered in Hebrew.  The survey was translated into Hebrew and then back-translated into 
English to ensure equivalence of meaning across the original and back-translated surveys.   
Measures 
SDO. The full 16-item SDO6 scale was used in all five samples (see Table 1 for items).  
In Samples 1-3, all items were answered on a 7-point scale, with 1 = Strongly 
disagree/disapprove and 7 = Strongly agree/approve.  In Sample 4, a 4-point scale was used, 
ranging from 1 = Strongly disagree to 4 = Strongly agree.  Sample 5 used a 7-point scale, with 1 
= Do not agree at all and 7 = Strongly agree.  Alpha reliabilities are reported below, after we use 
factor analyses to show what items constitute the two dimensions. 
Intergroup attitudes hypothesized to be more strongly related to SDO-D.  We 
expected old-fashioned prejudice, zero-sum competition, and aggressive intergroup attitudes to 
be more strongly related to SDO-D than to SDO-E (see Appendix 1 for items and scale 
reliabilities for all samples).  “Old-fashioned” prejudice alleges that Blacks and Latinos in the 
American context and Mizrachi Jews in the Israeli context are intellectually challenged, have a 
poor work ethic, and are generally “inferior.”  It was measured in Samples 1, 2, 3, and 5.  Zero-
sum competition addresses the notion that a gain for certain groups entails a loss for other 
groups.  It was measured in Samples 1, 4, and 5.  Various aggressive intergroup attitudes were 
measured.  Nationalism (measured in Samples 1 and 5) represents a particularly aggressive 
assertion of one’s country as superior, reflecting the desire to dominate other countries.  Beliefs 
about immigrant persecution were assessed in Samples 2 and 3 by a variation of Altemeyer’s 
Posse Scale, an instrument measuring one’s willingness to participate in persecution of and 
violence against immigrants (Altemeyer, 1996; Thomsen et al., 2008).  Sample 5 included some 
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variables that pertained directly to the longstanding Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including the 
denial of Palestinians’ right to land, belief in the Jewish right over all of Israel, and the belief that 
ceding land to Palestinians is a threat to security.  Sample 5 also contained a variable indexing 
support for war as a means of maintaining superiority.  Importantly, sample 5 uniquely allows us 
to test whether variables that we hypothesize are more related to SDO-E than SDO-D in the U.S. 
and similar societies (i.e., outgroup affect, political conservatism) might be strongly related to 
SDO-D in the relatively hierarchical Israeli-Palestinian context.  Such variables included affect 
toward Palestinians and right-wing political identification. 
Intergroup attitudes hypothesized to be more strongly related to SDO-E.  We 
expected political conservatism (in the U.S.), system justification/legitimacy beliefs, opposition 
to affirmative action, the Protestant work ethic, the belief that college admissions are fair, 
opposition to various redistributive racial/social policies, symbolic racism, and affect toward the 
Mizrachim (in Israel) to be more strongly related to SDO-E than to SDO-D (see Appendix 1 for 
items and reliability statistics).  Conservatism was measured through political party affiliation 
and self-placement on social and economic conservatism scales.  It was assessed in Samples 1, 2, 
3, and 4.  System justification/legitimacy beliefs, measured in Samples 1, 2, and 5, represent the 
idea that one gets what one deserves, and the social system is fair and just.  Opposition to 
affirmative action was measured in Samples 1, 2, and 4.  Similar to system legitimacy beliefs, the 
Protestant work ethic reflects the view that one will be rewarded for what one works for.  It was 
measured in Samples 1 and 4.  Samples 2 and 3 also asked about the legitimacy of admissions to 
an elite university (Harvard), which can be interpreted as a system legitimacy belief.  Opposition 
to various redistributive racial/social policies was measured in Samples 1, 2, 3, and 5.  Sample 4 
was unique in assessing support for symbolic racism, which contrasts with the “old-fashioned” 
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racism believed to be related to SDO-D.  Finally, we believed affect toward Mizrachi Jews (the 
lower status Jewish ethnic group) would be more strongly related to SDO-E.  Negative affect is a 
core component of symbolic racism, which we generally believe to be more strongly related to 
SDO-E.  Note, however, that this prediction stands in contrast to our prediction that SDO-D will 
relate more strongly to affect toward Palestinians.  Given the long-standing and continuing 
Israeli hostility towards Palestinians, we reasoned that affect toward Palestinians would be 
predicted substantially more by support for active group dominance than by opposition to group 
equality.   
Results 
Our first goal was to test whether in fact a two-factor model of the 16 SDO6 items fits the 
data better than a one-factor model. We conducted confirmatory factor analyses with two 
correlated latent dimensions representing SDO-D and SDO-E.  Each dimension was represented 
by three parcels, which included the eight items expected to represent the dimension (see Table 
1).  Parcel 1 consisted of the mean of items 1-3 under SDO-D in Table 1, Parcel 2 consisted of 
the mean of items 4-6 under SDO-D, and Parcel 3 was the mean of items 7-8 under SDO-D.  
Parcels 4, 5, and 6 were the means of items 1-3, 4-6, and 7-8 under SDO-E, respectively.  The 
use of item parcels rather than individual items has been shown to reduce the random error of 
manifest indicators.  That is, the reliability of our indicators is improved because forming 
composites (parcels) will take into account the random error associated with any one item.  In 
Sample 1, the two-factor model yielded an excellent fit with just two modifications (χ2/df ratio = 
1.00, RMSEA = .00, CFI = 1.00), whereas the one-factor model yielded a relatively poor fit even 
after two modifications (χ2/df ratio = 5.88, RMSEA = .17, CFI = .95).2 The chi-square difference 
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test showed a significant deterioration of model fit in the one-factor model (χ2diff = 35.15, df = 1, 
p < .001).   Identical analyses in Samples 2-5 yielded similar results (see Table 2).3 
Having replicated previous findings demonstrating that a two-factor model fits the data 
better than a unidimensional model, we computed the reliabilities for the two SDO subscales.  
The SDO-D dimension was found to be highly reliable in all five samples:  Sample 1, α = .89; 
Sample 2, α = .91; Sample 3, α =.92; Sample 4, α = .82; Sample 5, α = .81.  The SDO-E 
dimension was reliable as well: Sample 1, α = .88; Sample 2, α = .90; Sample 3, α =.91; Sample 
4, α = .80; Sample 5, α = .79.  These dimensions are used in all subsequent analyses. 
To test Hypothesis 2, concerning the relationship between SDO-D and SDO-E, we 
computed the Pearson correlation coefficients for the relationship between the two dimensions.  
In Sample 1, the correlation between the two dimensions was .53 (p < .001).  In Sample 2, the 
correlation was .49 (p < .001).  In Sample 3, the correlation was .44 (p < .001).  In Sample 4, the 
correlation was .36 (p < .001).  Finally, in sample 5, the correlation was .49 (p < .001). 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that SDO-D would correlate more strongly with endorsing 
intergroup aggression, subordinate group inferiority, zero-sum competition between groups, and 
overt domination than would SDO-E. To test this hypothesis, we regressed each of the intergroup 
attitudes thought to be related to this dimension on SDO-D and SDO-E in a multiple regression 
analysis, and obtained semi-partial correlations.  If our hypothesis is confirmed, the semi-partial 
correlation between SDO-D and each criterion should be stronger than each criterion’s 
relationship to SDO-E.  To test this, we used Malgady’s test for comparing two dependent semi-
partial correlations (Hittner, Finger, Mancuso, & Silver, 1995).  We used one-tailed tests given 
our a priori predictions concerning which dimension should more strongly relate to the criterion 
Page 18 of 49
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/pspb
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
DIMENSIONS OF SOCIAL DOMINANCE ORIENTATION  19 
 
variables we examine.  Given the large number of analyses involved, we refer the reader to Table 
3 rather than present all statistics in the text, where we describe the findings.4   
Old-fashioned prejudice was measured in Samples 1, 2, 3, and 5, and predicted 
significantly by SDO-D in all four samples (see Table 3).  Furthermore, it was significantly more 
strongly related to SDO-D than to SDO-E in Samples 2 and 3, marginally significantly more 
related to SDO-D than to SDO-E in Sample 1, and more strongly related to SDO-D, though not 
significantly so, in Sample 5. 
Perceptions of zero-sum competition vis-à-vis a subordinate ethnic group was assessed in 
Samples 1, 4, and 5, and as expected, was significantly predicted by SDO-D in all three samples 
and significantly more strongly predicted by SDO-D than by SDO-E in all samples. 
We also assessed attitudes toward aggressive intergroup behavior (i.e., nationalism and 
immigrant persecution).  Nationalism was related to SDO-D in the way we expected in Sample 5 
– i.e., significantly related to SDO-D and significantly more related to SDO-D than SDO-E – but 
was only marginally significantly related to SDO-D in Sample 1.  Interestingly, nationalism was 
also significantly positively related to SDO-E in Sample 1, and significantly negatively related to 
SDO-E in Sample 5.  In both Samples 2 and 3, beliefs about immigrant persecution were 
significantly related to SDO-D and more strongly related to this dimension than to SDO-E. 
Finally, Sample 5 provided the greatest number of unique variables to test the differential 
predictive power of SDO-D.  The semi-partial correlations indicated that SDO-D significantly 
predicted the denial of a Palestinian right to land, the belief that Jews have a right to all of Israel, 
the belief that ceding land to Palestinians threatens Israeli security, and support for war to 
maintain national superiority.  SDO-D predicted all of these variables significantly better than 
SDO-E did.   
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In support of Hypothesis 4 - the prediction that SDO-D would be related to outcomes that 
justify the existing hierarchy in contexts where the hierarchy is severe and highly contested - 
SDO-D also significantly predicted affect toward Palestinians and right-wing political 
identification in Israel, and these variables were better predicted by SDO-D than by SDO-E.  
Whereas we hypothesized that outgroup affect and political conservatism would be more related 
to SDO-E in a less hierarchical context, it appears that support for right-wing political 
establishments and negative affect toward subordinate groups are strongly related to SDO-D 
when power relations are more contested and hierarchical. 
Our next test, Hypothesis 5, predicted that SDO-E would correlate more strongly with 
endorsement of subtle legitimizing myths (e.g., symbolic racism), support for the status quo (e.g., 
system legitimacy beliefs), and opposition to redistributive social policies. We also predicted that 
SDO-E would relate more strongly to political conservatism in the United States.  We followed 
the same regression procedure used to test Hypothesis 3, regressing each of these variables on 
SDO–D and SDO-E, and again examined whether the semi-partial correlations were significantly 
different (through one-tailed tests; See Table 4).   
We measured political conservatism in all four American samples (Samples 1-4), and in 
every case, found that it was significantly predicted by SDO-E and significantly more strongly 
related to SDO-E than SDO-D. 
System justification/legitimacy beliefs were assessed in the first two American samples 
(Sample 1 and 2), and in both cases, it was predicted significantly by SDO-E and more strongly 
by SDO-E than SDO-D.  We also measured system justification in the Israeli context.  As this 
measure assessed beliefs in justice for the Jewish ethnic groups in Israel (a less contested 
hierarchical context similar to race relations in the US), we expected SDO-E to be related to 
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system justification.  Again, SDO-E was indeed related to system justification in the Israeli 
context, but not more strongly than it was related to SDO-D.  Consistent with our expectations, 
we found that perceptions of equal opportunity for the Jewish ethnic groups in Israel were 
predicted significantly by SDO-E in Sample 5, and were more positively related to this 
dimension than to SDO-D. 
Turning to affirmative action in the US, as we expected, opposition to this policy was 
predicted significantly by SDO-E in all three samples in which it was measured (Samples 1, 2, 
and 4), and significantly more related to this dimension than to SDO-D.  The Protestant work 
ethic in the US was similarly significantly related to SDO-E in Samples 1 and 4, and 
significantly more related to this dimension than SDO-D in Sample 1. 
We also expected that the belief that the admissions process to Harvard University is fair 
would be positively related to SDO-E and more positively related to SDO-E than to D, and found 
in Samples 2 and 3 that this was indeed the case.   
Opposition to various redistributive social policies – i.e., opposition to legally enforced 
racial policy and opposition to social welfare in Sample 1, opposition to redistributive social 
policy and opposition to civil rights activism in Samples 2 and 3, and opposition to income 
redistribution (between Jewish ethnic groups in Israel) in Sample 5 – was found to be 
significantly predicted by SDO-E in all seven of these cases and was significantly more related 
to SDO-E than to SDO-D in all cases except with respect to civil rights activism in Sample 2, 
where the magnitude of the relationship with SDO-E was still stronger.  
Symbolic racism was measured in Sample 4, and as expected, it was significantly related 
to SDO-E and marginally significantly more strongly related to SDO-E than to SDO-D.   
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Finally, in Sample 5, we found that affect toward the Mizrachi Jews was significantly 
predicted by SDO-E but not significantly more strongly predicted by SDO-E than by SDO-D.  
Relationships with affect toward Palestinians were different.  Although negative affect is a 
component of symbolic racism, and thus generally expected to be better predicted by SDO-E, 
when an outgroup that is engaged in a bitter conflict with the dominant group (Palestinians vis-à-
vis the dominant Jewish group in Israel) is considered, it is better predicted by SDO-D than by 
SDO-E. 
Discussion 
The present research examined whether the SDO6 scale consists of two distinct, 
substantive subdimensions - support for group-based domination and opposition to group-based 
equality.  We tested both the factor analytic structure of the SDO items and whether each 
subdimension of SDO differentially predicts criterion variables in five samples. Results 
supported all of our hypotheses.  Specifically, in all five samples, a two-factor solution 
accounted for the intercorrelations among the 16 SDO6 items better than a one-factor solution, 
confirming Hypothesis 1 that SDO is composed of two subdimensions.  Notably, and confirming 
Hypothesis 2, SDO-E and SDO-D were both very strongly correlated in every sample.  Our 
substantive hypotheses examined the kinds of intergroup attitudes that should be more strongly 
related to SDO-D or to SDO-E. Confirming Hypothesis 3 - that SDO-D especially relates to the 
active and forceful subjugation of outgroups - endorsing immigrant persecution, old-fashioned 
racism, perceived zero-sum competition, and support for war were all significantly predicted by 
SDO-D beyond the effects of SDO-E in the U.S. and in Israel.  Furthermore, consistent with the 
hypothesis that SDO-D would also predict system legitimizing/justifying ideologies (e.g., 
conservatism) in extremely hierarchical and highly conflictual intergroup contexts, we found that 
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in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, high status Israelis exhibited a relationship 
between SDO-D on the one hand, and political conservatism and negative affect toward 
Palestinians on the other hand.  Hypothesis 5 proposed that SDO-E especially relates to less 
confrontational hierarchy-enhancing ideologies that legitimize relatively egalitarian but still 
socially stratified systems. Confirming this, we found that for the variables we thought would be 
predicted by SDO-E, namely, subtle hierarchy-enhancing legitimizing ideologies and hierarchy-
attenuating social policies, most were predicted significantly by SDO-E, controlling for the 
effects of SDO-D, and were more strongly predicted by SDO-E than by SDO-D.   
Given these findings, it appears safe to conclude that there are two related but distinct 
aspects of SDO, and these aspects predict qualitatively different intergroup phenomena.  The 
point of greatest convergence between us and two other research teams who have been 
examining the structure of SDO, namely Jost and Thompson (2000) and Kugler et al. (2010) lies 
in our collective views on what SDO-E should relate to.  That is, all three research teams argue 
for and find support for the relationship between SDO-E and hierarchy-attenuating social 
policies (e.g., affirmative action opposition) and political conservatism in the United States.  The 
replication of these findings by independent research teams using different operationalizations of 
criterion measures provides confidence that SDO-E corresponds to non-inclusive and non-
egalitarian preferences regarding intergroup relations.   
Despite this similarity in our mutual understanding of SDO-E, our interpretation differs 
somewhat from the system-justification approach of Jost and Thompson (2000) and Kugler et al. 
(2010) in two important ways.  First, we do not believe that the concept of system-justification 
necessarily always invokes sentiments expressed by SDO-E. For example, in Sample 5, support 
for right-wing political beliefs, a typical measure of endorsement of the status quo, was more 
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strongly related to SDO-D than to SDO-E.  We argue that in hierarchical societies engaged in 
violent intergroup conflicts, legitimizing the existing social structure may be more strongly 
related to SDO-D than to SDO-E.  In other words, the relational orientations that motivate 
system justification hinge crucially upon the kinds of relationships the system entails. When the 
system entails contested dominance relations, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, support for 
the hierarchical status quo may be motivated more by support for group-based dominance than 
by opposition to group-based equality.   
A second way in which our perspective differs from that of others is that in contrast to 
Kugler et al. (2010), we do not see SDO-D as the prejudice dimension.  Rather, we believe that 
different types of prejudice are related to the two SDO dimensions.  What is often called old-
fashioned prejudice, that is, the belief in outgroup inferiority, should serve to legitimize group-
based dominance and thus should be related to SDO-D.  However, prejudice that is not dressed 
up in notions of outgroup inferiority, but in reference to other values that nonetheless have the 
consequence of demeaning outgroups, like symbolic racism, should be more related to SDO-E.  
This is because symbolic racism is based upon the belief that minority group members violate 
traditional values (i.e., the Protestant work ethic), which constitutes a legitimizing ideology that 
supports inequality, but not necessarily outright dominance (e.g., Reyna et al., 2009).  Our data 
confirm the conceptual distinction between “old-fashioned” and “modern” prejudice and show 
that modern prejudice is still motivated by support for group inequality.  Furthermore, we 
emphasize that SDO-E is about group-based inequality.  While it should share variance with 
prior operationalizations of anti-egalitarianism (e.g., Katz & Hass, 1988), group-based anti-
egalitarianism should be distinguished from beliefs about interpersonal equality.   
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Contrary to the conclusions of Sears et al. (2008), the present evidence shows that the 
SDO-D dimension is far from being socio-politically inert, even in the U.S. Rather, we found 
that it is substantially related to a number of socio-political phenomena such as perception of 
zero-sum group competition, nationalism, old-fashioned racism, and the willingness to 
participate in the persecution of immigrants.  In the Israeli sample, SDO-D was further related to 
support for war, affect toward Palestinians, and various forms of opposition to making 
concessions to Palestinians.  Indeed, we found that SDO-D was a better predictor than SDO-E 
was for aggressive intergr up behaviors, perceptions of zero-sum intergroup competition, and 
old-fashioned racism.  While SDO-D may not predict more subtle acts of intergroup bias, like 
support for less extreme hierarchy-enhancing ideologies, or opposition to hierarchy-attenuating 
social policies, we have demonstrated that it is useful in understanding more extraordinary, 
potentially costly intergroup conflicts.   
Throughout our analysis of the four American datasets, we were able to find more 
variables we thought would be related to SDO-E than SDO-D.  We do not believe this was by 
chance.  Many theorists in the field of intergroup relations have argued that persuasion, or 
ideological control, is the preferred means of social control, compared to the use of naked force, 
in maintaining group-based hierarchies (e.g., Jackman, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Tyler, 
2006).  As such, the relatively mundane aspects of intergroup conflict that are best predicted by 
SDO-E should be more common than the relatively extreme intergroup behaviors and beliefs that 
emerge from SDO-D. 
Importantly, we note that in many instances, it may still be best to use the full SDO scale. 
Many forms of bias might naturally mix elements of both dimensions of SDO.  For example, 
perceiving mixed-race individuals as belonging more to their subordinate parent group (i.e., 
Page 25 of 49
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/pspb
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
DIMENSIONS OF SOCIAL DOMINANCE ORIENTATION  26 
 
according to a rule of hypodescent) might entail the belief that the subordinate parent group is 
inferior, but at the same time constitute a relatively subtle means of maintaining status 
boundaries (Ho, Sidanius, Levin, & Banaji, 2011).  In such cases, separating the SDO scale will 
not prove more useful than using the full scale. We recommend that future tests of the separate 
dimensions be guided by the theoretical distinction we make between the underlying 
psychological processes of support for group-based dominance and unequal group relations.  For 
example, social dominance theory argues that the SDO scale is a good measuring stick for testing 
the function of legitimizing myths, in particular whether they are hierarchy-enhancing or 
hierarchy-attenuating.  Along these lines, examining whether a legitimizing myth is more related 
to SDO-D or SDO-E may help ascertain whether the myth is intended to support dominance and 
oppression involving the use of force, or intended to uphold inequality in less overt ways.  For 
example, the finding that old-fashioned racism is more related to SDO-D and symbolic racism is 
more related to SDO-E suggests that old-fashioned racism might justify forceful forms of group 
oppression such as slavery or apartheid, whereas symbolic racism might lead one to oppose 
equality for all groups, but not support the use of force to dominate subordinate groups.   
We view both dimensions of SDO as primarily supporting generalized group-based 
hierarchy rather than ingroup dominance (Pratto et al., 2006), even if there are qualitative 
differences in the character of the hierarchy the two dimensions support.  However, at present, a 
few items in the SDO-D dimension (e.g., “In getting what your group wants, it is sometimes 
necessary to use force against other groups”) may be interpreted as support for ingroup 
dominance.  Future measures of SDO should remove this potential confound. 
Social dominance theorists have long argued and demonstrated that individual differences 
in the desire for group-based hierarchy have serious consequences for the ways in which 
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individuals engage in intergroup relations.  The new analyses presented in this study demonstrate 
that depending on the outcome and the socio-structural context, one component of SDO might be 
more consequential than the other.  These findings should help us understand more precisely the 
underpinnings of intergroup conflict, whether it occurs on the battlefield or in the voting booth.  
We hope that continued analysis of SDO’s structure and function, and the further development of 
its measurement, will shed more light on what motivates various manifestations of intergroup 
conflict. 
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Footnotes 
1 Whereas a partial correlation examines the correlation between an independent variable (IV) 
and dependent variable (DV) after controlling for the effects of a third variable on both the IV 
and DV, a semi-partial, or part correlation examines the correlation between an IV and DV 
controlling for the effects of a third variable on the IV only.   
2 Based on the modification indices, we correlated the residuals of parcels 5 and 6 and parcels 5 
and 1 in the two-factor model, and the residuals of parcels 5 and 6 and parcels 5 and 4 in the one-
factor model. 
3 Based on the modification indices, we added one modification to the two models in Sample 4: 
We correlated the residuals of parcels 2 and 4 in the two-factor model, and the residuals of 
parcels 5 and 6 in the one-factor model. 
4 The p-values for the semi-partial correlations are based on significance tests of the B-coefficients 
produced in the regression analyses, which in principle provide the same information.   
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Table 1.   
Items Proposed to Form the SDO-D and SDO-E Dimensions (Jost & Thompson, 2000) 
SDO – Dominance (SDO-D) SDO – Egalitarianism (SDO-E) 
1. Some groups of people are just more worthy than 
others 
2. In getting what your group wants, it is 
sometimes necessary to use force against other 
groups. 
3. Superior groups should dominate inferior groups 
4. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to 
step on other groups. 
5. If certain groups of people stayed in their place, 
we would have fewer problems. 
6. It's probably a good thing that certain groups are 
at the top and other groups are at the bottom. 
7. Inferior groups should stay in their place. 
8. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their 
place. 
1. It would be good if all groups could be equal. 
2. Group equality should be our ideal.  
3. All groups should be given an equal chance in 
life.  
4. We should do what we can to equalize 
conditions for different groups.  
5. Increased social equality.  
6. We would have fewer problems if we treated 
different groups more equally.  
7. We should strive to make incomes more equal. 
8. No one group should dominate in society. 
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Table 2. 
 
Fit Statistics for Confirmatory Factor Analyses for Two- and One-Factor SDO Models  
and Chi-Square Difference Test Comparing the Two Models 
 
 χ2/df  RMSEA  CFI  χ2difference test 
Sample 1     
Two-factor model 1.00 0.00 1.00 χ2diff = 35.15, df = 1, p < .001 
One-factor model 5.88 0.17 0.95  
Sample 2     
Two-factor model 2.47 0.06 0.99 χ2diff = 479.94, df = 1, p < .001 
One-factor model 55.52 0.34 0.78  
Sample 3     
Two-factor model 7.50 0.06 0.99 χ2diff = 1998.52, df = 1, p < .001 
One-factor model 228.73 0.37 0.71  
Sample 4     
Two-factor model 1.13 0.03 1.00 χ2diff = 39.75, df = 1, p < .001 
One-factor model 5.95 0.17 0.85  
Sample 5     
Two-factor model 0.58 0.00 1.00 χ2diff = 112.90, df = 1, p < .001 
One-factor model 13.06 0.19 0.89  
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Table 3. 
 
Semi-Partial (Part) Correlations Between SDO-E, SDO-D, and Criterion Variables 
Hypothesized to be Related to SDO-D 
 
Note. +p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001; difference tests are one-tailed. The p-values of 
the semi-partial correlations are based on significance tests of the B-coefficients obtained from 
the same regression analyses as the semi-partial correlations.  
Criterion Variable SDO-E Part R SDO-D Part R Difference test 
Sample 1 - UCLA 1993    
Old racism .18** .33*** t = -1.36, p = .09 
Zero-sum competition .09 .31*** t = -1.84, p = .04 
Nationalism .27*** .12+ t = 1.25, p = .11 
Sample 2 - Harvard 2007    
Old racism .18*** .37*** t = -2.98, p = .00 
Beliefs about immigrant persecution  .05 .42*** t = -5.33, p = .00 
Sample 3 - Harvard 2009    
Old racism .10*** .44*** t = -9.67, p = .00 
Beliefs about immigrant persecution .06** .46*** t = -11.29, p = .00 
Sample 4 - LACSS 1996    
Zero-sum competition .07 .34*** t = -2.36, p = .00 
Sample 5 – Israeli universities 1994    
Old-fashioned prejudice toward Mizrachi 
Jews 
.15** .28*** t = 1.19, p = .12 
Zero-sum competition (with Mizrachi Jews) .02 .36*** t = 3.21, p = .00 
Nationalism  -.16* .22** t = 3.25, p = .00 
Denial of Palestinian right to land -.04 .44*** t = 4.56, p = .00 
Jewish right over all of Israel -.10 .39*** t = 4.45, p = .00 
Giving Palestinian land threatens security -.06 .36*** t = 3.74, p = .00 
War support -.06 .28*** t = 2.96, p = .00 
Affect towards Palestinians -.07 -.30*** t = -2.11, p = .02 
Right-wing political identification .00 .32*** t = 2.73, p = .00 
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Table 4 
 
Semi-Partial (Part) Correlations Between SDO-E, SDO-D, and Criterion Variables 
Hypothesized to be Related to SDO-E 
 
Note. +p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001; difference tests are one-tailed. The p-values of 
the semi-partial correlations are based on significance tests of the B-coefficients obtained from 
the same regression analyses as the semi-partial correlations.  
Criterion Variable SDO-E Part R SDO-D Part R Difference test 
Sample 1 – UCLA 1993    
Political conservatism .48*** -.05 t = 4.80, p = .00 
System legitimacy beliefs  .45*** -.02 t = 4.17, p = .00 
Opposition to affirmative action  .34*** -.02 t = 2.90, p = .00 
Protestant work ethic .39*** -.03 t = 3.56, p = .00 
Opposition to legally enforced racial policy .52*** .06 t  = 4.56, p = .00 
Opposition to social welfare .46*** .03 t = 3.96, p = .00 
Sample 2 – Harvard 2007    
Political conservatism  .30*** .11** t = 2.63, p = .00 
System justification .36*** .15*** t = 3.12, p = .00 
Opposition to affirmative action quotas  .22*** -.04 t = 3.36, p = .00 
Opposition to redistributive social policy  .47*** .12** t = 5.65, p = .00 
Opposition to civil rights activist .27*** .19*** t = 1.21, p = .11 
Belief that Harvard admissions is fair  .40*** -.07+ t = 6.51, p = .00 
Sample 3 – Harvard 2009    
Political conservatism .37*** .04+ t = 8.86, p = .00 
Opposition to redistributive social policy .55*** .04+ t = 15.88, p = .00 
Opposition to civil rights activist .34*** .13*** t = 5.63, p = .00 
Belief that Harvard admissions is fair .31*** -.05* t = 8.90, p = .00 
Sample 4 – LACSS 1996    
Political conservatism .28*** .07 t = 1.73, p = .04 
Affirmative action opposition .31*** .03 t = 2.33, p = .01 
Protestant work ethic .22** .09 t = 1.11, p = .14 
Symbolic racism .29*** .14+ t = 1.29, p = .10 
Sample 5 - Israeli universities 1994    
System justification .24*** .25*** t = -.09, p = .41 
Opposition to income redistribution .39*** -.14* t = -4.77, p = .00 
Affect towards Mizrachi Jews -.20*** -.11+ t = .83, p = .20 
Equal opportunity .22** -.17* t = -3.38 p = .00 
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Appendix 1 
All measures used a 1 (Strongly disagree/disapprove) to 7 (Strongly agree/approve) scale unless 
otherwise indicated. 
 
Sample 1 
 
 
SDO-D Criterion Variables 
Old-fashioned racism (α = .89) 
 
1. Blacks are inherently inferior. 
2. Chicanos/Latinos are inherently inferior. 
3. African Americans are less intellectually able than other groups. 
4. African Americans are lazier than other groups. 
  5. Latinos are less intellectually able than other groups. 
6. Latinos are lazier than other groups. 
 
Zero-sum competition (α = .67) 
 
1. Better jobs for African Americans means fewer good jobs for Whites. 
2. The economic advancement of certain groups threatens the advancement of other 
ethnic groups. 
 
Nationalism (α = .60) 
 
1. For the most part, America is no more superior than any other industrialized country in 
the world. 
2. To maintain our country's economic superiority, aggressive economic policies are 
sometimes necessary. 
3. The USA should not dominate other countries. 
4. There are many other cultures in the world that are superior to ours. 
 
 
 
SDO-E Criterion Variables 
Political conservatism (α = .88) 
 
1. How would you describe your political party preference? 
        1 = ”Strong Democrat” to 7 = ”Strong Republican” 
2. In terms of economic issues, how would you describe your political attitudes and 
beliefs?  
      1 = “Very liberal” to 7 = “Very conservative” 
3. In terms of social issues, how would you describe your political attitudes and beliefs? 
    1 = “Very liberal” to 7 = “Very conservative” 
 
System legitimacy beliefs (α = .78) 
 
1. America is a just society where differences in status between ethnic groups reflect 
actual group differences.   
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2. Differences in status between ethnic groups are fair.  
3. Minority groups are given the same treatment as other ethnic groups in the criminal 
justice system.        
4. American society treats all ethnic groups equally.  
5. Although there was discrimination in the past, today members of all ethnic groups have 
equal opportunity.  
 
Opposition to affirmative action (α = N/A) 
 
1. Affirmative action. 
 
Protestant work ethic (α = .81) 
 
1. America is a just society where differences in status between ethnic groups reflect 
actual group differences.  
2. If people work hard they almost always get what they want.          
3. Most people who don't get ahead should not blame the system; they really have only 
themselves to blame. 
4. In America, getting ahead doesn't always depend on hard work.  
5. Even if people work hard, they don't always get ahead. 
 
Opposition to legally enforced racial policy (α = .87) 
 
1. Government should see to it that minorities get fair treatment in jobs.  
2. Government should not pass laws concerning the hiring of ethnic minorities.  
3. Government should ensure that Whites and minorities go to the same school  
4. Government has no business trying to ensure racial integration in schools  
5. Government should do what it can to improve the economic condition of poor ethnic 
minorities.        
6. Government has no business trying to improve the economic condition of poor ethnic 
minorities.  
 
Opposition to social welfare (α = .83) 
 
1. Greater assistance to the poor 
2. Reduced public support for the homeless  
3. Reduced benefits for the unemployed 
 
 
Sample 2 
 
 
SDO-D Criterion Variables 
Old-fashioned racism (α = .75) 
 
1. Racial integration 
2. White superiority 
3. Blacks are inherently inferior 
 
Willingness to participate in immigrant persecution (α = .93) 
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Now, suppose that the American government some time in the future passed a law 
outlawing immigrant organizations in the US. Government officials then stated that the 
law would only be effective if it were vigorously enforced at the local level and appealed 
to every American to aid in the fight against these organizations. 
 
Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
 
1. I would tell my friends and neighbors that it was a good law. 
2. I would tell the police about any immigrant organizations that I knew. 
3. If asked by the police, I would help hunt down and arrest members of immigrant 
organizations. 
4. I would participate in attacks on the immigrant headquarters organized by the proper 
authorities. 
5. I would support physical force to make member of immigrant organizations reveal the 
identity of other members. 
6. I would support the execution of leaders of immigrant organizations if the government 
insisted it was necessary to protect the United States. 
 
 
 
SDO-E Criterion Variables 
Political conservatism (α = .81) 
 
1. How would you describe your political party preference? 
___ Strong Republican  ___ Weak Republican   ___ Independent Republican  
___ Independent  ___ Independent Democrat  ___ Weak Democrat  
___ Strong Democrat   
Other (please specify)___________________ 
 
2. In terms of economic issues, how would you describe your political attitudes and 
beliefs?     
___ Very Conservative   ___ Conservative  ___ Slightly Conservative  
___ Middle-of-the-road   ___ Slightly Liberal  ___ Liberal   
___ Very Liberal 
Other (please specify)___________________ 
 
3. In terms of social issues, how would you describe your political attitude and beliefs?  
___ Very Conservative   ___ Conservative  ___ Slightly Conservative  
___ Middle-of-the-road   ___ Slightly Liberal  ___ Liberal  
___ Very Liberal 
Other (please specify)___________________ 
 
System justification (α = .68) 
 
Please use the following scale to rate the extent to which each of the following statements 
is true for you.  There are no right or wrong answers for any question.  The best answer is 
what you think is true for yourself. 
 
1. Our society is an open society where all individuals can achieve higher status. 
2. Advancement in our society is possible for all individuals. 
3. Differences in status between groups in society are fair. 
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4. Differences in status between groups in society are the result of injustice. 
 
Affirmative action quotas (α = N/A) 
 
Please indicate how you personally feel about different kinds of affirmative action.  For 
the following policy, please indicate if you strongly support, somewhat support, 
somewhat oppose, or strongly oppose the policy. 
 
1. Quotas, that is, setting aside places for certain groups. 
 
1 = strongly oppose, 2 = somewhat oppose, 3 = somewhat support, 4 = strongly support 
 
Opposition to redistributive social policy (α = .73) 
 
1. Government sponsored healthcare for everybody 
2. Low income housing 
3. Reduced benefits for the unemployed 
4. Increased taxation of the rich  
 
Civil rights activist (α = N/A)  
 
1. Civil-rights activists  
 
Harvard admissions fair (α = .85) 
 
1. Societal injustice makes it impossible for some Blacks to get the acceptance to Harvard 
that they truly deserve.  
2. Societal injustice makes some Whites get an acceptance to Harvard that they don’t 
actually deserve. 
3. Societal injustice makes some White persons get the spot at Harvard that should have 
been given to another, Black, person if things were fair. 
 
 
Sample 3 
 
 
SDO-D Criterion Variables 
Old-fashioned racism (α = .75) 
 
1. Racial integration 
2. White superiority 
3. Blacks are inherently inferior 
 
Beliefs about immigrant persecution (α = .91) 
 
Now, suppose that the American government some time in the future passed a law 
outlawing immigrant organizations in the US. Government officials then stated that the 
law would only be effective if it were vigorously enforced at the local level and appealed 
to every American to aid in the fight against these organizations. 
 
Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
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1. I would tell my friends and neighbors that it was a good law. 
2. I would tell the police about any immigrant organizations that I knew. 
3. If asked by the police, I would help hunt down and arrest members of immigrant 
organizations. 
4. I would participate in attacks on the immigrant headquarters organized by the proper 
authorities. 
5. I would support physical force to make member of immigrant organizations reveal the 
identity of other members. 
6. I would support the execution of leaders of immigrant organizations if the government 
insisted it was necessary to protect the United States. 
 
 
 
SDO-E Criterion Variables 
Political conservatism (α = .89) 
 
1) How would you describe your political party preference? 
___ Strong Republican  ___ Weak Republican   ___ Independent Republican  
___ Independent  ___ Independent Democrat  ___ Weak Democrat  
___ Strong Democrat   
Other (please specify)___________________ 
 
2) In terms of economic issues, how would you describe your political attitudes and 
beliefs?     
___ Very Conservative   ___ Conservative  ___ Slightly Conservative  
___ Middle-of-the-road   ___ Slightly Liberal  ___ Liberal  
___ Very Liberal 
Other (please specify)___________________ 
 
3) In terms of social issues, how would you describe your political attitude and beliefs?  
___ Very Conservative   ___ Conservative  ___ Slightly Conservative  
___ Middle-of-the-road   ___ Slightly Liberal  ___ Liberal  
___ Very Liberal 
Other (please specify)___________________ 
 
Opposition to redistributive social policy (α = .73) 
 
1. Government sponsored healthcare for everybody 
2. Low income housing 
3. Reduced benefits for the unemployed 
4. Increased taxation of the rich  
 
Civil rights activist (α = N/A)  
 
1. Civil-rights activists  
 
Harvard admissions fair (α = .88) 
 
1. Societal injustice makes it impossible for some Blacks to get the acceptance to Harvard 
that they truly deserve.  
Page 44 of 49
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/pspb
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
DIMENSIONS OF SOCIAL DOMINANCE ORIENTATION  45 
 
2. Societal injustice makes some Whites get an acceptance to Harvard that they don’t 
actually deserve. 
3. Societal injustice makes some White persons get the spot at Harvard that should have 
been given to another, Black, person if things were fair.  
 
 
Sample 4 
 
 
SDO-D Criterion Variables 
Zero-sum competition (α = .77) 
 
Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the 
statement? 
 
1. More good jobs for Blacks means fewer good jobs for members of other groups. 
2. The more influence Blacks have in local politics the less influence members of other 
groups will have in local politics. 
3. The more good housing and neighborhoods go to Blacks, the fewer good houses and 
neighborhoods there will be for members of other groups. 
4. Many Blacks have been trying to get ahead economically at the expense of members of 
other groups. 
 
 
 
SDO-E Criterion Variables 
Political conservatism (α = .67) 
 
1. Generally speaking, and regardless of how you are registered, do you usually think of 
yourself as a democrat, a republican, neither a democrat nor a republican, an independent, 
or what? 
a. Do you think of yourself as a strong ___ or not so strong ___? 
2. Would you describe your political views in general as very conservative, somewhat 
conservative, neither conservative nor liberal, somewhat liberal, or very liberal? 
 
Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the 
statement? 
3. The government should guarantee that basic health care is available for all Americans. 
4. The government should lower taxes. 
5. The government has taken over too many things that should be handled by individuals, 
families, and private businesses.  
 
Affirmative action opposition (α = N/A) 
 
Please tell me if you strongly support, somewhat support, somewhat oppose, strongly 
oppose, or have you never heard of affirmative action? 
 
1. In general, do you support or oppose affirmative action?   
 
1 = strongly support to 4 = strongly oppose 
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Protestant work ethic (α = .70) 
 
Please tell me whether you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or 
strongly disagree with these statements: 
 
1. Although there was discrimination in the past, today members of all groups have an 
equal opportunity to succeed. 
2. Success, or one's achievement, in American society depends primarily on individual 
merit. 
 
Symbolic racism (α = .67) 
 
Please tell me if you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly 
disagree with the following statements: 
 
1. If blacks work hard they almost always get what they want. 
2. Hard work offers little guarantee of success for blacks. 
3. Blacks are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights. 
4. The Irish, Italians, Jews and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked 
their way up.  Blacks should do the same without any special favors. 
 
 
Sample 5 
 
 
SDO-D Criterion Variables 
Old-fashioned prejudice toward Mizrachi Jews (α = .58) 
 
On average, Mizrachim have lower income and less political power than Ashkenazim. 
Several explanations have been suggested for this. Using the scale below, indicate the 
degree to which you agree or disagree with each of these explanations: 
 
1. Mizrachim are less intellectually able than Ashkenazim. 
2. Mizrachim have lower motivation to succeed than Ashkenazim. 
 
Do not agree at all        1     2     3     4     5     6     7      Strongly agree 
 
 
Zero-sum competition with Mizrachi Jews (α = .70) 
 
Below are a series of statements with which you may either agree or disagree. For each 
statement, please indicate the degree of your agreement or disagreement by circling the 
appropriate number from '1' to '7'. Please remember that there are no right or wrong 
answers, and that your first responses are usually the most accurate. 
 
1. Better jobs for Mizrachim means fewer good jobs for Ashkenazim. 
2. The economic advancement of the Mizrachim threatens the advancement of the 
Ashkenazim. 
 
Do not agree at all        1     2     3     4     5     6     7      Strongly agree 
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Nationalism (α = .47) 
 
1. Since Israel is far from perfect, the country has many things to learn from other 
countries. 
2. For the most part, Israel is no more superior than any other industrialized country in 
the world. 
3. For me, there is no culture in the world that is superior to ours. 
 
Denial of Palestinian right to land (α = .89) 
 
1. What are you willing to give up in the West Bank in order to reach a peace agreement 
with the Palestinians? 
 
1. Everything 
2. The majority 
3. A certain part 
4. A small part 
5. Nothing at all 
 
Different solutions have been put forth for the future of the territories so that Israel will 
achieve peace and security. To what extent do you support or oppose each of the 
following solutions: 
 
2. Do you support or oppose Israel's forcing the Arabs to leave the territories in exchange 
for compensation, as stated by the transfer plan? 
3. Do you support or oppose annexation of the territories without giving equal rights to 
the Palestinians? 
4. Do you support or oppose the establishment of a Palestinian state? 
 
Strongly oppose        1     2     3     4     5     6     7      Strongly support 
 
Jewish right over all of Israel (α = .77) 
 
1. I believe in the right of the Jewish people over all the Land of Israel. 
2. The Palestinians have no right to demand territories from the Land of Israel. 
 
Giving Palestinian land threatens security (α = .92) 
 
1. Giving land to the Palestinians threatens the security of Israel. 
2. The Palestinians have no right to demand territories from the Land of Israel. 
3. A Palestinian state threatens the security of Israel. 
 
War support (α = N/A) 
 
1. To maintain Israel's superiority, war is sometimes necessary. 
 
Affect toward Palestinians (α = N/A) 
 
Using the scales provided, please indicate how positively or negatively you feel towards 
the following groups: 
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1. Palestinians 
 
Very Negatively        1     2     3     4     5     6     7      Very Positively 
 
Right-wing political identification (α = N/A) 
 
On the following scale, '7' represents identification with the political right and 'I' 
represents identification with the political left. Where do place yourself on this scale? 
 
Left        1     2     3     4     5     6     7      Right 
 
 
 
SDO-E Criterion Variables 
System justification (α = .56) 
 
1. Israel is a just society where differences in status between ethnic groups reflect actual 
group differences. 
2. Differences in status between ethnic groups are fair. 
3. Differences in status between ethnic groups are the result of injustice. 
 
Opposition to income redistribution (α = .51) 
 
Below are a series of statements with which you may either agree or disagree. For each 
statement, please indicate the degree of your agreement or disagreement by circling the 
appropriate number from '1' to '7'. Please remember that there are no right or wrong 
answers, and that your first responses are usually the most accurate. 
 
1. We must give greater assistance to the poor. 
2. We must increase taxation of the rich. 
 
Do not agree at all        1     2     3     4     5     6     7      Strongly agree 
 
Affect toward Mizrachi Jews (α = N/A) 
 
Using the scales provided, please indicate how positively or negatively you feel towards 
the following groups: 
 
1. Mizrachim 
 
Very Negatively        1     2     3     4     5     6     7      Very Positively  
 
Equal opportunity (α = .82) 
 
1. Israel is an open society where individuals of any ethnicity can achieve higher status. 
2. Advancement in Israeli society is possible for individuals of all ethnic groups. 
3. Individual members of a low status ethnic groups find it difficult to achieve higher 
status. 
4. Mizrachim usually don't get fair treatment (in the labor market, education, and 
politics). 
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5. Ashkenazim and Mizrachim have the same chances of finding jobs that match their 
skills. 
6. Ashkenazim and Mizrachim with the same qualifications have the same chances of 
getting into college. 
7. People often discriminate against Mizrachim. 
8. Although there was discrimination in the past, today members of all ethnic groups have 
equal opportunities. 
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Dimensions of Social Dominance
Dimensions of Social Dominance: Their 
Personality and Socio-political Correlates within a 
New Zealand Probability Sample 
Robin Bergh Harvard University, Cambridge MA, USA / Uppsala University, Sweden 
Jim Sidanius Harvard University, Cambridge MA, USA 
Chris G. Sibley University of Auckland, New Zealand
Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) was introduced as a unidimensional 
construct predicting numerous socio-political attitudes. However, recent 
findings suggest that SDO is composed of two sub-dimensions: dominance 
(SDO-D) and anti-egalitarianism (SDO-E). Despite converging evidence 
concerning their empirical differentiability, there is little consensus on how to 
best define them. Thus, we examined the correlates of SDO-D and SDO-E 
using a broad array of personality, political, ethnic and gender issue variables 
within a New Zealand national probability sample (N = 5,741) with European 
and Māori participants. SDO-D primarily related to the personality trait of 
honesty-humility, hostile and benevolent sexism. SDO-E primarily related to 
political conservatism and pro-Māori policies.  In many cases, the predictive 
power differed between SDO-D and SDO-E, and across ethnic groups. 
Keywords: Social Dominance Orientation, sub-dimensions, predictive validity, 
HEXACO personality, group attitudes
Introduction
Social dominance orientation 
(SDO) is widely recognized as one of 
the most powerful individual difference 
predictors of intergroup attitudes and 
prejudice (McFarland & Adelson, 
1996; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). SDO 
was introduced as a unidimensional 
construct (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, 
& Malle, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) 
but there is increasing agreement in the 
literature that SDO  is composed of 
two related sub-dimensions (e.g., Ho 
et al., 2012; Jost & Thompson, 2000). 
Following Ho and associates (2012), 
we refer to the two sub-dimensions as 
SDO-Dominance (SDO-D) and SDO-
Egalitarianism (SDO-E).
Although there is now an emerging 
consensus about existence of two sub-
dimensions, there is less agreement on 
how to best define them. For example, 
Jost and Thompson (2000) emphasized 
a difference between an ethnocentric 
orientation (i.e., wanting one’s own 
group to dominate, SDO-D) and a 
non-ethnocentric, general “preference 
for unequal social relations” (p. 
211, SDO-E). Empirically, however, 
their distinction was premised on 
the difference between promoting 
inequality between groups versus 
opposing equality. Of note, three of 
the SDO-D items in the SDO6 scale, 
on which they built most of their work, 
refer to dominating other groups, but 
the remaining five tap attitudes about 
group hierarchies in general (e.g., “some 
groups of people are simply inferior to 
other groups”).
Recently, Ho et al. (2012) replicated 
the two-dimensional structure of SDO 
in seven samples. Nonetheless, their 
interpretation of these findings differed 
from that of Jost and Thompson 
(2000). Ho et al. suggested that the key 
difference between SDO-D and SDO-E 
concerns how blatant or aggressive they 
are (SDO-E being more subtle). In other 
words, the distinction made by Ho and 
associates basically mirrors the one 
between “old-fashioned” and “modern” 
prejudice (see e.g., McConahay, 1986).
The main aim of this study was to 
conduct an exploratory analysis based 
on a broader set of criterion variables 
than used in previous studies to shed 
further light on what differentiates 
SDO-D and SDO-E. The rationale here 
was simple: Improved knowledge of the 
correlates of SDO-D and SDO-E should 
be informative about how best to define 
the two dimensions. Our 15 criterion 
variables centered on personality, 
political ideological beliefs as well as 
more specific social attitudes about 
gender and ethnic issues. Extending 
previous research we compared 
relations of SDO-D and SDO-E with 
the criterion variables within two groups 
of different social status. Jost and 
Thompson (2000) contrasted high and 
low status ethnic groups (White versus 
Black Americans) when examining the 
relationships of SDO-D and SDO-E 
with two outcomes (self-esteem and 
ethnocentrism). In comparison, we 
examined such contrasts for as many 
as 15 criterion variables in a national 
probability sample with European 
(Pākehā) and Māori New Zealanders 
(of which the first group enjoys higher 
status, see Sibley et al., 2011a). 
Our  compar ison  of  Pākehā 
and Māori would also speak to the 
generalizability of Jost and Thompson’s 
(2000) findings regarding high and low 
status groups, and the different effects 
of SDO-D and SDO-E. They found 
that SDO-D was positively related to 
ingroup bias among both White and 
Black Americans, while SDO-E was 
positively correlated with ingroup 
bias among White participants, and 
negatively among Black participants. 
Analogous findings for Pākehā and 
Māori New Zealanders would suggest 
that this applies to high and low status 
groups in general, and not Black and 
White Americans in particular. Further 
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hypotheses about outcomes that were 
expected to vary across ethnic groups 
are presented in the closing paragraphs 
of the introduction.
While seeking to replicate findings 
regarding some political and ethnic 
attitudes in relation to SDO-D and 
SDO-E, a second aim was to move 
beyond such attitudes and also examine 
blatant or aggressive versus subtle 
gender attitudes. In this domain, Eagly, 
Diekman, Johannesen-Schmidt, and 
Koenig (2004) hypothesized that 
group-based dominance (cf. SDO-D) 
would predict attitudes specifically 
related to “issues that directly threaten 
men’s higher social status” (p. 806) 
whereas group-based equality (cf. 
SDO-E) should account for inequality 
attitudes more broadly. Here we tested 
another perspective concerning what 
SDO-D and SDO-E predict in terms of 
gender attitudes. Specifically, we tested 
the possibility that SDO-D predicts 
hostile sexism whereas SDO-E predicts 
benevolent sexism (Glick & Fiske, 
2001) as well as gender based system 
justification (Kay & Jost, 2003). Such 
a notion would be in line with the 
defining features of SDO-D and SDO-E 
as proposed by Ho et al. (2012).
A unique contribution of this study 
compared to previous studies is that 
we also mapped SDO-D and SDO-E 
in relation to basic personality traits. 
Importantly, much research has focused 
on SDO as a broad ideological belief 
system that predicts a variety of more 
specific attitudes and beliefs (see e.g. 
Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006). 
As such, SDO has sometimes been 
portrayed as a personality variable, and 
this is indeed how it was first introduced 
(see Pratto et al., 1994). However, there 
are few scholars who take this position 
today. SDO is rather considered to 
be a general ideological orientation 
belonging in the attitudinal domain (see 
e.g., Sibley & Duckitt, 2008; Sibley & 
Liu, 2010). This is also the position that 
we take in this paper. Likewise, in more 
recent publications, social dominance 
theorists discuss SDO as “as a partial 
reflection of personality” (Pratto et al., 
2006, p. 293; emphasis added). Others 
have described SDO as surface traits, or 
characteristic adaptations, as opposed 
to core traits (see e.g., Ekehammar & 
Akrami, 2007). 
The aforementioned perspectives 
all converge on the position that SDO 
is not a core personality trait in itself, 
but it should be related to such variables 
nonetheless. In line with this perspective, 
it is well documented that SDO is related 
to tough-minded, or non-agreeable, 
personality characteristics (e.g., Akrami 
& Ekehammar, 2006; Sibley & Duckitt, 
2008). However, when it comes to the 
suggestion that SDO actually taps two 
sub-dimensions, there is no research at 
all on how they might relate differently 
to personality. Thus, in this study we 
provide the first mapping of SDO-D 
and SDO-E onto basic personality 
traits in terms of the Big-Five and 
HEXACO models (see Ashton & Lee, 
2008; Donnellan, Frederick, Oswald & 
Lucas, 2006). 
In terms of political attitudes, the 
study examined SDO-D and SDO-E 
in relation to two other ideological 
orientations. These were political 
identification (liberal – conservative) 
and right-wing authoritarianism (RWA; 
e.g., Altemeyer, 1996). Although much 
research has focused on the overall 
relation between RWA and SDO (e.g., 
Roccato & Ricolfi, 2005), no studies 
to our knowledge have examined the 
specific links to SDO-D and SDO-E. 
Yet, as RWA includes tendencies for 
aggression/hostility (Altemeyer, 1981; 
presumably a SDO-D domain) but also 
adherence to conservative ideology 
(Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 
2003; presumably a SDO-E domain), 
we expected relations with both sub-
dimensions. Nonetheless, exploring 
potential differences in the strength 
of the associations could lead to more 
fine-grained theorizing when and how 
authoritarian and dominance-based 
ideologies converge or not. 
Pol i t ica l  ident i f ica t ion  has 
previously been found to be more 
closely related to SDO-E (see Ho et 
al., 2012; Jost & Thompson, 2000; 
Sidanius, Levin, van Laar & Sears, 
2008). Here, we examined whether this 
finding replicates in a third geographic 
region (besides the United States and 
Israel). More to the point, if conservative 
ideology reflect motivated cognition 
(Jost et al., 2003) and a subtle form 
of dominance (Ho et al., 2012), then 
the relation with SDO-E could be 
expected to be reliable across countries 
(at least as long as conservative or 
right-wing ideology has a reasonably 
similar meaning across the geographic 
contexts). 
Also, in terms of political attitudes, 
we aimed to examine issues specific 
to the New Zealand context. We were 
interested in support for policies 
favoring Māori, being either resource-
based (e.g., Māori ownership to land as 
historically agreed upon) or symbolic 
(e.g., teaching Māori language in 
primary schools). Taken together, these 
attitudes address social inequalities 
between the two major ethnic groups 
in New Zealand. As such, they should 
relate to the sub-dimensions of SDO, 
and possibly stronger with SDO-E due 
to their political nature.
As  fo r  a t t i t udes  cen te r ing 
on ethnicity, this inquiry was also 
concerned with ethnic identification and 
ingroup bias. SDO has been found to be 
positively related to group identification 
in high status groups, but less so (or 
reversely related) in low status groups 
(e.g., Levin, Sidanius, Rabinowitz, 
& Federico, 1998). Likewise, SDO 
has been found to relate differently 
to in- and outgroup negativity and 
among high and low status groups 
(Levin & Sidanius, 1999; Levin, Pratto, 
Matthews, Sidanius, & Kteily, 2013). 
Still, Jost and Thompson (2000) showed 
that the direction and strength of such 
relations may vary for SDO-D and 
SDO-E. Specifically, they found SDO-D 
to be positively related to ingroup bias 
in both high and low status groups, but 
negatively related to SDO-E in a low 
status group. In this study we examined 
if Jost and Thompson’s (2000) findings 
would replicate in another context.
In  pr inc ip le  the  s tudy was 
exploratory and we did not derive 
specific predictions for all criterion 
variables about the differences between 
SDO-D and SDO-E or between the 
ethnic groups. Noteworthy, the number 
of contrasts examined would make a 
strictly hypothesis-driven approach both 
untenable with any space limitation of 
the manuscript, and also appear to be a 
large-scale guessing game. Thus, while 
conducting a largely explorative study, 
with the overarching aim of shedding 
more light on what differentiates SDO-D 
and SDO-E, we sought to safe-guard 
against type I errors in our inferences by 
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employing a very large sample.
Whi le  no t  hav ing  spec i f i c 
predictions about every single contrast 
examined, the study was premised on a 
few broad-spanning predictions.  The 
first was that to the extent that SDO 
taps core personality tendencies, the 
relations should not vary across ethnic 
groups. Neither did we did expect the 
relations with attitudes concerning 
gender to vary across ethnic groups. In 
contrast, we expected the two groups to 
differ in terms of the relations of SDO-D 
and SDO-E with attitudes centering on 
ethnicity. That is, we expected relations 
to vary across groups when the criteria 
matched the dimension along which 
the groups differed (ethnicity; see also 
Reynolds & Turner, 2006). 
Beyond e thnic  d i ffe rences , 
and following Ho et al. (2012), we 
considered the possibility that SDO-D 
would correlate most strongly with 
statements for which there is normative 
pressure concerning the “right” way to 
answer. The rationale here is that people 
high on SDO-D simply do not care much 
about holding back their thoughts and 
feelings about themselves and others. 
In contrast, we expected SDO-E to be 
more predictive than SDO-D concerning 
more socially accepted expressions of 
anti-egalitarian attitudes (i.e. “modern” 
expressions of social dominance). 
In other words, SDO-E should be 
expressed when it is safe to do so. 
Thus, we considered honesty humility 
and hostile sexism to be plausible 
marker criteria of SDO-D. In contrast, 
conservatism, benevolent sexism, 
ethnic identification, and opposition 
to pro- Māori policies were expected 
to be SDO-E domains (see also Ho et 
al., 2012). 
Method
Sampling Procedure and 
Participants
We analyzed data from the 2009 
New Zealand Attitudes and Values 
Study (NZAVS). The Time 1 (2009) 
NZAVS contained responses from 
6,518 participants sampled from the 
2009 New Zealand electoral roll. The 
electoral roll is publicly available 
for scientific research and in 2009 
contained 2,986,546 registered voters. 
This represented all citizens over 18 
years of age who were eligible to vote 
regardless of whether they chose to vote, 
barring people who had their contact 
details removed due to specific case-by-
case concerns about privacy. The sample 
frame was spilt into three parts. Sample 
Frame 1 constituted a random sample 
of 25,000 people from the electoral roll 
(4,060 respondents). Sample Frame 2 
constituted a second random sample of a 
further 10,000 people from the electoral 
roll (1,609 respondents). 
Sample Frame 3 constituted 
a booster sample of 5,500 people 
randomly selected from meshblock 
area units of the country with a high 
proportion of Māori, Pacific Nations 
and Asian peoples (671 respondents). 
Statistics New Zealand (2014) define 
the meshblock as “the smallest 
geographic unit for which statistical 
data is collected and processed by 
Statistics New Zealand. A meshblock 
is a defined geographic area, varying in 
size from part of a city block to large 
areas of rural land. Each meshblock 
abuts against another to form a network 
covering all of New Zealand including 
coasts and inlets, and extending out to 
the two hundred mile economic zone. 
Meshblocks are added together to 
‘build up’ larger geographic areas such 
as area units and urban areas. They are 
also the principal unit used to draw-up 
and define electoral district and local 
authority boundaries.” Meshblocks were 
selected using ethnic group proportions 
based on 2006 national census data. A 
further 178 people responded but did not 
provide contact details and so could not 
be matched to a sample frame (see also 
Sibley, 2014). 
In sum, postal questionnaires were 
sent to 40,500 registered voters or 
roughly 1.36% of all registered voters 
in New Zealand. The overall response 
rate (adjusting for the address accuracy 
of the electoral roll and including 
anonymous responses) was 16.6%. 
We limited the analyses to the 5741 
(3435 women) participants who were 
either Pākehā (n = 4,629) or Māori (n = 
1,112). The mean age was 48.62 years 
(SD = 15.83).
There are three things to note 
concerning the sample characteristics 
for Pākehā and Māori. First, the 
respondents in this sample did not 
differ in terms of employment, χ2(1) = 
1.91, p = .17. Second, there was a higher 
proportion with a degree or certificate 
from high school among Pākehā (50%) 
compared to Māori (34%), χ2(1) = 
91.88, p < .001. Importantly, however, 
these descriptive statistics are fairly 
close to the percentages in the general 
population (55 and 38% for Pākehā 
and Māori respectively for adults 25-34 
years old; see Statistics New Zealand, 
2013). Finally, the gender distribution 
was somewhat skewed with 40% men 
and 60% women, χ2(1) = 217.33, p < 
.001. To adjust for this, we used sample 
weights for gender in all analyses 
concerning relations with the criterion 
variables. For extensive details about 
sample characteristics, see Sibley, 
McPhee, & Greaves, (2014).
Questionnaire measures
SDO was assessed using 6-items 
from the SDO-6 scale (see Pratto et al., 
1994). The items assessing SDO-D were 
“it is OK if some groups have more of 
a chance in life than others”, “inferior 
groups should stay in their place”, and 
“to get ahead in life, it is sometimes 
okay to step on other groups”.   The 
SDO-E items included “we should 
have increased social equality”, “it 
would be good if groups could be 
equal”, and “we should do what we 
can to equalize conditions for different 
groups”. Response alternatives ranged 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly 
agree), and SDO-E items were reversed 
coded to assess anti-egalitarianism. The 
response format above was used for all 
scales unless otherwise specified. For 
means, standard deviations, and internal 
consistency reliabilities for all variables, 
see Table 1.
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The Big-Five dimensions were 
measured using the Mini-IPIP scale 
developed by Donnellan et al. (2006). 
The honesty-humility scale used marker 
items from Ashton and Lee (2008). 
All scales were validated for use in 
New Zealand by Sibley et al. (2011b). 
Each personality scale included 4 
items, including statements such as 
“I don’t talk a lot” (reverse-scored 
extraversion), “I sympathize with 
others’ feelings” (agreeableness), “I like 
order” (conscientiousness), “I get upset 
easily” (emotionality), “I have a vivid 
imagination” (openness to experience), 
and “I deserve more things in life” 
(reverse-scored honesty-humility).
To assess RWA, a balanced 6-item 
scale was adopted from Altemeyer (1996; 
e.g., “it would be best for everyone if the 
proper authorities censored magazines 
so that people could not get their hands 
on trashy and disgusting material”). 
Political orientation was assessed with 
the item “Please rate how politically 
conservative versus liberal you see 
yourself as being”, with 1 representing 
extremely liberal and 7 representing 
extremely conservative. Attitudes 
toward resource-specific and symbolic 
Māori policies were assessed with four 
items each. These were selected from 
Liu and Sibley (2006; e.g., I support… 
“Maori ownership of the seabed and 
foreshore” [resource-specific], and 
“teaching Maori language in New 
Zealand primary schools” [symbolic]). 
Gender-specific system justification was 
measured with two items selected from 
Jost and Kay (2005), one of these two 
was “in general, relations between men 
and women in New Zealand are fair”. 
Benevolent and hostile sexism were 
represented by five items each from 
Glick and Fiske (1996). Items included 
“women should be cherished and 
protected by men” (benevolent sexism) 
and “women exaggerate problems they 
have at work” (hostile sexism).
Three items from Leach et al. 
(2008) measuring identity centrality 
were used to index ethnic identity, with 
an example being “I often think about 
the fact that I am a member of my ethnic 
group”. Affective thermometer ratings 
toward Pākehā, and Māori were used 
to create an index for ethnic ingroup 
bias by subtracting the outgroup rating 
from the ingroup one. Both groups 
showed an ingroup bias in terms of a 
mean difference between the ingroup 
and outgroup ratings, yet it was more 
pronounced for Pākehā than Māori 
participants, t(4512) = 38.58, p < .001, 
d = .57, and , t(1090) = 5.59, p < .001, 
d = .17 respectively.
Results
Preliminary analyses
Using both Pākehā and Māori 
participants, we first ran a confirmatory 
factor analysis to examine the suggested 
factor structure with two SDO sub-
dimensions (with three indicators per 
construct, factors correlated).  We used 
a robust maximum likelihood (referred 
to as T2* by Yuan & Bentler, 2000) 
estimator as we suspected somewhat 
non-normally distributed data. The 
proposed factor model had a good fit to 
the data, scaled χ2(8) = 121.54, p < .001, 
CFI = .98, RMSEA = .05, 90% CI [.04, 
.06]. The correlation between the factors 
was .56, p <.001. 
Next,  we ran a multi-group 
confirmatory factor analysis to examine 
if the relationships between the two 
factors varied across ethnic groups. 
Notably, previous research suggests that 
the relation between the two dimensions 
is stronger in groups with higher status 
(see Jost & Thompson, 2000). Indeed, 
we found support for this prediction 
in a New Zealand probability sample 
as well. Good fit was achieved when 
allowing the correlation to vary across 
ethnic groups while keeping loadings 
and intercepts equal, χ2(26) = 182.21, p 
< .001, CFI = .96, RMSEA = .05, 90% 
CI [.04, .05]. For Pākehā, the correlation 
was .61, p <.001, and for Māori it 
was .39, p <.001. Also, assuming the 
correlation between SDO-D and SDO-E 
to be equal among Pākehā and Māori 
resulted in a significantly worse fit, 
scaled Δχ2(1) = 17.72, p < .001. 
Comparison of SDO-D and 
SDO-E Criteria Relations 
among Pākehā and Māori
To examine the relations of SDO-D 
and SDO-E with our 15 outcomes, we 
ran multi-group (Pākehā versus Māori) 
regression analyses (i.e. SDO-D and 
SDO-E manifest) with each criterion as 
a dependent variable. More specifically, 
we ran five models for each criterion. 
First, we ran a baseline model (0 df) 
in which both coefficients in each 
ethnic group were free to vary. We then 
tested the difference of the SDO-D and 
SDO-E coefficients among Pākehā by 
running a model with the unstandardized 
relations constrained to be equal (1 
Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations and Internal Consistency Reliabilities for 
Study Variables.
Instrument M SD α
Social Dominance Orientation D 2.38 1.12 .52
Social Dominance Orientation E 2.79 1.21 .76
Agreeableness 5.27 0.99 .67
Conscientiousness 5.10 1.07 .66
Extraversion 4.05 1.16 .72
Neuroticism 3.43 1.10 .65
Openness to Experience 4.76 1.13 .68
Honesty-Humility 5.11 1.33 .78
Right-Wing Authoritarianism 3.56 1.16 .69
Political Identity (Conservatism) 3.76 1.23 -
Māori Resource Policy 5.25 1.55 .83
Māori Symbolic Policy 3.07 1.43 .78
Ethnic Identity 3.66 1.66 .83
Ingroup bias 0.70 1.41 -
Gender System Justification 4.80 1.27 .59
Benevolent Sexism 4.11 1.17 .72
Hostile Sexism 3.36 1.27 .81
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Table 2. Relations for SDO-D and SDO-E with Criterion Variables.
Pākehā (European 
New Zealanders) Māori
B β p B β p X2 p
Agreeableness D -0.19 -0.21 <.001 -0.13 -0.16 <.001 3.15 .08
E -0.12 -0.15 <.001 -0.14 -0.17 <.001 0.37 .55
X2 6.98 .01 0.05 .82
Conscientiousness D -0.06 -0.06 <.001 0.01 0.01 .68 4.11 .04
E 0.05 0.06 .001 -0.08 -0.09 .01 13.13 <.001
X2 17.02 <.001 3.59 .06
Extraversion D 0.02 0.02 .29 0.03 0.03 .31 0.12 .73
E 0.00 0.00 .95 -0.04 -0.04 .15 1.65 .20
X2 0.38 .54 2.52 .11
Neuroticism D 0.03 0.03 .06 0.07 0.08 .01 1.73 .19
E -0.06 -0.07 <.001 -0.03 -0.03 .33 1.06 .30
X2 11.79 <.001 5.36 .02
Openness to Experience D -0.13 -0.13 <.001 -0.18 -0.19 <.001 1.99 .16
E -0.04 -0.05 .01 -0.08 -0.09 .01 1.28 .26
X2 8.22 <.001 4.00 .05
Honesty-Humility D -0.33 -0.28 <.001 -0.31 -0.26 <.001 0.29 .59
E 0.02 0.02 .20 0.05 0.04 .17 0.45 .50
X2 111.38 <.001 35.43 <.001
Right-Wing D 0.10 0.09 <.001 0.19 0.20 <.001 7.48 .01
Authoritarianism E 0.14 0.14 <.001 0.06 0.07 .04 4.74 .03
X2 1.88 .17 7.32 .01
Political identification D 0.06 0.05 .003 -0.04 -0.04 .34 4.77 .03
E 0.24 0.24 <.001 0.19 0.18 <.001 1.46 .23
X2 32.77 <.001 14.68 <.001
Māori D 0.07 0.06 <.001 -0.18 -0.12 <.001 25.21 <.001
resource policy E 0.20 0.20 <.001 0.26 0.18 <.001 1.18 .28
X2 22.47 <.001 34.71 <.001
Māori D 0.17 0.14 <.001 -0.03 -0.03 0.31 31.67 <.001
symbolic policy E 0.28 0.24 <.001 0.20 0.21 <.001 3.85 .05
X2 9.44 <.001 21.67 <.001
Ethnic identity D 0.21 0.15 <.001 0.16 0.12 <.001 0.93 .34
E -0.12 -0.10 <.001 -0.38 -0.28 <.001 27.86 <.001
X2 78.05 <.001 71.79 <.001
Ingroup bias D 0.21 0.16 <.001 0.01 0.01 .85 25.00 <.001
E 0.14 0.11 <.001 -0.09 -0.09 .01 34.10 <.001
X2 4.21 .04 3.31  .07
Gender D 0.15 0.13 <.001 0.19 0.17 <.001 1.12 .29
system justification E 0.08 0.08 <.001 -0.04 -0.04 .26 7.89 .01
X2 6.16 .01 15.56 <.001
Benevolent sexism D 0.27 0.26 <.001 0.25 0.25 <.001 0.30 .58
E -0.02 -0.02 .28 -0.14 -0.15 <.001 9.95 <.001
X2 98.20 <.001 46.30 <.001
Hostile sexism D 0.32 0.28 <.001 0.27 0.24 <.001 2.04 .15
E 0.08 0.07 <.001 0.00 0.00 .90 3.05 .08
X2 60.26 <.001 20.24 <.001
Note. D = SDO-D, E = SDO-E. All coefficients are based on robust maximum 
likelihood estimation (see Muthén & Muthén, 2012) and weighted for gender. The 
X2 values are mean-adjusted and equivalent to Yuan and Bentler’s (2000) T2*. For 
political orientation, high scores represent conservative (as opposed to liberal) 
identification. Pākehā n varies between 4340 and 4593 Māori n varies between 
1019 and 1102.
df). Consequently, the X2 statistic for 
this model would give the significance 
level for the hypothesis that the two 
paths are different. By the same logic, 
we then tested the difference between 
the SDO-D and SDO-E coefficients 
in the Māori group. Subsequently, we 
constrained the SDO-D paths to be 
equal for Pākehā and Māori to test the 
difference across ethnic groups for this 
predictor. Finally, in a fifth model, we 
constrained the SDO-E paths to be equal 
across ethnic groups. The results of 
these analyses are presented in Table 2.
The results showed that both 
SDO-D and SDO-E predicted most 
variables, and many effects were highly 
significant, as could be expected in a 
sample of this size. Still, most of these 
effects were relatively weak. As for the 
contrasts between SDO-D and SDO-E 
within each ethnicity, we found that 
18 out of 30 were significant at p < 
.001. Because of the sample size and 
number of tests, we do not put much 
emphasis on effects that were not 
significant at this level. Nonetheless, 
many of the contrasts held up in both 
ethnic groups (see Table 2). While 
some of these were relatively small in 
an absolute sense, a couple of variables 
appeared to be marker criterion for 
SDO-D.  Honesty-humility and hostile 
sexism both revealed moderately strong 
relations with SDO-D, but only marginal 
relations with SDO-E. Benevolent 
sexism revealed the same pattern 
overall, but also a weak negative relation 
with SDO-E among Māori. In contrast, 
political identification was most clearly 
related to SDO-E.
 There were also differences across 
ethnic groups for many variables in 
relation to either SDO-D or SDO-E. 
Both SDO-D and SDO-E displayed 
variation in relation to some of the other 
ideological and attitudinal variables, 
dependent on membership in a group 
of either high or low social status. More 
specifically, of the 30 contrasts tested, 
we found 7 to be significant at p <.001. 
Again, we did not pay much attention to 
effects that failed to reach significance 
at this level in such a big sample as 
this one. Not surprising, the more 
pronounced differences between the 
ethnic groups were often associated with 
ethnicity-specific attitudes.  In contrast, 
it is noteworthy that there was little 
variation across ethnic groups in relation 
to personality (except conscientiousness 
– SDO-E), political orientation and 
hostile sexism (for details, see Table 2). 
Finally, in addition to the regression 
analyses, we also examined the zero-
order relations of SDO-D, SDO-E, and 
the full SDO scale with all criterion 
variables. For a majority of the criterion 
variables the full SDO revealed 
correlations in between the estimates 
for SDO-D and SDO-E, but in some 
cases the full SDO scale rather matched 
or slightly outperformed both of the 
component measures.  For example, 
the relation with agreeableness shows 
a small difference between SDO-D 
and SDO-E to start with, and neither of 
the components showed an advantage 
over the full SDO scale.  On the other 
hand, for many criterion variables we 
found more substantial differences 
between SDO-D and SDO-E in the 
regression analyses, and these were 
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largely consistent with differences at 
the zero-order level as well. Again, 
most effects were relatively weak, few 
correlations were above or approaching 
.30. The contrasts between the two 
ethnic groups were also consistent in the 
regression and correlational analyses. 
To avoid redundancy the results from 
the correlational analyses, along with 
details on how we tested these contrasts, 
are presented in Appendix A. 
Discussion
We explored the relations for two 
sub-dimensions of the SDO scale with 
a number of criterion variables in a 
national probability sample in New 
Zealand. The main rationale was that 
a study on the relations of SDO-D and 
SDO-E with a broad range of personality 
and socio-political variables would help 
clarify the distinctions between these 
two dimensions. Clearly, the full SDO 
scale still provides a useful tool in many 
settings, and parsimony speaks for it 
being preferable to using its components 
in some cases (e.g., in relation to 
Agreeableness). Nonetheless, there 
were also many cases where SDO-D 
and SDO-E revealed somewhat different 
relations with our criterion variables. 
Overall the results revealed some 
clear patterns, but also a couple of 
surprises.  Consistent with the findings 
of Ho and colleagues (2012), and in 
contrast to the argument of Sears, Haley, 
and Henry (2008), there seemed to be 
more of a story to tell about SDO-D than 
SDO-E. Compared to SDO-E, SDO-D 
displayed both stronger and more 
diverse relationships across the range of 
personality and socio-political variables. 
This finding is noteworthy considering 
that SDO-E was markedly more reliable 
than SDO-D. Put differently, while some 
might consider the reliabilities of our 
SDO instruments to be problematic it 
should be recognized that psychometrics 
tells us that the contrasts where SDO-D 
outperforms SDO-E would be stronger, 
if anything, if we had better instruments. 
Also, in this study we used more 
variables than Ho et al. (2012) that were 
likely to represent subtle expressions 
of dominance (e.g., agreeableness 
and benevolent sexism). Nonetheless, 
even with these additional “SDO-E 
candidates”, SDO-D often came out 
on top. 
An exception to the tendency for 
SDO-D to outperform SDO-E was found 
with regards to political identification 
(see also Sears, et al., 2008). Noteworthy, 
it is well known that conservatism 
maps onto a broad range of attitudes 
(e.g., Jost et al., 2003). However, the 
current study indicates that the binding 
factor that holds it all together may 
not be conservative ideology in itself, 
but rather the D dimension of SDO. 
More specifically, conservatism in 
itself seemed to be an SDO-E domain, 
whereas most social attitudes are more 
closely related to SDO-D. This suggests 
that SDO-D bridges the relation between 
conservatism (as well as SDO-E) and 
various social attitudes. 
The second clearest example of 
an SDO-E domain of attitudes dealt 
with pro-Māori policies. SDO-E was 
more strongly associated with an 
opposition toward both resource and 
symbolic policies favoring Māori, 
and this was true within both ethnic 
groups. This finding is intriguing when 
considering the link between SDO-E 
and conservative identity. Reasonably, 
support for giving positive attention to 
disadvantaged groups is a key ingredient 
in both conservatism-liberalism and 
SDO-E, and it seems to overrun in-
group interests (see Jost & Thompson, 
2000). 
In terms of mapping SDO-D and 
SDO-E onto basic personality, the 
strongest relations were found between 
honesty-humility and SDO-D. Thus, 
the current focus on agreeableness as 
the primary (core) personality correlate 
SDO (see Sibley & Duckitt, 2008), needs 
to be supplemented with more research 
on honesty-humility. Obviously, we 
cannot draw any causal inferences from 
these analyses, but the fact that honesty-
humility was practically unrelated to 
SDO-E also suggests that the personality 
roots of SDO-D and SDO-E may differ. 
Interestingly, a similar pattern was 
also found for openness to experience, 
and to some extent, agreeableness. 
Conscientiousness, extraversion and 
neuroticism showed only trivial relations 
with the two SDO dimensions. 
Consistent with our predictions, the 
relations with the personality variables 
showed only minor variation across 
the two ethnic groups. The observed 
difference for SDO-E in relation to 
conscientiousness seems uninformative 
when considering how weak the 
relations were in both groups, but of 
opposite signs. In principle, it seems to 
be the same kind of individuals, in terms 
of basic personality, who are drawn to 
social dominance (especially SDO-D) 
in high and low status groups. This also 
suggests that when the relations between 
SDO and prejudice fluctuate across 
groups (e.g., Levin & Sidanius, 1993) it 
is not because different group identities 
shift peoples’ sense of personality (as 
proposed in self-categorization theory, 
e.g., Reynolds & Turner, 2006).  
With regards to somewhat puzzling 
and unexpected results, the coefficients 
found here were generally low compared 
to the results of other studies. For 
example, the relations for the SDO 
dimensions with RWA were lower than 
what has been previously found for the 
full scale (see e.g., Roccato & Ricolfi, 
2005). However, this could in part be 
due to the lower reliabilities of the 
instruments used here, which would 
attenuate our effect size estimates as we 
necessarily used short-form scales. Also, 
another reason for some of the weak 
effects could be the cultural context of 
the study (see Mirisola, Sibley, Boca, 
& Duckitt, 2007). For example, the 
bicultural national identity in New 
Zealand (e.g., Liu & Sibley, 2009) might 
explain the counter-intuitive weak and 
negative relationship between SDO-E 
and ethnic identity among Pākehā. 
More specifically, a bicultural or even 
multicultural national identity may 
imply a more egalitarian stand compared 
to a mono-cultural identity, and hence 
lower or reverse the typical positive 
relationship between SDO and high 
status group identification.
Another surprising result concerned 
benevolent sexism. More specifically, 
we expected benevolent sexism to be 
in the SDO-E domain, as this dimension 
has been portrayed as dealing with 
more subtle expressions of dominance. 
However, benevolent sexism had a 
moderately strong relation with SDO-D 
while being unrelated to SDO-E among 
Pākehā and only weakly (negatively) 
related among Māori. The negative 
relation among Māori is noteworthy for 
the theorizing about ambivalent sexism. 
Glick and Fiske (2001) suggested that 
prejudice is about social inequality, and 
• 31 •New Zealand Journal of Psychology  Vol. 44  No. 2,  September 2015
Dimensions of Social Dominance
noted that people express benevolent 
sexism as a means to keep women “in 
their place”. However, it is possible 
that this effect is weaker in groups 
that are disadvantaged, especially 
among individuals supporting group 
equality (as indexed by low SDO-E 
scores). Specifically, what appears 
to be benevolent sexism among such 
individuals might be an expression of 
genuine benevolence, rather than a mild, 
or disguised form of sexism.
 These results also speak to a debate 
as to whether SDO-E is the system 
justifying aspect of SDO (see Jost & 
Thompson, 2000). In contrast to this 
idea, SDO-D was more strongly related 
to gender-specific system justification 
and this was true for both Pākehā and 
Māori. Also, many of the other criterion 
variables here could be described as 
hierarchy-enhancing ideologies (see 
Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) operating 
to maintain the status quo of group 
inequalities. Among several of these 
variables, such as benevolent and 
hostile sexism SDO-D was the stronger 
predictor. On the other hand, the data for 
the Māori policies were much in line 
with the system-justification perspective 
as proposed by Jost and Thompson 
(2000). Overall then, the arguments 
about system justifying tendencies in 
SDO seems to depend on the attitude 
domain that it is mapped onto (e.g. 
gender versus ethnic issues).
In evaluating the strengths and 
weaknesses of this study it is an obvious 
limitation that we did not have balanced 
scales for SDO-D and SDO-E (as 
opposed to e.g., Ho et al., 2012). This 
was due to the fact that we used data 
embedded in a large questionnaire, and 
only had a few SDO items available. 
On the other hand, the broad range of 
criterion variables (including all Big-
Five factors) represents a clear strength 
compared to previous studies. More 
important still, the findings were based 
on national probability sample, and 
include a large number of respondents 
from an ethnic minori ty group 
(Māori).  Thus, in terms of the breadth 
of criterion variables and statistical 
power the current study provided the 
most extensive examination SDO-D 
and SDO-E to date. Based on the 
current results we would argue that 
the distinction between these two 
sub-dimensions is more complex than 
a drive to dominate outgroups versus 
general anti-egalitarianism. Beside the 
conceptual problem that most SDO-D 
items do not specifically refer to in- 
and outgroups, there are some findings 
here that are difficult to reconcile with 
such a conceptualization. Neither does 
it seem correct that the distinction is 
all about blatant and aggressive versus 
subtle expressions of dominance (see 
Ho et al., 2012).  Instead, the closest 
thing to defining features of the two 
dimensions in these data appears to be 
the following: SDO-D is a demeaning 
attitude promoting hierarchies between 
groups whereas SDO-E is about 
opposing the recognition of groups as 
disadvantaged. 
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Appendix A
Pearson correlations for SDO-D and 
SDO-E with the criterion variables were 
analyzed within each ethnic group in 
our sample. We then examined contrasts 
within (SDO-D versus SDO-E) and 
across groups (Pākehā versus Māori). 
We used Steiger’s (1980) formula 
to compare dependent correlations 
(i.e. within groups) and Fisher’s 
z-transformation for the independent 
correlations (i.e. between groups). All 
contrasts were tested at http://www.
quantpsy.org/
corrtest/corrtest.htm, and http://
www.quantpsy.org/corrtest/corrtest2.
htm ). The results of these analyses are 
summarized in Table A1.
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Table A1. Zero-order relations of SDO (full scale), SDO-D and SDO-E with criterion variables and z-contrasts.
                 Pākehā (European
                  New Zealanders)
            Māori
Criterion Variable r p r p z p
Agreeableness SDO -.30 <.001 -.27 <.001 -1.04 .30
D -.27 <.001 -.21 <.001 -1.92 .06
E -.24 <.001 -.21 <.001 -0.81 .42
z* -1.93 .05 0.15 .88
Conscientiousness SDO .00 .83 -.05 .10 1.40 .16
D -.04 .01 .00 .97 -1.14 .25
E .03 .05 -.08 .01 3.21 <.001
z* -4.15 <.001 2.14 .03
Extraversion SDO .01 .41 -.02 .57 .86 .39
D .02 .19 .02 .59 0.09 .93
E .00 .94 -.04 .14 1.35 .18
z* 1.15 .25 1.62 .10
Neuroticism SDO -.03 .03 .03 .33 .95 .34
D .00 .86 .06 .04 -1.97 .05
E -.05 <.001 -.02 .55 -1.03 .30
z* 3.13 <.001 2.18 .03
Openness to Experience SDO -.15 <.001 -.23 <.001 2.50 .01
D -.15 <.001 -.22 <.001 2.29 .02
E -.11 <.001 -.14 <.001 0.93 .35
z* -2.55 .01 -2.30 .02
Honesty-Humility SDO -.22 <.001 -.18 <.001 -1.24 .22
D -.27 <.001 -.25 <.001 -0.54 .59
E -.10 <.001 -.02 .42 -2.17 .03
z* -11.15 <.001 -6.25 <.001
Right-Wing SDO .20 <.001 .22 <.001 -0.72 .48
Authoritarianism D .15 <.001 .23 <.001 -2.30 .02
E .19 <.001 .12 <.001 2.04 .04
z* -2.25 .03 2.90 .00
Political identification SDO .24 <.001 .13 <.001 3.27 .001
D .14 <.001 .02 .54 3.60 <.001
E .26 <.001 .18 <.001 2.25 .02
z* -7.02 <.001 -4.21 <.001
Māori SDO .22 <.001 .04 .18 5.37 <.001
resource policy D .14 <.001 -.08 .01 6.66 <.001
E .22 <.001 .15 <.001 2.27 .02
z* -5.29 <.001 -6.25 <.001
Māori SDO .32 <.001 .14 <.001 5.87 <.001
symbolic policy D .24 <.001 .02 .56 6.68 <.001
E .31 <.001 .20 <.001 3.44 .001
z* -4.52 <.001 -4.88 <.001
Ethnic identity SDO .04 .01 -.12 <.001 -2.46 .01
D .11 <.001 .05 .08 1.55 .12
E -.04 .02 -.24 <.001 6.29 <.001
z* 8.89 <.001 8.08 <.001
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Ethnic ingroup bias SDO .23 <.001 -.06 .04 5.02 <.001
D .21 <.001 -.01 .70 6.48 <.001
E .18 <.001 -.09 <.001 7.92 <.001
z* 1.62 .10 2.00 .05
Gender SDO .18 <.001 .11 <.001 2.07 .04
system justification D .17 <.001 .16 <.001 0.10 .92
E .13 <.001 .00 .90 3.81 <.001
z* 2.20 .03 4.28 <.001
Benevolent sexism SDO .20 <.001 .10 <.001 3.12 .001
D .25 <.001 .23 <.001 0.79 .43
E .10 <.001 -.08 .01 5.29 <.001
z* 1.20 <.001 8.48 <.001
Hostile sexism SDO .29 <.001 .20 <.001 2.95 .003
D .31 <.001 .25 <.001 2.03 .04
E .19 <.001 .07 .02 3.72 <.001
z* 7.60 <.001 4.81 <.001
Note. D = SDO-D. E = SDO-E. z* refers to the contrast between SDO-D and SDO-E, calculations of these were based on 
Steiger’s (1980) formula. High scores on political orientation represent conservative (as opposed to liberal) identification. 
Pākehā n varies between 4340 and 4595 Māori n varies between 1019 and 1103.
                 Pākehā (European
                  New Zealanders)
            Māori
Criterion Variable r p r p z p
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Spontaneous Prejudice in Context:
Variability in Automatically Activated Attitudes
Bernd Wittenbrink
University of Chicago
Charles M. Judd and Bernadette Park
University of Colorado
The goal of the research reported in this article was to examine whether automatic group attitudes and
stereotypes, commonly thought to be fixed responses to a social category cue, are sensitive to changes
in the situational context. Two experiments demonstrated such variability of automatic responses due to
changes in the stimulus context. In Study 1 White participants' implicit attitudes toward Blacks varied
as a result of exposure to either a positive (a family barbecue) or a negative (a gang incident) stereotypic
situation. Study 2 demonstrated similar context effects under clearly automatic processing conditions.
Here, the use of different background pictures (church interior vs. street corner) for Black and White face
primes affected participants' racial attitudes as measured by a sequential priming task. Implications for
the concept of automaticity in social cognition are discussed.
Only a decade ago, the first empirical investigations emerged on
the possibility that group attitudes and stereotypes may influence
people's social perceptions and behaviors in an automatic fashion,
outside of the individual's control (Devine, 1989; Gaertner &
McLaughlin, 1983). Since then, however, a substantial number of
studies have documented that such effects can occur (Banaji &
Greenwald, 1995; Banaji & Hardin, 1996; Bargh, Chen, & Bur-
rows, 1996; Blair & Banaji, 1996; Chen & Bargh, 1997; Devine,
Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991; Dovidio, Evans, & Tyler,
1986; Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997;
Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Gilbert & Hixon,
1991; Greenwald et al., 1998; Hense, Penner, & Nelson, 1995;
Kawakami, Dion, & Dovidio, 1998; Lepore & Brown, 1997;
Locke, MacLeod, & Walker, 1994; Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne,
Thorn, & Castelli, 1997; Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994;
Macrae, Stangor, & Milne, 1994; Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel,
& Schaal, 1999; Perdue & Gurtman, 1990; Spencer, Fein, Wolfe,
Fong, & Dunn, 1998; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997). Distin-
guishing automatic activation from a controlled and intentional
search for memory contents (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977), this
work leaves little doubt that stereotypes and group attitudes may
indeed be activated spontaneously from memory, without the
perceiver's intent, merely triggered by exposure to a relevant
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stimulus cue in the environment. Such automatic activation occurs
quickly, within a few hundred milliseconds after stimulus expo-
sure. It requires only very limited cognitive resources and is not
controllable by the perceiver. In fact, the perceiver often remains
unaware of the activation and its subsequent influences on judg-
ment and behavior.
It is this latter quality of automatic stereotyping and prejudice
that, in all likelihood, is responsible for much of the attention that
the topic has received in the past few years. Perhaps researchers
continue to be fascinated by the sources of people's behaviors that
remain unknown to them, as has been true of psychological inquiry
since its inception. However, it is more likely that the pragmatic
implications of such "unconscious" stereotyping and prejudice
have motivated this research. These pragmatic implications are
indeed significant. For example, unconscious activation of nega-
tive cultural stereotypes has the potential to lead well-intentioned
perceivers to walk away with a prejudiced impression of their
interaction partners (Devine, 1989). Worse yet, this activation
could lead to behaviors on the part of the perceiver that are likely
to be reciprocated in a stereotype-confirming manner, thus result-
ing in an automatic self-fulfilling prophecy (Chen & Bargh, 1997).
Moreover, to the extent that one can assess an individual's ten-
dency to show automatic prejudice, researchers have at their dis-
posal a genuine "bona fide pipeline" to people's group attitudes
and beliefs, a measurement instrument that is not marred by social
demand characteristics, as are standard self-report questionnaire
measures (Fazio et al., 1995). After all, if respondents remain
unaware of their prejudiced responses, they have little opportunity
to tailor these responses to comply with perceived social standards.
The Obligatory Nature of Automatic Responses
Given the significant implications for both research and applied
settings, it is hardly surprising that the issue of automaticity has
become one of the central topics in the literature on group attitudes
and stereotyping (see Blair, 2001). In this work, one particular
characteristic that is often attributed to automatic activation of
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attitudes and group-related beliefs is that they are more or less
fixed and stable responses to a group-relevant stimulus cue. That
is, given the passive nature of automatic activation, the fact that it
is triggered by an external stimulus cue, and that it is not under the
perceiver's volitional control, activation of certain memory con-
tents is thought to be obligatory: It always and unconditionally
follows exposure to the particular stimulus cue (see Bargh, 1999).
Consequently, attitude activation has been described as a "reflex-
ive" response following exposure to a relevant stimulus in the
environment (Bargh, 1997, p. 3). Likewise, stereotypes have been
thought to "be activated reflexively upon the mere presence"
(Chen & Bargh, 1997, p. 546) of features that are diagnostic of a
given social group (e.g., skin color, gender features; Bargh, 1994,
1999; Brewer, 1988). Thus, although one's overt responses may
actually vary across different situations, seeing, for example, a
Black person's face will always trigger memory activation of
attributes that are stereotypically associated with Blacks (e.g.,
cheerful, poor).
There is, however, some evidence to suggest that spontaneous
activation of group attitudes and stereotypes is not quite as reflex-
ive as it has been assumed to be and that, in fact, such activation
is not an obligatory response to a particular category cue. Most
notably, Gilbert and Hixon (1991) showed that stereotype activa-
tion does not inevitably, in a reflexive manner, follow exposure to
a stereotype target but that it depends on the availability of cog-
nitive resources. Whereas Gilbert and Hixon's study used Asian
targets, similar effects have also been reported by Spencer and his
colleagues (Spencer et al., 1998) for the stereotyping of Blacks.
Moreover, Blair and Banaji (1996) observed in a common sequen-
tial priming paradigm that spontaneous stereotype activation is
dependent on participants' expectations about the relationship be-
tween prime and target stimuli. When participants expected the
primes to be followed systematically by a counterstereotypic tar-
get, results no longer showed evidence of automatic activation
of stereotypic associations. Finally, Macrae and his colleagues
(Macrae et al , 1997) demonstrated that spontaneous stereotype
activation in such priming experiments depends on the task under
which participants encounter the priming stimuli. Processing the
primes simply for their (conceptually irrelevant) surface features
eliminated the occurrence of spontaneous stereotype activation.
Although these studies have not been without criticism (e.g.,
Bargh, 1999), to us the argument that exposure to a category cue
does not always lead to (automatic) activation of the attitude or
stereotype seems fairly plausible. In fact, our proposition in this
article goes even further. We suggest that variations in the stimulus
context affect not only whether a stimulus cue triggers activation
of group-related memory contents but also what particular aspects
of those contents it spontaneously activates. After all, what does it
really mean to activate one's attitude toward, for example, Ger-
mans? What exactly is that attitude? Is it the negative attitude
associated with German Nazis, the positive attitude associated with
products made in Germany, or one's evaluation of those somewhat
esoteric German psychologists? The notion that attitudes reflect a
unified, solitary construct is, to say the least, highly disputed.
Instead, attitudes are frequently conceptualized as multifaceted
representations in memory (Schwarz & Strack, 1991; Tesser,
1978; Tourangeau & Rasinski, 1988; Wilson & Hodges, 1992;
Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000; Zanna & Rempel, 1988).
Similarly, stereotypes also are likely to include a multitude of often
contradictory attributes (e.g., Devine & Baker, 1991).
With regard to explicitly expressed attitudes, there is ample
evidence that depending on what aspects of such a multifaceted
representation become salient, different "attitudes" will emerge
(Salancik & Conway, 1975). For example, questions regarding
one's attitudes toward affirmative action are likely to yield differ-
ent responses when they are framed by issues related to racial
prejudice than when they are placed within the context of equal
opportunity (cf. Kinder & Sanders, 1990). Likewise, to the extent
that social contexts make salient different stereotypic attributes,
one will observe different consequences of stereotype application
(e.g., Bodenhausen, Schwarz, Bless, & Wanke, 1995).
We believe that it is rather likely that such context effects not
only affect activation under controlled processing conditions but
also affect activation that is not under the perceiver's voluntary
control. For example, sitting among the crowd at the United Center
in Chicago and being flashed with references to the group of
Blacks, even the self-declared bigot might be more likely to
spontaneously activate memory contents such as "Michael Jor-
dan," "cheerful," and "athletic," rather than "Willie Horton,"
"lazy," or "poor." We suspect that the same bigot would show
largely the opposite pattern of spontaneous activation were he or
she ever to set foot in a primarily Black, poverty-stricken neigh-
borhood on Chicago's Southside on a dark night. In both exam-
ples, category cues would yield activation of stereotypic memory
contents, but, obviously, they would activate rather different as-
pects of the Black stereotype.
The argument that situational context may influence the out-
come of cognitive processes that occur automatically also finds
support in cognitive research. Here, evidence suggests that even
basic perceptual processes are not as unconditionally linked to a
specific stimulus input as was initially thought and that they are
indeed quite malleable—albeit resource efficient and generally
unconscious and uncontrollable (Kahneman, & Treisman, 1984).
For example, the processes by which we understand uttered
sounds as speech meet all common criteria for automaticity. Read-
ers will agree that, under most circumstances, they listen to their
counterparts without constantly trying to figure out whether the
person just uttered a d or a t. Identification of auditory input as a
given speech pattern is indeed effortless and resource efficient and
can occur involuntarily, without the perceiver's active control
(Shiffrin, Pisoni, & Castaneda-Mendez, 1974). Yet, despite the
fact that people carry out these identification processes without
their control, there is nevertheless good evidence that these pro-
cesses are not triggered in an unconditional fashion by a specified
auditory stimulus. Instead, the execution of these identification
processes is dependent on allocation of attentional resources (Nus-
baum & Schwab, 1986) and the perceiver's expectations about the
nature of the encountered stimulus: The same auditory stimulus
may be heard as a portion of uttered speech or as birds chirping,
depending on the perceivers' prior expectations (Remez, Rubin,
Pisoni, & Carrell, 1981).
Similarly, looking at the pattern depicted in Figure 1, we im-
mediately "see" the two words THE CAT. That is, although the
shape depicting the middle letter in each word is identical, it may
be seen as an H in one context and an A in another (Selfridge,
1955). Again, perception of the target stimulus is in both cases
spontaneous, fast, and resource efficient. But the exact outcome of
SPECIAL SECTION: SPONTANEOUS PREJUDICE IN CONTEXT 817
TME CHT
Figure 1. Context dependency in visual perception. The same shape may
be "seen" as an H in one context and as an A in another. Reprinted from
"Pattern Recognition and Modern Computers," by O. G. Selfridge, 1955, in
Proceedings of the 1955 Western Joint Computer Conference: Published
by the Institute of Radio Engineers (pp. 91-93), Los Angeles: Institute of
Radio Engineers. Copyright 1955 by the Institute of Radio Engineers (now
IEEE). Reprinted with permission.
this (by most definitions) automatic process depends on the con-
text in which the target is encountered. In this latter example,
variation in context does not consist of variation in the perceiver's
expectations but of variation in the stimuli in which the target is
embedded (i.e., T and E vs. C and 7).
We believe that similar principles should also apply to the
processing of social stimuli. Automatic attitudes and stereotypes
should not be linked in an all-or-none fashion to a given category
cue but should depend on the context in which the perceiver
encounters that cue.
In this article, we report two experiments that illustrate such
context effects on the memory contents activated spontaneously by
a social category cue. These experiments varied the nature of
additional stimuli in which the category cues were embedded.
Activation of group attitudes and stereotypes then was assessed
using two different procedures that have been commonly used in
work on automatic attitudes and stereotyping, the Implicit Asso-
ciation Test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998) and the sequential
priming paradigm (e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986; Fazio et al.,
1995; Wittenbrink et al., 1997).
Study 1
Earlier, we speculated that category references to Blacks may
trigger different memory contents depending on whether those
references are encountered in a positive stereotypic context (e.g., a
basketball arena) or a negative one (e.g., a poor urban neighbor-
hood). Study 1 was intended to test exactly this conjecture. Half of
the participants were shown a movie clip that depicted Black
targets in a positive stereotypic situation, a family barbecue,
whereas the remaining participants saw a movie clip with negative
stereotypic context, a gang-related incident. We were interested in
how this manipulation would affect the activation triggered by
group references as measured by the IAT (Greenwald et al., 1998).
Method
Participants
Ninety-nine participants (18 Asian Americans, 10 African Americans,
and 71 White Americans) were recruited on campus at the University of
Chicago for paid participation ($10) in a 1.5 hr psychology experiment.
They ranged in age from 17 to 37 years (Mdn = 20) and were predomi-
nantly undergraduate or graduate students. Participants who identified
themselves as African American and 2 other participants who failed to
follow instructions during the reaction time procedure were excluded from
the data analyses, leaving a total of 87 participants (47 female, 40 male).
Procedures
The study was introduced to participants as an experiment on "how
people tell stories" and, more specifically, on the role memory plays in the
construction of story narratives. As part of these instructions, the experi-
menter explained that participants would watch a short movie excerpt and
that it would be their task to write a story based on this excerpt. It was
further explained that, later in the experiment and following a distraction
task, participants would be asked questions about their stories and about the
movie episode. The distraction task, in actuality the IAT, was introduced as
a test of a person's ability to remain vigilant over a longer period of time.
Participants were told that because individuals vary in how much cognitive
energy they require to complete this test, the experiment would start out
with a baseline assessment for the vigilance test. At the conclusion of these
general instructions, the experimenter then mentioned in passing that in the
event that they were to finish the experiment early, participants would be
asked to complete a questionnaire for an unrelated study.
Following the introduction, participants were seated in front of a com-
puter and told that the experimenter would now assess their baseline for the
distraction task. Instructions for the IAT appeared on the computer screen.
Participants read these instructions at their own pace and then proceeded
with the baseline IAT. Half of the participants completed this baseline IAT
with consistent response categories first, followed by the inconsistent
response categories. For the remaining participants, this IAT order was
reversed. During the experimental administration of this task, participants
were seated at a distance of approximately 50 cm from the computer screen
with their two index fingers positioned over the two response keys. Further
details of the IAT trials are described below.
Once participants completed the first reaction time task, they were led to
another room in the laboratory, where they were greeted by another
experimenter and seated in front of a TV7VCR set. A shelf below the TV
set and in clear sight of the participants held seven video tapes, labeled A
through G. The experimenter explained that participants would now get to
watch a short clip from one of the movies available. The experimenter then
placed in the VCR one of the seven tapes, which for half of the participants
contained a clip with a positive stereotype context and for the remaining
participants contained a negative stereotype clip. After the short movie
clip, participants had approximately 20 min to write an essay about the
events depicted in the movie.
Following this story segment, participants returned to the computer room
to participate in the alleged computer distraction task. It was explained that
for them to better remember the movie episode while performing the
computer task, they would from time to time see brief reminders of the
movie clip. Participants then completed the experimental IAT. The actual
clips that appeared at random intervals during these experimental IAT trials
were matched with the movie excerpt participants had seen previously.
Immediately after they completed the experimental IAT, participants
returned to the "video room" and filled out a questionnaire that included a
series of questions relating to details of the movie episode (e.g., "List all
protagonists that appeared in the movie. For each protagonist, give their
name, describe their physical appearance etc."). Although the majority of
these questions were included only for the sake of maintaining the exper-
iment's cover story, the questionnaire included two items relevant to the
actual purpose of the study. First, participants were asked to identify,
among other features, the protagonists' race. We intended to use responses
to this query as a manipulation check, assuring that participants correctly
identified the movie targets' ethnicity. In addition, another question was
included to determine whether participants were, as intended, unfamiliar
with the movie from which the clip was taken. This question asked whether
the participant knew the movie and, if so, to identify it.
Once participants had completed this questionnaire, the experimenter
explained that there was still plenty of time left and that therefore they
should please help out a friend of the experimenter's who was collecting
data on an unrelated study. Participants then received a questionnaire
containing six different explicit measures of racial attitudes. Specifically,
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the questionnaire included an explicit measure commonly used to assess
feelings toward social groups, the Feeling Thermometer rating scale, as
well as a set of five belief-based attitude measures: the Modern Racism
Scale by McConahay, Hardee, and Batts (1981), the Pro-Black and Anti-
Black Scales of Katz and Hass (1988), and the Diversity and Discrimina-
tion Scales (both taken from Wittenbrink et al., 1997). To strengthen the
reliability of the Thermometer scale, ratings for the two target groups (i.e.,
Blacks, Whites) were embedded in a series of filler target groups (e.g.,
Republicans, Democrats).
At the end of the experimental session, participants were debriefed about
the actual purpose of the study, the nature of the IAT, and the potential
influence that the movie clips were hypothesized to have on participants'
IAT performance. They were then paid and dismissed.
Materials
Movie clips. Two movie excerpts were used to expose participants to
either positive or negative stereotypic depictions of Blacks. Specifically, a
2-min segment from a feature movie entitled Black & White & Red All
Over (Davis, McCoy, & Streeter, 1997) was used for the negative stereo-
type exposure condition. This segment depicted a gang-related incident in
which a group of Black targets was seen arguing with each other, picking
up a gun, and leaving the scene—apparently to confront an adversary. For
the positive stereotype exposure condition, we used a 2-min segment of
another feature movie, Poetic Justice (Singleton, 1993). The particular
scene included in this segment showed a Black family in harmony together
at an outdoor barbecue. Both movie segments included only relatively
unknown actors and, on the basts of pretesting, were effective in eliciting
narratives from participants that focused primarily on either positive or
negative aspects of the stereotype.
IAT. Presentation of experimental stimuli and data collection was
controlled by the PSYSCOPE software package (Version 1.2.4; Cohen,
MacWhinney, Flatt, & Provost, 1993) on Apple Macintosh 7200/120
computers that were equipped with dedicated PSYSCOPE button boxes
and 35-cm Apple color monitors. Stimuli were presented on a white
background in black Geneva Macintosh font, 18 point, bold.
The procedure followed closely the original IAT described by Green-
wald and his colleagues (Greenwald et al., 1998). In this task, participants
are asked to categorize target words into one of two categories on the basis
of a particular dimension of judgment (e.g., cancer—good vs. bad). The
particular trials of interest are those that combine two types of judgments.
For example, a series of trials may randomly present target words that
consist of first names that are stereotypic of Blacks or Whites (e.g., Rasaan,
Andrew) as well as nouns with either strong positive or strong negative
evaluative connotation (e.g., love, cancer). The procedure's critical feature
is that both category judgments (e.g., Black vs. White for names and good
vs. bad for nouns) are made using only two response key (e.g., Black/good
vs. White/bad). The time it takes to respond to target words in these critical
trials, therefore, is thought to be influenced by the extent to which the two
categories paired on a single key are associatively related in semantic
memory. Faster responses should be observed for category combinations
that are associatively related, whereas responses should slow down if the
category combinations are inconsistent with the respondent's associations.
Thus, in the case of combining social groups with evaluative categories, a
spontaneous prejudice bias would be reflected in relatively faster responses
on trials in which the out-group is paired with a negative category, relative
to trials in which it is paired with a positive category. Conceptually, this
prejudice bias is equivalent to what we have referred to as an indicator of
"generalized prejudice" (Wittenbrink et al., 1997; Wittenbrink, Judd, &
Park, 2001). It captures an individual's tendency to show a general nega-
tivity bias in associations with the out-group, independent of what the
specific contents of these associations are.
Accordingly, the IAT that was of theoretical interest to us in the current
study invofved Black versus White judgments and good versus bad judg-
ments. The target words consisted of 20 Black and 20 White first names
and of 20 positive words and 20 negative words. The particular items used
as targets were taken from Greenwald et al. (1998, Experiment 3).
In addition to the IAT trials of theoretical interest here, we also included
a set of filler IAT trials to further disguise the actual purpose of the IAT
procedure. For these filler IAT trials, participants had to categorize flowers
and insects (e.g., daffodil—flower vs. insect), using 20 filler items that
were also obtained from Greenwald et al. (1998, Experiment 1).
We organized the administration of IAT trials in blocks, varying judg-
ments and key assignments between blocks. Each block presented partic-
ipants in random order with the full set of target stimuli that were relevant
to the block's judgment task. Specifically, the baseline IAT consisted of a
sequence of five IAT blocks that make up the original Greenwald et al.
(1998) procedure: (Blocks 1 and 2) separate practice trials for each indi-
vidual judgment dimension, (Block 3) critical trials combining the two
judgment dimensions, (Block 4) practice trials for the reverse evaluative
judgments, and (Block 5) critical trials for the reverse combined judg-
ments. These trials were followed by an additional block of filler IAT
trials. The experimental IAT, administered after the movie manipulation,
then repeated the critical IAT trial blocks for combined judgments, each of
which were preceded by a block practicing the key assignment for the
required evaluative judgments. In addition, because evidence from previ-
ous research suggests that the IAT effect can be affected by whether the
consistent or the inconsistent trial blocks are presented first (Greenwald et
al., 1998, Experiment 1), we counterbalanced this order across participants.
The complete baseline IAT consisted of a total of 360 trials (8 blocks
per 40 trials). Of these, 80 trials were critical trials that were used for the
assessment of the baseline IAT effect. The experimental IAT included
another 240 trials, of which, again, 80 trials were critical for the subsequent
data analyses.
As already mentioned, the experimental IAT also included displays of
brief reminders of the movie clips that were used for the context manip-
ulation. For this, we prepared five different 20-s excerpts from each of the
original clips. The excerpts were then digitized so that they could be
presented on the computer screen as part of the experimental IAT trials.
Each of the five 20-s clips was displayed once during each of the two
critical IAT blocks, interrupting the IAT procedure at a randomly chosen
trial.
Results and Discussion
As expected, participants were unfamiliar with the movie clips
used for the stereotype exposure manipulation. When asked about
the movie title and actor names, all participants responded that
they did not know the movie nor the actors. Also, all participants
identified the movie protagonists correctly as African American.
IAT Response Latency Measure
Our primary objective in this study was to demonstrate that
exposure to different aspects of a group stereotype affects spon-
taneous activation of group attitudes, as measured by the IAT.
Thus, in reporting the results, we first focus on the analyses for the
IAT response latency measure. For these analyses, we conducted a
mixed model analysis of variance (ANOVA) that included two
within-subject factors—assessment (baseline/experimental) and
response assignment (consistent/inconsistent)—and two factors
that varied between subjects—stereotype exposure (positive/neg-
ative) and order of IAT blocks (inconsistent first/consistent first).1
' Preliminary examination of the data revealed no significant effects
involving participant gender. Consequently, this factor was not included in
the final analyses.
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Distributions for the response latency data show the common
positive skew and a small number of outliers in which responses
either were started prior to the actual target stimulus or were
delayed because of temporary inattention (see Ratcliff, 1993). To
address these problems in the present IAT data, we excluded
response latencies faster than 300 ms and slower than 3,000 ms
from the statistical analyses and then applied a log-transformation
to the latencies.2
As explained earlier, in the IAT, relatively faster responses to
consistent trials than inconsistent trials indicate a spontaneous
prejudice bias, the "IAT effect." Figure 2 presents the average IAT
effects observed at baseline and after the movie manipulation,
separately for the two stereotype exposure conditions and retrans-
formed into the millisecond metric.
Considering first the results for the baseline IAT, we find that
the response latencies reveal an overall strong spontaneous preju-
dice bias (M = 136.70), F(l, 86) = 136.80, p < .0001. It seems,
however, that participants in the positive and negative stereotype
exposure conditions differed in the extent to which they displayed
a spontaneous prejudice bias. Participants in the positive exposure
condition showed a somewhat larger IAT effect than did those in
the negative condition (Ms = 119.31 vs. 152.93). This difference,
however, is not statistically significant, F(\, 86) = 2.29, p = .134,
as it should not be because participants were assigned randomly to
condition and the experimental procedure did not vary for the two
conditions until after the time of the baseline assessment.3
The postmovie IAT assessment also yielded a sizable overall
IAT effect (M = 62.60), F(l, 86) = 68.44, p < .0001. However,
compared with the baseline assessment, this spontaneous prejudice
bias was now reduced to less than half its original size. This overall
reduction from Time 1 to Time 2 is statistically significant, F(l,
86) = 25.34, p < .0001, and most certainly reflects, in part, a
practice effect on participants' ability to respond quickly to the
target items and to do so in particular on the inconsistent trials.
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However, our main prediction for this study was that this change
from Time 1 to Time 2 would be moderated by the stereotype
exposure manipulation. In fact, comparison of the two exposure
conditions shows that participants who were exposed to the posi-
tive group stereotype showed a significantly larger decrease in
their IAT effect than did participants in the negative exposure
condition (Ms = 104.53 vs. 41.50). This mean difference corre-
sponds to the Assessment X Response Assignment X Stereotype
Exposure three-way interaction, which proves to be significant,
F(l, 86) = 8.08, p = .006. As suggested by the means, the
three-way interaction effect emerges primarily because of the
change in the IAT effect observed in the positive exposure condi-
tion: Whereas the change in the IAT effect from Time 1 to Time 2
is highly significant for participants in the positive exposure con-
dition, F(l, 86) = 30.79, p < .0001, it is not significant for
participants in the negative condition, F(l, 86) = 2.43, p = .127.
In fact, participants in the positive exposure condition, who at
baseline were the participant group with the larger spontaneous
prejudice bias, actually showed a smaller IAT effect following the
experimental manipulation than did participants in the negative
exposure condition (Ms = 48.41 vs. 77.81). Even when we did not
control for the baseline differences between the participant groups,
this now-reversed postmovie difference in IAT effect was margin-
ally significant, F(l, 86) = 3.31, p = .072.
Finally, the present latency data also show significant effects
due to the order of the IAT blocks. Specifically, the overall IAT
effect was reduced reliably when participants started with the
inconsistent IAT trials rather than the consistent trials, F(l,
86) = 10.06, p = .002. A reverse order of IAT blocks also yielded
an overall smaller change in the IAT effect from baseline to the
postmovie assessment, F(l, 86) = 4.84, p = .031, and it did so
more in the negative stereotype exposure condition than in the
positive condition, F(l, 86) = 5.55, p = .021. Although these
order effects are of limited theoretical interest here, the present
data are further indication that counterbalancing the trial order
seems essential for the IAT measure not to be confounded with this
procedural variable.
Explicit Attitude Measures
In addition to the IAT measure, Study 1 also included the six
explicit measures of racial attitudes. From responses to the belief-
based attitude scales, we calculated for each scale participants'
prejudice scores by recoding responses to reversed items and then
averaging across all items of the scale. For the Feeling Thermom-
eter measure, ratings for Blacks were subtracted from those for
Whites. On all measures, higher scores indicate higher levels of
out-group prejudice.
All five belief-based attitude scales had high internal consis-
tency. As is common for a college student sample, they yielded
what are, on average, relatively positive attitudes toward the target
Figure 2. Implicit Association Test effect by stereotype condition and
assessment (Study 2). Response time difference is in milliseconds between
inconsistent and consistent judgment trials collapsed across both order
conditions.
2
 The same latency boundaries and data transformation were used by
Greenwald et al. (1998), who, in addition, also recoded outlier responses
using the boundary values. In the current data, the reported results are not
affected in any substantive way by such data substitution.
3
 The experimenter responsible for this part of the experimental proce-
dure (the IAT assessment) was unaware of participants' condition assign-
ment.
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Table 1
Intercorrelations Among Measures of Racial Prejudice (Study 1)
Measure
Explicit attitudes
1. Modern Racism Scale
2. Pro-Black Scale
3. Anti-Black Scale
4. Diversity Scale
5. Discrimination Scale
6. Feeling Thermometer
Implicit Association Test
Baseline effect
Postmovie effect
Negative condition
Positive condition
1
—
64***
.58***
.60***
.81***
.43***
.18
- .03
.34*
- .19
2
—
.32**
.57***
.68***
40***
.21*
.06
.18
- .03
3
—
.51***
.64***
.29**
.17
- .06
.08
-.14
4
—
.71***
.36**
.21*
.09
.19
.01
5
—
34**
.21*
.07
.36*
- .03
6
—
.31**
.21*
.17
.21
a
.82
.79
.79
.54
.85
M
1.71
3.58
2.73
2.29
2.12
Note. N = 87.
*p£.05. **p£.01. ***p<.0001.
out-group. The correlations among these five scales show high
coefficients and are in the expected direction. The Feeling Ther-
mometer measure was also reliably correlated with the other
explicit measures; however, as in other studies in which we as-
sessed both belief-based attitudes and the Feeling Thermometer
scale (Wittenbrink et al., 2001), it is so to a lesser extent. The top
portion of Table 1 summarizes the internal consistency indices,
scale means, and correlation coefficients for these measures.4
Our primary interest in collecting the explicit measures was to
assess their relationship with participants' spontaneous group at-
titudes and, in particular, to determine how these relationships
were affected by the context manipulation. To this end, we corre-
lated the measures of participants' spontaneous prejudice bias,
their IAT effects at baseline and postmovie, with their responses to
the six attitude measures from the questionnaire (see bottom por-
tion of Table 1).
Beginning with the correlations observed prior to the experi-
mental manipulation, it is noticeable that the relationships between
the explicit and automatic measures remain fairly weak (rs =£ .21,
n = 87, ps > .05). The one exception is the Feeling Thermometer
measure. On this measure, respondents state "how they feel" about
the target group rather than indicate their agreement or disagree-
ment with certain beliefs pertaining to the group. Likewise, the
IAT is based on the strength with which evaluative labels (good,
bad) rather than stereotypic attributes are associated with the target
groups. The present correlation coefficients suggest that the Feel-
ing Thermometer measure indeed taps into something similar to
what is captured by this particular response time measure. Specif-
ically, it shows a moderate but reliable relationship with the IAT
effect (r = .31, n = 87, p = .004). Participants who indicated
relatively more negative feelings toward the out-group on the
Feeling Thermometer task also documented a stronger valence
bias in the response time procedure. Their responses were also
relatively faster in the condition in which out-group labels were
paired with the label bad (see also Wittenbrink et al., 2001).
The second noteworthy point about the correlations between the
explicit measures and the IAT effect is that they are clearly
weakened by the experimental manipulation; this is primarily due
to the effects of the positive stereotype exposure condition. That is,
following the movie manipulation that exposed participants to the
positive out-group stereotype, correlations between the IAT effect
and the explicit measures were no longer systematic. Indeed, four
correlation coefficients were in the direction opposite to what we
expected. In contrast, for participants exposed to the negative
stereotype, the relationship between the IAT measure and the
explicit measure remained systematic, but the nature of this rela-
tionship was changed. In particular, two belief-based attitude mea-
sures, the Modern Racism Scale (r = .34, n = 87,/? = .03) and the
Discrimination Scale (r = .36, n = 87, p = .018), rather than the
Feeling Thermometer measure (r = .17, n = 87, p = .3), showed
moderately strong correlations with participants' postmovie spon-
taneous prejudice bias. Exposure to the negative out-group stereo-
type increased overlap on these measures and the IAT, whereas the
relationship with the Feeling Thermometer measure was weak-
ened. Participants who held more negative beliefs about the out-
group were also more likely to show a spontaneous prejudice bias
on the IAT.
The first experiment, therefore, provides good evidence that
automatically activated group attitudes may vary with situational
context. In this experiment, placement of the category cues into
either a stereotypically positive or a stereotypically negative stim-
ulus context reliably changed participants' responses on the IAT.
When participants watched a video clip with a positive stereotypic
context (i.e., a family barbecue), their responses showed a signif-
icantly larger decrease in spontaneous prejudice bias relative to the
baseline assessment than when they saw a video with a negative
stereotype context (i.e., a gang-related incident).
One important question raised by these findings concerns the
role that intentional elaboration on the part of the perceiver plays
in this variation of automatic attitudes. Study 1 included several
reminders of the two alternative stereotype contexts during the
attitude assessment (i.e., the experimental IAT blocks). However,
prior to this assessment, participants first watched the video clips
and then had the opportunity to elaborate on the different stereo-
type contexts. Thus, one interpretation of the current results is that
4
 All explicit attitude measures remained unaffected by the stereotype
exposure manipulation, Pro-Black Attitudes, F( 1, 86) = 1.23, p - .271; all
others, Fs £ 0.34, ps > .36.
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the change in attitude activation was a result of participants'
rumination about different aspects of their group-related beliefs
and feelings and that such rumination temporarily increased the
accessibility of different memory contents. This interpretation is
consistent with other recent evidence suggesting that automatic
activation of stereotypes may be subject to strategic interference—
for example, when counterstereotypic expectations have been re-
inforced for a period of time (Blair & Banaji, 1996; Blair, Ma, &
Lenton, 2001; Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001).
Although we find it plausible that such intentional and strategic
interference, practiced over a certain period of time, may produce
variation in automatically activated attitudes, it seems less relevant
for the kind of situations that we describe earlier in this article. For
example, the pattern recognition effects described by Selfridge
(1955) certainly do not require the perceiver to first elaborate on
the various shapes of Hs and As that one may encounter. Similarly,
we argue that the suspected differences in memory contents acti-
vated by a Black target at either the United Center in Chicago or
the dark street corner do not result from prior elaboration about the
different situations. Study 2, therefore, is intended to address this
Study 2
Specifically, this second experiment involves a modified version
of Fazio et al.'s (1995) evaluative priming paradigm. The para-
digm is based on a sequential priming procedure in which partic-
ipants are first primed with a group exemplar (e.g., a picture of a
Black or a White target). The primes are followed by target
adjectives, which vary in valence and which participants have to
judge for their evaluative connotation (good/bad). Using this pro-
cedure, Fazio et al. (1995) showed that for White participants,
Black faces facilitated responses to negative items more than to
positive items. As was the case for the IAT, such a valence bias is
again assumed to indicate activation of negative attitudes toward
Blacks.
The current experiment essentially replicates this procedure,
with one critical modification. The priming stimuli varied not only
with respect to their group membership (Black/White) but also
with regard to their context. Independent of group membership,
half of the primes consisted of photos depicting the target person
in a positive context stereotypic of Blacks (a church), whereas the
remaining primes showed the target person in a negative stereo-
type context (a dilapidated street corner). Thus, different from
Study 1, in this second experiment variation of situational context
was an integral part of the response time procedure.
In addition to this primary change concerning the nature of the
context manipulation, Study 2 addresses several other questions
raised by the initial experiment. First, the design of Study 2 allows
for within-subject comparisons between the positive and negative
context conditions that could not be carried out for the data
obtained in Study 1. Second, the use of entirely different stimulus
materials in Study 2 enables us to verify that the context effects
observed in the first experiment were not merely due to peculiar-
ities of the two different movie clips used in the first experiment.
In addition, by relying on a different response time procedure, we
intended to illustrate the importance of context effects across
multiple implicit measures of stereotyping and prejudice.5
Method
Overview
In this second experiment, participants first completed a computer-based
reaction time procedure modeled after the Fazio et al. (1995) evaluative
priming paradigm. Following this computer task, participants worked on an
alleged filler task during which they completed the questionnaire with the
six explicit racial attitude measures from Study 1.
Participants
Fifty participants (6 Asian Americans, 3 African Americans, 41 White
Americans) were recruited in the same fashion as in Experiment 1 (median
age = 19 years). Participants who identified themselves as African Amer-
ican were excluded from the data analyses, as was 1 other participant who
failed to follow instructions during the reaction time procedure. Two
additional participants were excluded from the analyses because they
expressed suspicion about the purpose of the experiment. This resulted in
a total of 44 participants (26 female, 18 male) who were included in the
data analyses.
Materials
The reaction time task was presented using the same computer equip-
ment that was used for Study 1. The priming stimuli for this task were
based on 35 digital color photos of White and Black young adult males. All
photos were head shots taken against a monochrome background. Using
digital photo editing software, we removed the background from these
photos and replaced it with the experimental stimulus contexts. These
contexts consisted of an interior shot of a small Baptist church and the shot
of a street corner with a large graffiti-covered wall. In other words, the
original 35 photos were transformed into two sets of images that depicted
the identical targets either standing in a church or standing at a street
corner.
A set of 24 adjectives served as target items for the reaction time task.
Whereas Fazio et al.'s (1995) stimulus materials included adjectives based
solely on their evaluative connotation, the present study included items that
varied both in valence and in their stereotypicality with regard to the two
target groups (see Wittenbrink et al., 1997). Of these 24 adjectives, 8 were
attributes that are stereotypic of Whites (e.g., educated, greedy), 8 were
attributes that are stereotypic of Blacks (e.g., athletic, poor), and a final set
of 8 items were nonstereotypic adjectives that are not part of the cultural
stereotype for either of these two groups (e.g., appealing). In addition, item
stereotypicality was crossed with item valence so that each set was made
up of four positive and four negative adjectives. The Appendix presents
all 24 target adjectives. During the experiment, these critical target items
were complemented by an additional set of 16 filler items that were used
on filler trials only. Presentation of all lexical stimuli occurred in black
18-point Times Macintosh font on a white background.
Procedures
Computer task. The reaction time task was introduced to participants
as a study "on how people visually recognize words." It followed, in
5
 Study 2 also included an additional measure of out-group bias, a social
distance measure assessing participants' choice of seating distance from an
out-group target (e.g., Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1994).
However, this measure yielded results that were difficult to interpret.
Because the measure is only tangential to the primary goal of this research
and because it was collected after all other parts of the procedure had been
completed, we chose not to include it in this article. A description of
procedure and results, however, is available on request from us.
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principle, the evaluative priming procedure by Fazio et al. (1995) and was
organized into four blocks of individually randomized response trials.
The first block assessed baseline response times for participants' eval-
uative judgments (good/bad) of the target items, presented without a group
prime. Each trial in this block began with a cross mark (+) in the center of
the computer screen. The cross mark was then replaced by the target item,
which remained on the screen for 250 ms. Two seconds after a response
had been made, the block continued with the next trial, until participants
had seen all 24 target items plus 16 filler items and a set of 10 initial
practice trials. For each target, we recorded response and latency of the
response, measured from the target onset. These response latencies served
as the participant's baseline latency in the later assessment of priming
effects.
In keeping with the cover story used by Fazio et al. (1995), the second
trial block consisted of an alleged "face-learning" task, in which partici-
pants had to attend to facial photos for the purpose of later identifying them
from among several foils. Thus, in this second block participants saw a
series of eight practice photos, each presented twice, once with the church
background and once with the street background. Six of these photos
depicted White targets, and two depicted Black targets. None of the photos
was used again in the critical (fourth) priming block.
The third block involved a recognition test of the faces participants had
just seen. Participants were shown a series of 16 photos (the 8 practice
targets, plus 8 foils). Each target was shown with a neutral background and
remained on the screen until the participant had pressed one of two keys,
labeled yes and no.
The fourth trial block involved the critical sequential priming procedure.
Participants were told that the two previous tasks, the word task and the
face-learning task, would be combined to determine how much the dis-
traction from the face-learning task would slow down performance on the
word task. In addition, participants were led to believe that another face
recognition test for the faces included in this block would follow later in
the experiment. In actuality, this second recognition test was never admin-
istered, as it served only as a cover story.
The procedure for this fourth experimental block was the same as in the
first block, with the exception that the cross mark was replaced by a
priming sequence. For this priming sequence, each trial began with the
display of a forward mask. The nature of this mask varied with context
condition and consisted of the background pictures that were also used for
the actual priming stimuli (i.e., the church interior and the street corner).
After 1 s, this mask was replaced with the prime. Because the mask and the
prime background were identical, the prime display left the impression that
a person suddenly appeared in the scene. Presentation of the prime lasted
128 ms, followed by another 128-ms interval during which the screen
remained blank, and then was followed by the target item.6
After an initial set of practice trials with filler photos and items, partic-
ipants saw a total of 144 trials. Of these, 96 trials were experimental trials
that fully crossed, within participants, the four factors of the study's design:
prime (Black/White), prime context (positive/negative stereotype context),
target item (stereotypic of Blacks/stereotypic of Whites/nonstereotypic),
and valence (positive/negative). In other words, every participant saw
all 24 target items four times, each paired once with one of the four
different primes (Black/positive context, Black/negative context, White/
positive context, White/negative context). Four different Black and four
different White faces were used as primes. They were combined with the
target items so that each face was used twice as a prime for each item type
(i.e., Black stereotypic/positive valence)—once in the positive context and
once in the negative context. Although the pairing of target items and faces
was randomized across all participants, the same face was paired with the
same target item in both context conditions.
In addition to these critical trials, participants saw another 48 filler trials
on which an additional eight White faces were paired with filler items.
Additional measures. Once participants had completed the response
time task, they were instructed that the final face recognition test would
take place after a short break and were asked whether they would mind
filling up the time by participating in another short experiment that was
currently being conducted by a friend of the experimenter. All participants
readily complied with this request. The questionnaire that participants
filled out as part of this "experiment" contained the six explicit prejudice
measures already used in Study 1.
At the end of the experimental session, the experimenter probed partic-
ipants for suspicion about any aspects of the procedure and then debriefed
participants about the actual purpose of the experiment. Finally, partici-
pants were thanked and paid for their participation.
Results and Discussion
The primary objective of Study 2 was to demonstrate that
context-dependent variation in the spontaneous activation of group
attitudes, as found in Study 1, can be observed even without prior
elaboration about the nature of this context. In reporting the
results, we again begin with the analyses for the response latency
Response Latency Measure
Again, the latency data included a small number of outliers that
were due to unintended responses or temporary inattention. As in
Study 1, we excluded extremely fast and slow responses from the
data analysis (responses faster than 150 ms and slower than 2
standard deviations above the individual participant's mean re-
sponse time; 3.13% of all responses). The response latencies were
then subjected to a log-transformation to approximate the data to a
normal distribution. Next, participants' log-transformed response
latencies from the experimental block were subtracted from their
log-transformed baseline responses from Block 1 to determine the
effect of the group primes on the response latencies. Thus, more
positive values for these difference scores indicate greater re-
sponse facilitation due to a group prime. They were analyzed as a
function of four within-subject factors: (a) prime (Black/White),
(b) prime context (positive/negative), (c) item stereotypicality
(Black stereotypic/White stereotypic/nonstereotypic), and (d) item
valence (positive/negative), collapsing across the four individual
target items within each of the Stereotypicality X Valence cells of
the design.7 Mean facilitation scores, for ease of interpretation
again retransformed into milliseconds, are given in Table 2.
Our central prediction for these response latency data was that
the context manipulation would alter what responses were facili-
tated by the different group primes. A comparison of the mean
facilitation scores in the top and bottom panels of Table 2 readily
confirms this prediction. In the negative context condition, when
the group primes were presented as part of an urban street scene,
the facilitation scores of our participants reflect the kind of spon-
taneous prejudice bias reported in the original experiment by Fazio
et al. (1995): Black faces disproportionately facilitated responses
to negative target items. This effect is equivalent to the baseline
6
 Thus, the interval between prime onset and target onset (stimulus onset
asynchrony, or SOA) was a total of 256 ms, significantly shorter than the
SOA used by Fazio et al. (1995). We chose this more rigorous stimulus
timing to eliminate any potential influences stemming from controlled
processing of the priming stimuli (see Neely, 1977).
7
 As in Study 1, preliminary analyses of these scores revealed no
significant effects of participant gender.
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Table 2
Mean Response Facilitation by Prime Context in
Milliseconds (Study 2)
Prime type
Black faces White faces
Item stereotypicality
Item valence AA NON WA
Item stereotypicality
AA NON WA
Negative Prime Context
Positive -34.16 -11.18 -10.41 -1.39 -0.56 -1.30
Negative 66.81 56.29 21.14 5.55 4.70 3.16
Positive Prime Context
Positive 61.54 26.53 44.65 41.58 26.70 42.35
Negative 10.16 3.52 -6.33 -7.48 -6.51 -3.57
Note. AA = target items stereotypic of African Americans; NON =
target items stereotypic of neither group; WA = target items stereotypic of
White Americans.
IAT effect from Study 1 and has been documented by various
researchers (e.g., Banaji & Hardin, 1996; Chen & Bargh, 1997;
Dovidio et al., 1997; Fazio et al., 1995, Greenwald, et al. 1998;
Kawakami et al., 1998; Lepore & Brown, 1997; Moskowitz et al.,
1999; Wittenbrink et al., 1997). In contrast, the pattern of means
observed in the positive context condition differed substantially
from this by now familiar finding. In this condition, the mean
facilitation scores showed absolutely no indication of a prejudiced
valence bias. Instead, the same facial primes, now displayed as part
of the church scene, yielded generally stronger facilitation for
positive rather than negative target items.
Analyses of the response latency data confirm this predicted
Context X Prime X Item Valence interaction, F(l, 43) = 10.26,
p = .003. The analyses further reveal two significant lower order
effects related to this three-way interaction: Context X Valence,
F(l, 43) = 36.30, p < .0001, and context, F(l, 43) = 4.06, p =
.050; all other Fs < 1.62. Specifically, the two-way interaction
refers to the fact that, overall, there was a lowered facilitation
advantage for negative items in the positive context condition
(Ms = -42.26 vs. 36.11), whereas the context main effect indi-
cates that the positive context condition yielded stronger facilita-
tion overall than did the negative condition (Ms = 19.43 vs. 8.22).8
Considering the results for the two context conditions sepa-
rately, we find that facilitation scores for the negative context
condition show an overall valence effect with relatively higher
facilitation for negative than for positive target items (Ms = 26.27
vs. -9.83), F(l, 43) = 7.71, p = .008. However, this overall
valence effect is attributable almost entirely to the already men-
tioned differential effect from Black face primes, which facilitated
responses more when the target items were negative than when
they were positive (Ms = 48.08 vs. -18.58). In contrast, facilita-
tion from White faces was essentially the same for negative and
positive items (Ms = 4.47 vs. —1.09). Thus, the overall valence
effect was moderated by a significant Prime X Valence interac-
tion, F (1, 43) = 12.28,/? = .001. Additional tests involving just
the Black face primes indicate that this facilitatory bias for Black
faces for responses to negative items is observed across all three
kinds of adjectives: (Black) stereotypic, nonstereotypic, and
(White) counterstereotypic, F(l,43) = 25.74,p < .0001. However,
the bias was somewhat stronger for adjectives that were stereo-
typic of the group prime than for the other items, F(l, 43) = 5.16,
p = .028. No other significant effects were revealed by the
analyses for this condition (all F s s 1.18).
As we have already explained, in the positive context condition,
the effect of target item valence was reversed. The same facial
primes yielded, overall, stronger facilitation for positive target
items. Moreover, this was true for both Black face primes and
White face primes. Indeed, the only significant effect that emerged
from the analyses for this condition was a main effect due to item
valence, F(l, 43) = 11.91, p = .001 (all other Fs s 1.35).
Additional Measures
In addition to the response latency measure, the experiment also
included the six questionnaire-based attitude scales from Study 1.
The prejudice scores for each of the six questionnaire measures
were calculated in the same fashion as in the previous study. The
overall results are essentially the same as in Study 1, with one
exception: The Anti-Black attitude measure showed uncharacter-
istically low internal consistency (a = .36).
As in Study 1, our primary reason for collecting the explicit
measures was to determine how their relationship with partici-
pants' automatic attitudes was affected by the context manipula-
tion. Thus, separately for each context condition, we correlated
participants' explicit attitude scores with their spontaneous preju-
dice indices from the response time data. As in Study 1, the
resulting correlations remained weak (rs £ .17, n = 44, ps a .26).
And, similar to the results from Study 1, this is again especially
true for the correlations involving the response bias assessed in a
positive context (rs < .12, n = 44, ps S: .41). Once again, the
Feeling Thermometer measure was the exception to this pattern. At
least for the negative context condition, the spontaneous prejudice
index showed a correlation of r = .35, n = 44, p = .02 (positive
context: r = .05, n = 44, p = .752). Thus, with regard to these
correlations, the Study 2 results essentially repeat the general
pattern of findings from the first experiment.
General Discussion
Our primary goal in this research was to determine whether
automatic group attitudes and stereotypes, commonly thought to be
fixed and invariant, are in fact sensitive to changes in the situa-
tional context. The findings from both experiments clearly dem-
onstrate such potential for variation in automatic responses to
social category cues.
8
 These effects of the context manipulation were not limited to only
those target items that were, by nature of the Black stereotype, most closely
related to the two stereotypic contexts included in the study. For example,
results remained essentially the same even when items that are associated
with the church context (religious, musical) were excluded from the anal-
yses. Specifically, the critical Context X Prime X Item Valence interaction
remained significant, although at a slightly lower level, given the reduced
number of trials included in these analyses, F(\, 43) = 6.12, p = .017.
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In Study 1, placement of the category cues into either a stereo-
typically positive or a stereotypically negative stimulus context
reliably changed participants' responses on the IAT. In Study 2,
results from a rather different assessment procedure that used
entirely different stimulus materials again showed that the content
of automatically activated memory contents may vary across dif-
ferent situations. Moreover, Study 2, unlike Study 1, manipulated
context as a within-subject factor. That is, in Study 1, between-
contexts comparisons were carried out across different individuals.
In this initial study, we therefore had to take into account individ-
ual differences that already existed prior to the experimental ma-
nipulation to determine the effect of our context manipulation on
participants' automatic attitudes. In Study 2, however, we ob-
served effects of context as a result of variation within the same
participants, thus strengthening our argument that under different
circumstances, the same person may automatically activate differ-
ent attitudes in response to an attitude object.
Moreover, the particular stimulus timing as well as the nature of
the context manipulation used in Study 2 lead us to believe that the
observed context effects reflect variation in automatic activation
that occurs without prior elaboration or strategic interference on
the side of the perceiver. That is, in Study 2, context was varied at
the level of individual response trials, for which the presentation
order was fully randomized for each individual participant. In
other words, response trials were not presented in blocks repeating
the same context, which would have allowed participants to prac-
tice and elaborate on the nature of the situation. In addition, the
design of Study 2 crossed the context variable with group prime,
so that a given context appeared, randomly, with both in-group and
out-group faces. Furthermore, the stimulus timing for primes and
target stimuli minimized the potential for controlled processing of
the primes, whereas the observed effects were critically deter-
mined by the nature of the primes. That is, for the negative context
condition, Black primes facilitated responses to negative items,
whereas White primes yielded no evidence of such effects. All of
these factors in combination make it unlikely that the current
results reflect effects that stem from participants' rumination over
certain aspects of their group-related beliefs and feelings or that
require participants' strategic interference for suppressing other-
wise automatic responses. Instead, they illustrate that a group
reference may spontaneously activate quite different memory con-
tents depending on the particular circumstances under which it is
encountered.
This is not to say, however, that other context irrelevant memory
contents also associated with a triggering stimulus cue are not
being activated at all. In fact, a more detailed analysis of the
perceptual and cognitive processes underlying concept activation
would probably suggest a sequential mechanism whereby a larger
set of memory contents is initially activated and is subsequently
filtered for its contextual relevance. For example, research on text
comprehension (e.g., Burgess & Simpson, 1988; Gernsbacher,
Varner, & Faust, 1990) indicates that word stimuli yield broad
activation of context-relevant and irrelevant concepts immediately
following exposure to the stimulus (less than 100 ms). However,
activation for context-irrelevant concepts drops rapidly thereafter
(within a few hundred milliseconds). Similar findings have been
reported for activation resulting from nonlinguistic stimuli as well
(e.g., Gernsbacher & Faust, 1991). In other words, consistent with
our present findings, this research also indicates that activation,
although it is initially broad, is context specific and that the
mechanism that produces this specific activation occurs quickly
and does not require any active control on the side of the perceiver
or reader.
In addition, the present experiments offer data that were in-
tended to link the context differences in out-group prejudice ob-
served at the automatic level to other, explicit measures of group
attitudes. With regard to these explicit measures, we observed in
both experiments a similar pattern of weak to moderate relation-
ships. Of course, given their correlational nature and the relatively
small sample sizes for relationships of the magnitude that one
might expect between such diverse measures, these results remain
far from definitive. However, we believe that the additional mea-
sures included in the experiments illustrate that the differences in
spontaneous prejudice introduced by the context manipulations
covary in meaningful and predictable ways with other measures of
out-group prejudice and, therefore, are not merely "blips" in the
distribution of millisecond response latencies.
Components of Group Attitudes
One particular finding that is of interest is that in both studies
the response time procedures yielded somewhat stronger relation-
ships with the Feeling Thermometer measure than with the belief-
based attitude scales. The Feeling Thermometer measure asks
respondents about their feelings toward the target group rather than
about their beliefs pertaining to the group. Likewise, the two
response time procedures that we used in the current experiments
are based on evaluative judgments rather than on judgments that
focus on conceptual aspects of the target items (e.g., lexical deci-
sion tasks). Moreover, in Study 2 the variation of item stereotypi-
cality affected the observed priming effects only to a modest
degree (i.e., only for Black primes in the negative context condi-
tion). This is consistent with results we recently obtained in related
work in which we systematically varied the nature of the judgment
task in a sequential priming procedure (Wittenbrink et al., 2001).
In this research we found that evaluative judgments yielded overall
Prime X Valence effects similar to those observed in the present
studies, whereas a lexical decision task yielded the out-group
valence biases that interacted with the stereotypicality of the target
item. Individual-differences measures based on these response
time procedures also showed different relationships with explicit
attitude measures. The evaluative priming task showed relatively
stronger relationships with a Feeling Thermometer measure,
whereas the lexical decision task resulted in stronger relationships
with belief-based measures like the Modern Racism Scale. What
this suggests, therefore, is that these alternative measures, belief-
based measures on the one hand and evaluative measures on the
other hand, whether at the explicit or implicit level, seem to tap
into separate and partially independent components of group atti-
tudes: conceptual, belief-based aspects of prejudice versus general
feelings and affective responses toward the target group (see also
Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & Devine, 2000).
Automaticity in Social Cognitive Functioning
We believe that the findings from the current two experiments
have important implications for the nature of automatic processing
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in social cognition. Several years ago, Bargh (1989, 1994) offered
an important clarification to the then already extensive evidence
for automaticity in social information processing. He pointed out
that automaticity, rather than describing a discrete form of cogni-
tive functioning, varies substantially with regard to the conditions
that have to be met for the automatic process to take place.
According to this analysis, automaticity comes in a variety of
shapes and flavors, each defined by its particular set of conditions.
For example, goal-dependent automaticity requires activation of a
particular interaction goal prior to encountering a stimulus cue
(e.g., self- vs. other impression formation goals; Bargh & Tota,
1988), whereas postconscious automaticity takes place following
some form of prior processing that is conscious and aware (e.g.,
certain priming effects in impression formation; Banaji, Hardin, &
Rothman, 1993). In addition, this analysis also suggests that au-
tomatic processing may vary with regard to the number of neces-
sary conditions, thus defining a continuum ranging from processes
that are conditioned solely on the presence of a relevant stimulus
cue to processes that require a more complex combination of
circumstances.
We find this analysis particularly useful, as it emphasizes the
fact that all automatic processing is conditional and as it em-
phasizes the need for an analysis of what specific conditions
determine a given automatic process. Naturally, such an anal-
ysis can only benefit from empirical investigations that vary the
relevant variables systematically. For instance, the conditions
that determine whether behaviors trigger automatic trait infer-
ences can only be identified correctly to the extent that they
have been considered as potential candidates in the first place.
Indeed, a number of automatic effects that at first appeared to
be conditioned by a single factor (i.e., the presence of a stim-
ulus cue) have turned out to depend on a more complicated set
of circumstances once researchers began looking for them (e.g.,
the perceiver's goal state in the case of trait inferences; Uleman
& Moskowitz, 1994).
With regard to group attitudes and stereotypes, research has only
recently begun to specify more precisely the conditions of their
automatic activation. As we already mentioned, there is now
growing evidence that the conditions for automatic stereotype and
attitude activation are more complex than the mere exposure to a
category cue. Availability of attentional resources (Gilbert &
Hixon, 1991), the perceiver's processing goals (Macrae et al.,
1997; Moskowitz et al., 1999), and strategic preferences (Blair &
Banaji, 1996; Devine, Plant, Amodio, Harmon-Jones, & Vance,
2000) have been identified so far as conditional factors determin-
ing whether a category cue will result in automatic stereotyping or
attitude activation.
The findings from the present two studies are consistent with
this notion of conditional automaticity. In fact, the present data
suggest that variation in aspects of the situation other than the
category cue cannot only eliminate, hinder, or suppress the auto-
matic process, as demonstrated by the previously mentioned re-
search, but that it is a critical determinant for the exact nature of
the automatic process itself. In the present studies the social
category cues proved to be capable of automatically activating
group-related memory contents under a variety of contexts. How-
ever, depending on the context and, thus, depending on the par-
ticular conditions under which a triggering stimulus cue was
encountered, the particular memory contents that were activated
varied significantly.
Although automatic responses to social category cues do not
appear to be determined solely by the presence or absence of a
triggering cue, the general framework of conditional and multifac-
eted automaticity still leaves this as a possibility for automatic
responses to other kinds of stimuli. However—especially with
regard to the kind of stimulus situations that are generally of
interest to social psychologists—we are skeptical about the viabil-
ity of this form of automaticity, which is conditional only on the
perceiver's exposure to the stimulus cue. That is, we believe that
mere features of a distal stimulus, like the "Blackness" of a target
person, are unlikely to be the sufficient condition for a particular
response. Mere features have to be translated into percepts, a
process that is determined not just by the particular feature in
question but also by a variety of contextual factors like the per-
ceiver's focus of attention, other stimulus features present in the
environment, and so forth. To the extent that there is variation in
these other determinants, there is likely to be variation in the
resulting (spontaneous) cognitive activation. The two experiments
we report demonstrate such potential for variation in automatic
responses with regard to a particular set of stimuli, references to
racial groups. We suspect that the present findings are not limited
to automatic group attitudes and stereotypes but apply to automatic
responses more generally.
Of course, this is essentially the argument that, a long time ago,
Gestalt psychologists put forth against the then dominant doctrine
that psychological functioning could be explained by linking psy-
chological responses to a specific external stimulus. Despite the
fact that Gestalt psychologists emphasized the importance of con-
sciousness and subjective experience, many of the phenomena they
investigated required little active control on the side of the per-
ceiver. For example, Wertheimer's (1923) work on perceptual
organization focused on the experiential nature of perception, yet
it nevertheless was concerned with cognitive processes that clearly
qualify as automatic. As this work on perceptual organization
shows, stimuli may be perceived as part of a grouped entity or as
individual units, depending on the particular context in which they
are placed. Because such construal processes must take place for
any stimulus to acquire subjective reality, Gestalt psychologists
argued that psychological functioning could not be explained on
the basis of an analysis of the "objective" stimulus features alone
(Kohler, 1947).
Ultimately, the arguments advanced by Wertheimer, Kohler,
and their colleagues proved to be critical for a more complete
understanding of human functioning as well as instrumental in
defining the field of social psychology. The distinction between
active controlled processes in social-cognitive functioning and
those that are passive and that occur involuntarily without con-
scious experience has already proven to be enormously important.
However, this advancement in social psychological theorizing
should not lead us to commit once again what Kohler referred to
as the "experience error": assuming that a percept is nothing more
than a copy of the distal stimulus object (Kohler, 1947, p. 162). We
should not ignore one of the primary lessons learned in earlier
days: that distal stimulus features are an insufficient determinant of
human experience and behavior.
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Appendix
Target Items Used in Study 2
Items stereotypic of
African Americans
religious
cheerful
athletic
musical
poor
violent
lazy
threatening
Nonstereotypic items
desirable
fabulous
pleasant
wonderful
awful
horrible
repulsive
rotten
Items stereotypic of
White Americans
intelligent
successful
educated
responsible
boring
uptight
greedy
selfish
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A Model of (Often Mixed) Stereotype Content: Competence and Warmth
Respectively Follow From Perceived Status and Competition
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Stereotype research emphasizes systematic processes over seemingly arbitrary contents, but content also
may prove systematic. On the basis of stereotypes’ intergroup functions, the stereotype content model
hypothesizes that (a) 2 primary dimensions are competence and warmth, (b) frequent mixed clusters
combine high warmth with low competence (paternalistic) or high competence with low warmth
(envious), and (c) distinct emotions (pity, envy, admiration, contempt) differentiate the 4 competence–
warmth combinations. Stereotypically, (d) status predicts high competence, and competition predicts low
warmth. Nine varied samples rated gender, ethnicity, race, class, age, and disability out-groups. Contrary
to antipathy models, 2 dimensions mattered, and many stereotypes were mixed, either pitying (low
competence, high warmth subordinates) or envying (high competence, low warmth competitors). Ste-
reotypically, status predicted competence, and competition predicted low warmth.
Not all stereotypes are alike. Some stereotyped groups are
disrespected as incapable and useless (e.g., elderly people),
whereas others are respected for excessive, threatening compe-
tence (e.g., Asians). Some stereotyped groups are liked as sweet
and harmless (e.g., housewives), whereas others are disliked as
cold and inhuman (e.g., rich people). Surely, such differences
matter.
However, social psychology of late has eschewed the study of
stereotype content, focusing instead on stereotyping processes (for
reviews, see Brown, 1995; Fiske, 1998; Leyens, Yzerbyt, &
Schadron, 1994; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). And for good
reason. Stereotyping processes respond to systematic principles
that generalize across different specific instances of stereotypes, so
the processes invite social–psychological investigation, because
they are presumably stable over time, place, and out-group. If the
contents of stereotypes come and go with the winds of social
pressures, then no single stereotype remains stable and predictable
from theoretical principles.
Alternatively, if stereotypes do come and go with the winds of
social pressures, maybe we can understand those wind patterns
and, thus, some origins of stereotype content. In short, perhaps we
need a model that predicts the intergroup weather: Stereotype
content may respond to systematic principles, just as stereotyping
processes do.
If stereotype content responds to principles, then the first prin-
ciple must identify common dimensions of content. Following
Allport (1954), social psychologists have typically viewed only
unflattering stereotypes as indicating prejudice, where prejudice is
a uniform antipathy or contempt toward an out-group across a
variety of dimensions. Flattering stereotypes have presumably
targeted in-groups or, when they target out-groups, have presum-
ably indicated compunction stemming from modern egalitarian
ideals.
We argue instead that stereotypes are captured by two dimen-
sions (warmth and competence) and that subjectively positive
stereotypes on one dimension do not contradict prejudice but often
are functionally consistent with unflattering stereotypes on the
other dimension. Moreover, we argue that two variables long
identified as important in intergroup relations—status and compe-
tition—predict dimensions of stereotypes. We suggest that for
subordinate, noncompetitive groups (e.g., elderly people), the pos-
itive stereotype of warmth acts jointly with the negative stereotype
of low competence to maintain the advantage of more privileged
groups. For high-status, competitive out-groups (e.g., Asians), the
positive stereotype of their competence justifies the overall system
Susan T. Fiske and Amy J. C. Cuddy, Department of Psychology,
Princeton University; Peter Glick, Department of Psychology, Lawrence
University; Jun Xu, Department of Physiological Science, University of
California, Los Angeles.
This research was partially supported by National Science Foundation
Grant 94-21480 to Susan T. Fiske and by National Institutes of Health
Grant HD33044 to Nancy Forger, which supported Jun Xu at the Univer-
sity of Massachusetts, Amherst. We thank Stephanie Yellin, who helped
with Study 1 data collection, and several individuals who arranged for the
Study 3 data collection: Pat Bauer, Harold and Patricia Casselberry,
Donald and Barbara Fiske, Beth Haines, D. Brett King, Terry Rew-
Gottfried, and Hazel Spears. We also thank Don Operario for his input to
early stages of this research and John Darley, Dale Miller, Debbie Prentice,
and Penny Visser for comments on a draft of the article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Susan T.
Fiske, Department of Psychology, Green Hall, Princeton University,
Princeton, New Jersey 08544-1010. E-mail: sfiske@princeton.edu
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Copyright 2002 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.
2002, Vol. 82, No. 6, 878–902 0022-3514/02/$5.00 DOI: 10.1037//0022-3514.82.6.878
878
but acts jointly with the negative stereotype of low warmth to
justify the in-group’s resentment of them.
Finally, we argue that different combinations of stereotypic
warmth and competence result in unique intergroup emotions—
prejudices—directed toward various kinds of groups in society.
Pity targets the warm but not competent subordinates; envy targets
the competent but not warm competitors; contempt is reserved for
out-groups deemed neither warm nor competent.
Each of these issues—focus on dimensions of content, mixed
(but functionally consistent) content, predictions of that content,
and ensuing types of prejudice—follows precedents set by previ-
ous literature. Our innovation is to synthesize these insights into a
model of stereotype content that cuts across out-groups.
Focus on Content: Competence and Warmth
Unencumbered by theory, the classic study of stereotype con-
tents (D. Katz & Braly, 1933) was replicated at Princeton over
about 20-year intervals (G. M. Gilbert, 1951; Karlins, Coffman, &
Walters, 1969; Leslie, Constantine, & Fiske, 2001). These studies
document changes in the favorability (mostly improving) and
uniformity (decreasing) of stereotypes over time but do not un-
cover dimensions or principles therein. Although the Katz–Braly
checklist method has limitations (Devine & Elliot, 1995; Madon et
al., 2001), it does provide one of the few consistently documented
measures of stereotypes across groups.1 However, the Katz–Braly
lineage does not claim theoretical roots.
From a functional, pragmatic perspective (Fiske, 1992, 1993b),
we suggest that dimensions of stereotypes result from interper-
sonal and intergroup interactions. When people meet others as
individuals or group members, they want to know what the other’s
goals will be vis a` vis the self or in-group and how effectively the
other will pursue those goals. That is, perceivers want to know the
other’s intent (positive or negative) and capability; these charac-
teristics correspond to perceptions of warmth and competence,
respectively.
A variety of work on intergroup and interpersonal perception
suggests the relevance of these two dimensions in social percep-
tion. In the intergroup domain, early on, one ethnic out-group (i.e.,
Jews) was viewed as competent but not warm, and another (i.e.,
“Negroes”) was viewed as warm but not competent (Allport, 1954;
Bettelheim & Janowitz, 1950). Curiously, this older ethnic-group
distinction echoes modern-day views about perceived subgroups
of women (Deaux, Winton, Crowley, & Lewis, 1985; Eckes, 1994;
Noseworthy & Lott, 1984; Six & Eckes, 1991): disliked, dominant,
competent, nontraditional women (e.g., career women, feminists,
lesbians, athletes) versus likable, dependent, incompetent, tradi-
tional women (e.g., housewives, sometimes “chicks”). Overall, the
ethnic and gender distinctions both fit our hypothesized dimen-
sions of competence and warmth.
From various out-group stereotypes, Fiske and Glick (Fiske,
1998, p. 380; Fiske, Xu, Cuddy, & Glick, 1999; Glick & Fiske,
1999, 2001b) constructed a preliminary model of stereotype con-
tent: Stereotype content may not reflect simple evaluative antipa-
thy but instead may reflect separate dimensions of (dis)like and
(dis)respect. Some out-group stereotypes (e.g., housewives, dis-
abled people, elderly people) elicit disrespect for perceived lack of
competence; other out-group stereotypes elicit dislike for per-
ceived lack of warmth (e.g., Asians, Jews, career women). Al-
though some groups may elicit both dislike and disrespect (e.g.,
welfare recipients), qualitative differences among stereotypes are
captured by the crucial dimensions of competence and warmth.
The plausibility of competence and warmth as core dimensions
also springs from person perception research: Asch’s (1946)
warm–cold versus competence-related adjectives (Hamilton &
Fallot, 1974; Zanna & Hamilton, 1977) and multidimensional
scaling of trait descriptions (Rosenberg, Nelson, & Vivekanathan,
1968; see also Jamieson, Lydon, & Zanna, 1987; Lydon, Jamieson,
& Zanna, 1988). Perceptions of individuals in groups also vary
along a task dimension and a social dimension (Bales, 1970).
Relatedly, Peeters (1983, 1992, 1995) has argued for the dimen-
sions of self-profitability (e.g., confident, ambitious, practical,
intelligent)—akin to competence—and other-profitability (e.g.,
conciliatory, tolerant, trustworthy)—akin to warmth. The Peeters
distinction has been applied to national stereotypes (Peeters, 1993;
Phalet & Poppe, 1997; Poppe & Linssen, 1999)2, values (Woj-
ciszke, 1997), and evaluations of social behavior (Vonk, 1999).
Across racial prejudice, gender subgroups, national stereotypes,
and person perception, thus, come two dimensions. They fit the
functional idea that people want to know others’ intent (i.e.,
warmth) and capability to pursue it (i.e., competence). Groups
(like individuals) are distinguished according to their potential
impact on the in-group (or the self). Our stereotype content mod-
el’s first hypothesis hence holds that perceived competence and
warmth differentiate out-group stereotypes.
Mixed Stereotype Content
Across out-groups, stereotypes often include a mix of more and
less socially desirable traits, not just the uniform antipathy so often
assumed about stereotypes. Specifically, we suggest that mixed
stereotypes for some out-groups include low perceived compe-
tence but high perceived warmth. These paternalistic stereotypes
portray out-groups that are neither inclined nor capable to harm
members of the in-group. Another, equally important mixture
depicts out-groups that are seen as competent but not warm,
resulting in envious stereotypes. These groups are acknowledged
to be doing well (for themselves), but their intentions toward the
in-group are presumed not to be positive. Consistent with this idea,
Phalet and Poppe’s (1997) multidimensional scaling of Central and
Eastern European stereotypes revealed the majority (37 out of 58)
in two quadrants: incompetent but moral/social (e.g., Byelorus-
sians, Bulgarians, Czechs) and competent but immoral/unsocial
(e.g., Germans, Jews).
Paternalistic and envious stereotypes result from the combina-
tion of two separate dimensions, which also allows for the more
traditional kinds of prejudice, uniform derogation of a disliked and
disrespected out-group and pure in-group favoritism toward the
competent and warm in-group. But our model emphasizes the
mixed combinations, the off-diagonal cells of a theoretical Com-
1 Case studies of specific groups (e.g., Americans, Sisley, 1970; Blacks,
Devine & Elliot, 1995; see Fiske, 1998, for others) document continuity
and change over time but do not provide comparable measures across
groups.
2 The Phalet and Poppe (1997) work supported two bipolar dimensions,
which they termed competence and morality, but morality included honest,
helpful, and tolerant–socially warm traits.
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petence  Warmth matrix. We argue that these mixed combina-
tions are frequent because they are functional. Our second hypoth-
esis holds that many stereotypes are mixed on competence and
warmth, as defined by low ratings on one dimension coupled with
high ratings on the other.
Paternalistic Stereotypes
Paternalistic mixed stereotypes show up in race, age, dialect,
and gender prejudice. Ambivalent racism (I. Katz & Hass, 1986)
depicts a mix of anti-Black attitudes (e.g., perceived incompetence
and laziness, violating the work ethic) and paternalistic pro-Black
attitudes (e.g., perceived pitiful disadvantage, deserving help).
Overall, paternalistic mixed stereotypes portray a group disre-
spected but pitied, which carries overtones of compassion, sym-
pathy, and even tenderness, under the right conditions.3 In ageism,
dominant views of older people as not competent but kind suggest
a similarly ambivalent dynamic (Cuddy & Fiske, 2002). Linguistic
out-groups provide another example: Speakers of nonstandard
dialects (e.g., Scottish accents in Great Britain, Chicano accents in
the United States) are perceived as less competent but simulta-
neously friendly (Bradac, 1990; Ruscher, 2001). Paternalism ap-
pears prominently in gender stereotypes. The Ambivalent Sexism
Inventory (ASI; Glick & Fiske, 1996, 2001a, 2001b) measures, in
part, subjectively benevolent sexism (BS), which includes pater-
nalistic power relations; BS is directed toward traditional women
(homemakers), who are viewed as warm but not competent outside
the home. When people rate women in general, traditional home-
makers serve as the paternalistic default (Haddock & Zanna,
1994); this generates the “women are wonderful” effect: positive
ratings of generic women (Eagly & Mladinic, 1989), but primarily
on communal (i.e., warm), not agentic (i.e., competent), qualities.
All four paternalistic stereotypes (regarding disadvantaged Blacks,
elderly people, nonstandard speakers, and traditional women) de-
scribe out-groups perceived as low on competence but high on
warmth.4
Envious Stereotypes
In contrast stands a different set of out-groups stereotyped as
highly competent but not warm (Glick & Fiske, 2001a, 2001b):
nontraditional women, Jews, and Asians. The ASI in part measures
hostile sexism (HS), which includes competitive gender roles; HS
is directed toward nontraditional women (e.g., career women,
feminists, lesbians, athletes), who are viewed as task competent
but not warm (see also Eagly, 1987; Glick, Diebold, Bailey-
Werner, & Zhu, 1997; MacDonald & Zanna, 1998). Anti-Semitic
notions of a Jewish economic conspiracy exaggerate Jews’ stereo-
typically feared competence, whereas views of them as self-
serving portray them as not warm (Glick, in press). The modern
American equivalent, Asians—who are viewed as the model mi-
nority—are seen as too competent, too ambitious, too hardwork-
ing, and, simultaneously, not sociable (Hurh & Kim, 1989; Kitano
& Sue, 1973; Sue & Kitano, 1973; Sue, Sue, & Sue, 1975). The
Anti-Asian-American Prejudice scale measures dislike for this
perceived lack of sociability along with envious respect of per-
ceived competence (Lin & Fiske, 1999). Thus, nontraditional
women, Jews, and Asians elicit a shared stereotype as being too
competent and not at all nice.
Why Mixed Stereotypes Occur
Although isolated analyses of specific out-groups suggest mixed
competence–warmth ascriptions, the present research aims to ex-
amine whether these mixed stereotypes are sustained across a
wider variety of out-groups, all compared at once.
Our approach emphasizes a 2  2 (Warmth  Competence)
interaction (see Table 1). The mixed stereotypes hypothesis pre-
dicts that many out-group stereotypes fall into two cells: high
warmth but low competence for compliant subordinates, and low
warmth but high competence for successful competitors. For pa-
ternalized out-groups, the mixed stereotype justifies their subordi-
nation (i.e., low competence) and encourages their compliance
(i.e., high warmth). They are seen as having no intent to harm
societal reference groups and no ability to do so, in any case. The
mixed stereotype functions to promote existing systems of privi-
lege and to placate the nonthreatening but disadvantaged out-
groups by assigning them socially desirable, though subordinating,
traits (Ridgeway, 2001). Socioeconomically successful out-
groups, however, pose a competitive threat, and their success
elicits envy. For envied out-groups, the mixed stereotype explains
their apparent success, thereby justifying the system of meritoc-
racy that benefits societal reference groups and dominant in-
groups. Stereotypes of low warmth justify taking action against
envied groups by casting the groups as being concerned only with
furthering their own goals. Thus, envied groups may be appropri-
ately resented and socially excluded.
Because these mixed stereotypes involve two separate dimen-
sions, they are not psychologically inconsistent—one may view a
group as warm but not competent (e.g., the elderly as nice but
dotty) or as competent but not warm (e.g., Asians as cold but
efficient) without experiencing discomfort. Furthermore, the func-
tional perspective suggests that both envious and paternalistic
stereotypes maintain the status quo and defend the position of
societal reference groups. We hypothesize that many out-groups
are stereotyped as high on either competence or warmth but low on
the other, precisely because these combinations are functionally
consistent for perceivers. These mixed combinations have been
3 Although hostility and aggression have surfaced as content in some
subtypes of Blacks (Devine, 1989; Devine & Elliott, 1995; Devine, Mon-
teith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991), this may be directed primarily toward
criminal or militant Black people, with the generic out-group reflected in
modern prejudice scales being those ambivalently perceived as lazy but
disadvantaged (i.e., incompetent but deserving sympathy). We return to
this point. Note also that these mixed racial stereotypes could reflect a
conflict between predominantly negative stereotypes and egalitarian ideals
(Allport, 1954; Devine, 1989; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Kinder & Sears,
1981; McConahay, 1983). Although we do not dispute the importance of
contemporary egalitarian norms, we note that paternalistic stereotypes of
perceived low competence and high warmth are not a uniquely modern
development. European colonialism and American slavery both were jus-
tified through stereotypes of non-Whites as warm and simple folk requiring
the guidance of a superior culture (Jackman, 1994), a stereotype evident in
older images of Black people in American films and literature (e.g., Uncle
Tom). This low-competence, high-warmth stereotype clearly does not
reflect an egalitarian sensibility.
4 Attributions of warmth to targets should not be confused with perceiver
feelings of warmth toward those same targets.
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neglected by prior treatments that focus on uniformly negative
stereotypes (see Glick & Fiske, 2001b).
Of course, out-groups do not fall into only these two mixed
cells. Low-status groups viewed as openly parasitic (i.e., opportu-
nistic, freeloading, exploitative) underlings are banished to the not
warm, not competent cell. These groups are rejected for their
apparent negative intent toward the rest of society (i.e., not warm)
and for their apparent inability to succeed on their own (i.e., not
competent).
At the opposite extreme, who is favored as both warm and
competent? We suggest three possible inhabitants of this cell:
Through in-group favoritism, the in-group may be rated both warm
and competent. Close allies in a hostile world might also be
allowed a purely positive stereotype. And the cultural default (e.g.,
middle class) may be viewed in an unmixed, positive way. We
refer to both in-groups and societal reference groups because in the
United States, at least, many groups view themselves as part of the
societal ideal; for instance, most Americans identify themselves as
middle class (even if qualified by lower or upper). Similarly,
Whites and Christians, even where they are not a local majority,
may be viewed as culturally dominant, societywide reference
groups. Even groups who acknowledge their own exclusion from
the cultural ideal may still identify with aspects of the societal
reference group. Hence, people’s understanding of culturally
shared stereotypes takes the perspective of society’s dominant
reference groups.
Predicting Stereotype Content
If stereotype contents systematically vary along competence and
warmth, with many stereotypes falling in the mixed combinations,
the question follows, what predicts where groups fall on these
mixed dimensions? In their 1933 study, D. Katz and Braly noted
that
the degree of agreement among students in assigning characteristics
. . . seems too great to be the sole result of the students’ contacts with
members of those races. . . . Prejudice of this kind seems largely a
matter of public attitude toward a race name or symbol. (pp. 288, 290)
Stereotype content may result from shared public views of groups.
Hence, we focus on perceived cultural—that is, shared—stereo-
types. Why the consensus on groups’ warmth and competence?
We suggest that cultural stereotypes result from the social
structural relations between groups in two primary ways. Specif-
ically, the social structural hypothesis proposes, first, that out-
groups are perceived as more competent to the extent that they are
perceived as powerful and high status or as less competent to the
extent that they are perceived as powerless and low status. The
perceived link between a group’s societal outcomes and its per-
ceived competence serves several functions. This link may repre-
sent a form of correspondence bias, namely, that people’s behavior
(in this case, their position) reflects their traits (D. T. Gilbert &
Malone, 1995). Or it might reflect just-world thinking, namely,
that people get what they deserve (Lerner & Miller, 1978). At the
level of groups, it justifies the system (Jost & Banaji, 1994) and
legitimates power–prestige rankings (Berger, Rosenholtz, &
Zelditch, 1980; Ridgeway & Berger, 1986).
The opposite viewpoint is conceivable: Cultural stereotypes
could instead reflect group-level sour grapes (with a bigot reason-
ing that the out-group may have high status, but they inherited it,
lucked out, or cheated, so they do not deserve it, and they actually
are stupid). However, we suggest that intergroup stereotypes turn
in part on consciousness of power relations; stereotypes function to
justify the status quo (Berger et al., 1980; Fiske, 1993a; Glick &
Fiske, 2001b; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost, Burgess, & Mosso, 2001;
Ridgeway & Berger, 1986). Envious stereotypes devolve on that
high competence but low warmth lot who seem to be doing better
than others. This prediction receives support from findings that
perceived power strongly predicted perceived competence in Cen-
tral and Eastern European stereotypes (Phalet & Poppe, 1997;
Poppe & Linssen, 1999).
The second part of the social structure hypothesis holds that
out-groups are seen as relatively warm and nice to the extent that
they do not compete with others. Compliant subordinate groups
fulfill a convenient role, so they receive paternalistic prejudice,
which disrespects their competence but simultaneously likes the
qualities that keep them subordinated as long as they do not pose
a threat. Warmth-related identities placate subordinates by assign-
ing them socially desirable traits that conveniently also imply
deference to others (Glick & Fiske, 2001b; Ridgeway, 2001).
Negative intentions are not attributed to noncompetitive out-
groups, and attributions of warmth help to maintain the status quo
with a minimum of conflict (Jackman, 1994).
In contrast, competitive out-groups frustrate, tantalize, and an-
noy, so they are viewed as having negative intent. Out-group goals
presumably interfere with in-group goals, so they are not warm. A
primary source of negative affect toward out-groups results from
perceived incompatibility of their goals with in-group goals (Fiske
& Ruscher, 1993). If out-groups are successful, they receive
grudging respect for their envied control over resources but never
are liked as warm.
Low–low groups (e.g., welfare recipients), viewed as parasites
in the system, also compete with other groups, not for status but for
resources nonetheless. In allegedly draining economic and political
capital from society, they supposedly compete in a zero-sum
allocation of resources. Their goals are incompatible with others
(and in that sense are competitive), so they are not warm.
Table 1
Four Types of Out-Groups, Combinations of Status and
Competition, and Corresponding Forms of Prejudice as a
Function of Perceived Warmth and Competence
Warmth
Competence
Low High
High Paternalistic prejudice Admiration
Low status, not competitive High status, not competitive
Pity, sympathy Pride, admiration
(e.g., elderly people, disabled
people, housewives)
(e.g., in-group, close allies)
Low Contemptuous prejudice Envious prejudice
Low status, competitive High status, competitive
Contempt, disgust, anger,
resentment
Envy, jealousy
(e.g., welfare recipients, poor
people)
(e.g., Asians, Jews, rich
people, feminists)
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Finally, of course, the in-group, its allies, and reference groups
do not compete with themselves, so they are acknowledged as
warm. The cultural default groups (middle class, Christian, het-
erosexual) may not be viewed as competitive, precisely because
they possess cultural hegemony. Support for the competition 3
warmth prediction also comes from the Phalet and Poppe (1997)
and Poppe and Linssen (1999) studies, in which perceived inter-
nation conflict negatively predicted socially desirable traits (i.e.,
morality or warmth).
Generally parallel efforts to predict intergroup images from
structural relations show up in previous work: for example, enemy
images in political psychology (Alexander, Brewer, & Herrman,
1999)5, the social role theory of gender stereotypes (Eagly, 1987;
Eagly, Wood, & Diekman, 2000)6, and analyses of city-dweller
and rural-dweller stereotypes (Campbell, 1967; LeVine & Camp-
bell, 1972).7 Both the Eagly (1987) and the Campbell (1967) role
analyses focus on characterizing behaviors that result from roles,
hence their social utility. Nevertheless, our view is more general,
at once applying to many more social groups and going beyond
analyses of specific roles. We also emphasize the functional com-
patibility of combinations that mix perceived competence and
warmth, whereby the high–low combination justifies resentment,
the low–high combination justifies subordination, and both main-
tain the status quo.
Review of Hypotheses
The goals of this research are to investigate our proposals
regarding stereotype content:
1. Perceived competence and warmth differentiate out-group
stereotypes.
2. Many stereotypes include mixed ascriptions of competence
and warmth, as defined by low ratings on one dimension coupled
with high ratings on the other.
3. Stereotypes depict out-groups as competent to the extent that
they are perceived as powerful and high status; stereotypes depict
out-groups as relatively warm and nice to the extent that they do
not compete with others.
Research Strategy
A preliminary study and three of the current studies (on eight
samples) address these hypotheses. Each study uses a sample of
6–25 out-groups, which come primarily from judges’ nominations
of out-groups that are important in the current U.S. scene. Partic-
ipants rated cultural stereotypes of the out-groups on a series of
trait adjectives derived from previous work. We then separately
factor analyzed each group’s trait ratings and isolated those that
loaded distinctly on competence and warmth dimensions. Traits
that loaded consistently across groups constituted two common
dimensions, which provides an initial evaluation of the hypothesis
that competence and warmth differentiate out-groups. Each group,
with its score on the common competence and warmth dimensions,
became a unit in cluster analyses. Reasonable cluster solutions
derive from standard decision rules. We compared clusters for
distributions of groups across the entire space to examine further
the dimensional hypothesis.
For the mixed stereotypes hypothesis, we examined (a) proportions
falling into the mixed, off-diagonal combinations, (b) between-
clusters group differences on competence and on warmth, (c) within-
cluster group differences between competence and warmth, and (d)
individual within-group competence and warmth differences.
Participants also rated each group on items assessing perceived
status and competition, with specific items again derived from
their reliability across a new set of factor analyses within each
rated individual group. Correlations of status and competition
scales with competence and warmth scales assess the third, social
structural hypothesis.
A fourth study, on a ninth sample, examines unique affective
responses for each of the four competence–warmth combinations.
Elaboration of that hypothesis appears later.
Preliminary Evidence
Previous studies have lacked theory, cross-groups comparison,
or generalizable samples. To examine the mixed content of ste-
reotypes, as predicted by social structural variables of status and
competition, we undertook some preliminary studies (Fiske et al.,
1999). Forty-two undergraduates rated consensual stereotypes
of 17 groups on competence and warmth traits.8 A first study
5 When we examine internation images, we find that their taxonomy
predicts that incompatible goals (paired with status or strength) lead to
negative perceptions along the warmth dimension: hostile, untrustworthy,
ruthless, evil. Low status and power lead to perceived lack of competence
and some form of warmth. Their parsing of the dimensions differs from
ours, as they separate status, capacity (strength), and compatibility, logi-
cally creating the possibility of a 2 2 2 matrix, of which they specified
four cells. Moreover, they did not theorize about fundamental dimensions
or the mixture of stereotype content or address how the attribution of
positive traits can reinforce some types of prejudice (e.g., attributed com-
petence can be integral to feelings of envy and resentment). But their
scenario studies support the point that social structure (status and compe-
tition) predicts out-group images.
6 Broad gender stereotypes distinguish stereotypically female communal
traits (e.g., warmth, nurturance) from stereotypically male agentic traits
(e.g., competent, confident, assertive). Social role theory suggests that
gender stereotypes result from three overlapping factors: division into
homemakers and employees, sex-typed distribution in paid occupations,
and high-status versus low-status roles. Social role theory holds that
perceivers infer traits from observations of role-constrained behavior, so
when groups tend to be concentrated in certain roles, they receive the
stereotype that follows from these roles. As these roles shift, gender
stereotypes should, too (Diekman & Eagly, 2000). In a fictional portrayal
of city workers and child raisers, role-based stereotypes mimicked gender
stereotypes, perhaps rationalizing the distribution of the sexes into social
roles (Hoffman & Hurst, 1990). This framework for gender roles resembles
ours, but applied so far only to men and women.
7 Low-status rural people stereotypically are close to the earth, resemble
animals, and inhabit a sphere related to sociality; when they are disre-
spected, their perceived faults follow primitive, emotional–social lines:
sex, aggression, and laziness. In contrast, high-status city dwellers inhabit
a sphere related to sophisticated, cerebral, economic enterprise; when they
are disliked, their perceived faults follow achievement-related lines: greed,
ambition, and dishonesty.
8 We used a pool of traits derived from Conway, Pizzamiglio, and
Mount’s (1996) study of communality and agency in gender stereotypes,
and the final scales included five competence traits (i.e., competent, intel-
ligent, confident, competitive, independent) and four warmth traits (i.e.,
sincere, good natured, warm, tolerant). The original list of adjectives
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indicated that many groups fell along the diagonal from being
relatively high on competence but low on warmth to being rela-
tively low on competence but high on warmth, forming two
predominantly mixed clusters.
A second study examined social structure correlates of stereo-
typic competence and warmth, with the same groups rated on the
single traits of competence and likability (for warmth) along with
the hypothesized social structural correlates, status and competi-
tion.9 Perceived status did predict perceived competence, and
perceived competition predicted perceived (lack of) warmth.
Although they are generally supportive of our framework, these
preliminary studies were theoretically undeveloped (i.e., did not
include the functional analysis developed here), focused on a
broad-brush description that has proven insufficiently sensitive
(i.e., only two clusters), and did not include emotional reactions
(i.e., prejudices). Moreover, the preliminary studies have several
methodological shortcomings. First, they used groups that are
certainly current on the U.S. scene but that were selected by our
own judgment. Thus, a critic could argue that the results fit the
hypotheses because the groups were selected to fit the model.
Second, the entire trait scale appeared in the first study only, so the
second study’s social structural correlates tested only one trait for
each dimension, which is hardly ideal but was necessary to prevent
participant fatigue. A critic could argue that this creates a weak test
of the hypotheses, generalizing inappropriately from one study to
another without completely overlapping scales. Third, the respon-
dents were University of Massachusetts undergraduates, so if they
accorded some positive attributes to any given out-group (i.e., not
rating any minorities as completely without positive attributes),
perhaps this derived from their liberal political orientation, north-
east subculture, or college egalitarianism. Fourth, a salient Amer-
ican out-group, Blacks, fell unaccountably in the middle on
warmth and competence.
Current Studies
The current full-scale studies, long surveys on four samples and
short surveys on five samples, formally test our hypotheses. To
avoid potential bias in sampling out-groups, in our pilot studies we
checked the selection of groups to be included in the surveys. To
avoid separating the trait and social structure scales, we included
both scales on each questionnaire. To include varied samples, we
ensured that five out of nine samples comprised adult respondents,
whereas four samples went outside Massachusetts to diverse loca-
tions across the United States. To address the puzzlingly nonde-
script stereotypes of Blacks, we better specified that out-group in
terms of commonly used subgroups.
This research fills a gap in studies of stereotype content by
simultaneously examining groups that cut across gender, age, race,
ethnicity, nationality, social class, and disability. It investigates
stereotypes that do not neatly fit into the antipathy model of
prejudice. It also examines prejudices that correspond to different
types of out-groups. Moreover, it offers theoretically guided social
structure correlates as predictors of stereotype content. In addition,
it taps a wide variety of respondents in the United States.
Pilot Study: Selecting Representative and Relevant
Groups for Study 1
The pilot study sought a more representative array than the
groups in our initial studies.
Method
Participants
University of Massachusetts undergraduates (24) and nonstudent Am-
herst, Massachusetts, residents (7) volunteered to complete the question-
naire (15 women, 12 men, 4 unknown; mean age 21.5 years). They were
completely unaware of our hypotheses and unacquainted with stereotyping
research.
Questionnaire and Procedure
Participants completed a self-administered, open-ended questionnaire at
home, reading the following:
Off the top of your head, what various types of people do you think
today’s society categorizes into groups (i.e., based on ethnicity, race,
gender, occupation, ability, etc.)? In the space below, please list
between eight and sixteen such groups.
Most participants finished the questionnaire in less than 10 min.
Results and Discussion
The most frequently listed groups were Blacks (74%), Hispanics
(45%), rich people (45%), poor people (42%), gay men (39%),
Asians (32%), elderly people (29%), blue-collar workers (23%),
Jews (23%), disabled people (19%), retarded people (16%), poor
Whites (13%), physically attractive people (13%), professionals
(13%), southerners (10%), welfare recipients (10%), business or
9 The structural measures included perceived status (e.g., prestigious
jobs, economic success, good education) and perceived competition with
the in-group (e.g., special breaks, resource conflict, power trade-off). In
addition, several measures involved what was intended to be cooperation or
voluntary mutuality, which we expected to load on a bipolar cooperation–
competition factor. Instead, these items (i.e., cooperative relations being
necessary, difficult to achieve goals without their help, relying on them,
being in a cooperative relationship to achieve common goals) ended up
being perceived as obligatory asymmetrical dependence. That is, partici-
pants seemed to view these items as indicating that cooperative relations
were necessary, often because the group being rated was perceived as
powerful. Because repeated attempts to construct a reliable measure in
Studies 1 and 3 yielded no useful results, these items are omitted in
descriptions of these studies.
included some negative ones, but our respondents did not use these
consistently to describe societal stereotypes across groups, as revealed by
patterns across factor analyses calculated for each group separately. Hence,
we are left with two positive dimensions that run from low to high. This,
however, seems acceptable for reasons of theory and precedent. First, much
prejudice is indicated by the withholding of positive attributes and rewards
from out-groups, as Mummendey (1995) and Dovidio, Kawakami, and
Gaertner (2000) have shown, so one might expect more variation in
positive attributes than in negative ones. Second, the person perception
literature has shown for some time that people tend to use variations in the
positive end of the scale to assess other people because negative evalua-
tions carry disproportionate weight (Fiske, 1980; Skowronski & Carlston,
1989).
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professional women (10%), and housewives (3%). Of the 17
groups used in the preliminary studies, 12 were listed by at least 1
person in our new sample, which suggests that the preliminary list
was not too biased by our hypotheses. Nevertheless, these re-
sponses—as well as the prior results—changed some of the groups
considered.
The new set included 23 groups, 12 of which appeared in both
our preliminary studies and the pilot sample: rich people, gay men,
Asians, elderly people, Jews, disabled people, retarded people,
southerners, welfare recipients, businesswomen, housewives, and
Latinos (which we changed to Hispanic to reflect respondents’
own terms). The pilot study added blue-collar workers and poor
Whites, which makes 14 groups that directly fit the pilot study.
Five groups were included for purely theoretical reasons. Be-
cause of the gender subgrouping literature, which indicates four
consistently replicated subtypes (i.e., housewives, career women,
feminists, and sex objects), feminists were retained, although they
were not mentioned in the pilot, and sexy women were added.
Because of our interest in locating Blacks more precisely, we
tried separating Black subgroups by social class on the basis of our
pilot sampling listing poor Blacks among poor people, our own
judgment, and prior studies (Bayton, McAlister, & Hamer, 1956;
Smedley & Bayton, 1978): We chose Black professionals and poor
Blacks. If respondents had been combining these two groups
previously, the averaged response might land generic Blacks in the
middle. If we were wrong to divide them, professional and poor
Blacks should end up in the same middle location as before. We
added poor Whites to examine race–class stereotypes suggested by
this division of Blacks and also to fit the pilot study item poor
people.
Finally, four groups resulted from psychometric concerns. Be-
cause of our interest in retaining groups that might be significant
in the United States outside the northeast, we kept migrant workers
and house cleaners and added Arabs. For continuity, we also
retained blind people. Thus, the new set of groups, although it was
not entirely determined by our pilot sample’s response, included
the major groups mentioned by them as well as some other
theoretically and politically interesting ones. In any event, the
essential sample was not determined a priori by our specific
hypotheses.
Study 1, Long Survey: Competence, Warmth, Mixed
Stereotypes, and Their Predictors
Students and nonstudents were surveyed about society’s percep-
tions of social groups’ traits and the structural relationships of
status and competition. An adult and a student sample, both from
Massachusetts, completed a questionnaire on which they rated 23
groups on warmth and competence traits and on social structure
variables representing status and competition.
Method
Participants
Students. University of Massachusetts undergraduates, recruited from
various psychology courses, completed the questionnaire for course credit (50
women, 23 men, 1 who did not indicate gender; mean age 19.4). Of the 74
participants, 58 (78%) identified themselves as White or Caucasian, 6 (8%) as
Black or African American, 4 (5%) as Asian, 3 (4%) as multiethnic, and 2
(3%) as European, leaving 1 (1%) unknown. Participants completed the
questionnaires in groups of 10–20, using an empty classroom and taking less
than half an hour. One questionnaire was eliminated because it had a comple-
tion rate of less than one fifth, which left us with n  73.
Nonstudents. Fifty nonstudents (25 women, 13 men, and 12 who did not
indicate gender; mean age  35.2), recruited by undergraduate psychology
students, completed the questionnaires in their own home on a volunteer basis.
Most of the adults were friends or family of University of Massachusetts
students. Two thirds of the participants identified themselves as White. The
students who recruited participants received extra course credit for their
involvement. Because of the unmonitored conditions under which the ques-
tionnaires were completed and some of the sample’s apparent inexperience
with questionnaires, 12 questionnaires were omitted because respondents
failed to follow the instructions, which left us with n  38.
Questionnaire and Procedure
The questionnaire named the same 23 groups listed on the second pilot
questionnaire. Participants rated these groups on scales reflecting warmth,
competence, perceived status, and perceived competition (see Table 2);
items were scrambled. Participants were instructed to make the ratings,
using 5-point scales (1  not at all to 5  extremely), on the basis of how
the groups are viewed by American society. They read, “We are not
interested in your personal beliefs, but in how you think they are viewed by
others.” As in all our studies, this instruction was intended to reduce social
Table 2
Scales, Study 1
Construct Items
Competence As viewed by society, how . . . are members of this group?
[competent, confident, independent, competitive, intelligent]
Warmth As viewed by society, how . . . are members of this group?
[tolerant, warm, good natured, sincere]
Status How prestigious are the jobs typically achieved by members of this group?
How economically successful have members of this group been?
How well educated are members of this group?
Competition If members of this group get special breaks (such as preference in hiring decisions),
this is likely to make things more difficult for people like me.
The more power members of this group have, the less power people like me are likely
to have.
Resources that go to members of this group are likely to take away from the resources
of people like me.
Note. For the Competence and Warmth Scales, the points of ellipsis were replaced by the words in brackets
for each question.
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desirability concerns and to tap perceived cultural stereotypes. Students
received written feedback, and nonstudents received oral feedback.
Results
This study tests the introduction’s three hypotheses. To test the
utility of warmth and competence in describing out-groups, we
examined their two-dimensional array in cluster analyses. To test
the frequency of mixed combinations, we examined the distribu-
tion of groups into various clusters and assessed differences in
warmth and competence ratings for each group. To test the struc-
tural hypotheses, we examined correlations of status with compe-
tence and competition with (lack of) warmth.
Perceived Competence and Warmth Differentiate Among
Out-Group Stereotypes
To construct trait and predictor scales, we needed ones that
worked for each group separately but that overlapped across
groups. We calculated 23 factor analyses (one per group) exam-
ining all 26 response items; these typically yielded five–eight
factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0. Across groups, five
similar factors emerged consistently, and these formed the scales
of competence, warmth, status, and competition (as noted in Foot-
note 2, we omitted cooperation).
Each participant rated the 23 groups according to the compe-
tence scale (competent, confident, independent, competitive, intel-
ligent; student   .90, nonstudent   .85) and warmth scale
(tolerant, warm, good-natured, sincere; student   .82, nonstu-
dent   .82). For each of the 23 groups, the competence and
warmth ratings each were averaged across participants, so the
means supplied competence and warmth scores for each group.
According to these means, the 23 groups arrayed on a two-
dimensional Competence  Warmth space (see Figures 1 and 2).
As predicted, the two dimensions differentiated the groups.
To examine the structure of this two-dimensional space, we
conducted two types of cluster analyses of the 23 groups. Follow-
ing Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and Black (1995), we first conducted
hierarchical cluster analyses (Ward’s, 1963, method, which mini-
mizes within-cluster variance) to determine the best fitting number
of clusters. We then conducted k-means cluster analyses (with the
parallel threshold method) to determine which groups fell into
which clusters. The distinction between the two analyses roughly
parallels stepwise and simultaneous multiple regression.
To decide the number of clusters that best reflect the data, we
examined agglomeration statistics from the hierarchical analysis. Us-
ing Blashfield and Aldenderfer’s (1988) guidance, we interpreted the
hierarchical cluster analyses with a twofold approach. First, we iden-
tified a plausible number of clusters using typical decision rules, and,
second, we validated that solution several ways.10
10 Regarding the first step, Blashfield and Aldenderfer (1988) wrote,
“Most resolutions to the number-of-clusters problem in applied research
have involved some subjective analysis of the cluster solution” (p. 463).
Hierarchical cluster analysis produces an agglomeration schedule that
specifies which cases or clusters have been merged in each stage and that
provides coefficients indicating distances between each pair of cases or
clusters being merged at each stage. According to Blashfield and Aldender-
fer (1988), “a jump (in coefficients) implies that two relatively dissimilar
clusters have been merged, thus the number of clusters prior to the jump is
the most reasonable estimate of the number of clusters” (p. 463). The SPSS
statistical package Version 10.1 in-program tutorial also instructs, “The
stage before the sudden change indicates the optimal stopping point for the
merging clusters.” This technique, as in the more familiar scree plots of
factor analysis eigenvalues, searches for the “elbow” in the plot, using the
relatively vertical portion of the plot as the number of clusters or factors to
pursue. Thus, we used this graphical technique as the stopping rule for
determining the ideal number of clusters for each data set.
Blashfield and Aldenderfer (1988) recommended validating a cluster
solution by (a) replicating across samples. We follow this advice, as
reviewed in each study. Additionally, as in factor analysis, one can validate
the utility of the proposed solution by (b) examining the relationships of the
obtained factors or clusters to each other. We provide t tests that compare
clusters centers with each other. Moreover, one can validate cluster solu-
tions by (c) examining their relationship to other variables. We provide a
second pair of variables (the status and competition predictors) that map
onto our warmth–competence clusters in Studies 1–3. And Study 4 exam-
ines the clusters’ ratings on still another set of variables (emotions).
Figure 1. Four-cluster solution, Study 1, long survey, student sample.
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For both student and nonstudent samples in this study, the last
large change came in the break between three and four clusters, so
we adopted a four-cluster solution. As footnoted, this decision rule
resembles the scree test in factor analysis, whereby researchers
have typically cut the number of factors at the bend in the eigen-
values, below which lies statistical rubble.
Next, we turned to the k-means cluster analysis to examine
which groups fit into which cluster. For both the student sample
(see Figure 1) and the nonstudent sample (see Figure 2), one
cluster comprised seven groups: Asians, Black professionals, busi-
nesswomen, feminists, Jews, northerners, and rich people. These
groups also clustered together in the less useful three- and two-
cluster solutions in both samples (Table 3), so this cluster was
stable across samples and across solutions.
Another cluster comprised three groups: blind people, elderly
people, and housewives; for both samples, these were groups that
clustered together also in the four-, three-, and two-cluster solu-
tions, making these stable solutions. The student sample added to
this cluster disabled people, house cleaners, and retarded people,
who appeared with the others in all three student cluster solutions,
making this addition a stable result for the student but not the
nonstudent sample.
Another cluster also included, for both students and nonstu-
dents, three groups: poor Blacks, poor Whites, and welfare recip-
ients, groups that appeared together in all three cluster solutions for
each sample, making this a stable result. Students consistently
added Hispanics to this trio in all cluster solutions, making this
group stable in this cluster for students. Nonstudents included
house cleaners and disabled people here rather than in the previous
cluster, in which the students had placed them; nonstudents also
added migrant workers here; the last three groups remained in all
nonstudent solutions.
The final cluster included only two groups that consistently
appeared together across solutions and across samples: blue-collar
workers and southerners. Across samples and across solutions, the
remaining groups (Arabs, gay men, sexy women, and, for students,
migrant workers) did not reliably cluster with these two or with
each other.
In short, competence and warmth dimensions differentiated
among four stable clusters that meaningfully and reliably ac-
counted for 16 of the 23 groups (70%) across solutions and
samples.
Table 3
Group Cluster Assignments in Two-, Three-, and Four-Cluster
Solutions, Students and Nonstudents, Study 1
Group
Students Nonstudents
4a 3 2 4 3 2
Asians 2 2 2 2 2 2
Black professionals 2 2 2 2 2 2
Businesswomen 2 2 2 2 2 2
Feminists 2 2 2 2 2 2
Jews 2 2 2 2 2 2
Northerners 2 2 2 2 2 2
Rich people 2 2 2 2 2 2
Blind people 4 3 1 3 3 1
Elderly people 4 3 1 3 3 1
Housewives 4 3 1 3 3 1
Retarded people 4 3 1 3 1 1
Disabled people 4 3 1 4 1 1
Housecleaners 4 3 1 4 1 1
Poor Blacks 1 1 1 4 1 1
Poor Whites 1 1 1 4 1 1
Welfare recipients 1 1 1 4 1 1
Hispanics 1 1 1 1 1 1
Migrant workers 3 3 1 4 1 1
Blue-collar workers 3 2 2 1 3 2
Southerners 3 2 2 1 3 2
Gay men 3 3 2 1 3 2
Arabs 3 1 1 1 2 2
Sexy women 3 3 1 1 2 2
Note. Groups indicated in boldface showed the most stable respective
clusters, across solutions and across samples. Breaks between clusters
indicate student solutions; nonstudent solutions differed only slightly, as
indicated in the right three columns.
a Indicates the number of clusters in the solution.
Figure 2. Four-cluster solution, Study 1, long survey, nonstudent sample.
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Many Stereotypes Include Mixed Competence
and Warmth
We defined mixed stereotypes as low ratings on one dimension
coupled with high ratings on the other; our hypothesis holds that a
substantial number of out-group stereotypes will prove high on
either competence or warmth but low on the other. Three analyses
address this hypothesis.
First, compare the means for the four cluster centers (Table 4).
In both samples, the cluster with the highest competence ratings
(student M  4.04, nonstudent M  3.78) is the one that reliably
contains Asians, Black professionals, businesswomen, feminists,
Jews, northerners, and rich people. In both samples, this cluster’s
rated competence differed significantly from all the other clusters
(student M  2.29 to 3.14, nonstudent M  2.41 to 3.12, all ps 
.001). Matched pair t tests reveal a significant difference between
this cluster center’s scores on competence (above) and warmth
(student M 3.12, nonstudent M 2.94), student t(6) 5.61, p
.01; nonstudent t(6)  6.34, p  .01. Therefore, in both samples,
this cluster was higher in competence than in warmth, a mixed
combination by our definition.
The cluster with the highest warmth rating (student M  3.62,
nonstudent M  3.48) was the one that reliably contained house-
wives, elderly people, and blind people, with some others included
by students. In both samples, this cluster’s warmth differed sig-
nificantly from all other clusters (student M  2.66 to 3.14,
nonstudent M 2.74 to 3.01; all ps .05). Warmth scores (above)
were significantly higher than the competence scores (student
M  2.49; nonstudent M  2.50) for members of this cluster,
student t(5) 6.76, p  .001; nonstudent t(3) 6.98, p  .01. For
both samples, this cluster was higher in warmth than in compe-
tence and therefore mixed by our definition.
Note that, of 23 groups, the two mixed clusters contained 13
groups for the student sample and 11 groups for the nonstudent
sample, which suggests a substantial number of out-groups that did
not fit the pure antipathy hypothesis.
Who came closest to fitting the pure antipathy hypothesis? Poor
Blacks, poor Whites, and welfare recipients (along with other
groups that depend on the sample, as noted) reliably elicited low
marks on both dimensions, which amounts to derogation relative to
other clusters. The cluster that reliably scored the lowest on both
warmth (student M 2.66, nonstudent M 2.74) and competence
(student M  2.29, nonstudent M  2.41) differed significantly
( p  .01) from the other means in 8 out of 12 comparisons across
the two samples. Though lowest on both dimensions, they fared
worse on competence than warmth, student matched t(3)  3.80,
p  .05; nonstudent matched t(5)  4.66, p  .05.
The remaining cluster (which reliably contained southerners and
blue-collar workers, and others depending on the sample and the
solution) lay in the middle on both dimensions (student M  3.14
and 3.14 for competence and warmth, respectively; nonstudent
M  3.01 and 3.12), which did not differ significantly from each
other. They elicited neither pure derogation nor mixed prejudice,
by our definition.
Finally, at the level of individual groups, we examined matched
pair t tests comparing competence and warmth ratings for each of
the 23 groups, separately for the student and nonstudent partici-
pants. Competence and warmth ratings differed significantly for 20
groups in the student sample and for 17 groups in the nonstudent
sample (see Table 5). In both samples, 9 groups were perceived to
be significantly more competent than warm (from highest to low-
est difference): rich people, Asians, feminists, businesswomen,
Jews, Black professionals, northerners, sexy women, and Arabs;
all except the latter two (which showed the smallest differences)
fell in the direction predicted by their cluster membership.
For students, 11 groups, and for nonstudents, 8 groups were
rated as more warm than competent (from highest to lowest):
retarded people, housewives, disabled people, elderly people, blind
people, house cleaners, poor Whites, migrant workers, poor
Blacks, welfare recipients, and gay men; the first six (the biggest
Table 4
Competence and Warmth Means for Each Cluster, Study 1
Cluster
Students (n  73) Nonstudents (n  38)
Competence Warmth Competence Warmth
Asians, Black professionals, businesswomen,
feminists, Jews, northerners, rich people 4.04a  3.12b 3.78b  2.94b
Housewives, elderly people, blind people
retarded people 2.49c  3.62a 2.50c  3.48a
(student sample adds housecleaners,
disabled people)
Poor Whites, poor Blacks, welfare recipients 2.29c  2.66c 2.41c  2.74b
(student sample adds Hispanics; nonstudent
sample adds housecleaners, disabled
people, migrant workers)
Blue-collar workers, southerners 3.14b  3.14b 3.12b  3.01b
(both samples four-cluster solution adds
Arabs, gay men, sexy women;
nonstudents add Hispanics; students add
migrant workers)
Note. Groups clustered reliably across solutions and across samples, except for the variants noted parenthet-
ically. See text for details of cluster membership. Within each row, within each sample, means differ ( p  .05)
if  or  is indicated. Within each column, means that do not share a subscript differ ( p  .05).
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differences) all fell in the direction predicted by their cluster
membership.
Competence and warmth ratings did not differ for southerners,
blue-collar workers, and Hispanic people in either sample; this
result fits their consistent location in the middle of the cluster
space.
Levels of analysis for clusters and for individual groups can be
combined: For the students, 13 groups, and for the nonstudents, 10
groups elicited mixed stereotypes (indicated by the within-group t
tests) predicted by their cluster membership. Thus, roughly half the
groups showed consistently mixed stereotypes across samples and
methods of analysis.
Status Predicts Competence, and Competition Predicts
Warmth
Having provided evidence of the importance of the competence
and warmth dimensions as well as the substantial numbers of
groups in the mixed combinations, we turn to social structural
predictors of groups’ places in the trait space. Out-groups are
perceived as competent to the extent that they are perceived as
powerful and high status or as incompetent to the extent that they
are perceived as powerless and low status; out-groups are seen as
relatively warm and nice to the extent that they are perceived as
not competing with the mainstream in-group.
We had developed social structure predictor scales for status
(student   .92, nonstudent   .78) and competition (student
  .69, nonstudent   .61; see Table 2). The student partici-
pants and nonstudent participants rated the 23 groups on these
scales. We used two procedures to analyze the relationships be-
tween the traits (competence and warmth) and the hypothesized
social structure correlates. First, the group-level procedure aver-
aged the trait and social structure ratings across participants for
each of the 23 groups and then entered each group’s mean ratings
for correlational analyses (see upper portion of Table 6). The
second, individual-level procedure examined the correlation be-
tween traits and social structure for the 23 groups, separately for
each individual participant (73 student participants, 38 nonstudent
participants), after which the participants’ correlation coefficients
were averaged within sample (see lower portion of Table 6).
The results from the two procedures and samples are similar.
Perceived status was highly correlated with perceived competence
by both procedures for the student sample, group-level r(21) 
.98, p  .001; individual-level r(71)  .83, p  .001, and the
nonstudent sample, group-level r(21)  .97, p  .001; individual-
level r(36)  .64, p  .001. Although the group-level correlations
might seem surprisingly high, recall that they are based on the
stable group means collapsed across all participants, so they ag-
gregate across individual-level variation as well as across multiple
items for each scale. However, even the individual-level mean
correlations substantially support our hypothesis that perceived
status confers competence.
Perceived competition negatively correlated with perceived lack
of warmth for the student sample, group-level r(21)  .98, p 
.001; individual-level r(71)  .83, p .10, and the nonstudent
sample, group-level r(21)  .97, p  .001; individual-level
r(36) .64, ns. Again, the group-level correlation takes advantage
of the stability achieved when we averaged across all participants
in the sample, and those correlations substantially support our
hypotheses. The individual-level correlations are weak. Surprised
by the discrepancy between the individual-level and group-level
correlations, we examined the distributions of the individual cor-
relations. For the students, the distribution was clearly bimodal,
with 52 correlations centering on a mode of .46, a dip at .00,
and 20 correlations centering at .13. For nonstudents, although the
Table 6
Correlations Between Traits and Predictors, Study 1
Predictor
Competence Warmth
Students Nonstudents Students Nonstudents
Group-level
Status .98*** .97*** .04 .09
Competition .33† .55** .68*** .53**
Individual-level
Status
r .83*** .64*** .08 .06
% 94 76 27 24
Competition
r .16 .19 .22† .11
% 31 21 29 24
Note. Group-level df  21; individual-level student df  71; individual-
level nonstudent df  36. Individual-level correlations were converted to
Fisher’s z scores, averaged, then reconverted to correlations. Percentages
are the percentage of participants for whom that correlation was significant
( p  .05).
† p  .10. ** p  .01. *** p  .001.
Table 5
Mean Paired Differences (Competence  Warmth) for Student
and Nonstudent Samples, Study 1
Group Student (n  73) Nonstudent (n  38)
Rich people 1.736*** 1.493***
Asians 1.073*** 0.897***
Feminists 1.016*** 0.779***
Businesswomen 0.902*** 0.824***
Jewish people 0.706*** 0.733***
Black professionals 0.551*** 0.625***
Northerners 0.429*** 0.371*
Sexy women 0.374*** 0.371*
Arabs 0.194* 0.601***
Southerners 0.143 0.206
Hispanics 0.009 0.006
Blue-collar workers 0.002 0.110
Gay men 0.213* 0.174
Welfare recipients 0.401*** 0.422**
Poor Blacks 0.500*** 0.118
Migrant workers 0.511*** 0.383**
Poor Whites 0.518*** 0.236
House cleaners 0.654*** 0.429**
Blind people 0.865*** 0.706**
Elderly people 0.960*** 0.982***
Disabled people 1.058*** 0.829***
Housewives 1.475*** 0.991***
Retarded people 1.755*** 1.460***
Note. Matched pair t tests revealed that the competence and warmth
ratings significantly differed for most groups. Means of paired differences
(competence rating  warmth rating) are reported.
* p  .05. ** p  .01. *** p  .001.
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distribution was not bimodal, 26 of 35 correlations were negative,
ranging between .61 and .00, with the minority again positive.
Thus, the competition–warmth hypothesis holds at the group level
of analysis for both samples and at the individual level of analysis
for 72% of the student sample and 74% of the nonstudent sample.
The off-diagonal correlations (i.e., status with warmth, compe-
tition with competence) were nonsignificant, as predicted, except
for unexpected group-level correlations between competition and
competence. Examination of the competence items suggests why:
In our preliminary studies, factor analyses of students’ trait ratings
indicated that competence included the traits competitive and in-
dependent. Those items naturally correlate with a scale of zero-
sum tradeoffs. (Study 2 addresses this point.)
Discussion
This study focuses on three hypotheses. Support for perceived
competence and warmth as differentiating out-group stereotypes
appeared in cluster analyses that used competence and warmth;
four stable clusters consistently accounted for 70% of the groups,
across solutions and samples. Support for the substantial number
of mixed stereotypes—low ratings on competence coupled with
high ratings on warmth or vice versa—came from three analyses:
For each sample, two cluster centers were rated significantly
higher on warmth than on competence or vice versa. Half the
studied groups fell into one of these two mixed clusters. And
across samples, matched pair t tests indicated that the same half of
the groups showed consistently mixed stereotypes. Finally, support
for the hypothesized correlations between social structure predic-
tors and traits is strong for the status–competence prediction at the
group and individual levels of analysis. For the competition–
warmth correlation, support is strong at the group level and weaker
at the individual level, though in the predicted direction for 72–
74% of the participants.
The reasons for this last discrepancy are not clear. One possi-
bility is that a minority of respondents hurried through the ques-
tionnaire, using a halo heuristic, simply rating some groups more
positively than others on all dimensions, thereby positively corre-
lating warmth and competition in their own answers. This fits the
bimodal pattern of these data for the student sample and is plau-
sible for the nonstudent sample as well. Study 2 reassesses this
relationship under circumstances that are less overwhelming for
respondents. In addition, Study 3 reassesses the relationship using
far fewer groups and scales to undercut any fatigue or carelessness
caused by the sheer number of ratings in Study 1 (23 groups  26
ratings  598 responses).
Overall, the support for the hypotheses is substantial, as pre-
dicted for many of the included groups. Nonetheless, the excep-
tions are informative. Although cross-culturally a gender subgroup
of sexy women appeared reliably (Fiske, 1998), this group did not
emerge as incompetent but warm in these Massachusetts samples.
Although we had brainless bimbo in mind, some of our respon-
dents may have been thinking villainous vamp. Moreover, the
blue-collar workers, gay men, Hispanics, and southerners did not
fall into any of the expected quadrants. These groups may possess
less consensual stereotypes in our sample. Alternatively, sub-
groups might explain the middling and unstable results for these
groups; two polarized subgroups can cancel each other out.
This had been exactly the case for Blacks in our prior studies.
The Study 1 results for Black professionals and poor Blacks
explain the previously obtained nondescript stereotype for Blacks
as a whole. That is, in the previous studies, the two distinct
subgroups apparently had canceled each other out, leaving the
generic group in the middle. In these data, the content of Black
racial stereotypes depends entirely on social class (cf. Bayton et
al., 1956; Smedley & Bayton, 1978). Along these class-oriented
lines, participants did not distinguish poor people by race: Poor
Blacks, poor Whites, and all welfare recipients were incompetent
and not warm.
Revealing as these results are, our sampling of groups still is not
fully representative. Although many were picked according to our
pilot test, some were selected on the basis of our theories and our
curiosities. One might argue that the empirical support emerges
from the particular groups used. Study 2 adheres to stricter criteria
for selecting groups.
The four-cluster solutions for Study 1 reveal clusters in three
quadrants of a 2  2 Competence  Warmth matrix, with a fourth
cluster indecisively stationed in the middle. What groups fit into
the high competence, high warmth combination? Not out-groups,
we suggest, but in-groups, their allies, or cultural default reference
groups. To test this hypothesis, Study 2 explicitly includes
in-groups.
Among the Study 1 groups, competence differentiated more
than warmth did. For students, the range was 1.75 on competence
and 0.96 on warmth; for nonstudents, the range was 1.37 on
competence and 0.74 on warmth. Both dimensions differentiated
significantly among the groups, and the warmth effect sizes are
large by Cohen’s (1992) standards (see General Discussion). The
warmth differences may suffer merely in comparison with the
larger competence differences, not because they are intrinsically
small effects. In any case, these particular groups and scales do not
establish whether competence is generally a stronger dimension in
intergroup perceptions, so a new sample of groups and traits would
be informative.
One might also critique the competence and warmth scales in
their own right. The warmth scale includes elements of both
sociality (good-natured, warm, tolerant) and morality (sincere), but
all are prosocial traits. On the other dimension, we defined com-
petence as task competence, in keeping with the person perception
and small groups literatures. Moreover, undergraduates’ own rat-
ings of the adjectives went into the factor analyses that determined
which traits entered the scales. But others might disagree, so a
thesaurus resolved the issue in Study 2.
Turning to the social structure variables, we note that status and
competition for the most part correlated respectively with compe-
tence and (lack of) warmth. The competition–warmth negative
relationship held across groups and for the majority of participants
at the individual level of analysis; the sizes of the group-level
correlations indicate a substantial relationship between perceived
competition and lack of warmth. However, in both samples,
individual-level analyses showed weaker results; improved scales
might increase the correlation, so Study 2 addresses this question.
On the other hand, the group-level correlation for status predict-
ing competence might seem suspiciously high. One answer is
statistical: Averaging across participants to derive a score for each
group, then assessing the correlation across groups, allows an
unusually large, stable correlation. A critic might argue that we are
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measuring the same variable twice (after all, the correlations are in
the range of more than satisfactory reliabilities). To this, we
respond that social status variables (e.g., prestigious jobs, eco-
nomic success, good education) are not conceptually identical to
competence traits (e.g., competent, competitive, confident, inde-
pendent, intelligent). Nevertheless, Study 2 sharpens the distinc-
tion between predictors and traits by removing the potential over-
lap between the predictor well-educated and the trait intelligent; it
eliminates the former. It also adds new competence traits (e.g.,
capable, skillful) that are distinct from status.
If they are not the same conceptual variable, a critic might
argue, the status–competence results are obvious. We respond
that, a priori, our hypothesis was not obvious. As suggested in the
introduction, the reported cultural stereotype could have viewed
high-status groups resentfully, as not deserving their position but
instead being incompetent and phony. People could have re-
sponded differently if they thought the cultural stereotype holds
that many high-status people do not deserve their attainments or
that outcomes are arbitrary. Finally, the extremely high status–
competence correlation in our samples is further sustained by the
Phalet and Poppe (1997) high beta coefficients for a similar
relationship.
Finally, the oddly high (and not predicted) correlation of com-
petence with competition is easily explained by the inadvertent
inclusion of competitive and independent in the traits for compe-
tence. Study 2 deletes these traits.
Groups-Listing Pilot Study for Study 2
In addition to concerns that our inclusion of theoretically inter-
esting out-groups may have biased previous samples, we noted that
groups representing pure antipathy may not have been given
sufficient chance to emerge, so we explicitly asked pilot partici-
pants for low-status groups. Moreover, our eliciting procedures
may have omitted mainstream groups or the respondents’ own
in-groups, so we explicitly requested them as well.
Method
Participants and Procedure
Sample 1. Thirty Massachusetts students and nonstudents, recruited by
undergraduates in psychology, volunteered to complete the self-
administered, open-ended survey in their own homes. One respondent was
omitted for failing to follow instructions, leaving n  29 (16 men, 13
women; mean age  46.1). The majority of participants (27) identified
themselves as White (plus 1 biracial, 1 Black).
Sample 2. Thirty-one University of Massachusetts undergraduates
completed the self-administered, open-ended survey in their own homes.
Six were omitted for failing to follow instructions, leaving n  25 (10
men, 15 women; mean age  20.1). Most participants (18) were White
(plus 5 biracial, 2 Black).
Sample 3. Twenty-one University of Massachusetts psychology under-
graduates (4 men, 17 women; mean age  21.3) volunteered to complete
the third item in the questionnaire at the beginning of a class period. All
were White except 1 participant (who was biracial).
Questionnaire
Sample 1 and 2 participants read and answered the following three
questions:
1. Off the top of your head, what various types of people do you think
today’s society categorizes into groups (i.e., based on ability, age,
ethnicity, gender, occupation, race, religion, etc.)?
2. What groups are considered to be of very low status by American
society?
3. What groups, based on the same kinds of criteria used in the first
question, do you consider yourself to be a member of?
Planning to survey students for the revised questionnaire, we desired a
roster of in-groups relevant to that sample. Thus, we included only under-
graduates in analyses of the in-group question.
Results and Discussion
In Question 1, 21 groups were listed by 15% or more of the
participants, our criterion for inclusion on Study 2s revised long
survey; they were (in descending order): Blacks/African Ameri-
cans (65%), Whites (57%), Hispanics (56%), Jews (48%), women
(46%), Christians (44%), elderly people (43%), men (43%),
Asians (41%), blue-collar workers (30%), disabled people (26%),
teens/young people (26%), poor people (22%), rich people (22%),
middle class (20%), professionals (20%), educated people (20%),
Muslims (20%), Native Americans (17%), students (17%), and gay
men (15%).
Question 2 elicited some redundant groups: Blacks (57%), His-
panics (54%), poor people (28%), and blue-collar workers (26%).
Also, the following four groups emerged: welfare recipients
(37%), homeless people (26%), drug dealers (20%), and mentally
retarded people (20%).
When asked to list in-groups (Question 3), participants named
Whites (60%), students (40%), Christians (48%), middle class
(38%), women (32%), educated (36%), and men (22%).
Study 2, Revised Long Survey: Competence, Warmth,
Mixed Stereotypes, and Their Predictors
Armed with a new list of groups in Study 2, we aimed to use
stricter inclusion criteria, determined solely by our pilot partici-
pants, and to explicitly include both in-groups and those out-
groups that might most favor the antipathy hypothesis rather than
our mixed prejudice hypothesis. Revised competence and warmth
scales aimed to fit more closely with common usage and to see
whether warmth would differentiate more strongly among groups
and correlate more strongly with its hypothesized predictor, com-
petition. For the status–competence correlations, Study 2 used
scales with even less potential overlap than the Study 1 scales had.
Finally, to prevent halo effects, we decreased demands on partic-
ipants by dividing the groups list.
Method
Participants
University of Massachusetts undergraduates (N  148; 111 women, 37
men; mean age  19.8), recruited from lower level psychology courses,
completed the questionnaire for extra credit. The majority of participants
(122) identified themselves as White. Of the remaining 26 participants, 13
self-identified as Asian, 5 as Hispanic, 4 as Black, 2 as multiethnic, and 2
as being in no group. On a 5-point scale ranging from low (1) to upper (5),
the average social class was 3.27, and the modal response was “middle.”
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Questionnaire and Procedure
Instructions and circumstances were the same as Study 1s student
sample, except as follows: Participants rated 25 social groups (designated
by the second groups-listing pilot) on items measuring competence,
warmth, status, and competition (see Table 7). To prevent fatigue, partic-
ipants rated the group list split in half (12 and 13). Because results are
analyzed primarily at the group level (i.e., each out-group receives mean
ratings, which are then compared with other groups’ mean ratings), ran-
domly assigning different participants to rate different groups and then
combining the data sets seemed permissible. The order of presentation
reversed for each list, yielding four versions of the questionnaire, to which
participants were randomly assigned.
This questionnaire differed essentially from the first long survey in two
regards: (a) Items were added and deleted to reflect warmth (we added
friendly, well-intentioned, and trustworthy, and we dropped tolerance) as
well as competence (we added capable, efficient, and skillful, and we
dropped competitive and independent). (b) The roster of social groups,
derived from the groups-listing pilot, now included in-groups and addi-
tional low-status groups.
Results
Using Study 1s technique, 25 factor analyses (1 per group)
examining 25 items yielded five–eight factors with eigenvalues
greater than 1.0. Across groups, five similar factors emerged
consistently: Competence (competent, capable, intelligent, effi-
cient, skillful, and confident;   .94), Warmth (warm, good-
natured, sincere, friendly, well-intentioned, and trustworthy;  
.90), and abridged scales of Status (prestigious jobs and economic
success;   .89) and Competition (“special breaks . . . make
things more difficult for me” and “resources to this group . . . take
away from resources for me”;   .67). (See Footnote 9.)
Perceived Competence and Warmth Differentiate Among
Out-Group Stereotypes, and Many Stereotypes Are Mixed
As in Study 1, two types of cluster analysis examined the first
hypothesis, that stereotypes of groups fall along two main dimen-
sions of competence and warmth. We calculated competence and
warmth scores for each of the 25 groups by averaging across
participants. Preliminary analyses indicated that on warmth, drug
dealers scored three standard deviations below the mean of all
other groups, so they seemed to be from a different population
distribution; we eliminated this outlier from the remaining analy-
ses. (If included, it would constitute by far the lowest score on
warmth, M  1.45, and comparable to the lowest competence,
M  2.31.)
Agglomeration statistics generated by hierarchical cluster anal-
ysis point to a five-cluster solution as the best fit for the 24 groups,
using the same rule as before. Because this survey added in-
groups, which we expected to score high on both competence and
warmth, but did not delete the previously middling groups, the
five-cluster solution was expected.
As before, a k-means cluster analysis, parallel threshold method
examined cluster memberships (see Figure 3). One cluster, high
competence and low warmth, comprised six groups: Asians, edu-
cated people, Jews, men, professionals, and rich people. A
matched pair t test on its cluster center shows this cluster to be
perceived as significantly more competent (M  4.29) than warm
(M  3.23), t(5)  7.80, p  .01. The contents and center of the
cluster closely resemble the comparable cluster in the first two
samples, despite changes in scales and groups; feminists, business-
women, northerners, and Black professionals are missing from
Study 2, but otherwise the configuration is similar. This cluster
scored the highest on competence (see Table 8).
Another cluster, containing disabled people, elderly people, and
retarded people, scored significantly higher on warmth (M 3.73)
than on competence (M  2.28), t(2)  8.04, p  .05. This cluster
resembles the comparable cluster in Study 1, except that Study 2
eliminated housewives and blind people. This cluster scored high
on warmth, fully comparable to the in-groups (see below). To-
gether, the two mixed clusters included nine groups, nearly a third
of the groups sampled.
As before, pure derogation was directed only toward the poor—
poor people, welfare recipients, and homeless people. Although
this cluster was perceived to be lower on warmth than was any
other cluster, its warmth score (M  2.42) was still significantly
higher than its competence score (M 1.97), t(2) 4.95, p .05.
The cluster’s competence, however, was equivalent to that of
disabled, elderly, and retarded people.
The middle included seven groups: gay men, blue-collar work-
ers, Hispanics, Muslims, Native Americans, Blacks, and young
people. The first few overlap the middle cluster in Study 1; new
warmth and competence scales and new neighboring groups did
Table 7
Scales, Study 2
Construct Items
Competence As viewed by society, how . . . are members of this group?
[competent, confident, capable, efficient, intelligent, skillful]
Warmth As viewed by society, how . . . are members of this group?
[friendly, well-intentioned, trustworthy, warm, good-natured, sincere]
Status How prestigious are the jobs typically achieved by members of this group?
How economically successful have members of this group been?
Competition If members of this group get special breaks (such as preference in hiring decisions),
this is likely to make things more difficult for people like me.
Resources that go to members of this group are likely to take away from the
resources of people like me.
Note. For the Competence and Warmth Scales, the points of ellipsis were replaced by the words in brackets
for each question.
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not change their position. Warmth scores (M 3.14) did not differ
from competence scores (M  3.16), t(6)  0.20, ns, as expected.
As predicted, a final, new cluster also emerged. The in-groups—
Christians, middle class, students, Whites, and women—com-
posed the only cluster scoring high on both competence
(M  3.78) and warmth (M  3.79). Warmth and competence
scores did not differ for these groups, t(4)  0.05, ns. They scored
the highest on warmth and next to highest on competence, sur-
passed there only by the high-status groups. The groups in this
high–high cluster perfectly describe the majority of Study 2s
participant sample, omitting only the potentially relevant groups
young and educated people, designations that may have held a
different meaning for our respondents than for us.
Finally, supporting the mixed stereotypes hypothesis at the level
of individual groups, matched pair t tests reveal 19 of 24 groups to
differ significantly on competence and warmth (see Table 9). Ten
were significantly more competent than warm (from highest dif-
ference): rich people, professionals, men, Asians, Jews, educated
people, Whites, Blacks, students, and Muslims. Nine were rated
significantly more warm than competent (from highest): retarded
people, elderly people, disabled people, poor people, women,
homeless people, gay men, welfare recipients, and Christians.
Again, when we combine the cluster and individual group levels
of analysis, nine groups show t test differences between warmth
and competence that reflect their mixed cluster membership, so
roughly one third show mixed stereotypes across analysis methods.
Social Structure Predicts Stereotype Contents
We examined relationships between the social structure vari-
ables of perceived competence and perceived status at both the
group and the individual levels (see Study 1). Again (see Table
10), perceived status was highly correlated with perceived com-
petence, group-level r(22)  .98, p  .001; individual-level
r(147)  .88, p  .001. And, again, perceived competition corre-
lated with perceived lack of warmth, group-level r(22)  w.64,
p  .001; individual-level r(147)  .31, p  .01. Note that the
individual-level results are stronger than in Study 1, and Study 1s
anomalous competition–competence correlation is eliminated,
presumably by more careful scale construction. However, this time
the individual-level correlations reveal an unexpected status–
warmth correlation; this does not occur in any of this article’s other
Table 8
Groups in Two-, Three-, Four-, and Five-Cluster Solutions, and
Means for Each of Five Clusters, Study 2
Group
Cluster solution
Mean for each
of five clusters
5 4 3 2 Competence Warmth
Asians 3 4 3 1 4.29a  3.23b
Educated people 3 4 3 1
Jews 3 4 3 1
Men 3 4 3 1
Professionals 3 4 3 1
Rich people 3 4 3 1
Disabled people 5 3 2 2 2.28d  3.73a
Elderly people 5 3 2 2
Retarded people 5 3 2 2
Homeless people 1 1 1 2 1.97d  2.42c
Poor people 1 1 1 2
Welfare recipients 1 1 1 2
Christians 4 4 3 1 3.78b  3.79a
Middle-class people 4 4 3 1
Students 4 4 3 1
White people 4 4 3 1
Women 4 4 3 1
Black people 2 2 2 1 3.16c  3.14b
Blue-collar workers 2 2 2 1
Gay men 2 2 2 1
Muslims 2 2 2 1
Native Americans 2 2 2 1
Young people 2 2 2 1
Hispanics 2 2 2 2
Note. Within each row, means differ ( p  .05) if  or  is indicated.
Within each column, means that do not share a superscript differ ( p .05).
Figure 3. Five-cluster solution with the addition of in-groups, Study 2, revised long survey.
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six operationalizations of this relationship, and inclusion of in-
groups may explain its appearance here. With that exception, these
findings support the hypothesis that perceived status and compe-
tition respectively predict perceived competence and lack of
warmth.
Discussion
Using groups nominated solely by pilot respondents and using
improved trait and predictor scales, Study 2 supports findings from
Study 1s two samples. The addition of in-groups created clusters
of groups in all four quadrants of the Competence  Warmth
space. Fitting hypotheses, many groups fell into the mixed quad-
rants, being high on either competence or warmth but low on the
other. The pure derogation hypothesis fit only poor people, and the
main diagonal followed through neutral groups to positively fa-
vored in-groups. Competence and warmth again differentiated
out-groups, many with mixed stereotypes.
One concern about the Study 1 data is that competence distin-
guished among the out-groups more than warmth did. Study 2,
with improved scales and an altered sample of groups, creates a
bigger range from highest to lowest cluster on both competence
(2.32) and warmth (1.37). Both were significant and substantial
differences on a 5-point scale. Though the range for competence
again was larger, the disparity was far less.
Study 2 lends considerable support to our first three hypotheses.
Perhaps, however, students in Amherst, Massachusetts, and their
friends or relatives believe, more than do most Americans, that the
cultural stereotype endorses a just world where talent and hard
work pay off. Perhaps, also, our other findings are limited by other
world views peculiar to this region, for example, a politically
correct concern with saying something good about almost any
out-group. Either kind of sample bias would create a misleading
picture. To explore these alternatives, we took our hypotheses
outside the northeast.
Study 3, Short Survey and Varied Samples: Competence,
Warmth, Mixed Stereotypes, and Their Predictors
Method
In Study 3, 230 participants completed surveys in five separate samples
differing by participants’ location (from Florida to Colorado) and age
(college to late retirement). All participants were assured of the anonymity
of their responses and received written feedback explaining the study.
Materials and procedures varied slightly among the samples.
Participants and Procedures
Colorado students. The first sample consisted of 125 University of
Colorado at Boulder undergraduate psychology students (54 men, 63
women, 8 unknown; mean age  19.9) who volunteered to complete the
questionnaire. The majority of participants (77%) were White. The ques-
tionnaire was administered to all participants in a lecture hall in the second
half of a class period. Most participants completed the questionnaire in less
than 15 min.
Massachusetts adults. Under the same recruitment and administration
conditions used with Study 1s nonstudent sample, 61 nonstudents (25
men, 36 women; average age  37.9) were recruited by University of
Massachusetts undergraduates. Seventy-one percent of the participants
were White. Extra course credit was awarded to the students who recruited.
Wisconsin adults. Students in an undergraduate psychology course at
Lawrence University in Appleton, Wisconsin, volunteered to collect ques-
tionnaires from friends and family members. Sixty-four nonstudents (39
women, 17 men, 8 unknown; mean age  47.7) completed the question-
naire in their homes. The majority of participants (84%) were White.
Table 10
Correlations Between Traits and Predictors, Group and
Individual Levels, Study 2
Predictor Competence Warmth
Group-level
Status .98*** .35
Competition .16 .64***
Individual-level
Status
r .88*** .36**
% 93 29
Competition
r .07 .31**
% 28 33
Note. Group-level df  22; individual-level df  147. Individual-level
correlations were converted to Fisher’s z scores, averaged, then recon-
verted to correlations. Percentages are the percentages of participants for
whom that correlation was significant ( p  .05).
** p  .01. *** p  .001.
Table 9
Paired Competence–Warmth Differences, by Group, Study 2
Group Difference
Rich people 1.598***
Professionals 1.304***
Men 1.091***
Asians 0.888***
Jews 0.833***
Educated people 0.705***
Whites 0.480***
Blacks 0.257***
Students 0.253***
Muslims 0.199**
Middle class 0.062
Native Americans 0.018
Hispanics 0.005
Blue-collar workers 0.007
Young people 0.018
Welfare recipients 0.331***
Christians 0.333***
Gay men 0.345***
Homeless people 0.390***
Women 0.436***
Poor people 0.612***
Disabled people 1.233***
Elderly people 1.293***
Retarded people 1.813***
Note. n  73 or 74 (each group was rated by half the sample). Matched
pair t tests revealed that the competence and warmth ratings significantly
differed for most groups. Means of paired differences (competence rat-
ing  warmth rating) are reported.
** p  .01. *** p  .001.
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Florida retirees. The third sample was collected in a Northern Florida
retirement community. Twenty-five participants (13 men, 12 women; mean
age 61.1) completed the questionnaire in their own homes on a volunteer
basis. All of the participants were White.
Illinois retirees. Nineteen residents (6 men, 10 women, 3 unknown;
mean age  78.4) of a Chicago retirement home responded to an ad in a
community newsletter. For each questionnaire, $1 was donated to a com-
munal fund. Sixteen identified themselves as White, 1 as Black, and the
other 2 did not identify their race. The questionnaire replaced the group
elderly people with the group retarded people. Two questionnaires were
omitted because they were less than one third complete.
Questionnaires
An abbreviated version of the questionnaire listed 6 groups selected to
represent a full range of the 23 groups sampled in Study 1 (this study was
started before Study 2 was completed). We judged 6 groups to be the
smallest number reasonable for analysis, and we made every effort to
sample without regard to our hypotheses. The subset of 6 groups arose
according to several simultaneous criteria: In the Study 1 nonstudent
sample, we calculated a six-cluster solution in the two-dimensional space
defined by Competence  Warmth. We picked six clusters to generate 6
groups from a cluster solution that would be sufficiently detailed not to
privilege our hypothesized three-cluster solution for this dataset. Then, (a)
we picked 1 group per cluster, to include groups fully distributed across the
space to represent the greatest variety of different types of societal out-
groups. Given those constraints, we chose the following groups: (b) within
each of the six clusters, groups whose locations tended to be farther from
the two-dimensional midpoint, to minimize groups viewed ambiguously or
differently by different participants; (c) groups whose standard deviations
on competence and warmth were low, indicating consensus within the
sample; and (d) groups that did not overlap in meaning and identifying
characteristics (i.e., the overall sample to include out-groups variously
designated by gender, race, age, socioeconomic status). The resulting
groups were welfare recipients, housewives, elderly people, feminists,
Black professionals, and rich people, but in keeping with this study’s focus
on out-groups, for the Illinois retirees (average age 78.41), retarded people
replaced elderly people.
Twelve items, two for each dimension, represented the trait (competence
and warmth) and social structure correlates (status and competition). Item
selections (see Table 11) were based on the most reliable item–scale
correlations in the Study 1 Massachusetts samples.
Results
As in the three long-survey samples, we predicted that the
out-groups would be differentiated by competence and warmth,
with mixed stereotypes well-represented, and that the status–
competence and competition–warmth correlations would replicate.
We used the main statistical techniques used in Studies 1 and 2:
cluster analysis, t tests, and correlations.
Perceived Competence and Warmth Differentiate Among
Out-Group Stereotypes, and Many Stereotypes Are Mixed
Cluster analyses are relatively unsuited to examining only six
items, but the groups do array in the Competence  Warmth
space. Hierarchical cluster analysis indicated a three-cluster solu-
tion; agglomeration statistics were aggregated over the five sam-
ples (which separately show the same pattern). The selected groups
included neither in-groups nor moderate, middling groups, so the
three-cluster solution would be expected.
The k-means parallel threshold cluster method identified the
predicted groups (see Figure 4). Rich people, feminists, and Black
professionals, in one cluster, centered on 3.93 competence
and 2.83 warmth (averaged across samples), differing over a full
scale point, t(14)  7.06, p  .001. This cluster scored signifi-
cantly the highest on competence, p  .001 (see Table 12). The
included groups fit the results of Studies 1 and 2, despite changes
in format, groups, items, and samples.
The elderly (or retarded) people and housewives in the other
mixed cluster averaged 2.94 on competence and 4.00 on warmth,
a substantial and significant difference, t(9) 7.66, p .001. (The
means differ only trivially when we exclude retarded people used
for the Illinois sample.) This cluster scored significantly the high-
est on warmth, p  .001. The groups fit the earlier long surveys.
Finally, welfare recipients ended up alone in a low–low posi-
tion, scoring lowest on both dimensions (competence M  1.86,
warmth M  2.42), significantly different from each other,
t(4)  12.06, p  .001, and from the other clusters, p  .05.
Because we picked groups at the extremes of their clusters, no
middling cluster appears. And because in-groups were not explic-
itly included, no high–high quadrant appears.
Next, we compared competence and warmth, group by group
(Table 12); they differed significantly for all groups examined. In
all six groups, in each of five samples, rich people, feminists, and
Black professionals showed significantly more competence than
warmth, whereas housewives, elderly (in Illinois, retarded) people,
and welfare recipients showed significantly more warmth than
competence. With a shorter questionnaire, across 6 decades in
average ages and five U.S. locations, respondents agreed on cul-
tural stereotypes that some kinds of out-groups specialize in com-
petence over warmth, whereas others specialize in warmth over
competence, and only welfare recipients fit the pure derogation
model.
Status Predicts Perceived Competence, and Competition
Predicts Perceived Warmth
Finally, we examined the social structural correlates of per-
ceived competence and warmth. The correlation between per-
ceived status and perceived competence averaged a group-level
r (4)  .97, p  .01, and an individual-level r (228)  .87, p 
001, comparable to the Study 1 and Study 2 samples. The corre-
lation between perceived competition and perceived warmth aver-
aged r (4)  .69, p  .15, at the group level and r (228)  .36,
Table 11
Items in Abbreviated Questionnaire, Study 3
Construct Items
Competence How confident are members of this group?
How competent . . .?
Warmth How sincere . . .?
How warm . . .?
Status How well educated . . .?
How economically successful . . .?
Competition If members of this group get special breaks,
this is likely to make things more difficult
for people like me.
Resources that go to members of this group are
likely to take away from the resources of
people like me.
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p  .001, at the individual level, again comparable to or even
better than the Study 1 and Study 2 samples. Whereas the group-
level analyses are of roughly the same magnitude as the long
survey samples, the individual-level analyses are stronger than
Study 1 and comparable to Study 2, perhaps because, as in Study 2,
participants were not so overloaded, given only 72 questions to
answer instead of Study 1s 598. In any case, the structural
correlates of the traits performed as hypothesized in these new
samples, at both levels of analysis. Moreover, the off-diagonal
correlations, as predicted, do hover around zero (status–warmth,
group r  .07, individual r  .02; competition–competence,
group r  .00, individual r  .12).
Discussion
The results of five more varied samples corroborate Studies 1
and 2, suggesting that the original respondent samples did not
create any obvious bias. The hypotheses about Competence 
Warmth, mixed stereotypes, and social structure correlates were
supported.
Study 4, Prejudiced Emotions: Affective Reactions to
Distinct Stereotype Content
Our stereotype content model proposes, and the first three
studies support the idea, that many stereotypes are mixed, portray-
ing groups as high competence but low warmth or low competence
but high warmth. Strictly speaking, stereotypes are cognitive, and
mixed stereotypes do not speak to the affective or evaluative
response. Study 4 addresses the mixed emotional responses we
hypothesize to differentiate the main group clusters.
Previous work specifies affective reactions to different out-
groups but not a theory of their origins (Dijker, 1987). Previous
work also suggests that people view the in-group as overlapping
the self (E. R. Smith, 1993); just as appraisal of threats and benefits
to the self provoke emotion, so do appraisals regarding the in-
group’s well-being. If all this is so, then emotional reactions to
out-groups should vary by their structural relations to others in
society. We hypothesize four types of affective reactions to the
four primary combinations on the basis of perceived competence
and warmth (Glick & Fiske, 2001a; see Table 1). Consider first the
two mixed cells.
We hypothesize that paternalistic prejudice targets low-status,
noncompetitive groups (e.g., elderly, disabled) that are seen as
incompetent but warm; they should elicit pity and sympathy. Pity
is directed toward people with negative outcomes who cannot
control the cause (Weiner, 1985; Weiner, Graham, & Chandler,
1982; Weiner, Perry, & Magnusson, 1988). In an interpersonal
theory of social comparison-based emotions, Richard Smith (2000)
Table 12
Groups’ Competence and Warmth Scores
Across Five Samples, Study 3
Group and cluster Competence Warmth Difference
Rich people 4.34  2.48 1.86
Feminists 3.69  2.75 0.94
Black professionals 3.83  3.37 0.46
Cluster 3.93a  2.83b 1.10
Elderly peoplea 2.74  4.06 1.32
Housewives 3.06  3.94 0.88
Cluster 2.94b  4.00a 1.06
Welfare recipients 1.86c  2.42c 0.56
Note. Matched pair t tests reveal significant competence  warmth
differences for all groups and clusters, p  .05, as indicated by  or .
Within columns, cluster means with different subscripts differ, by inde-
pendent sample ts, at p  .05.
a This row of statistics includes the Illinois sample, in which the group
retarded people replaced elderly people; with retarded people omitted, the
competence mean equals 3.02, the warmth mean equals 4.15, the difference
is 1.13, and the difference is still significant.
Figure 4. Four-cluster solution, Study 3, short survey, five samples combined, no in-groups.
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described downward assimilative emotions as including sympathy
and pity. If we translate his theory to our group level of analysis,
a lower status group elicits downward comparison (by definition),
and, in our terms, a noncompeting group allows assimilation to
one’s own group. This form of response is paternalistic when
directed at out-groups, because it combines assumed superiority
with potential care taking. Groups that are low status and incom-
petent are seen as badly off but not able to control their outcomes
and so not responsible. Moreover, if they are warm, their intent is
positive. Groups deserve pity and sympathy for uncontrollable
negative outcomes that occur despite their best intentions.
High-status, competitive groups that are seen as competent but
not warm should elicit envy and jealousy (along with a grudging
admiration for their perceived skills), a response we call envious
prejudice. High status represents a positive outcome, and compe-
tence implies control over it, so these groups are seen as respon-
sible for their position. The lack of warmth imputed to these
groups corresponds to perceived competition and hostile intent.
When people’s own controllable, positive outcomes deprive oth-
ers, those others feel envy. That is, when one person lacks anoth-
er’s superior outcome but wishes the other lacked it, envy results
(Parrott & Smith, 1993). Upward contrastive (i.e., competitive)
social comparisons elicit envy and resentment along with subjec-
tive feelings of injustice and inferiority (R. H. Smith, 1991, 2000;
see also E. R. Smith, 1993). In intergroup perceptions, one might
expect that higher status, competent groups would also elicit anger,
which they may, but anger could also be directed downward,
toward groups that are perceived to be parasitic on one’s own
higher position, so envy seems more diagnostic than does
resentment.
The third combination, low-status, free-loading groups that are
perceived as neither competent nor warm, receive what we have
termed contemptuous prejudice, encompassing anger, contempt,
disgust, hate, and resentment. Anger is directed toward those with
negative outcomes that they could have avoided; blame results
from perceiving individually controllable causes (Weiner, 1985;
Weiner et al., 1982; Weiner et al., 1988; Zucker & Weiner, 1993).
Again, however, more specific reactions than anger are relevant;
contempt, disgust, and resentment involve moral overtones of
injustice, indignation, and bitterness toward illegitimate behavior.
In this case, groups that are perceived to have interests that detract
from others create competition in a zero-sum sense. Groups that
use up societal resources compete with other societal priorities,
though they are not viewed as successful per se. Contempt and
disgust are directed downward in contrastive comparisons (R. H.
Smith, 2000; also see E. R. Smith, 1993). If we translate to the
group level, the low-status, incompetent groups that are perceived
not to be warm may be perceived to have hostile, exploitative
intent that impacts others in society, also provoking resentment
and hatred.
Finally, some groups elicit unmixed positive regard: pride,
admiration, and respect. Pride is directed toward those with posi-
tive outcomes (e.g., high status) when that reflects well on the self.
In-groups and reference groups with whom one identifies both are
extensions of the self (see E. R. Smith, 1993, on in-groups). Pride
results from self-relevant, positive, controllable outcomes (Weiner,
1985). People feel positive about the successes of close others as
long as the domain is not reserved for the self (Tesser, 1988).
Admiration is directed toward those with positive outcomes when
that does not detract from the self. Upward, assimilative social
comparisons elicit admiration and inspiration (R. H. Smith, 2000).
At the group level, pride and admiration should target successful
in-groups and close allies as well as the cultural default, those
groups that might be considered collective reference groups (e.g.,
the middle class).
In short, we hypothesize that pity, envy, contempt, and admi-
ration (and related emotions) differentiate the four combinations of
perceived warmth and competence.
Method
Participants
Fifty-five University of Massachusetts undergraduates (50 women, 5
men; mean age  19.8), recruited from lower level psychology courses,
completed the questionnaire for extra credit. Once again, the majority of
participants (43) identified themselves as White.
Questionnaire and Procedure
Using a 5-point Likert scale (1  not at all, 5  extremely), participants
rated the same 24 social groups rated in Study 2 on 24 emotions items: “As
viewed by society, does this group make your group feel: disappointed,
fearful, sympathetic, envious, uneasy, proud, angry, disgusted, respectful,
pitying, hateful, frustrated, jealous, admiring, resentful, inspired, contemp-
tuous, compassionate, tense, ashamed, comfortable, fond, anxious, se-
cure?” As in Study 2, to prevent participant fatigue, we split the list of
groups in half and reversed the order of presentation for each list, which
yielded four versions of the questionnaire. Participants were randomly
assigned to complete one of the four versions. They read the same instruc-
tions and completed the questionnaire under the same conditions as in
Study 1 and Study 2.
Results
Again, using the same technique employed in Studies 1 and 2,
24 factor analyses (1 per group) examining 24 items yielded
five–eight factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0. Across
groups, four factors emerged consistently: Admiration (admiring,
fond, inspired, proud, respectful;   .86), Contempt (angry,
ashamed, contemptuous, disgusted, frustrated, hateful, resentful,
uneasy;  .93), Envy (envious, jealous;  .89), and Pity (pity,
sympathetic;  .82). The remaining items were dropped because
they did not load consistently on any given factor across groups.
We predicted (see Table 1) that high competence, low warmth
groups would elicit envious prejudice; low competence, high
warmth groups would elicit pitying, paternalistic prejudice; low
competence, low warmth groups would elicit contemptuous prej-
udice; and in-groups would be admired.
Comparing Prejudices Within Clusters
Emotions scores differed significantly within all clusters, which
were drawn from Study 2 (Table 13). As predicted, participants
strongly endorsed emotions reflecting admiration (M  2.72) for
the in-groups cluster (students, Whites, middle class, women, and
Christians), with much less envy (M  1.57), contempt
(M  1.43), and pity (M  1.42), F(3, 16)  24.45, p  .001.
The high competence and low warmth cluster (rich people, men,
Jews, Asians, professionals, and educated people) elicited both
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envy (M  2.58) and admiration (M  2.82) but not much
contempt (M 1.76) or pity (M 1.37), F(3, 20) 6.79, p .01.
For the high warmth and low competence cluster (disabled
people, elderly people, and retarded people), participants endorsed
paternalistic prejudice: pity (M  3.66), but much less admiration
(M  2.29), contempt (M  1.70), and envy (M  1.03), F(3,
8)  41.79, p  .001.
Emotions toward the low competence and low warmth cluster
(poor people, welfare recipients, and homeless people) unexpect-
edly reflected both pity (M  3.39) and contempt (M  2.50) and
little admiration (M  1.36) or envy (M  1.03), F(3, 8)  47.12,
p  .001. This cluster’s contempt ratings, though lower than its
pity ratings, were the highest for that emotion (see below).
Emotion ratings for the middle cluster (gay men, blue-collar
workers, Native Americans, Blacks, young people, Muslims, and
Hispanics) were nondescript, as follows: admiration (M  2.06),
pity (M  1.96), contempt (M  1.82), and envy (M  1.26);
because of the low envy ratings, they differed significantly, F(3,
24)  9.61, p  .001.
Comparing Clusters Within Prejudices
The highest admiration ratings went to the in-group and the
competent but not warm out-groups (see Table 13). We had
predicted that the high-competence out-groups would receive
some grudging (i.e., envious) acknowledgement of their achieve-
ments. Admiration for high-competence out-groups, however, co-
existed with envy, suggesting a volatile mix of emotions that could
create hostility when groups feel threatened (Glick, in press).
Moreover, all groups except the low–low groups received some
admiration, which may constitute a positive baseline.
The highest envy ratings went to the high-competence out-
groups, and no other group came close to eliciting comparable
envy. Pity went to the warm, not competent out-groups, as pre-
dicted, but also to the low–low groups, reflecting less uniform
antipathy than predicted. Contempt was reserved for the low–low
group, and no other groups came close.
In summary, our hypotheses specified 20 predictions for emo-
tions (four emotions on five clusters). The 5 predictions of partic-
ular emotions as targeting particular clusters indeed emerged as
predicted; of the remaining 15 predicted to be low, 14 emerged as
predicted. The sole anomaly (pity for the poor) is not surprising, in
hindsight.
Discussion
These data support the hypothesis that emotions differentiate
among the four main quadrants. Each cluster elicited a unique
pattern of emotions, hypothesized to be characteristic of the prej-
udice directed toward that kind of out-group. In addition, the affect
directed toward the high competence but low warmth groups and
the low competence but high warmth groups suggests a mix of
emotions (rather than the pure contempt usually assumed to be
characteristic of prejudices).
Both envy items (i.e., envious, jealous) reflect the belief that
another possesses some object that the self desires but lacks; this,
then, acknowledges the out-groups’ possession of good qualities
and also that the out-group is responsible for the in-group’s dis-
tress. In short, envy and jealousy are inherently mixed emotions. In
a similar way, pity and sympathy directed toward warm but in-
competent out-groups suggest a mixture of subjectively good
feelings and acknowledgement of the out-groups’ inferior position.
Again, pity is inherently a mixed emotion.
Study 4 thus supports the validity of the four main clusters, as
distinguished by emotion responses, evidence that converges with
the earlier cluster results as well as the social structural predictors.
General Discussion
These data, from nine survey samples, support our hypotheses
regarding stereotype content. Conducted on a variety of samples
with a variety of group selection methods, the cluster analyses in
Studies 1–3 found evidence for the dimensional hypothesis that
perceived competence and warmth differentiate out-group stereo-
types. These studies also support the mixed stereotypes hypothesis
that many out-groups are viewed as competent but not warm or not
competent but warm. They also found social structural correlates
of perceived competence and warmth. That is, perceived social
status predicted perceived competence, whereas perceived compe-
tition predicted perceived lack of warmth. Finally, Study 4 ad-
dresses the emotional concomitants of different stereotype con-
tents, showing that pity, envy, contempt, and admiration
differentiated the four combinations of perceived warmth and
competence.
These data go beyond previous discussions (including our own)
of stereotype contents and prejudiced affects. They uniquely show
Table 13
Emotions Expressed for Key Clusters, Study 4
Cluster Admiration Envy Pity Contempt
In-groups (students, Whites,
middle class, women,
Christians) 2.72 1.57 1.42 1.43
Competent, not warm (rich
people, men, Jews,
Asians, professionals,
educated people) 2.82 2.58 1.37 1.76
Warm, not competent
(disabled people, elderly
people, retarded people) 2.29 1.03 3.66 1.70
Not competent, not warm
(poor people, welfare
recipients, homeless
people) 1.36 1.03 3.39 2.50
Middle (gay men, Hispanics,
blue-collar workers,
Blacks, Native
Americans, Muslims,
young people) 2.06 1.26 1.96 1.82
Note. Numbers in boldface indicate emotions predicted to be high for
particular clusters. Between-clusters contrasts examining each emotion
separately (i.e., by column) show significant differences between the main
cluster predicted to score high on that emotion and the average of the other
four clusters (contrast ps  .015–.0001). Within-cluster contrasts examin-
ing each cluster separately (i.e., by row) show significant differences
between the main emotion predicted to be high for that cluster and the
average of the other three emotions. In addition, admiration for the high-
competence, low-warmth cluster was predicted but not tested separately
because it was not completely orthogonal to the envy predictions. Also, the
unpredicted result of pity toward the low–low cell was not tested.
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the full combination of the Competence  Warmth dimensions,
emphasize mixed but functionally consistent stereotypes, and dis-
play the full range of mixed emotions. These data simultaneously
address pity, contempt, pride, and envy at the group level, and they
document both trait attributions and social structural variables at
once.
Nevertheless, several issues arise. Regarding meaning of re-
sponses, were participants reporting the culture’s, their group’s, or
their own personal stereotypes and prejudices? The questionnaire
at the outset emphasized the project’s interest in American society
and at the top of each page instructed participants to answer “as
viewed by society.” However, as the questionnaire went on, par-
ticipants may have forgotten these instructions and begun to re-
spond as individuals or group members, particularly on the com-
petition items, which used the term “people like me.” In retrospect,
we might have phrased those items differently.
However, several clues argue against the possibility that partic-
ipants responded primarily either as group members or as individ-
uals rather than reporting on society’s cultural stereotypes and
prejudices. Students and nonstudents did not differ radically in
their responses, and, in Study 3, variations in age and region did
not produce radically different responses. Moreover, if members of
different gender and ethnic groups might be expected on average
to hold different personal or group stereotypes, their responses
should differ. Our reanalysis of the largest data sets (Study 1
student and nonstudent samples, plus Study 2) suggests otherwise.
In each of these three samples, we could compare responses of
White women (the largest group), White men, and minorities of
both genders (minority samples were not large enough to break
down by gender). We conducted 280 F tests on four kinds of
ratings (competence, warmth, status, and competition) across the
23–24 groups per sample. Of these comparisons, only 8% revealed
differences by gender and ethnicity of participants.11 Compared
with the 92% that showed no difference by gender or ethnicity, this
suggests that participants answered as requested, according to
consensual societal stereotypes.
In a related vein, we have hedged about whether membership in
the high–high cell consists of the in-group of raters or the culture’s
main reference group. We suspect something of a mix. In the study
that explicitly included potential in-groups or societal reference
groups, the ones in the unambivalently well-regarded cluster were
probably both cultural reference groups and in-groups for most of
our participants in that sample: Christian, middle class, and White.
However, the presence of students and women in that cluster
suggests some in-group favoritism, though the F tests revealed no
group differences in the placement of those two groups. This
seems a task for further research. Preliminary data collected in
other countries suggest that participants are quite capable of re-
porting how their group is viewed negatively by the culture at
large. On balance, we suspect that the high–high cluster is re-
served mostly for societal reference groups.
The data leave another puzzling cluster as well. The groups that
persistently landed in the middle of the competence–warmth space
(gay men, Arabs and Muslims, blue-collar workers, Native Amer-
icans, migrant workers) may indeed elicit the nondescript stereo-
types suggested by this location. However, consider the case of
Black people, who inhabited the middle cluster when labeled at
this abstract level yet, at the subgroup level, split neatly into
competent but not warm Black professionals and incompetent but
warm poor Blacks. Stereotypes of gay men might, for example,
subdivide into threatening militants, imagined predators, harmless
buffoons, and respected aesthetic professionals. American stereo-
types of Muslims might divide among American citizens, harmless
Arab nationals, and terrorists. Our data for these middle groups do
not distinguish between unformed stereotypes and averages over
opposite subgroups. Nor do they address the possibility that mas-
sive and contradictory individual differences may have resulted in
a lack of consensus. We did examine the variances of ratings for
these middling groups and found no pattern of higher variances,
which might have indicated idiosyncratic responses or aggregation
over disparate subtypes. At this point, the answer is not clear.
Turning to rating dimensions, we note that the competence
dimension consistently differentiated the groups more than the
warmth dimension did. Perhaps this is not surprising, given that it
has more readily manifested public signs (e.g., academic perfor-
mance) than the warmth dimension allows (e.g., no consensual
indicators of a group’s intent). Moreover, if intent (i.e., warmth)
and capability to enact it (i.e., competence) are central, compe-
tence matters first because it may be seen as more stable than
warmth. And intentions matter only for those capable of enacting
them.
Nevertheless, across samples, effect sizes comparing the two
mixed clusters on warmth averaged large by Cohen’s (1992)
standards (group-level d  1.28; individual-level d  0.83). And
effect sizes comparing the low–low cluster with the low
competence–high warmth cluster averaged even larger (respec-
tively, 2.24 and 1.35). Thus, the warmth dimension did consis-
tently distinguish among groups. Across studies, 76.4% of the
warmth comparisons were significant. More specifically, a critic
might argue that the high competence, low warmth group was not
consistently low on warmth. However, it was significantly lower
than the high warmth groups in nine of nine tests and equivalent to
the other low warmth cluster four of eight times. Thus, the warmth
dimension remains important, although it admittedly distinguished
less than the competence dimension did. Because competence
varied more than warmth, the warmth differences suffer by com-
parison. Nevertheless, the warmth effects are sizable, significant,
and reliable.
Regarding predictors, we were surprised, in initial pilot studies,
that cooperation, as we measured it, did not predict warmth.
Instead, a lack of competition predicted warmth. Attempts to find
survey items reflecting mutual cooperation failed. In our view,
most out-groups are not viewed as cooperating equally with the
in-group, so cooperation is inherently asymmetrical, with one
group depending on the other more than vice versa. As our pilot
studies found, two depend-on-us and depend-on-them cooperation
variables were associated with competence and status but not with
warmth. Equal-status cooperation might occur only for the in-
group and its closest allies, a phenomenon we measured by per-
ceptions of the competent and warm in-groups; the Alexander et al.
11 Although they were close to the level expected by chance, we exam-
ined the few significant differences and found weak evidence for two
patterns. For 10 ratings of particular characteristics of particular groups
(3.6%), White men tended to be more negative than did White women and
minorities of either gender. For another 7 (2.5%), minorities rated low-
status groups as less competitive that Whites did.
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(1999) and Phalet and Poppe (1997) studies also support that
prediction. However, an unpublished study conducted after our
data were collected (Eckes, 2001), for which new measures of
cooperation were developed, found evidence that cooperation pre-
dicts perceived warmth, so the possibility of perceived cooperation
remains viable and merits further attention.
In any case, status and competition did reliably differentiate
groups’ competence and warmth. The relationship between status
and competence was stronger than that between competition and
(lack of) warmth. Perhaps stable group hierarchies determine in-
tergroup stereotypes and prejudices more than the potentially
changeable competitions do.
Although we have argued for the competence and warmth
dimensions (on the basis of their theoretical functions in interper-
sonal and intergroup detection of goals, their prevalence in past
research on both person perception and group stereotypes, and
their effects on emotions toward groups), this is not to say that
these are the only possible dimensions in stereotypes. For example,
sheer activity level is a dimension suggested by the small groups’
task, social, and dominance dimensions (Bales, 1970) or by the
semantic differential dimensions of evaluation, potency, and ac-
tivity (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum, 1957).
Our data do suggest that stereotypes of out-groups carry two
central dimensions and that the corresponding prejudices fre-
quently show mixed reactions, not univalent antipathy. We have
avoided labeling paternalistic and envious stereotypes as ambiva-
lent because that term typically assumes cognitive conflict and
warring emotions. The predominant prejudices (envy and pity) for
these two mixed clusters, however, are inherently mixed emotions.
Pity combines sympathy with superiority. Envy combines ad-
miration with resentment. Nevertheless, neither form of prejudice
necessitates a state of psychological conflict (presumably typical
of ambivalence). In each case, positive perceptions and feelings
are consistent with negative aspects: One would not envy a group
that has no desirable attributes, and one would not typically pity a
group considered superior to one’s own. Thus, the more positive
aspects entirely fit the more negative prejudices.
Social psychologists have tended to assume that prejudice in-
volves simultaneous dislike and disrespect for an out-group. Our
data suggest, however, that out-group prejudice often focuses on
dislike or disrespect but not both. High-status out-groups may
elicit an envious mixture of admiration (rather than disrespect)
plus intense dislike motivated by a sense of threat (for dangerous
competitors). Thus, a person’s belief that Asian Americans, Jews,
and businesswomen are competent (perhaps even hypercompetent)
may only add fuel to the fire of prejudice. Anti-Semites, for
instance, often believe outrageous conspiracy theories of Jewish
economic and social influence. In this case, positive stereotypes of
an out-group’s competence (along with correspondingly negative
stereotypes of the group’s lack of warmth and ill intentions) drive
a particularly dangerous form of prejudice that all too often results
in extreme forms of violence (Glick, in press; Glick & Fiske,
2001b). Agreeing that “Jews are extraordinarily clever” is at least
as likely to indicate dangerously anti-Semitic prejudice as the lack
of it (Wilson, 1996). Although these emotions are mixed and even
multivalent, they are not cognitively inconsistent or unstable (as is
usually assumed about ambivalent emotions). Envious resentment
entirely fits with (and is even motivated by) admiration for certain
attributes.
Likewise, the mixed components of paternalism are psycholog-
ically consistent. Members of subordinated groups are often re-
warded for showing the low competence and high warmth that
make them nonthreatening. (Think of sexist admonitions to women
not to appear too smart or ageist admonitions to older people not
to work too hard.) Positive stereotypes of low-status groups’
warmth may come at the cost of these groups’ being perceived as
incompetent and safely subordinated (i.e., as posing no competi-
tive threat). Again, the subjectively positive aspects of these ste-
reotypes and prejudices are perfectly consistent with the negative
aspects. Whereas envious prejudices evoke feelings of threat,
defensiveness, and resentment, paternalistic prejudices elicit pa-
tronizing forms of affection and pity. Both envious and paternal-
istic prejudice are psychologically consistent mixed feelings.
Moving to hypothesized predictors, we note that correlational
results linking status–competence and competition–warmth are
encouraging for our model. However, the links are only correla-
tional. One could reasonably argue that social structural variables
precede the perceived traits of groups and so logically should be
prior and therefore potentially causal. But one could argue the
opposite, that the groups’ actual or perceived traits give them their
place in society. We do not deny this possibility, but we focus on
perceptions.
Conclusion
The stereotype content model posits qualitative differences in
stereotypes and prejudices toward different groups, simultaneously
providing a conceptual framework that explains why and when
these differences occur. For example, our model suggests that
anti-Semitism and racism (Allport’s, 1954, most frequent exam-
ples) follow distinct psychological dynamics, explaining differ-
ences in how these groups have been treated historically. Earlier
Europeans viewed Africans as a low-status group that they could
safely domesticate and exploit because of their own superior
technological power. In the contrasting social conditions of a
radical loss of status and power, many Germans viewed the Jews
as a hyperpotent enemy that had to be destroyed. In other cases, the
model suggests underlying psychological similarities between
prejudices (e.g., paternalistic forms of both racism and sexism,
equivalently envious anti-Asian and anti-Semitic prejudice) that
might otherwise go unrecognized.
By linking intergroup attitudes to status and interdependence,
the model suggests how prejudice is likely to be affected by
changing social circumstances that alter groups’ relative status and
interdependence (e.g., an increasing economic gap between rich
and poor ought to exacerbate envious prejudices toward successful
minorities). And, although the current research purposely re-
stricted participants to reporting on shared societal stereotypes,
distinguishing the psychological dynamics of prejudice directed
upward (envy) versus downward (paternalism, contempt) suggests
how a person’s own (or his or her group’s) social status may affect
prejudice. Members of disadvantaged minorities or unsuccessful
members of dominant groups (e.g., poor Whites) may be more
likely to exhibit envious prejudice. In contrast, successful mem-
bers of high-status groups may be more prone to paternalistic and
contemptuous prejudices toward other, less successful groups in
their society.
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The mixed stereotypes we have described may be the product of
historical and social accidents, but we have shown that—at the
level of the two crucial dimensions of competence and warmth—
they are predictable from variables that have long been of interest
to prejudice theorists. Other theorists have argued that relative
status leads to predictable forms of group differentiation (Jost &
Banaji, 1994; Tajfel, 1981). Similarly, competition has a history in
prejudice work, from Sherif’s (1966) manipulation of group inter-
dependence to the contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954) and more
recent attempts at prejudice reduction (e.g., Dovidio, Gaertner, &
Validzic, 1998; Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2000; Gonzalez
& Brown, 1999). The idea that these social structural variables
determine the quality of relations with out-groups is not new, but
our approach shows how status and competition together create
different forms of prejudice. Although it is impossible to predict
the paths of individual snowflakes in a blizzard, we may at least be
able to understand why and in what direction the wind will blow.
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RELATIONS BETWEEN IMPLICIT MEASURES OF PREJUDICE:
What Are We Measuring?
 
Michael A. Olson and Russell H. Fazio
 
Ohio State University
 
Abstract—
 
Some recent ﬁndings suggest that different implicit mea-
sures of prejudice assess the same underlying construct, but other
work suggests that they may not. In this experiment, White partici-
pants completed a version of a priming measure of racial attitudes
that either encouraged categorization of the face primes in terms of
race or did not encourage such categorization, and then completed the
Implicit Association Test. Correspondence between the two measures
was found only when categorization by race was required on the prim-
ing measure. Moreover, participants appeared more prejudiced when
they were led to construe individuals in terms of race than when they
were not so encouraged. The discussion focuses on the potential for
dissociations between evaluations of a category and evaluations of
 
members of the category.
 
Asking someone to report his or her attitude toward another race
may not produce an honest response. Implicit measures do not require
respondents to report an attitude and are less controllable by respon-
dents, so they appear to solve the social-desirability biases of explicit
measures (Fazio & Olson, 2003). The present research addresses the
correspondence between two implicit measures of attitudes: the Im-
plicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998)
and a priming technique sometimes referred to as the “bona ﬁde pipe-
line” (BFP; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995).
The IAT measures the associative strength between two target cate-
gories (e.g., Blacks and Whites) and two attributes (e.g., pleasant and
unpleasant) by forcing participants to categorize exemplars of both the
target and the attribute categories within a single task. Negativity to-
ward Blacks is evident in faster response latencies on Black-unpleas-
ant (and White-pleasant) trials than on Black-pleasant (and White-
unpleasant) trials. The BFP assesses the evaluation activated in re-
sponse to a prime by considering how the prime (e.g., a Black or
White face) facilitates judging the connotation of subsequently pre-
sented evaluative adjectives. Prejudice toward Blacks is evident in
faster latencies to negative adjectives (and slower latencies to positive
adjectives) following Black compared with White primes.
Both measures have been shown to predict race-related behaviors
(Fazio & Olson, 2003), and several researchers have argued that, apart
from measurement error and procedural differences, they should cor-
respond to one another (e.g., Banaji, 2001). In fact, Cunningham,
Preacher, and Banaji (2001) found that correspondence between the
measures improved from around .20 to over .50 after latent structural
equation modeling was used to control for low reliabilities.
However, evidence suggests that the IAT and BFP may measure
different constructs. In our own lab, four studies with more than 300
participants altogether have revealed little correspondence between
them (rs from .05 to .13). Correlations of essentially zero also have
been reported for smoking attitudes (Sherman, Presson, Chassin,
Rose, & Koch, 2003) and condom use (Marsh, Johnson, & Scott-Shel-
don, 2001). Although measurement error undoubtedly plays a role, it
probably cannot fully account for such null relations.
Another difference between the measures is the percentage of par-
ticipants who appear prejudiced on each. The BFP reveals negativity
in 50 to 60% of White college students (e.g., Fazio et al., 1995), but
prejudiced IAT scores are found in 70 to 90% of Whites (e.g., Nosek,
Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002).
That the two measures correlate sporadically at best and show dif-
ferent distributions of prejudice implies some difference in the psy-
chological constructs they tap. Consideration of the mechanism
underlying each measure may point to the nature of that difference and
provide insight into one condition in which they might correspond
(see Fazio & Olson, 2003, for a detailed analysis). In the BFP, positiv-
ity or negativity is automatically activated in response to an attitude-
evoking prime, which readies an evaluatively congruent response.
Evaluatively congruent adjectives are responded to relatively quickly,
and response competition slows responses to incongruent adjectives
(see Fazio, 2001, for a review). The BFP typically includes exemplars
of two categories as primes (e.g., Black and White faces), and re-
sponses are averaged across exemplars to estimate attitudes toward the
categories. It is important to note that responses are made at the level
of the individual exemplar, and participants are not forced to construe
primes as members of a particular category. This sensitivity to speciﬁc
exemplar primes was illustrated by Livingston and Brewer (2002),
who observed greater automatically activated negativity in response to
prototypical compared with less prototypical Black faces. This differ-
ence, however, was eliminated when participants were instructed to at-
tend to race.
The IAT is based on the assumption that two categories that are as-
sociated in memory (e.g., Blacks and unpleasant) will be more easily
represented by the same response key (Greenwald & Nosek, 2001)
than two categories that are not associated. De Houwer (2001) sug-
gested that associations to categories drive the IAT more than do spe-
ciﬁc exemplars. In a British-foreigner IAT that included both liked and
disliked Brits (princess Diana, a mass murderer) and foreigners (Ein-
stein, Hitler), British participants showed a bias toward Brits regard-
less of the valence of the speciﬁc exemplars (De Houwer, 2001). This
suggests that the IAT is affected more by associations to category la-
bels than by evaluations activated by a given exemplar (see also
Mitchell, Nosek, & Banaji, in press).
The BFP bases scores only on the evaluation automatically acti-
vated in response to an exemplar, which may or may not include cate-
gory-level information. This implies that forcing participants to
construe the exemplar primes as representatives of the category, as in
Livingston and Brewer’s (2002) experiment, will produce responses
that tap associations to the category, resulting in increased BFP-IAT
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correspondence. The experiment reported here was designed to test
this hypothesis.
The BFP involves a cover story justifying the presence of the
primes. Participants are told that if judging word meaning occurs auto-
matically, then they should be able to perform the adjective-connota-
tion task well, even while performing another task simultaneously. We
used this secondary task to manipulate whether participants were free
to construe the faces as they would normally, as in the “traditional”
BFP, or were forced to categorize them by race, as in the “category”
BFP. We predicted better correspondence between the IAT and the cat-
egory BFP than between the IAT and the traditional BFP.
 
METHOD
 
One hundred White undergraduates participated for course credit.
Participants with high error rates (
 

 
 20%) on either measure were
omitted, resulting in a sample of 61 females and 31 males. They were
told that they would be participating in two separate experiments, the
ﬁrst (BFP) about word meaning as an automatic skill and the second
(IAT) about categorization skills.
The BFP procedure (for more details, see Fazio et al., 1995) in-
volved multiple phases. In Phase 1, participants identiﬁed the connota-
tion of 12 positive and 12 negative adjectives by pressing either a
“good” or a “bad” key. In Phase 2, Black, White, Asian, and Latino
faces were presented. In the traditional condition, participants were
told, “We’re interested in how well you can learn these faces, so it’s
important that you pay attention to them. After you ﬁnish this task, we
are going to test you for how well you can recognize these faces.” In
the category condition, they were told, “We want you to keep a mental
tally of how many of the faces were Caucasian, Asian, Latino, and Af-
rican-American. After you ﬁnish this task, we are going to have you
estimate how many members of each race you saw.” Phase 3 consisted
of the test that participants anticipated.
Participants were told that Phase 4 (the priming phase) combined
Phases 1 and 2, and consisted of four blocks. On a given trial, a prime,
which participants were to either study or add to their racial tally, was
presented for 315 ms, followed by a 135-ms interval and then the tar-
get adjective. Participants responded to the target as in Phase 1.
Thirty-two of the 48 trials per block included a prime from 16 gender-
matched Black-White pairs presented with the same two positive and
two negative adjectives. Primes were yearbook-style color photos (and
included other-race ﬁllers). Participants in the category condition esti-
mated the number of faces presented for one of the four races after
each block. In the traditional condition, participants completed a face
recognition test at the end of the priming phase. They were then es-
corted to another area of the lab.
The IAT included 12 blocks of 50 trials each. On a given trial, par-
ticipants were presented with an exemplar of one of four categories:
Black names, White names, pleasant words, and unpleasant words
(stimuli were from Greenwald et al., 1998). Participants categorized
items by pressing one of two keys whose meanings changed depend-
ing on the block. Participants categorized Black and White names in
Blocks 1 and 2, and pleasant and unpleasant items in Blocks 3 and 4.
Blocks 5 through 7 were critical combined blocks, in which one of the
races and pleasant words were assigned to one response key, and the
other race and unpleasant words were assigned to the other response
key (counterbalanced). Blocks 8 and 9 involved categorizing Black
and White names, with the meaning of the keys now reversed. Blocks
10 through 12 were identical to Blocks 5 through 7, but the race that
was associated with pleasant items was now associated with unpleas-
ant items (and vice versa).
 
RESULTS
BFP
 
Attitude estimates were derived as described in Fazio et al. (1995).
For each participant, mean facilitation scores for the two positive and
two negative adjectives were computed for each face. An effect size of
the Race of Prime 
 

 
 Valence of Adjective interaction was computed
for each participant, resulting in an attitude estimate in which negative
numbers imply more negativity toward Blacks than Whites (see Table
1). Participants’ scores were more negative in the category condition
than in the traditional condition, t(90)  3.06, p  .01, with the
former mean differing signiﬁcantly from zero, t(42)  3.67, p  .01.
 
1
 
IAT
 
IAT scores were computed as described in Greenwald et al. (1998).
The ﬁrst two trials from each block were dropped, and response laten-
cies were natural-log-transformed. The mean from the three blocks in-
volving White-pleasant and Black-unpleasant pairings was subtracted
from the mean from the blocks involving White-unpleasant and Black-
pleasant pairings, resulting in a measure for which higher numbers in-
dicate more negativity toward Blacks (see Table 1). On average, par-
ticipants appeared prejudiced against Blacks, t(91)  9.12, p  .001.
IAT scores did not vary as a function of BFP condition, t  1.
 
Proportion Appearing Prejudiced
 
The proportion of participants displaying some degree of negativity
toward Blacks (see Table 1) was signiﬁcantly lower for the traditional
BFP than for either the category BFP (p  .05) or the IAT (p  .01).
 
Table 1.
 
Descriptive data for each implicit measure
 
Measure Mean
 
SD
 
Proportion prejudiced
Traditional BFP 0.00 .26 .52
Category BFP
 

 
.19 .33 .74
IAT 79.6 ms 91.5 .79
 
Note.
 
For the bona ﬁde pipeline (BFP), more positive numbers reﬂect 
more positivity toward Blacks; the reverse is true for the Implicit 
Association Test (IAT). The last column refers to the proportion of 
participants with scores on the side of the neutral point indicative of 
prejudice toward Blacks.
 
1. In the many studies we have conducted using the BFP, the average score
has sometimes been signiﬁcantly more negative than zero (e.g., Fazio et al.,
1995; Olson & Fazio, 1999; Towles-Schwen & Fazio, 2001) and sometimes
not (e.g., Fazio & Dunton, 1997; Fazio & Hilden, 2001; Jackson, 1997; Olson
& Fazio, in press; Towles-Schwen, 2002). We presume this simply reﬂects
sampling variability. Relations between the attitude estimates and race-related
judgments and behaviors have been observed regardless of the sample’s aver-
age negativity toward Blacks.
 at NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIV on March 8, 2015pss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
 PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE
 
Implicit Measures
 
638
 
VOL. 14, NO. 6, NOVEMBER 2003
 
BFP-IAT Correspondence
 
A regression analysis predicting IAT scores from BFP scores, a
condition dummy variable, and the interaction term revealed a signiﬁ-
cant BFP Score 
 

 
 Condition interaction, 
 
t
 
(87) 
 

 
 2.07, 
 
p
 
 
 

 
 .05. The
category BFP corresponded with the IAT, 
 

 
 
 

 
 
 

 
.28, 
 
t
 
(40) 
 

 
 2.03,
 
p
 
 
 

 
 .04, but the traditional BFP did not, 
 

 
 
 

 
 .18, 
 
t
 
 
 

 
 1.
 
2
 
Reliability
 
Split-half correlation coefﬁcients were computed using attitude esti-
mates based on the ﬁrst and second halves of the critical trials for each
measure. Correlations were .04 (n.s.) and .39 (
 
p
 
 
 

 
 .05) for the tradi-
tional and category BFP, respectively, and .53 (
 
p
 
 
 

 
 .05) for the IAT.
 
DISCUSSION
 
Conﬁrming our reasoning that they measure different constructs, a
traditional version of the BFP and the IAT showed little correspon-
dence. However, correspondence was observed when participants were
forced to categorize exemplars as representatives of racial categories
during the BFP. These results are consistent with our reasoning that the
BFP assesses evaluations of exemplars and the IAT assesses associations
to categories.
 
3
 
 We reconcile these ﬁndings with those of Cunningham
et al. (2001) by noting that their participants completed several ex-
plicit measures of prejudice, that their priming procedure used only
Black and White faces, and that it sometimes was completed after the
IAT. Hence, their procedures made race salient, encouraging categori-
zation by race, much as the category version of the BFP does.
The distribution of prejudice also showed an interesting pattern.
Roughly three quarters of the participants appeared prejudiced on the
IAT and the category version of the BFP, compared with about half on
the traditional BFP. Thus, it appears that evaluations of Blacks are
more negative when assessed at the category level than when assessed
at the level of the exemplar, a ﬁnding that extends Sears’s (1983) no-
tion of more favorable self-reported evaluations of exemplars than
collectives to implicit measures. Although it may appear surprising
that evaluations of a category can be somewhat distinct from evalua-
tions of the category exemplars, the informational environment might
encourage such dissociations. For example, “Blacks” are often repre-
sented negatively without reference to individual members, and
individual Black celebrities are often represented positively without
reference to their category membership.
We argued that the category BFP related to the IAT more strongly
than the traditional BFP did because both the category BFP and the
IAT assessed category-level associations. In our view, the observed
difference in reliability between the two versions of the BFP also re-
ﬂects their differential emphasis on exemplar- versus category-level
construal. In the traditional BFP, people are free to construe the faces
as they do naturally; they need not categorize by race (Fazio & Dun-
ton, 1997). They may, for example, attend to the gender of some faces,
and to the attractiveness of others. Thus, for people who do not spon-
taneously attend to race, the estimate of racial attitudes will be essen-
tially noise, because it is based on Black-White difference scores.
People with more extreme racial-attitude estimates, in contrast, are
known to categorize social targets by race more extensively (Fazio &
Dunton, 1997). They also displayed more reliability on the traditional
BFP in the current study.
 
4
 
 So what appears to be poor reliability based
on simple measurement error is at least in part based on real differ-
ences regarding spontaneous categorization by race. Because it forces
categorization by race, the category BFP provides both a reliable esti-
mate of reactions to the Black versus White faces and correspondence
with the IAT.
It is important to note that the traditional BFP has proven to be a
reliable predictor of behavior in past studies (see Fazio & Olson,
2003). Given the many demonstrations of the predictive validity of the
traditional BFP, it seems inappropriate to dismiss the lack of a relation
between the BFP and the IAT as due to the former’s unreliability. Al-
though allowing categorization by race to vary reduces the traditional
BFP’s reliability, that same natural variation may make it a relatively
superior predictor of judgments and behavior toward individual
Blacks in settings that do not promote categorization by race. In con-
trast, behavior toward the category “Black,” or toward an individual
Black in settings that do encourage categorization by race, may be bet-
ter predicted by the IAT or the category version of the BFP.
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Stereotype research depicts the generic immigrant as incompetent and untrustworthy. The current
research expands this image, specifying key information dimensions (e.g. nationality, socioeconomic
status) about immigrants. To see how perceivers differentiate among particular immigrant groups,
we extend a model of intergroup perception, the Stereotype Content Model (SCM; Fiske, Cuddy,
Glick, & Xu, 2002. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 82, 878–902), to immigrant
subgroups. The SCM predicts that perception centers on competence and warmth, and relates to
targets’ perceived status and competition within society. Speciﬁed by nationality, race, ethnicity, and
class, images of immigrants differ by both competence and warmth, with most groups receiving
ambivalent (low–high or high–low) stereotypes rather than the uniform low–low for the generic
immigrant. As predicted, ambivalent stereotypes reﬂect target nationality combined with socio-
economic status, supporting the SCM’s ambivalent stereotypes and social structural hypotheses, as
well as better deﬁning immigrant stereotypes and their contingencies.
r 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The prevailing stereotype of an immigrant is an incompetent and untrustworthy
outsider. Stereotype research documents this image of a generic immigrant in Belgium
(Cuddy, Fiske, Demoulin, & Leyens, 2000), in Germany (Eckes, 2002), and in Hong Kong
and South Korea (Cuddy et al., in press-b). Apparently, people hold a limited image ofsee front matter r 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
.ijintrel.2006.06.005
nding author.
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T.L. Lee, S.T. Fiske / International Journal of Intercultural Relations 30 (2006) 751–768752immigrants in general, but we argue that, given additional information along key
dimensions (nationality, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status), they will differentially
evaluate immigrant groups and make attributions about immigrants at each of these levels,
consistent with previous intergroup perception research: Italians are warm and friendly but
lax (Cuddy et al., in press-b); Asians are shy but successful (Kitano & Sue, 1973); rich
people are accomplished but not nice (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). We propose a
taxonomy of immigrant images, given a target group whose classiﬁcations implicate
different categories. Here, we extend a model of intergroup perception, the Stereotype
Content Model.2. Stereotypes of national, racial, and ethnic groups
Perceivers tend to agree on stereotypes of different nationalities (Peabody, 1985), due to
their reliance on certain features of the nation, ranging from politics and economics
(Poppe, 2001), to religion (Peabody, 1985), to geography (Linssen & Hagendoorn, 1994),
and relational status, cooperating or conﬂicting, between one’s ingroup and the outgroup
(Alexander, Brewer, & Herrmann, 1999; Salazar & Marin, 1977). Various combinations of
these features then catalyze images of that nation’s people (Hagendoorn, 1991), usually
viewed within a two-dimensional framework utilizing competence and morality (Phalet &
Poppe, 1997; Poppe & Linssen, 1999).
Within the United States, over 70 years, perceivers agree on stereotypes of nine speciﬁc
national, racial, and ethnic groups (African–Americans, Chinese, English, Germans, Irish,
Italians, Japanese, Jews, and Turks), which have increased in favorability, while the
stereotype of the ingroup (Americans) has decreased in favorability (Leslie, Constantine, &
Fiske, 2006). Although African–Americans, Chinese, and Turks originally received the
most negative stereotypes (Katz & Braly, 1933), this no longer holds true. Across four
studies, stereotypes of the same target groups ﬂuctuated in uniformity over time (Gilbert,
1951; Karlins, Coffman, & Walters, 1969; Katz & Braly, 1933; Leslie et al., 2006), but some
recognizable patterns emerge for distinct groups.
Despite these studies of national, racial, and ethnic groups, few studies have targeted
stereotypes of immigrants speciﬁcally. In those few studies, a striking ﬁnding consistently
emerged: People perceive immigrants as low in competence and low in warmth (speciﬁcally
trustworthiness). But perhaps immigrant groups, if speciﬁed by originating country, would
have received differentiated ratings on these two key dimensions.3. Interpersonal and intergroup perception
Previous stereotype research documents a two-dimensional framework that combines
competence and warmth/morality. Individual person perception research demonstrated
the efﬁciency of such a two-dimensional framework for perceiving others (Asch, 1946;
Rosenberg, Nelson, & Vivekananthan, 1968). A literature search shows that two recurring
dimensions appear, reﬂecting competence and warmth: task and social (Bales, 1970);
intelligence and honesty (Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994); competence and morality (Phalet
& Poppe, 1997; Poppe & Linssen, 1999; Wojciszke, 1994); self- and other-proﬁtability
(Peeters, 2002); and self-promotion and self-deprecation (Vonk, 1999).
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relations
One speciﬁc instance of intergroup perception, the Stereotype Content Model (SCM),
posits stereotyping along perceived warmth and competence dimensions (Fiske et al., 2002;
Fiske, Xu, Cuddy, & Glick, 1999). The SCM’s premise is that social perception
immediately answers two key questions: Is the outgroup’s intention good or ill toward me
and my group (friend or foe)? and Can the outgroup members enact their intentions (able
or unable)? This model works well in a variety of intergroup perception, whether targets
are elderly people (Cuddy, Norton, & Fiske, 2005), gay subgroups (Clausell & Fiske,
2005), or female subgroups (Eckes, 2002), in both American (Fiske et al., 2002) and
international (Cuddy et al., in press-b) samples.
The SCM proposes two key components: cross-dimensional ambivalence and the reﬂection
of societal power relations in stereotype content. Ambivalent stereotypes describe inconsistency
between the competence and warmth dimensions. For example, high-status outgroups receive
envious stereotypes (people think of them as competent although not nice) and are therefore
respected but disliked, and low-status outgroups receive paternalistic stereotypes (their niceness
compensates for their low competence) and are liked but disrespected. Rather than uniform
antipathy, as in most traditional prejudice (Allport, 1954), many groups receive ambivalent
stereotypes. Ambivalence in group perception manifests in racial attitudes (Katz & Hass, 1986),
gender beliefs (Glick & Fiske, 1996, 1999, 2001), and ageist perceptions (Cuddy et al., 2005).
The SCM also proposes a social structural hypothesis: Competence assessments
correspond positively to perceived societal status and power, while warmth assessments
negatively reﬂect perceived competition with the ingroup. People attribute competence to
those perceived as holding prestigious jobs and being economically successful, and they
attribute warmth to those perceived to be harmless (in that they are not competitive with
the ingroup, for jobs, school admissions, power, and resources).
Additional studies demonstrate the SCM’s utility at subgroup levels: Women are either
competent or warm, depending on whether they are professionals or homemakers (Cuddy,
Fiske, & Glick, 2004; Eckes, 2002), and gay men likewise receive stereotypes according to
their perceived subgroup (Clausell & Fiske, 2005). Women generically are perceived
positively (consistent with the homemaker stereotype), and gay men generically are
perceived neutrally (consistent with averaging across all the varied subgroups). Here, we
propose to extend the SCM to study perceptions of immigrants at multiple levels. If
immigrants are perceived negatively—as international data indicate—how do people feel
about speciﬁc immigrants? Will they average across subgroups, as in the case of gay men,
or will they assimilate to a speciﬁc (probably negative) salient subgroup, unless prompted
otherwise? Depending on the mix of stereotype dimensions (e.g. nationality, ethnicity,
socioeconomic status), reactions to speciﬁc immigrant groups may drastically differ. But
these differences should be systematic, not arbitrary, according to the SCM, which means
their effects also are predictable, as we shall see. We believe that most immigrant
stereotypes should reveal ambivalence and reﬂect social structural correlates.
4. Applying the stereotype content model to immigrant perception
The current research explores perceptions of immigrants by members of the receiving
country. We believe that the content of majority members’ perceptions of immigrants will
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framework in person perception and group perception apply widely, little research has
applied this model to study speciﬁc immigrant groups. This matters because the host
country’s reception of immigrant groups reﬂects a particular set of intergroup relations
and images, which will require knowledge of how those particular groups fare in the new
country. This research explores whether this is the case.
SCM predicts that immigrant groups labeled by country of origin thus will disperse from
the low-competence, low-warmth corner, landing in locations across the SCM space and
receiving attributions varying in levels of competence and warmth. Comparing stereotypes
of a group with its subgroups, similar trends emerge. Besides subgroups for women and for
gay men: While black people as a category received neutral ratings, black professionals and
poor blacks differed dramatically along the competence dimension (Fiske et al., 2002).
Outside the SCM, other evidence comes from the Dutch majority reporting degrees of
perceived similarity between themselves and each of four immigrant groups (Moroccans,
Turks, Antilleans, and Surinamers) (Schalk-Soekar, van de Vijver, & Hoogsteder, 2004).
All this suggests that, at levels more speciﬁc than the generic, immigrant images should
systematically differ from each other.
4.1. Immigrants’ nationality determines stereotypes, as a function of social structure
According to the SCM, immigrants’ national origin will guide majority members’
perceptions of them. Each immigrant nationality has its own unique economic and social
history with regard to its host country. When one country happens, for its own social
structural reasons, to send immigrants of certain social conﬁgurations to another country,
status and competition relations are created in the host country. The SCM posits that
status buys respect (perceived competence) and competition costs liking (perceived lack of
warmth). Stereotype contents, thus, are immigration accidents: who happens to come
under what circumstances. We can make a number of speciﬁc predictions for speciﬁc
immigrant groups in the US, based on SCM principles.
Consider each sending continent in turn. For Latin America, the closest neighboring
continent, North American samples have rated ‘‘Hispanics’’ as either average on
competence and warmth or low on both dimensions, and migrant workers (a common
North American role, currently, for Latinos) have likewise ended up in the lower left
corner, low in both attributes (Fiske et al., 2002). SCM suggests that immigrants of
Hispanic background or from Latin American nations will be attributed similar
stereotypes as Hispanics and migrant workers, the latter association because Latin
American immigrants in the US are associated with migrant or farm work.
Consider Asia. Across cultures, rich people consistently elicit stereotypes as competent
but not nice (Cuddy et al., in press-b; Eckes, 2002; Fiske et al., 2002). Immigrant groups
perceived as well-to-do should receive similar stereotypes. We suggest that this is one
reason Asian immigrants to the US will fall into this category. Perceived as a relatively
successful ‘‘model minority,’’ the stereotype of Chinese and Japanese as competent, but
lacking socially desirable interpersonal traits appeared decades ago (Karlins et al., 1969;
Katz & Braly, 1933; Sue & Kitano, 1973). Asians as a category (not specifying
‘‘immigrant’’) have received the competent-but-not-nice stereotype, whether perceived
by Americans (Fiske et al., 2002; Lin, Kwan, Cheung, & Fiske, 2005) or Belgians (Cuddy
et al., in press-b).
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given the early European hegemony over native American nations and over African slaves,
transplanted an initially Anglo-European culture to the US, which survives in modiﬁed
form to date. Hence, American society perceives European countries (especially the UK)
to be its closest global allies, so many European immigrants should fall in a space similar to
native-born Americans. Indeed, in one study, the British nationality was closest to
Americans (Leslie et al., 2006). However, of European immigrants, for reasons of social
class, Irish and Italian immigrants used to be perceived as low-status, but their changing
status over the past century suggests that they will receive either stereotypes associated
with low-status (low-competence, high-warmth) or that they will ﬁt in with the American
mainstream.
Moving to Africa, two immigrant subgroups generate more complicated predictions. We
do not predict that African immigrants will receive the same stereotype as ‘‘blacks’’
(middle on both dimensions) (Eckes, 2002; Fiske et al., 2002), because perceptions of black
subgroups resulted in an averaged aggregate neutral rating for blacks as a group.
Voluntary African immigrants to the US now include many high-status people; indeed
fully half the black students at elite universities are of immigrant African (and Caribbean)
origin (Massey, Charles, Lundy, & Fischer, 2003). However, this reality is complicated by
media images of challenges in their countries of origin, so the predictions here could go
either way, or average over the two extremes.
In previous SCM research, Arabs received average competence and low warmth ratings
(Fiske et al., 2002). We predict that immigrants from Middle Eastern nations, because of
their association to Arab background (whether accurate or not), will receive average
competence stereotypes compared to other groups, perhaps mixing low- and high-status
images, along with low-warmth, because of the tragically difﬁcult relationship between the
US and the Middle East.
Overall, then, stereotypes are not conﬁned to national, racial, and ethnic categories but
also socioeconomic status, which cross-cuts the former. The aforementioned stereotypes of
Black Americans is one illustrative example. That poor blacks and professional blacks
received distinct stereotypes demonstrates the inﬂuence of socioeconomic status in
intergroup perception. As noted, the social structural hypothesis of the SCM posits that
stereotypes reﬂect the perceiver’s knowledge of power relations in society. Perceived status
leads to perceived competence, and the people perceived as competent are begrudgingly
given respect. On the other hand, those perceived as non-competitive are consequently
perceived as warm, in order to placate them in their lower status in society. We predict that
certain immigrant groups will be stereotyped based on occupations associated with them,
such as farm-worker or tech industry employees, or social status, such as their legality in
the host nation.
5. The current research
Prior work points to immigrants generically as low in competence and low in warmth.
However, given previous research on national, racial, ethnic, and social class stereotypes,
we argue that speciﬁc immigrant groups will differentiate and locate at various points
along the two dimensions. We apply the SCM to understand how people differentiate
among immigrant group stereotypes. We also conduct auxiliary analyses to see if those
stereotypes illustrate the ambivalent stereotype and social structural aspects of the SCM.
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distinct locations in the SCM space. That is, competence and warmth will differentiate
immigrant images.(2) Immigrant groups from Asian, Latin American, and Middle Eastern countries will
locate in clusters corresponding to previous SCM research on, respectively, ‘‘Asians,’’
(high-competence and low-warmth) ‘‘Hispanics,’’ (low-competence and low-warmth or
average in both) and ‘‘Arabs’’ (average-competence and low-warmth). Immigrants
from speciﬁc European nations will group in clusters corresponding to previous
stereotype research on European nations: low-competence and low-warmth for
Russian, and high-competence and low-warmth for German, and average-competence
and low-warmth for French.(3) Similar to other social groups in previous research, most immigrants will receive
ambivalent stereotypes.(4) Social structure will inﬂuence the stereotypes immigrants receive, in that perceived
socioeconomic status and competition will correlate with attributions of competence
and warmth, respectively.7. Pilot study: selecting immigrant groups
7.1. Method
7.1.1. Participants
Thirty-nine undergraduates (31 from Princeton University, 8 from Stanford University;
24 women, 14 men, 1 unknown; mean age ¼ 19.84, SD ¼ 1:37) volunteered to complete
the questionnaire; 28 were born in the United States.
7.1.2. Questionnaire and procedure
In the open-ended questionnaire, participants read the following instruction: ‘‘In the
space below, please list the main immigrant groups in the US that come to your mind.
There are no right or wrong answers.’’ The rest of the page was blank. To avoid suggest-
ing that we expected a particular quantity of responses, we did not provide an allotted
number of lines. A list of basic demographic questions followed on the back side of
the paper.
7.2. Results and discussion
Participants provided a total of 45 groups. We selected groups to include in our survey if
they were mentioned by at least ﬁve respondents (13%). They were Mexican (59%), Asian
(49%), Chinese (44%), African (36%), Hispanic (31%), Latino or Latin American (31%),
Irish (26%), Indian (23%), South American (23%), Eastern Europeans (21%), Japanese
(21%), German (18%), Middle Eastern (18%), European (15%), Korean (15%), Canadian
(13%), French (13%), Italian (13%), Russian (13%), and Vietnamese (13%) immigrant
groups. Since no participant listed both Latino (or Latin American) and Hispanic, we
combined them into one group labeled Latino.
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factors beyond their race or ethnicity, we added additional categories: documented,
undocumented, farm-worker, tech industry, ﬁrst generation, and third generation. They
were included to understand the impact of perceived socioeconomic status. We believe that
people’s occupation most directly inﬂuences their perceived status, but also in the case of
immigrants, documentation status and acculturation also matter. For comparison with our
immigrant groups, and to anchor the social space, we included eight groups that have
reliably appeared in one of the four SCM quadrants: Americans and college students in
high-competence and high-warmth, rich people and professionals in high-competence and
low-warmth, elderly people and housewives in low-competence and high-warmth, and
homeless people and poor people in low-competence and low-warmth (Cuddy et al., 2004,
in press-b; Cuddy et al., 2005; Fiske et al., 1999, 2002). A total of 33 groups appeared in the
ﬁnal survey.8. Survey: attributions of warmth and competence
8.1. Method
8.1.1. Participants
Two participant samples provided data. Fifty-two undergraduates, recruited from an
introductory psychology course, completed the short survey. An additional 150 students
(mean age ¼ 20.16, SD ¼ 1:77) constituted our second sample, who completed the long
survey in a volunteer, paid ‘‘Questionnaire Day.’’
We analyzed data from only those participants who had lived in the country at least ﬁve
years because we wanted to ensure familiarity with societal perceptions of stereotypes; this
left 49 participants (28 women, 18 men, 3 unknown; 2 immigrants longer than 5 years) in
the ﬁrst sample and 137 (69 women, 65 men, 3 unknown; 17 immigrants longer than 5
years) in the second. The combined sample comprised 186 participants.8.1.2. Questionnaire and procedure
In the short survey, participants rated each target group on perceived warmth and
competence using a 5-point scale (1 ¼ not at all; 5 ¼ extremely). They read that we were
interested in ‘‘people’s perceptions of different social groups in American society’’ and
simply and directly, were asked, ‘‘To what extent do others in society believe each group is
warm? Competent?’’.
The long survey added two more immigrant groups: ﬁrst and third generation
immigrants. Additionally, this survey included questions related to the perceived structural
variables: socioeconomic status and competition they posed for the perceiver’s own group.
For status, participants rated the prestige of immigrants’ jobs and their economic and
educational success. For competition, they rated anticipated impact on one’s ingroup
if immigrants received special breaks, had power, and received more resources.
(See Appendix A for the status and competition scale items.)
In both versions of the survey, participants initially could see only the eight comparison
groups on the ﬁrst page and therefore were at ﬁrst unaware of the list of immigrants on the
following page. Thus, they rated immigrants in comparison to these anchors, not vice
versa. Immigrant groups were explicitly labeled by their immigration status (e.g., ‘‘Italian
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groups and not nationalities per se.
8.2. Analyses
To conduct cluster analyses using warmth and competence, we calculated the means for
ﬁrst and third generation immigrants using data from the second sample (n ¼ 137), but for
all other target groups using the combined data from both samples (n ¼ 186).
Preliminary analyses determined that homeless people were an outlier group on the
competence dimension (2.68 SDs away from the overall mean) and were omitted from
cluster analyses, as in some previous research (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, in press-a).
Analyses on perceived status and competition used data from only the second sample
because these items were not asked in the ﬁrst sample. As in previous research, we created
aggregate scores for status (a ¼ .81) and competition (a ¼ .90).
8.3. Results
8.3.1. Immigrant groups scatter over SCM space
We hypothesized that people’s perceptions of speciﬁc immigrant groups vary on the
dimensions of competence and warmth, and consequently they hold distinct images of
different immigrant groups. We used cluster analysis to capture (a) how these groups
differentiate in perceivers’ minds along competence and warmth dimensions, (b) which
groups are perceived as similar to each other, and (c) how immigrant groups compare to
the prototypical American. We expected to see clusters of immigrant groups disperse
throughout the SCM space, not contained in the lower left corner only, as in previous
research on perceptions of the generic immigrant.
Two cluster analyses determined respectively, ﬁrst, the number of clusters and then their
members. A hierarchical cluster analysis using Ward’s method (minimizing within-cluster
variance and maximizing between-cluster variance) revealed agglomeration statistics that
supported a ﬁve-cluster solution, instead of the usual four clusters (see Fig. 1). Next, K-
means cluster analysis using the parallel threshold method revealed the cluster membership
of each target group.
Two statistical tests then substantiated the ﬁve-cluster solution. First, a two-way
5 (clusters) 2 (stereotype dimensions) ANOVA revealed a main effect of cluster,
F(4, 27) ¼ 17.16, po:001, Z2 ¼ :72; a main effect of dimension, F(1, 27) ¼ 9.61, po:01,
Z2 ¼ :26; and most importantly, a cluster by dimension interaction, F(4, 27) ¼ 60.32,
po:001, Z2 ¼ :90. Follow-up univariate analyses yielded simple effects of cluster on both
warmth, F(4, 27) ¼ 25.79, po:001, Z2 ¼ :79, and competence, F(4, 27) ¼ 42.42, po:001,
Z2 ¼ :86, supporting both dimensions as necessary to classify our target groups. Cluster
analyses results conﬁrmed our ﬁrst hypothesis: Immigrant groups dispersed into ﬁve
clusters across the SCM space (Fig. 1).
8.3.2. Immigrant groups receive stereotypes similar to their nationality plus social class
Our second hypothesis was that Asian, Latin American, and Middle Eastern immigrant
groups should receive stereotypes similar to ‘‘Asians,’’ ‘‘Hispanics,’’ and ‘‘Arabs’’ in
previous SCM research. European immigrant groups should receive stereotypes based
on their nationality. In addition, groups associated strongly with particular social classes
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Fig. 1. Five-cluster solution. Note: ﬁlled circles indicate immigrant groups; open circles indicate comparison
groups; diamonds indicate cluster center. A four-cluster solution combines the ingroup/allies and nondescript
clusters and causes unstable groups, indicated by gray circles, to move to an adjacent cluster.
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corresponding to poor or rich people. To test our hypothesis, we investigated how each
cluster compared to the ingroup (the American ‘‘us’’), and where applicable, whether
immigrant groups received stereotypes similar to stereotypes of their nationality or social
class in previous research. Analyses on the cluster level included paired-sample t-tests
comparing competence and warmth scores for each cluster and independent-samples t-tests
differentiating clusters along each stereotype dimension.
The ingroup cluster was relatively high in competence and average in warmth; it
included Americans and college students, presumably the predominant ingroups, and
Canadian, documented, European, Indian, and third generation immigrants. This cluster
comprised the ingroup, as it included Americans and college students, and its allies, groups
with greatest perceived similarity to the ingroup. To our surprise, Indian immigrants were
included here and not with other Asian groups. Overall, this cluster ranked second highest
among all clusters on both dimensions, perhaps suggesting a muted form of ingroup
favoritism. We believe this cluster embodied the image of the prototypical American,
whom people implicitly use as the standard of comparison to evaluate others. Accordingly,
we investigated how other clusters compare.
The least competent and clearly low-warmth cluster embodied the image of the low-
status migrant or farm-worker class: poor people, and African, farm-worker, Latino,
Mexican, South American, and undocumented immigrants. Though they were nearly as
warm as the ingroup/allies cluster, tð12Þ ¼ 1:33, n.s., their real distinguishing feature is
their association to their much lower competence, tð12Þ ¼ 9:93, po:001, perhaps due to
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stereotype similar to that given to Latino and farm-workers in previous research (Fiske
et al., 2002). At least some (undocumented immigrants) were close to contempt/disgust
stereotypes directed at homeless people.
The cluster adjacent to the low-competent cluster—but warmer—included elderly people
and housewives, and Irish and Italian immigrants. This cluster’s most salient characteristic
is its top-level warmth: As expected, these groups constituted a high-warmth cluster,
scoring higher on warmth than competence, diff ¼ :91, tð3Þ ¼ 3:85, po:05, and higher in
warmth than the ingroup/allies, tð9Þ ¼ 3:38, po:01. Though less competent than the
ingroup/allies cluster, tð9Þ ¼ 4:24, po:01, they received higher competence scores than in
previous research, besting the stereotypically low-status cluster, tð9Þ ¼ 3:13, po:05. The
location of Irish and Italian immigrants replicated results of previous research (Cuddy
et al., in press-b), especially on the warmth dimension. Because it scored more warm than
competent, this group receives what previous work has called a paternalistic or pity
stereotype (Fiske et al., 2002).
The fourth cluster was moderate in competence and low in warmth and comprised only
immigrant groups: Eastern European, ﬁrst generation, French, German, Middle Eastern,
Russian, and Vietnamese. We believe that groups without a clear stereotype constituted
this cluster. Despite lacking a readily available common stereotype, this cluster was still
perceived to be both less warm, tð12Þ ¼ 5:96, po:001, and less competent, tð12Þ ¼ 3:47,
po:01, than the ingroup/allies. Ratings replicated a ﬁnding from previous research for the
French (Cuddy et al., in press-b) on both dimensions. Russians fared better on the
competence dimension here than in previous research (Phalet & Poppe, 1997), while
Germans fared worse (Cuddy et al., in press-b; Poppe & Linssen, 1999).
The ﬁfth cluster was high-competence and low-warmth and comprised two standard
SCM groups and ﬁve immigrant groups: rich people and professionals, and Asian,
Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and tech-industry immigrants. As predicted, these immigrant
groups received the stereotype of the model minorities (Kitano & Sue, 1973): more
competent than they are nice, diff ¼ 1:61, tð6Þ ¼ 12:86, po:001, and uniquely, more
competent than the ingroup/allies cluster, tð12Þ ¼ 4:02, po:01 (but less warm, tð12Þ ¼ 6:95,
po:001). Because it was more competent than nice, this cluster received what previous
research has called an envious stereotype (Fiske et al., 2002).
Comparisons within and between clusters revealed that most immigrant groups
received stereotypes similar to their nationality, ethnicity, or in association to their social
class within the United States. Furthermore, most are distinct from the prototypical
American.
8.3.3. Most immigrant stereotypes are ambivalent
We hypothesized that immigrants receive ambivalent stereotypes. We tested our
hypothesis on two levels: the group level and the cluster level. Groups received ambivalent
stereotypes if their competence and warmth scores differed. Paired-sample t-tests within
groups revealed that all but four of the 33 target groups differed on the competence and
warmth dimensions, p’so.001 (see Table 1), corroborating people’s ambivalent stereotypes
of immigrant groups. Most immigrant groups are not seen as uniformly either good
(competent and warm) or bad (incompetent and unfriendly). This indicates that people
have distinct conceptions of particular immigrant groups, at least on these two dimensions,
and they are not all negative.
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Table 1
Paired competence-warmth differences, by group
Group Difference
Professionals 2.04
Rich people 1.94
Tech industry 1.74
Asian 1.55
Japanese 1.52
Chinese 1.38
Korean 1.08
German .95
French .77
Middle Eastern .71
Indian .68
College students .66
Russian .58
European .43
Eastern European .35
Vietnamese .34
Americans .32
Third generation .14
Documented .02
Canadian .04
First generation .05
Farm-worker .38
Undocumented .42
Irish .47
Italian .58
African .66
South American .70
Latino .77
Mexican .78
Poor people .82
Homeless people .88
Housewives 1.12
Elderly people 1.47
Note: n ¼ 137 for ﬁrst and third generation immigrants; for all other groups, n ¼ 186. Matched pair t-tests
revealed that competence and warmth ratings differed for 29 out of the 33 target groups. Italicized groups are
comparison groups; non-italicized groups are immigrant groups. Positive differences refer to greater competence
and negative to greater warmth.
po:001.
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and (b) were higher on their high dimension than groups low on that dimension and lower
on their low dimension than groups high on that dimension (Cuddy et al., in press-b). To
see if clusters met the ﬁrst requirement, we conducted paired-sample t-tests within clusters,
which revealed that all ﬁve clusters differed on the two dimensions, p’so.05 (see Table 2).
To see if clusters met the second requirement, we conducted ten independent samples
t-tests comparing clusters on each dimension (four unique pairs of the traditional SCM
clusters on each dimension, plus the Nondescript cluster compared to the high-warmth
clusters). Nine out of the ten tests were signiﬁcant (p’so.05).
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Table 2
Competence and warmth scores, by cluster
Cluster Stereotype dimension
Competence Warmth
Ingroup/Allies cluster (Americans, college students;
Canadian, documented, European, Indian, and third
generation immigrants)
3.51a 4 3.19a
Low-status cluster (Poor people; African, farm-worker,
Latino, Mexican, South American, and undocumented
immigrants)
2.35b o 2.99a
Warm cluster (Elderly people, housewives; Irish and Italian
immigrants)
2.87c o 3.78b
Nondescript cluster (Eastern European, ﬁrst generation,
French, German, Middle Eastern, Russian, and Vietnamese
immigrants)
3.08c 4 2.55c
Competent but not Nice cluster (Rich people, professionals;
Asian, Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and tech-industry
immigrants)
4.04d 4 2.43c
Note: Within each row (cluster), 4 or indicate means differ, results from matched pair t-tests. Within each
column, different subscripts indicate that clusters differ (po:05), results from independent samples t-tests.
Table 3
Social structural correlates, by group and by individual
Group-level analysis Individual-level analysis
Status Competition Status Competition
Competence .96 .16 .77 .06
Warmth .29 .55 .01 .14
Note: df ¼ 31 for group-level analysis and df ¼ 135 for individual-level analysis. Per the procedures in Eckes
(2002), we calculated group-level correlations by computing the means for stereotype and social structure ratings
across participants for each target group, and then correlating those aggregate measures. We calculated
individual-level correlations by computing correlations for each participant, transforming them to Fisher’s Z-
scores, averaging them, and transforming back to correlations.
po:01.
po:001.
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the ﬁrst criterion, and most met the second for an ambivalent cluster. Overall, ﬁndings
revealed that people do not think immigrants to be equally as (in)competent as they are
(not) warm but that they perceive them at a particular level of competence and another
level of warmth.
8.3.4. Warmth and competence attributions have social structural correlates
We hypothesized that competence and warmth would correlate with perceived status
and competition. We determined the correlation between stereotype dimensions and social
structure (see Table 3), and as predicted, competence and status positively relate (r ¼ :96,
df ¼ 31, po:001), and warmth and competition negatively relate (r ¼ :55, df ¼ 31,
ARTICLE IN PRESS
T.L. Lee, S.T. Fiske / International Journal of Intercultural Relations 30 (2006) 751–768 763po:01), in the group-level analysis. Individual-level analysis replicated the result for
competence and status (r ¼ :77, df ¼ 135, po:001), but not warmth and competition. The
more a group seems to have status, the more it receives competence attributions; the more
it seems competitive, the less it receives warmth attributions.
9. General discussion
Speciﬁc immigrant nationalities are distinguishable from each other, in that they mostly
differ on competence and warmth, signiﬁcantly higher on one or the other. Categories
(clusters) of immigrants tend to be unique on one dimension: uniquely low competence for
undocumented migrants; uniquely high competence for Asians; uniquely high warmth for
Italian and Irish. Immigrants are not perceived at the broad generic ‘‘immigrants’’ level; if
this were the case, we would have observed only the immigrants hovering around the
middle of the SCM space with the known-comparison social groups occupying the
periphery. Instead, most immigrant groups receive ambivalent stereotypes, and most of
these reﬂect stereotypes of their nationality or implied socioeconomic status. We found
that stereotype content relates to perceived social structure, with perceived status strongly
correlating with stereotypic competence and perceived competition inversely correlating
with stereotypic warmth.
The current research suggests that people conceptualize immigrants at three levels (at
least): the generic immigrant, who is equally low in competence and warmth; clusters of
immigrant groups uniquely deﬁned by one attribute, such as low or high competence, or
high warmth; and immigrants by speciﬁc origin. Consistent with the continuum model of
interpersonal perception (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990), the ﬁrst-cut image of an immigrant may
be a low-competence, low-warmth person. Given additional information, people replace
this image with a more differentiated one, anchoring on competence and warmth
dimensions, compared to the location of the prototypical American on those dimensions.
People may also then sort the groups by similarity in national origin or current status in
the new country.
A few surprises emerged. The ingroup/allies cluster included Indian immigrants, whom
we expected to be in the high-competence, low-warmth cluster. Further research focused
on this group may explain this Asian anomaly.
Subgroups may explain the emergence of the nondescript cluster, another surprise.
People might have varying images of different subgroups for the immigrants in that cluster.
For instance, to some, Middle Eastern immigrants might summon an image of American-
friendly immigrants while, to others, they might provoke images of terrorists. Likewise,
while some people might think of Vietnamese immigrants in union with the East Asian
immigrants (and therefore, also high-competent but low-warmth), others might envision
images of war refugees (and therefore, poor and stereotypically low-competence). First-
generation immigrants comprise a range of people who vary tremendously in the
circumstances under which they arrived: Professionals who moved volitionally mid-career
to pursue further advancement, people who work minimum wages and send back money to
the rest of their families back in the native land, etc. However, possibly, some immigrant
groups just do not receive a clear stereotype: Some (e.g., French) may be in the States long
enough over generations that they are not perceived in terms of that nationality.
The nondescript cluster also stands out because it lacks a clear prototype. Prototypes
can be either averages or ideals (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Most clusters contain a group that
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mean for Americans is almost identical to the cluster mean); Mexican immigrants (closest
to the cluster mean) or undocumented immigrants (an ‘‘ideal’’ extreme) for the low-status
cluster; either housewives or elderly people (as extremes) for the warm cluster; and Asian
immigrants (closest to the cluster mean) or professionals (an extreme) for the competent
cluster. The nondescript cluster lacks an extreme prototype, and though Russians are a
central-tendency prototype—statistically, they occupy the space closest to the cluster
mean—we do not know how in real terms they might represent a prototype of the groups
in that cluster.
One group that received the least favorable stereotype across both dimensions was
undocumented immigrants. In contrast, documented immigrants were perceived similarly
to an American. Legal status alone determines whether an immigrant is perceived as a
regular member of the mainstream society or as an outsider with the lowest status,
reﬂecting an unfortunate equating of ofﬁcial sanction and unofﬁcial status on personal
attributes. One possible extension from this study could be the role of media framing of
immigration status in perceived competition for ﬁnite amounts of societal resources.
Perceived competition fosters negative immigration attitudes (Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, &
Armstrong, 2001; Esses, Jackson, & Armstrong, 1998); documentation status could
instigate or bolster this relation. Another extension would explore what other observable
factors (e.g., low linguistic proﬁciency) can become equated with seemingly unrelated
internal traits and attributes—those with accents are perceived as less competent (Ruscher,
2001).
People’s differing evaluations of documented and undocumented immigrants suggest
that some dimensions (in this case, legal documentation) overwhelmingly bias judgment.
We raise the question of which dimensions are most inﬂuential in perceiving immigrants
when people receive information on multiple dimensions. If Asian immigrants are
competent but undocumented immigrants are not, are undocumented Asian immigrants
high or low in competence? We suspect that the more salient dimension would guide
perception.
A time-based analysis would help clarify whether one dimension (and which) takes
priority in evaluating immigrants. While this study centered on content, a complementary
research focus should explore the historical development of stereotype content of
immigrants. Longitudinal research on stereotypes and prejudice toward various ethnic
groups (Bogardus, 1930; Leslie et al., 2006) would tell us how immigrants shed their
stereotypes and receive different ones (e.g., originally perceived as quick-tempered, the
Irish and Italian are now seen as warm). The process might be as quick as being in the new
country for a couple of generations: In the current research, we found that ﬁrst generation
immigrants are relatively low in both competence and warmth, but third generation ones
are included with the prototypical Americans.
We did not observe strong ingroup favoritism, also missing in studies conducted with
East Asian samples (Cuddy et al., in press-b), but unlike previous studies with Western
respondents (Cuddy et al., 2000; Eckes, 2002; Fiske et al., 2002). Before we draw
conclusions from this ﬁnding, note that the current study’s participants included only
college students. Following Sears’s (1986) advice, future work should use a more diverse
sample, varying age, socioeconomic status, and political orientations, whose inclusion
might reﬂect knowledge of more differentiated stereotypes of immigrant groups.
In particular, the current sample is more liberal than average, and about half are from
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stereotypes less extreme and more favorable than others.
In explaining similar data that did not reveal strong ingroup favoritism, Cuddy et al. (in
press-b) suggested a superordinate category, as per the Common Ingroup Identity Model
(Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993). Possibly, in the current study,
immigrants were seen more as American subgroups and less as outgroups. If so, it presents
an encouraging view of relations between immigrants and majority members; otherwise,
immigrants perceived as not belonging to their new country face fervent political
opposition from majority members (Pettigrew, 1998). Future research should show when
immigrants are perceived as host-country subgroups versus outgroups.
We conclude with anticipations—some optimistic, others not—of host nation members’
reactions (emotional, behavioral intentions, acculturation preferences) toward immigrants
based on their stereotype content. People respect those with status, who are seen as
competent, while they dislike competitors, who are seen as not warm (Cuddy et al., in
press-a; Fiske et al., 2002). People admire those who are high in both competence and
warmth; they feel contempt toward those who are low-competence and low-warmth; they
envy those who are competent but not warm; and they pity those who are incompetent but
warm (Cuddy et al., in press-a; Fiske et al., 2002). Each combination of the two trait
dimensions thus predicts a distinct emotion toward the target immigrant.
Research also connects perceived location in the SCM space and perceivers’
corresponding behavioral intentions, a speciﬁc combination of tendencies toward active
or passive harm or help (Cuddy et al., in press-a). Regardless of competence, warm people
are actively facilitated while not-warm people are actively harmed, and regardless of
warmth, competent people are passively facilitated while incompetent people are passively
harmed.1 Passivity refers to lack of action by the perceiver, but still with impact on the
target. Passive harm includes knowing that an immigrant receives below-minimum wages
but refusing to do anything on behalf of that person. Passive help includes associating or
cooperating with a successful immigrant.
Finally, one’s SCM location inﬂuences majority members’ preference for immigrants’
acculturation style (integration, separation, assimilation, marginalization; Berry, 1984).
Majority members’ preferred acculturation style depended on whether the immi-
grant group is ‘‘devalued’’ or valued’’ (Montreuil & Bourhis, 2001). Such a status can
be derived from their stereotypes. For example, groups perceived as both competent and
warm presumably have the most to offer to the host country while groups perceived as
neither competent nor warm might be seen as exploiting resources. Majority members’
preferences for certain immigrants or particular acculturation styles are not without
consequence (Crocker & Quinn, 2001). Often, immigrants are aware of majority members’
perceptions of them and in turn, their own acculturation strategies are inﬂuenced by
the preferences of their perceivers (Bourhis, Moise, Perreault, & Senecal, 1997). Given
that stereotypes illuminate perceivers’ prejudice and preferred acculturation strategies
for immigrants, these stereotypes should be one catalyst for consequences in intergroup
relations.1To the extent these associations are automatic, they may be even more insidious. Automatic associations also
predict subtle behaviors (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002; Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, &
Howard, 1997; McConnell & Leibold, 2001).
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Perceived status
(1) How prestigious are the jobs typically held by members of this group?
(2) How economically successful have members of this group been?
(3) How well educated are members of this group?Perceived competition
(1) If members of this group get special breaks (such as preference in hiring decisions), this
is likely to make things more difﬁcult for people like me.
(2) The more power members of this group have, the less power people like me are likely to
have.
(3) Resources that go to members of this group are likely to take away from the resources
of people like me.Note. All items used a ﬁve-point scale (1 ¼ not at all; 5 ¼ extremely).References
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INDIVIDUAL CONFORMITY TO ATTITUDES'OF
CLASSROOM GROUPS1
WILBERT J. McKEACHIE
University of Michigan
A INDIVIDUAL'S attitudes are influencedto some extent by the groups ofwhich he is a member. Evidence for
this statement dates back to Moore's experi-
ments in 1921, which demonstrated that
people will reverse their judgments if told
that they differ from those of the majority
of the group. In a similar experiment Marple
(7) found, on a measure of attitude toward a
number of controversial issues, that his 300
high school seniors, college seniors, and adults
made over half of the possible changes of
attitude toward the majority attitude as
compared with about 15 per cent made by a
control group not told the majority attitude.
Both of these experiments provide evidence to
support the hypothesis that the individual
tends to adopt attitudes corresponding to
those held by the majority of the group. This
tendency has usually been termed "conform-
ity."
The perceived group norm. What is the in-
dividual conforming to? Most investigations
of the relationship of attitudes to group norms
have dealt only with conformity to the group
norm as perceived by the experimenter (E).
For example, Marple (7) found that some
members of his group changed their attitudes
toward those designated as the attitudes of
the majority of the group, while other group
members did not change their attitudes in
this direction or changed away from the atti-
tudes of the majority. Why did some indi-
viduals change in one direction, some in
another, and some not at all?
We might improve our ability to answer this
question if we knew what group members
perceived the group norm to be—both at the
time of the pretest and at the time of the
posttest. It seems probable that even before
the opinion of the majority was announced, the
1
 This article is based upon research conducted for a
Ph.D. dissertation completed in 1949 and carried out
under the direction of Professor Donald G. Marquis.
Drs. Harold Guetzkow, Everett Bovard, and Mr. Lee
Danielson assisted in various aspects of the research.
group members had some vague perception of
the opinion of the majority. We can then ex-
plain failure to conform thus: not all members
of the group had the same perception of the
group norm when the pretest was given. When
confronted with what purported to be the
group norm, some group members saw that it
lay in one direction from their original per-
ception2 and changed their attitudes accord-
ingly; others saw that it lay in another direc-
tion from then- original perception and hence
changed their attitudes in the opposite direc-
tion from the first group. Those who did not
change may have found that the announced
norm was in accordance with their original
guess, or else failed to believe E when he
announced a different one. Hence, what Marple
discovered may not have been the "prestige
value" of majority opinion, but rather the
effect of a change or lack of change in a per-
ceived group norm.
A study of the factors involved in conformity
will, then, be more definite if one studies con-
formity to the perceived group norm, rather
than to a norm perceived by E. We shall call
this relationship between the individual's
attitude and his perception of the group norm
congruence, retaining "conformity" as the
term referring to the relationship of attitude
to the objective group norm (see Fig. 1).
The reference group—a matter of degree.
Newcomb (9) has extended our question,
"what is the individual conforming to?" by
introducing the term "reference group." Ac-
cording to his hypothesis, the individual tends
to conform to the norm, not necessarily of the
groups of which he is a member at a given
J
 This theory assumes that when an invididual takes
an attitude test in a group, the group acts as a con-
straint upon Mm even if the group norm exists for him
in only a vague way. An experiment by F. H. Allport
(1) demonstrated that an individual's judgments in a
group were less extreme than his judgments alone. This
indicates that the group norm exists for individuals, at
least in some vague form, even when it has not been
made explicit.
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FIG. 1. VARIABLES INVOLVED IN CONFORMITY
EXPERIMENTS
moment, but to the norm of a group to which
he refers his attitude.
When is a group a reference group? The
usual solution is to use an all-or-none classi-
fication. Either the individual is a member of
the group or he is not a member; either he
uses a group as a referent for his attitude or
he does not use that group as a referent.
It seems probable, however, that a number
of groups may be influencing an individual at
any moment in time. Thus, two individuals
who refer to the same group may be influenced
to a different degree or in different directions
by that group; therefore, quantitative meas-
ures of the individual's group membership are
needed. Those who have discussed group iden-
tification or similar concepts (e.g., Krech
and Crutchfield [5], Festinger [4], and New-
comb [10]) have indicated that group member-
ship, group identification, or group belonging-
ness are not simple all-or-none concepts.
Festinger, for example, defines "cohesion" as
"attraction of the group," and has evidence
that the more cohesive the groups the greater
the conformity to the group norms. Does this
hold true for norms not directly related to
group goals? Do the individuals who are most
attracted to the group show greater con-
formity?
Conformity and group process. In any dis-
cussion of the influence of groups upon the
individual's behavior, Lewin's classic group
decision experiments (6) inevitably come
to mind. Lewin and his associates found that
women who had held a discussion and then
raised their hands to indicate that they would
serve certain desired foods did serve the foods
to a much greater extent than women who had
simply listened to a lecture inducing them to
serve the foods. Other experiments showed that
in bringing about changes in behavior, this
procedure, which Lewin called group decision,
was also superior to discussion without de-
cision or to individual instruction.
Group decision evidently is an effective
method of influencing behavior. Conformity
to the group norm is high. But even though no
norm was announced, conformity to the group
norm of not serving the desired foods was
even higher in the lecture groups. Obviously
more research is needed to isolate the effects
of differing group procedures upon conformity.
Does the discussion before the group decision
promote greater tolerance for deviation from
the norm, or does it help in mobilizing group
pressures toward uniformity?
HYPOTHESES
In order to fill some of the gaps in our knowl-
edge about conformity, an experiment was
devised to test the following hypotheses:
1. Attitude shifts of group members are
positively correlated with changes in their
perceptions of the group norms. (A group
member's perception of the group norm is
defined as his estimate of the attitude of
"most of the group.")
It should be pointed out that the confirma-
tion of this hypothesis will not tell us the
direction of causation. As we shall see in the
discussion section, such a correlation may have
two explanations. The purpose of testing this
hypothesis is simply to provide evidence that
anyone interested in conformity should pay
attention to group members' perceptions of
group norms.
2. There will be a higher positive correlation
between attitudes of group members and their
perceptions of the group norms in groups in
which there is a greater liking for the group
than in groups in which there is less liking
for the group by group members. Corollary:
The greater an individual's liking for a group,
the greater the congruence between his atti-
tudes and perceived group norms.
3. The correlation between group members'
attitudes and perceptions of the group norm
will be lower after participating in a group
decision preceded by a group discussion than
after listening to a lecture and writing an
essay about the problem.
This hypothesis is based on the assumption
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that group discussion weakens forces toward
congruence, which group decision can only
partially restore. It does not contradict
Lewin's results. As we stated earlier, con-
gruence was probably high in Lewin's lecture
groups. But it does contradict the assumption
that discussion contributes to congruence.
METHOD
In order to test our hypotheses we need to create
groups whose members differ between groups in the
degree of liking for the group. While this might con-
ceivably be done in groups meeting but once, it seems
desirable to have groups meeting over a period of time,
especially since we need to subject each group to differ-
ing procedures for changing attitudes. For these reasons,
and because of their availability, the experiment was
carried out in elementary psychology classes at the
University of Michigan.
The measures of the attitudes used were Wang and
Thurstone's Attitude-toward-the-Treatment-of-Crimi-
nals scale scored by Likert's technique, Koch's Attitude-
toward-the-Freedom-of-Children scale scored by the
Likert technique, and Likert's Attitude-toward-the-
Negro scale.
Each of these tests was given as a pretest during the
second and third weeks of the semester. Each student
was asked to check his own attitude and to indicate by
a zero the position on each item which "most of the
class will check." Approximately at the end of each
month one of the three procedures for arriving at group
norms described below was used in each section in ac-
cordance with the experimental design (see Table 2). A
week after the experimental treatment of each topic,
the students took the attitude scale related to the topic,
following the same procedure of indicating their own
attitudes and the attitude of the class. Thus pre- and
posttest scores for the attitudes of students and their
perceptions of the attitude of "most of the class" were
available.
Students for the six sections involved in the experi-
ment were not especially selected from the total en-
rollment of the elementary psychology course at the
University of Michigan. Each section consisted of 25 to
35 undergraduate students with the largest number
coming from the sophomore class of the literary college.
Students enrolling for sections at these hours were
assigned to these sections alternately, i.e., the first stu-
dent registering was assigned to one section, the second
student to a section taught by the alternative method.
Students were not told that they were participating in
an experiment. Each section met for one-hour periods
three times weekly for a semester.
Differences in cohesiveness. Three instructors each
agreed to teach their two sections of the elementary
psychology course in different ways. In order to build
up differences in liking for the group and feeling of
membership in the group, they agreed that their tech-
niques should differ in (a) opportunity of class members
to know other members of the class, (6) amount of
direct interaction between class members, and («) num-
ber of decisions which the class would be allowed to
make about its own goals and procedures.
TABLE 1
MEMBERS' LIKING FOR THE GROUP IN CLASSES
TAUGHT BY DIFFERENT METHODS
GROUP MEAN SD N
Leader-centered classes
Group-centered classes
2.0 1.51 73
3.0 1.56 64
Specific procedures used were as follows:
a. Members of the experimental or group-centered
class introduced themselves at the first meeting and
each member made a seating chart identifying other
members of the class. In the control or leader-centered
class only the instructor possessed a seating chart and
only he introduced himself.
b. In group-centered classes the instructor referred
as much as possible of the discussion from student to
student and refrained from interrupting student ex-
changes. In control groups be commented upon or an-
swered each student participation, so that interactions
between students were mediated through him.
c. In group-centered classes the instructor gave
direction at the beginning of the semester, but as the
semester progressed, he referred more decisions to the
group. Thus students in group-centered sections made
group decisions on their assignments, the number and
dates of tests, and even on having class and breakfast
together in an especially reserved lunchroom. The
decisions made in the experimental groups about tests
and assignments were also carried out in the control
groups in which the instructor simply announced the
assignments and tests. Thus assignments and tests were
the same in both groups.
These procedures were effective in producing the
desired differences. On a scale,on which students rated
from —5 to 5 their dislike or liking for the group,
students in the group-centered classes expressed
significantly greater liking for their groups (p < .01).
These results are presented in Table 1.
Differences in group process of arriving at norm. The
reason for using different techniques in presenting the
attitute was to analyze more carefully some of the
factors involved in group decision experiments.
The first technique used was that of an open vote. I
call this "group decision."* Students discussed the
problem, preliminary votes were taken on the alterna-
tive solutions to the problem presented by the instruc-
tor, and compromises made until agreement on a solu-
tion could be reached. Observers recorded the facts and
arguments used in the discussion, and these formed the
content of the lecture given in the groups which used
the other two techniques. The order of procedures in
each group is indicated in Table 2.
The second procedure was the giving of informa-
tion and arguments on both sides of a problem in a
lecture by the instructor. Following the lecture each
student spent 10 to 12 minutes writing an essay on one
of the six suggested alternative statements of attitude
toward the problem.
* It should be pointed out that my group decisions
were in reference to attitudes. Usually this term refers
to decisions about behavior rather than attitudes.
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TABLE 2
DESIGN OF EXPERIMENT
PBOCIDUMB
INSTIUCTOSS
B
LKADIX-CKNTXUffi MOTIONS
Lecture and Attitude to- Attitude to- Attitude to-
secret vote ward the ward the ward the
freedom of Negro treatment of
children criminals
Lecture and re- Criminals Children Negro
suit of vote
announced
Group decision Negro Criminals Children
QSOOT-CENTEKSD SECTIONS
Lecture and Children
secret vote
Vote announced Criminals
Group decision Negro
Negro
Children
Criminals
Criminals
Negro
Children
TABLE 3
CORRELATION OS SHUT OF ATTITUDE WITH CHANGE
IN PERCEPTION or GROUP NORM
TEST N
Attitude toward the freedom of children .350 121
Attitude toward the treatment of crim- .422 121
inals
Attitude toward Negroes .391 137
On the class day following the lecture, students were
told, "Most of the students in this class chose the
following alternative ...." In all cases the alternative
chosen by the group decision was also that chosen by
the majority in this, which I shall refer to as the "vote
announced," group. This technique was designed to
test the effect of making a group norm explicit.
The third technique was identical with the "vote
announced" technique except that the results of the
vote were not announced. I shall call this the "lecture"
group.
Thus, information and arguments about the subject
were equivalent for all three methods. The last two
methods were equivalent in all respects except an-
nouncement of the norm, and the norm announced was
the same in the first two procedures.
Design. Since it would be inadvisable to treat each
attitude by each method in each section, i.e., treat each
topic three times in each section, it was not possible to
use an ordinary factorial design. In a situation such as
this, the latin-square design permits the maximum of
sources of variance to be isolated. However, this experi-
ment as blocked out in Table 2 is not a simple latin-
square design, but is actually a double latin square with
replications.
Hypotheses were tested by computing the signifi-
cance of differences between the within-groups correla-
tions derived by analysis of covariance.4
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Probably the first question one asks, al-
though this was not the primary focus of the
experiment, is, "did the variables produce
shifts of attitude?" Significant changes in atti-
tude toward the treatment of criminals and in
attitude toward Negroes had occurred—a
change which may not be startling but is all
too rare in the record of the effect of teaching
upon attitudes.6
Relationship of shift of attitude to change of
perceived group norm. We have seen that the
students liked then- groups. In fact, only one
student expressed dislike for the group.
Thus we have a situation in which we would
expect the individual's attitude to be in-
fluenced positively by the group norm. In
the introduction, I suggested that in such a
situation the important variable is the sub-
ject's perception of the change in the group
norm. If E considers only the objective group
norm, he fails to account for many changes
in scores while the norm has remained con-
stant, or must invoke genii called "degree of
suggestibility" or "contrasuggestibility."
As we predicted, correlations of the shifts
in attitude of individuals with changes in
perceived group norm were significantly dif-
ferent from zero (p < .01). These correlations
are given in Table 3.
This finding indicates that our ability to
predict attitude shifts is improved by con-
sidering group norm perceptions. However,
this finding does not show how this relation-
ship is determined. It seems that either or
4
 Formulae for treating this design were developed by
Professor Paul S. Dwyer, Consultant in the Statistical
Research Laboratory of the University of Michigan.
»Another interesting question is this: how is con-
gruence affected by the attitude involved? Taking the
correlations between attitude and perceived group norm
separately for the three tests used, we find that the
correlation is significantly less (p < .02) for attitude
toward the Negro than for attitude toward the treatment
of criminals. The correlation for attitude toward the
freedom of children is not significantly different from
either of the other two. This result, while peripheral to
our main findings, is probably a good illustration of the
fact that a given group does not have the same effect
on all attitudes. In addition to the relevance of attitude
to group functioning, some attitudes are undoubtedly
more difficult to change because they were learned in
the family or other important reference groups.
286 WlLBERT J. McKEACHIE
both of the following processes are involved:
(a) An individual who shifts his attitude
projects his own attitude shift onto the
group and tends to perceive the other group
members as having changed similarly, (b)
An individual whose perception of the group's
attitude changes tends to shift his own attitude
to maintain a similar relationship to the group
norm.
Further experimentation to reveal the exact
operation of these processes should give us a
clearer understanding of the traditional prob-
lem of the "prestige" influence of majority
opinion.
The generality of this research is limited by
the fact that all but one of the students in
this experiment were either neutral or posi-
tively oriented toward their groups as indi-
cated by their responses on the liking for the
group scale. Nevertheless, in some cases even
the individual who is negatively oriented to-
ward the group may shift his attitude in the
same direction as he perceives the group's
attitude to be changing. Ordinarily we think
of the individual who is negatively oriented
toward the group as shifting his attitude in
the opposite direction from the group norm.
Actually the direction of the shift may depend
upon the situation. If the change in the per-
ceived group norm increases the distance be-
tween the individual and the disliked group, his
attitude may not shift. But, if the perceived
group norm shifts toward him, he may shift
his attitude in the same direction to maintain
the same degree of nonconformity.
Relationship of attraction-to-group and con-
gruence. Our second hypothesis predicted that
in the classes in which there was more liking
for the group and feeling of membership in
the group there would be a higher correlation
between attitudes and perceived group norms.
This prediction about congruence on the post-
test was not only not verified, but as the data
in Table 4 indicate, if I had used a two-tailed
test, congruence would have been signifi-
cantly lower in the group-centered classes.
That congruence is not a simple function of
cohesiveness is also indicated by the finding
that within the groups the degree of liking
for the group was not significantly related to
the degree of congruence.
Despite the fact that our hypothesis about
congruence was not confirmed, students in
TABLE 4
POSITEST CONGRUENCE IN LEADER-CENTERED AND
GROUP-CENTERED CLASSES
GROUP N
Leader-centered classes .636 180
Group-centered classes .370 207
TABLE 5
MEAN DIFFERENCE OF ATTITUDE FROM GROUP NORM
ATTITUDE TESTS
GROUP CHILDREN NEGRO CRIMINALS
Leader-centered
Group-centered
6.2
7.3
5.6
3.6
7.9
6.5
P - 5.24 for 1 and 252 df.
t < .05.
group-centered classes actually did conform
to the group norm6 more closely than did
students in leader-centered classes. (See Table
5.)'
How can these results be explained?
One group of variables is composed of fac-
tors affecting one's perception of the group
norm. Here we have such factors as objective
clarity of the norm, misperceptions due to
personality defenses, etc. On the surface it
would appear that these variables cannot alone
account for our result because our groups were
not significantly different in the accuracy
of their perception.
Another group of variables is that having
to do with the relationship between one's
own attitude and the perceived group norm,
or congruence. Festinger and his colleagues
have shown cohesiveness to be of importance
in determining conformity. Because the mem-
bers of a cohesive group are more strongly
motivated to remain members, we would ex-
pect greater fear of rejection and, conse-
quently, greater conformity to group norms.
Our group-centered classes were more cohesive
than our leader-centered classes (using Festin-
8
 "Group norm" here refers to the mean score of the
group on an attitude test.
7
 The significance tests for this table and Table 7
should be interpreted with caution. Since Bartlett's test
indicated that the assumption of homogeneity was not
justified, a log transformation was applied. However,
even after this transformation, Bartlett's test was
significant at the .05 level.
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TABLE 6
CONGRUENCE ASTER DIFFERENT GROUP
PROCESSES WERE USED FOR
CONSIDERING A PROBLEM
PROCEDURE ff
Lecture
Vote announced
Group decision
.577
.498
.320
132
108
90
ger's definition of cohesion as "attraction of
group"). Yet, these group-centered classes
showed less congruence than the leader-
centered classes. How can we explain this?
We have already suggested that need to be
accepted by the group is one of the major
motives for conformity. But groups differ
hi the degree to which nonconformity is
punished. In a group such as ours, hi which
there has been a good deal of interaction be-
tween members, the group member should
be able to develop a fairly good idea of what
behavior the group will reward, what it will
ignore, and what it will punish. Perhaps a
good deal of his feeling of security hi a group
depends upon his knowledge of these limits.
It seems probable that hi most democratic
groups the pattern of rewards and punishments
is such that the group member will learn to
cooperate on issues where uniformity of be-
havior is necessary to group progress. How-
ever, such groups are likely to permit or even
reward individual variation on problems
which require individual rather than group
action. This ability to differentiate between
areas where conformity is necessary and where
it is not necessary may not only be a measure
of the security of the individual group member
but also, when summed for the whole group,
may be an important dimension related to
the group's effectiveness hi problem solving.
Relationship to congruence of procedures used
in arriving at norm. Our third hypothesis stated
that congruence will be less after a group de-
cision than after a lecture. As indicated in Table
6, our results showed that congruence was
significantly lower (p - .03) following group
decision than following a lecture.
Again this result may be interpreted in
terms of rewards and punishments involved hi
the group process. If we assume that one of
the primary motives for a group member's
conformity is his need to gain acceptance or
avoid rejection by the group, the function of a
discussion becomes more apparent. If the dis-
cussion is one in which the group member
hears many divergent attitudes expressed
and H these deviations are tolerated by the
group, the forces toward conformity will be
weakened. On the other hand, if conforming
statements are rewarded and deviation results
hi rejection, the forces toward conformity
will be increased. Our group discussions pre-
ceding group decisions were extremely per-
missive, and it is not surprising that con-
gruence was reduced.
Let us turn now to the factors which result
hi a discrepancy between the "real" group
norm and the perceived group norm. These,
too, help us to understand the effectiveness of
group decision.
One of these factors is the ambiguity or
"clarity" of the norm. We know from many
studies that the individual's needs and past
experiences are involved in his perception of a
social situation. The more ambiguous the
situation the more these individual factors
enter into perception. Thus, an ambiguous
norm can easily be interpreted differently by
each group member. The result is a low degree
of conformity.
Too often we have assumed that if £ told a
group, "the group norm here is so and so,"
each member would perceive the norm in the
same way. Unfortunately, not all subjects
trust psychologists, and if their needs to dis-
believe hi a particular norm are strong, they
are likely to dismiss the announcement.
Consequently, they maintain conformity to a
group norm which is more agreeable to them.
This, I think, is one of the explanations for
the high degree of congruence hi our "lecture"
procedure, where the norm was relatively
vague and unknown.
Nevertheless, the objective situation is an
important factor in perception, and one of the
features of group decision is that it makes the
group norm clearly perceptible to members of
the group. While congruence was low hi our
"group decision" procedure, students' atti-
tudes hi this group were actually significantly
closer to the "real" group norm than hi the
other techniques (see Table 7). These students
were more accurate in their perception of the
group norm as indicated in Table 8. While the
discussion had weakened the pressure felt by
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the individual to align his attitude with that of
the group, the vote had made clear the norm
to which he was relating, and the resulting
conformity was thus greater than in other
groups.
Thus our findings indicate that clarity of
the norm is an important factor in conformity
and that a permissive discussion weakens
tendencies to conform.
With these findings Lewin's "group dis-
cussion" experiments may be more clearly
interpreted. Lewin describes three phases of
group decision—unfreezing, change of level,
and freezing at a new level.
The phase of "unfreezing" is accomplished
by lessening the forces toward conformity to
the old norm. If one of the forces toward con-
formity is the threat of nonacceptance by the
group when one diverges from the norm, letting
individuals present varying points of view
and accepting these divergent opinions with-
out punishment should remove some of the
fear of diverging from the norm.
The step, "change of level" of behavior,
requires strengthening forces directed toward
the new level or reduction of forces directed
away from the new level. In the women's
groups in which Lewin was attempting to
change food habits, the "unfreezing" discussion
was accompanied by dietitians' recipes and
information aimed at weakening or removing
some of the forces which had been preventing
serving of the experimental foods. Thus,
forces toward serving the experimental foods
became proportionately stronger during the
discussion.
"Freezing behavior at the new level" in-
volves reinvoking forces to conformity to the
new norm. This is accomplished by a hand
vote and in at least one of Lewin's experiments
by the knowledge that a check on behavior
would be made by E. In terms of my empha-
sis upon the perceived norm, I interpret this
as a method of making the new norm clearly
perceived and unambiguous. Unanimity in
the decision is important, therefore, not only
because it makes the norm clearer, but because
it re-emphasizes the necessity for conformity
if group acceptance is to be obtained.
In the light of this theory, Lewin's lecture
groups were unsuccessful hi changing behav-
ior because change of level was attempted
TABLE 7
MEAN DIFFERENCE as ATTITUDE FROM GROUP NOKM
ATTITUDE TESTS
PROCEDURE CHILDREN NEGRO CRIMINALS
Lecture
Vote announced
Group decision
7.7
7.0
5.6
5.3
4.1
4.3
8.9
6.3
6.2
P - 2,66 with 1 and 252 dj.
t < .10.
TABLE 8
MEAN DIPIERENCE or PERCEIVED GROUP NORM FROM
GROUP NORM ATTITUDE TESTS
PROCEDURE
Lecture
Vote announced
Group decision
CHILDREN
6.7
5.9
5.8
NEGRO
7.6
4.4
4.4
CRIMINALS
7.9
5.1
4.4
F - 5.91 with 2 and 252 df.
p < .01,
without unfreezing. As a result, conformity to
the old standard of behavior was very high.
Lewin's discussion groups were less suc-
cessful than group decision because although
unfreezing and changes of level were carried
out, the new group norm was not made clear
and perceptions of the norm probably varied.
In addition, in both groups the forces for con-
formity were probably weakened if varying
viewpoints were accepted during the discus-
sion.
The group-decision technique was successful
because all three phases bad been carried out.
In addition, it is possible that the discussion
before the group decision may actually have
increased the attractiveness of the group,
which may have helped counteract the effect
of lack of punishment of divergent viewpoints.
SUMMARY
1. To study the relationship of the indi-
vidual's attitudes to group norms, experimen-
tal classroom situations were set up involving
three sets of variables: (a) The relationship
between attitude change and changes in per-
ception of the group norm, (b) The relation-
ship between attraction to the group and
"congruence" of attitudes and perceived
group norms, (c) The effect of different group
processes used in considering a problem upon
congruence.
2. Attitude changes were found to be sig-
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nificantly correlated with changes in group
norms.
3. Classes taught by a group-centered tech-
nique created greater member-liking for the
group than leader-centered classes, but con-
gruence was less hi group-centered classes.
4. A group-decision technique resulted hi
less congruence but greater conformity than a
lecture.
5. The findings are interpreted hi terms of a
theory emphasizing the importance of the
distribution of rewards and punishments ad-
ministered by the group for conformity and
the discrepancy between the objective group
norm and the perceived group norm.
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CSocial Anxiety Moderates Memory Conformity in
AdolescentsDANIEL B. WRIGHT1*,
KAMALA LONDON2 and MICHAEL WAECHTER2
1Psychology Department, Cognitive Laboratory and Workshop (CLAW), Florida International
University, USA
2Department of Psychology, Forensic Developmental Psychology Lab, University of Toledo, USASUMMARY
When two people view the same event and later try to remember it together, what one person says
affects what the other person reports. A model is presented which predicts that this memory
conformity effect will be moderated, in different ways, by two components of social anxiety. People
with higher fear of negative evaluation should be more influenced by their peers than others, but those
with higher social anxiety related to avoiding social situations may be less influenced by their peers
than others. Pairs of adolescent-aged participants took part in a face recognition study. For each trial
one person responded and then the next person responded. The effect of what the first person said on
the second person’s responsewas measured; the size of the effect was moderated by the social anxiety
measures as predicted by the model. This is the first study showing the relationship between social
anxiety and memory suggestibility. Copyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
For over 30 years, research showing that postevent information (PEI) can be incorporated
into people’s subsequent memories of an event has been applied to errors in an eyewitness
context (Loftus, 2005). The findings have been influential in establishing methods for
interviewing eyewitnesses (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992) and are part of much expert
testimony about the reliability of memory (Loftus, 1979, 1986). Most of the research has
involved the PEI being embedded in biased questions or false narratives. However, there is
another way in which people encounter PEI. Surveys of real eyewitnesses show that they
often receive PEI from other eyewitnesses (Paterson & Kemp, 2006b; Skagerberg and
Wright, 2008c). Because of this, several groups have conducted research where the PEI is
delivered by another person (e.g. Candel, Memon, &Al-Harazi, 2007; Cuc, Ozuru, Manier,
& Hirst, 2006; French, Garry, &Mori, 2008; Gabbert, Memon, &Wright, 2007; Hope, Ost,
Gabbert, Healey, & Lenton, 2008; Mori, 2007; Ost, Ghonouei, Cook, & Vrij, 2008;
Paterson & Kemp, 2006a; Principe & Ceci, 2002; Reysen, 2005; Skagerberg & Wright,
2008a,b; for a review see Wright, Memon, Skagerberg, & Gabbert, 2009). This type of
memory suggestibility is called memory conformity or social contagion of memory
(Roediger, Meade, & Bergman, 2001). The goal of this study was to examine whether
social anxiety moderates memory conformity among adolescents.Correspondence to: Daniel B. Wright, Psychology Department, Florida International University, 11200 S.W. 8th
treet, Miami, FL, 33199, USA. E-mail: dwright@fiu.edu
opyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Memory conformity and social anxiety 1035For several reasons, adolescents are an important group in which to study the moderating
effects of social anxiety on memory conformity. Adolescents consistently are among the
most common victims and witnesses to participate in the legal system (U.S. Bureau of
Justice Statistics, 2007) yet there is little research to guide forensic practice with
adolescents. Memory conformity is a particularly interesting paradigm to use with
adolescents since this developmental period is when individuals are highly susceptible to
peer influence (e.g. Berndt, 1982; Costanzo & Shaw, 1966). However, the influence of
peers on adolescents’ memory reports has not yet been examined. Adolescence is also the
most common age of onset for social anxiety (Rapee & Spence, 2004; Weems & Costa,
2005), and social anxiety affects interactions with peers (La Greca & Lopez, 1998).
Therefore, we reasoned this age group would allow adequate response variability on our
memory conformity and social anxiety measures. Below, we first present our basic model
of memory conformity followed by a discussion of how social anxiety is expected to
moderate the memory conformity effects.A MODEL OF MEMORY CONFORMITY
Social psychologists often differentiate two reasons why people conform to others. These
are informational and normative processes (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955; see also Kelman,
1958). In this section we examine how these processes may operate within a model of
memory conformity.
One process that can lead people to conform is trusting the other person’s memory more
than their own memory. This is informational influence and involves combining beliefs
from different sources. People conform for informational reasons when the other person is
more confident or when one expects the other person to have a better memory. For example,
Wright, Self, and Justice (2000, Exp. 2) showed pairs of participants a set of photographs of
a crime. One person in the pair saw the culprit with an accomplice and the other saw the
culprit act on her own. Immediately after seeing these photographs participants took a
memory test on their own. The test included a question about whether there was an
accomplice. Participants also rated their confidence. The pairs were asked to discuss the
event and in every pair the existence of an accomplice was mentioned. The people in each
pair were separated and asked individually whether there was an accomplice. In 75% of the
pairs one of the people had changed their belief to coincide with the other’s belief. In
almost every case the less confident person in the pair accepted the more confident person’s
memory.
Another study demonstrating informational influence is by Gabbert, Memon, and
Wright (2007). Pairs of participants arrived at the laboratory and were shown several
pictures of busy scenes. Half of the participants were told that they viewed the scenes for
half as long as the other person and half of the participants were told that they viewed the
scenes for twice as long. The participants who thought that they viewed the scenes for less
time should think that the other person in the pair has a better memory (all other things
being equal). After viewing the scenes participants discussed the scenes together, and were
then tested individually. The participants who thought they viewed the scenes for less time
showed higher levels of conformity than those who thought they viewed the scenes for
longer.
People also conform for normative reasons, which involve individuals comparing
the costs of disagreeing with the costs of making an error. When talking with the otherCopyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 24: 1034–1045 (2010)
DOI: 10.1002/acp
1036 D. B. Wright et al.co-witnesses an eyewitness may not want to disagree with them. There is a social cost
associated with disagreeing with others. For example, disagreeing with a romantic partner
can carry a high cost. If the costs of making an error are low then people would often agree
with the other people if the costs of disagreeing are relatively high. This is why some of the
participants in Asch’s (1955) conformity studies knowingly gave the wrong answer. Baron,
Vandello, and Brunsman (1996, Experiment 1) conducted a study where they manipulated
the cost of an error. They presented participants either with a simple or with a difficult
identification task. Consider their simple task where participants got to see the culprit and
the line-up pictures for several seconds. In the control condition participants were accurate
97% of the time, so empirically the task was easy. Participants in the experimental
conditions were faced with a confederate who provided an incorrect response. When
participants were told that these data would be used by police and courts, and that the most
accurate participants would be given a monetary prize, only 16% of responses conformed.
However, when they were told the data would just be used as pilot data 33% conformed.
Participants in Baron et al. were reconciling the costs of disagreeing with the other person
with the costs of making an error. When the costs of making an error were low, there were
twice as many conforming responses.
Figure 1 shows our model of informational and normative influences applied to memory
conformity. People combine beliefs of their own with other people’s beliefs. There are
arrows back from the combined belief to the originals, which allows, for example, people to
think someone who always gives a different answer than them has a poor memory. The cost
of disagreeing and the cost of making an error are combined to create a payoff matrix for
the value of each response. The believed probability of any response being accurate can be
multiplied by the appropriate value in the payoff matrix and the person gives the response
with the highest utility. While formal mathematical models can be created for this modelFigure 1. Normative and informational influences model of memory conformity. According to the
model people combine their beliefs with others and consider the costs of disagreeing and the costs of
making an error
Copyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 24: 1034–1045 (2010)
DOI: 10.1002/acp
Memory conformity and social anxiety 1037(and are currently being tested), the focus here is on which individual difference measures
should predict memory conformity. Before describing these measures, it is important to
stress that the social psychological processes outlined in our model are inter-related to
aspects of the belief (i.e. is the belief a recollective memory, is it a false memory, etc.), that
memorial processes must be considered (e.g. that people believe their own memories for an
event more than they believe their lack of memories for an event), and that the memory
conformity procedures can produce false recollective memories (Roediger et al., 2001).WHY LEVELS OF SOCIAL ANXIETY MAY RELATE TO
MEMORY CONFORMITY
Understanding individual differences in performance is important for understanding any
cognitive task. From Figure 1 we predict that if people vary in how important it is to agree
with others then this should be positively associated with memory conformity. Our model
also predicts that some people may be more attuned to information from others in a social
setting. This should affect how people combine their belief with the beliefs of others. Our
literature search led us to examine social anxiety.
Historically the concept of social anxiety has been associated with many different labels:
Stage fright, social phobia, social withdraw, shyness, introversion, etc. Early versions of
the DSM (pre-IV) distinguished social avoidance disorder from social phobia, and while
later versions offer many different diagnosis (Kearney, 2005), the research literature
continues to find two main components of social anxiety. Consider research on the
psychometric properties of one of the main social anxiety self-report scales: The Social
Anxiety Scale for Children (La Greca, Dandes, Wick, Shaw, & Stone, 1988). With various
versions of this scale, researchers consistently show different components of social anxiety
for fear of negative evaluation and social avoidance.
The fear of negative evaluation component maps onto having a high cost of disagreeing.
The model in Figure 1 predicts somebody will knowingly give an errant response if the cost
of disagreeing is higher than the cost of being wrong. Thus, if certain people have a higher
cost of disagreeing, Figure 1 predicts that they will agree with the other person more than if
they have a lower cost of disagreeing.
Figure 1 also predicts that if somebody does not process social information well then
they may show less memory conformity. This is because when combining their belief with
others, they should pay less attention to information presented from the other person. A
second component of social anxiety, called social avoidance, may relate to this. The
prediction is that people who score high on social avoidance will have lower amounts of
memory conformity than people who score high. This second prediction is more tentative
because people who avoid social information may still weigh it highly when combining
beliefs.
We predict that these two components of social anxiety will be associated with memory
suggestibility in different ways. Scores on fear of negative evaluation will be positively
associated with memory conformity while social avoidance may be negatively associated
with memory conformity. La Greca et al. (1988) and others find these components tend to
be positively correlated with each other, so predicting that they will be related to memory
conformity in opposite directions is important.
Our target population is adolescents and we use a social anxiety scale specifically
designed for adolescents (La Greca and Lopez’ [1998] Social Anxiety Scale forCopyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 24: 1034–1045 (2010)
DOI: 10.1002/acp
1038 D. B. Wright et al.Adolescents, SAS-A). There has been a recent upsurge in adolescence research on
memorial processes (Melnyk & London, 2009), social information processing (Blakemore
& Choudhury, 2006) and the behavioural consequences (Morgan & Banerjee, 2006).
Adolescence is a time when there is much variation in social anxiety so we reasoned this
was the ideal age period to look for the relationship between social anxiety components and
memory conformity.MEMORY CONFORMITY METHODS
Three approaches have used to examine memory conformity. First, some researchers have
shown small groups of participants an event sequence, had the participants discuss the
event, and then examined how each participant’s memory was affected by what the other
people said during the discussion (e.g. Gabbert, Memon, & Wright, 2006). The second
approach is to show participants an event sequence and then provide participants with false
information about how other participants performed (e.g. Shaw, Garvin, & Wood, 1997;
Skagerberg & Wright, 2009). Both of these approaches can be used to construct situations
similar to those involving some eyewitnesses (e.g. showing participants a simulated
robbery). However, it is difficult to have more than a couple of discrepant items in the
discussion and therefore it is difficult to estimate individual differences in suggestibility
unless the expected effect is very large.
The third approach is to present participants with a large number of stimuli and then to
test people in small groups where the participant can hear or see other people’s responses
(e.g. see Allan & Gabbert, 2008; Meade & Roediger, 2002; Schneider & Watkins, 1996;
Wright, Mathews, & Skagerberg, 2005). The stimuli are sets of simple unrelated items.
Researchers have used words, photographs of faces and photographs of objects. This
recognition memory procedure produces a large amount of data for each participant. As the
number of stimuli increases so does the reliability of the estimates for memory conformity
and therefore this procedure is appropriate for exploring potential moderators of the
memory conformity effect. Thus, we use a social recognition memory procedure to test
whether the components of social anxiety are associated with memory conformity in a
manner consistent with the model in Figure 1. This is the first study examining the
relationship between social anxiety and memory suggestibility.METHODS
Ninety eight participants were recruited in pairs from local schools and YMCAs in Toledo,
US, area. Twelve were dropped because of having more than one missing item on the
personality measures. Of the remaining 86 participants, 32 were male. They were between
11 and 18 years old with a mean of 14.72 years (SD¼ 1.54 years). No age trends were
found in these data.
Participants were given La Greca and Lopez’ (1998) Social Anxiety Scale for
Adolescents (SAS-A), which is adapted from their child social anxiety scale. The SAS-A is
a widely used scale specifically designed to measure social anxiety in adolescents. The
SAS-A is a self-administered pen and paper questionnaire composed of 22 items where
participants respond on 1–5 scales for how often they feel each statement applies to them.
Participants were tested individually. La Greca and Lopez found that the items loaded onCopyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 24: 1034–1045 (2010)
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distress to new situations (SAD-New) and social avoidance and distress generally (SAD-
General). They found Cronbach’s as of .91, .83 and .76 for these subscales.
Next, a face recognition memory procedure was conducted as follows. Participants
were tested in pairs. They sat approximately 1m from a computer screen and were shown
50 white male faces one at a time for 2 seconds each with no time between faces (stimuli
from Wright, Gabbert, Memon, & London, 2008, Experiment 2). To prevent confounding
differences among face stimuli with differences among participants, all pairs saw the same
set of faces. Next, the experimenter explained they were going to take part in a memory
recognition procedure. They were shown a response sheet with two columns. The first
column was for the first participant to place their response and the second column was
for the second participant. Each column contained 100 rows, with boxes marked ‘old’
and ‘new’ on which participants were instructed to mark their responses for each of the
100 faces. They were told that they would see the same 50 photographs interspersed with
50 new photographs and that they should say whether they think the face had been shown
before (‘old’) or not (‘new’). During testing, a facewas shown on the screen, the first person
marked ‘old’ or ‘new’, and handed the response sheet to the second person to mark their
response. After the second person responded they handed the sheet back to the first person
who pressed RETURN on the computer and the next face was shown. This continued for all
100 faces. All participants indicated that they understood the instructions. The
experimenter was present throughout to ensure this procedure was followed.
Participants were randomly allocated either always to respond first or always to respond
second. Those responding first provide a baseline for accuracy and are the control group.
Primary interest is with those responding second: The PEI group. For any of the 100 trials
the PEI participants can be in one of four conditions of a 2 2 within-subject design. The
first factor is whether the face was previously shown (old) or not (new). The second is
whether the other person said ‘old’ or ‘new’. These factors are correlated because the first
person tends to respond accurately, therefore there are not 25 trials per cell per person.1 The
dependent variable is whether the participant says ‘old’ or ‘new’.RESULTS
A single missing value on SAS-Awas replaced using the missing values procedure in SPSS
(EM algorithm). Subscales were calculated and standardized so each subscale had a mean
of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Their reliabilities were: FNE (Cronbach’s a¼ .88, 95%
CI¼ [.84, .92]); SAD-new (Cronbach’s a¼ .86, 95% CI¼ [.81, .90]); and SAD-general
(Cronbach’s a¼ .67, 95% CI¼ [.54, .77]). The Cronbach’s as reported by La Greca and
Lopez (1998) are all within our observed confidence limits. These SAS-A subscales were
correlated among themselves between .56 and .64, which are also approximately the same
as those La Greca and Lopez (1998) report.
For the 43 participants who responded first (i.e. the control group), only six of the
4300 trials had missing values (0.1%). They responded ‘old’ for 28.9% of new faces (i.e.
‘false alarms’) and for 59.9% of old faces (i.e. ‘hits’). One popular measure of accuracy is
the logit. This is the natural logarithm of the ratio of the odds of saying ‘old’ when the face1Some research uses a confederate for responding first (e.g. Wright et al., 2008). A confederate was not used in the
current research because it would have been impractical to have confederates of similar ages to the participants.
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responding so values above zero showmemory. If the variables are scaled properly then the
population logit is estimated by the coefficient in a multilevel logistic regression (Wright,
Horry, & Skagerberg, 2009; and appendix for details of this approach). For the control
group the estimate is: 1.51, se¼ 0.18, p< .001, indicating they performed significantly
above chance in accuracy.
For the 43 participants who responded second (i.e. the PEI group), 12 of the 4300 trials
(0.3%) were missing due to participants not ticking ‘new’ or ‘old’, or responding after the
first person did not tick one of these. Analyses are based on the remaining 4288 trials.
Table 1 shows the responses broken down by whether the face was old or new and what the
first participant said. The memory effect is evident because people said ‘old’ more to old
faces than to new faces, both when the first participant said ‘old’ and when the first
participant said ‘new’. The memory conformity effect is evident because people said ‘old’
more if the other person said ‘old’ than if the other person said ‘new’, both for faces that
were old and those that were new.
Multilevel logistic regressions were used for inferential statistics. The PEI participant’s
response was the dependent variable. We allowed the intercept to vary for both participants
and faces and allowed the coefficient for accuracy to vary by participant. The units for all the
b values we report are logits, though for graphing the data we use the probability of
responding ‘old’. The memory accuracy effect, b¼ 1.45, se¼ 0.18, p< .001, and the
memory conformity effect, b¼ 1.05, se¼ .08, p< .001, are both much larger than zero. The
interaction between what the other person said and whether the face was old or new was
statistically significant, likelihood ratio x2(1)¼ 5.50, p¼ .02. The conformity effect was
larger for new faces, b¼ 1.26, than for old faces, b¼ .90, replicating Wright et al. (2005).
Next, moderator analyses were conducted to see if any of the social anxiety components
moderated the size of the conformity effect. We used a stepwise approach to search for
moderator variables. The main effect of each social anxiety component and its interaction
with what the other person said were included in the model.We searched for the component
with the largest interaction. Because stepwise procedures involve many statistical tests, we
required p< .01 for including an effect. The interaction between SAS FNE and what the
other person said had the largest interaction, x2(1)¼ 15.78, p< .001. As predicted, FNE
was positively associated with memory conformity. Neither of the other two components
had significant interactions at this stage, but we then introduced them into regressions
including FNE and its interaction. The SAD-new subscale interaction had the larger
improvement, x2(1)¼ 10.78, p¼ .001. As predicted, social avoidance was negatively
associated with memory conformity. After including the effects for SAD-new, the
interaction between SAD-G and what the first person said was non-significant,
x2(1)¼ 0.57, p¼ .45.Table 1. The frequency and percentage of trials with ‘old’ responses from the participant responding
second when the first person says ‘new’ or ‘old’, and when the face is new or old
First person says:
Row meanNew Old
New faces 257/1526¼ 16.8% 306/621¼ 49.3% 563/2147¼ 26.2%
Old faces 398/859¼ 46.3% 908/1282¼ 70.8% 1306/2141¼ 61.0%
Column mean 655/2385¼ 27.5% 1214/1903¼ 63.8% 1869/4288¼ 43.6%
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(La Greca & Lopez, 1998). These probabilities are while holding the values of the other subscale
constant at 0
Memory conformity and social anxiety 1041Figure 2 shows the final model including the interactions of FNE and SAS-new. The
predicted probabilities for responding ‘old’ are shown, broken down by whether the face
was old or new and what the first person said for different values of the two statistically
significant social anxiety components holding the value of the other component fixed at 0.
These social anxiety variables are standardized, so 0 is the mean of the sample and values
of 1 and þ1 are one standard deviation below and above the means for these variables.
For FNE, the conformity effect (i.e. the difference between the other person saying ‘old’
and ‘new’) is about 13% for people scoring one standard deviation below the mean while it
is about 32% for those scoring one standard deviation above the mean. For SAD-new the
effect is about 30% for those scoring one standard deviation below the mean and 17% for
those scoring one standard deviation above the mean.DISCUSSION
This study is the first to show a relationship between social anxiety and memory
suggestibility. Most relevant research has differentiated at least two components of social
anxiety. We predicted that the two main components would moderate the memory
conformity effect, but in opposite directions. We hypothesized that people who think the
cost of disagreeing is higher than the cost of making an error would be likely to conform in
memory conformity tasks (Figure 1). In the social anxiety literature, the Fear of Negative
Evaluation subscale of La Greca and Lopez’ SAS-A (1998) measures individual difference
in the cost of disagreeing. As we predicted, FNE scores were positively correlated with
memory conformity (left panel of Figure 2). A shift from one standard deviation below the
mean to one standard deviation above the mean is associated with approximately doubling
the size of the memory conformity effect.
Figure 1 also shows that how people combine information from other people and from
themselves is important for memory conformity. If someone avoids information from
others they should not be susceptible to memory conformity. We thought that people who
score high on social avoidance might not process information from other people well. WeCopyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 24: 1034–1045 (2010)
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and Lopez’ SAS-A has two subscales that correspond to this type of social anxiety. The
avoidance of new situations subscale was negatively correlated with memory conformity
after controlling for fear of negative evaluation. The right panel of Figure 2 suggests the
influence is about half the size for people one standard deviation above the mean compared
with people one standard deviation below the mean. Because this effect was only found
after controlling for FNE and that the effect was observed for only one of the two social
avoidance subscales further research is necessary before any definitive conclusions are
reached.
In summary, remembering in social situations is a complex task and the current research
shows how individual differences in social anxiety are associated with memory conformity
among adolescents. To understand the relationship it is necessary to differentiate these
types of social anxiety. People who are social avoidant are less influenced, in general, by
other people and we show that they also appear less influenced by their memory reports.
People who fear negative evaluation are more likely to coalesce with others’ memory
reports to avoid negative appraisal. The literature on individual differences and PEI is small
and in the past has focused on cognitive measures (e.g. Bruck & Melnyk, 2004; Read &
Winograd, 1998). Further testing is needed to examine whether the moderating effects of
social anxiety on memory conformity extend to other age groups and with other measures
of social anxiety. The memory conformity procedures are arguably a more ecologically
valid way to examine memory suggestibility than traditional individual tasks because
memory conformity tasks are embedded in the social situation in which the suggestion
occurs. Here we show personality variables related to social encounters should be
considered when examining memory suggestibility.
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For any individual trial the participant can say ‘old’ or ‘new’. The probability of them
saying ‘old’ should increase if they were previously shown the face, provided their memory
is above chance. The probability of them saying ‘old’ should increase if the other person
says ‘old’ (and should decrease if the other person says ‘new’), provided they exhibit at
least some memory conformity. The probability of an ‘old’ response will vary among
participants and among the faces. We also expect there to be differences among
participants for how good their memories are. Following Clark (1973), the aim is to allow
random effects for both participants and stimuli. Recent computing advances allow these
random effects to be modelled relatively easily with the following multilevel logistic
regression (Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008; Goldstein, 2003; Wright & London, 2009):
ln
Prðresponseijk ¼ oldÞ
1 Prðresponseijk ¼ oldÞ
 !
¼ b0jk þ b1jseenijk þ b2 othersaysijk
Let responseijk be the ith trial for the jth person to the kth face. The b0jk is the intercept
and it relates to the response criterion in signal detection theory terminology. It includes the
subscripts j and k. This means it has different values for each participant and each face. WeCopyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 24: 1034–1045 (2010)
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Memory conformity and social anxiety 1045assume there is some grand mean, b0, and that values for participants will be normally
distributed around this value with some unknown standard deviation to be estimated.
Similarly, values for faces are also assumed to be normally distributed around b0.
b1j is related to accuracy. It has the subscript j meaning that the values vary by
participant. We assume that these values are normally distributed around b1. b2 is the
parameter that measures conformity. The higher the value is, the greater the conformity is.
We examine variation in the size of this effect by the social anxiety measures.
On the basis of past research (e.g. Wright et al., 2005) we expect that there will be large
effects for memory (b1>> 0) and for conformity (b2>> 0). Our interest is whether the
conformity effect is moderated by the components of social anxiety. ‘Moderator analysis’
is the phrase used in much social and health psychology when exploring if an effect of one
variable depends on the level of another variable. In statistics terminology this is an
interaction. To test if a component of social anxiety moderates the conformity effect we
first include the main effect of the component, and then test whether adding the interaction
between the component and the coefficient for conformity improves the fit of the model.
Because of the number of tests, we decided beforehand to set a¼ .01 rather than .05, but for
these data none of the observed p values were between these levels.
Multilevel generalized linear models are currently fit with methods that approximate
maximum likelihood. The Laplace method is used. This is the default for the package
lme4 (Bates, Maechler, & Dai, 2008), which was used. It is part of the software R
(R Development Core Team, 2008) and is available for free from the Comprehensive R
Archive Network.Copyright # 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Appl. Cognit. Psychol. 24: 1034–1045 (2010)
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We propose that people treat prejudice as more legitimate when it seems rationalistic—that is, linked to
a group’s pursuit of collective interests. Groups that appear to be coherent and unified wholes (entitative
groups) are most likely to have such interests. We thus predicted that belonging to an entitative group
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that prejudice and discrimination seemed more socially acceptable to third parties when committed by
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prejudice when an interests-based explanation was plausible—namely, when the outgroup could possibly
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People draw an intuitive distinction between violence in the
service of self-interest and violence that is “senseless.” Violence
enacted in the name of self-preservation, self-defense, or even
self-enrichment can seem more rational and legitimate than vio-
lence that lies outside the bounds of logic and justification (Ray,
2011). In the present work, we suggest that prejudice and discrim-
ination are much like violence—that when outgroup bias reflects
the pursuit or defense of ingroup interests, it seems more natural,
understandable, and acceptable than prejudice that bears no plau-
sible relation to group interests. We refer to such instances of
outgroup bias as rationalistic to highlight their apparent origin in
perpetrators’ group-interested calculations.1
The present research examines how being in the right sort of
social group—namely, the kind most likely to have collective
interests—can legitimize the expression of bias against outsiders.
We contend that the same acts of prejudice and discrimination will
seem more rationalistic when perpetrated by members of tightly
knit and unified (i.e., entitative) groups than by members of diffuse
and heterogeneous (i.e., nonentitative) groups. As a result, people
who perceive their ingroup as entitative, compared with people
who do not, will be more likely to give voice to their anti-outgroup
prejudices (if they indeed have such prejudices). We describe this
phenomenon as a licensing effect (Miller & Effron, 2010), indi-
cating that membership in an entitative group grants people per-
mission or legitimacy to express prejudiced attitudes without nec-
essarily changing their private attitudes.2
Our theoretical logic rests on two propositions: that the ability to
attribute prejudice to the defense or pursuit of collective interests
can legitimize outgroup bias, and that entitativity signals that a
group has collective interests. We discuss each proposition in turn.
We then review previous research connecting entitativity percep-
tions to intergroup bias. Finally, we present eight studies demon-
1 The term rationalistic describes instances of prejudice and discrimi-
nation that a reasonable person might regard as furthering a group’s
interests. Rationalistic prejudice is not necessarily rational in the sense of
actually being in a group’s interests.
2 The licensing effect we examine is theoretically distinct from the
“moral self-licensing effect,” whereby securing a moral identity (e.g., by
demonstrating a lack of prejudice) makes one willing to act less morally
(e.g., by expressing seemingly prejudiced views; Merritt, Effron, & Monin,
2010; Monin & Miller, 2001).
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strating (a) that perceivers will judge bias as more socially accept-
able when perpetrated by entitative, compared with nonentitative,
groups; (b) that this licensing effect stems from the attribution of
entitative groups’ prejudice to the defense or pursuit of collective
interests; and (c) that perceiving their own ingroup as entitative
makes people more likely to express their prejudice against out-
groups.
Collective Interests Provide Legitimacy
The defense or pursuit of collective interests can justify actions
that might otherwise seem illegitimate. For example, people are
more likely to violate social norms concerning equality and fair-
ness when acting on behalf of others than when acting only on
behalf of themselves (Diekmann, 1997; Gino, Ayal, & Ariely,
2013; Wiltermuth, 2011). People also feel more comfortable voic-
ing opinions about social and political issues that directly affect
their group’s interests than issues that do not (Effron & Miller,
2012; Ratner & Miller, 2001)—particularly when their opinions
are unpopular (Morrison, 2011). One interpretation of these find-
ings is that the ability to attribute one’s behavior to collective
interests can grant people a license to do what they would other-
wise inhibit themselves from doing.
Collective interests may also legitimize behavior that harms
outgroups. Consistent with this idea, a norm of group interest
permits people to prioritize ingroup interests ahead of outgroup
interests (Wildschut, Insko, & Gaertner, 2002). According to this
norm, individuals should strive to maximize ingroup benefits, even
if doing so negatively affects outgroups. Previous empirical work
has emphasized how the norm of group interest can obligate
individuals to help their group at others’ expense: Participants
playing a zero-sum economic game made more ingroup-favoring
decisions at the expense of an outgroup when decisions were
public versus private, presumably because the participants felt
pressure to conform publicly to the group-interest norm (Wild-
schut et al., 2002 Study 3). In our view, this norm can also license
people to publicly express private prejudices against the out-
group—legitimizing, without necessarily obligating or motivating,
outgroup derogation (cf. Miller, 1999; Miller & Effron, 2010). The
subjective sense of legitimacy or entitlement to express one’s
views or to act on one’s attitudes has been called psychological
standing (Miller, 1999; Miller & Effron, 2010; Miller, Effron, &
Zak, 2009). Without psychological standing, people tend to inhibit
their behavior rather than risk opprobrium. We propose that one
source of standing is the ability to point to collective interests.
Research on the effects of “intergroup threat” (e.g., Blumer,
1958; Bobo & Hutchings, 1996) underscores the importance of
collective interests in intergroup relations. Indeed, there can be no
intergroup threat without collective interests, although the mere
existence of such interests does not imply that they are threatened.
Intergroup threat “occurs when one group’s actions, beliefs, or
characteristics challenge the goal attainment or well-being of an-
other group” (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006, p. 336). Thus, one
group’s actions only become threatening—in the intergroup
sense—if they impinge on or conflict with another group’s collec-
tive interests (i.e., its desire for well-being and goal attainment).
Whereas previous work has shown that intergroup threat (and thus
concern for collective interests) can provoke prejudiced attitudes
(e.g., Bobo, 1988; Kinder & Sears, 1981; Riek et al., 2006; Sherif
& Sherif, 1969; Stephan & Stephan, 1996, 2000), we argue that the
expression of prejudice seems more legitimate when it can be
attributed to a desire to defend collective interests against threat.
Entitativity Provides Collective Interests
We have argued that outgroup bias seems more legitimate when
it can be attributed to group members’ concern for their collective
interests. But when does prejudice and discrimination seem to stem
from collective interests? The most basic prerequisite is the exis-
tence of a collective. In this respect, some social aggregates
constitute truer collectives than others. For example, Yankees fans
attending a game form a more coherent, unified entity—and more
clearly have collective interests—than do pedestrians outside the
stadium. In other words, the former social group is more entitative
than the latter (Campbell, 1958; Hamilton & Sherman, 1996).
Entitative groups are characterized by high similarity, proximity,
and interdependence among members who share information and
have strong interpersonal bonds (Brewer, Hong, & Li, 2004;
Campbell, 1958; Crump, Hamilton, Sherman, Lickel, & Thakkar,
2010; Ip, Chiu, & Wan, 2006). Of particular relevance to the
present analysis, the pursuit of common goals—and thus the ex-
istence of collective interests—is a central characteristic of
entitative-group members (Denson, Lickel, Curtis, Stenstrom, &
Ames, 2006; Lickel et al., 2000).
If, as we suggest, prejudice seems more legitimate when moti-
vated by collective interests, then membership in an entitative
group—the only kind that can possess such interests—should
license bias against outgroups. Hence, outside observers should
tolerate a group’s bias to the extent they regard the group as
entitative. Moreover, to the degree that group members themselves
see the ingroup as entitative, they should feel liberated to express
their own biases against outgroups.
A Plausibility Constraint
We do not expect that entitativity will always give a group
psychological standing to discriminate against outgroups. Entita-
tivity provides collective interests, but these interests should only
legitimize prejudice that they could reasonably have engendered.
In this respect, bias against outgroups that could not plausibly
interfere with ingroup interests should seem illegitimate—even
when the ingroup’s entitativity makes those interests seem partic-
ularly strong. For example, perceiving Palestinians as a cohesive
group with clear collective interests might lead a person to grant
Palestinians greater license to express bias against Israeli Jews,
because Israeli Jews could be perceived as interfering with the
pursuit of those interests. By contrast, we would predict that clear
collective interests would not give Palestinians a license to be
prejudiced against African Americans, as it is difficult to argue that
such prejudice could be motivated by those interests. Thus, we
theorize that the standing to express bias depends not only on the
existence of ingroup interests but also on the plausibility that the
outgroup might threaten such interests. Prejudice or discrimination
that does not meet this plausibility constraint is not rationalistic.
Prior Research on Entitativity and Intergroup Bias
Prior research has examined the role of entitativity in intergroup
bias, but has not considered how membership in an entitative
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group gives one license to express prejudice. Perceiving outgroups
as homogeneous—a correlate of perceiving them as entitative—
has long been associated with stereotyping (Allport, 1954; Brewer
& Harasty, 1996; Hamilton, Sherman, & Rodgers, 2004), and
people who perceive an outgroup as entitative are more likely to
endorse and apply stereotypes about that group (Levy, Plaks,
Hong, Chiu, & Dweck, 2001; Levy, Stroessner, & Dweck, 1998;
Ryan, Bogart, & Vender, 2000; Rydell, Hugenberg, Ray, &
Mackie, 2007; Spencer-Rodgers, Hamilton, & Sherman, 2007;
Spencer-Rodgers, Williams, Hamilton, Peng, & Wang, 2007).
Compared with less-entitative outgroups, highly entitative out-
groups tend to elicit greater suspicion (Newheiser, Sawaoka, &
Dovidio, 2012) and more negative evaluations (Abelson, Das-
gupta, Park, & Banaji, 1998; Dasgupta, Banaji, & Abelson, 1999).
Increasing a disliked group’s apparent entitativity reduces people’s
willingness to help its members (R. W. Smith, Faro, & Burson,
2013). In short, people tend to have stereotyped beliefs and prej-
udiced feelings toward more entitative outgroups (see also Ne-
wheiser, Tausch, Dovidio, & Hewstone, 2009). We make the novel
claim that people whose ingroup is entitative feel more licensed
(and are perceived by others as being more licensed) to express
prejudice against outgroups.
Our work builds on three prior investigations that establish a
connection between perceived ingroup entitativity and bias, but
that do not share our focus on the legitimization of anti-outgroup
prejudice and discrimination. First, Insko, Wildschut, and Cohen
(2013) found that laboratory-created groups made more competi-
tive choices in a prisoner’s dilemma game when they were induced
to view their own group as more (vs. less) entitative. Competition
could arise from intergroup prejudice, but Insko and colleagues
instead emphasized the role of greed. Moreover, these researchers
did not examine whether ingroup entitativity licensed people to act
on extant competitive motives (as our account would predict) or
instead strengthened the motives themselves. Second, Gaertner
and Schopler (1998) manipulated impressions of ingroup entita-
tivity by varying the level of interpersonal interaction within
experimenter-created three-person groups. Members of the more
entitative groups allocated more money to the ingroup at the
expense of the outgroup, and rated ingroup solutions to a problem
more favorably than outgroup solutions. In contrast to our focus on
anti-outgroup prejudice, these findings were entirely explained by
increased positivity toward the ingroup (see also Gaertner, Iuzzini,
Witt, & Oriña, 2006) and not by increased negativity toward the
outgroup—perhaps because dislike had little opportunity to de-
velop between minimal three-person groups. Third, Castano, Yzer-
byt, Paladino, and Sacchi (2002) found that priming thoughts of
death led to more favorable ratings of ingroup members (Ital-
ians)—an effect mediated by perceptions of the ingroup’s entita-
tivity—but did not influence ratings of an outgroup (Germans).
Thus, although this study suggests a relationship between ingroup
entitativity and intergroup bias, it did not show our predicted
relationship between ingroup entitativity and the expression of
anti-outgroup prejudice—perhaps because derogating the outgroup
was a less appealing strategy than affirming the ingroup for deal-
ing with death-related anxiety.
Whereas these three prior investigations argued that perceived
ingroup entitativity can motivate ingroup favoritism, ours is the
first to show that perceived ingroup entitativity can license anti-
outgroup prejudice. Motivation impels people to act; a license, by
contrast, allows people to act if they wish (Miller & Effron, 2010).
In other words, we propose that perceived ingroup entitativity
seems to legitimize prejudice, and gives people standing to express
prejudiced views if they already hold them. Our claims are par-
ticularly important to test because scholars have advanced (but not
tested) a conflicting hypothesis: that perceived ingroup entitativity
will predict less outgroup derogation (Yzerbyt, Castano, Leyens, &
Paladino, 2000, p. 287), because the esteem afforded by member-
ship in a cohesive group could obviate the need to derogate
outsiders (cf. Lickel et al., 2000).
The Present Research
We tested two hypotheses related to the proposed licensing
effect of ingroup entitativity. First, if membership in an entitative
group legitimizes prejudice, then observers should expect
entitative-group members to be granted greater standing to express
prejudice than non-entitative-group members (cf. Effron & Miller,
2012; Ratner & Miller, 2001). Specifically,
Hypothesis 1 [H1]: People will think prejudice and discrim-
ination are more socially acceptable when committed by
members of more- versus less-entitative groups.
We use the term socially acceptable to refer to people’s beliefs
about what others find acceptable.
Our second hypothesis examines a potential behavioral conse-
quence of the entitativity–legitimacy link. If people are aware that
expressing prejudice is more socially acceptable for members of
entitative groups, then perceiving their own group as entitative
should make them feel that they have psychological standing to
express prejudice against outgroups. Thus,
Hypothesis 2 [H2]: Perceiving one’s own group as more
versus less entitative will disinhibit the expression of preju-
dice against outgroups.
In other words, belonging to an entitative group makes people
feel licensed to express prejudice.
We tested H1 in four studies. In Study 1, participants rated the
entitativity of the largest racial groups in the United States and
estimated how socially acceptable it would be for a member of one
such group to discriminate against a member of another. Studies
2A and 2B manipulated the entitativity of novel groups, assessed
the social acceptability of intergroup bias, and tested for mediation
by the attribution of prejudice to the defense or pursuit of collec-
tive interests. Study 3 used the same paradigm to test a boundary
condition: Whereas our other studies examined intergroup contexts
in which an outgroup could plausibly threaten an ingroup’s inter-
ests, Study 3 tested whether rendering such threat implausible
would eliminate the licensing effect of entitativity.
Studies 4 through 7 tested H2. Study 4 examined the association
between non-Blacks’ perceptions of ingroup entitativity and their
willingness to express prejudice against Blacks. Study 5 tested our
licensing account by examining whether perceiving one’s ingroup
as entitative predicts non-Blacks’ tendency to give explicit voice to
their implicit anti-Black prejudice. Finally, Studies 6 and 7 tested
whether perceiving a racial or religious ingroup as entitative could
cause greater expressions of, respectively, racial or religious prej-
udice.
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236 EFFRON AND KNOWLES
Our hypotheses apply specifically to prejudice expressed by
entitative (vs. nonentitative) groups, but we also examined how
legitimate it seems to express prejudice against entitative (vs.
nonentitative) groups. We were unsure what to predict. On the one
hand, entitative groups seem more dislikeable (e.g., Dasgupta et
al., 1999; Newheiser et al., 2009), which could legitimize prejudice
against them. On the other hand, positively regarded victims seem
to elicit greater sympathy when they are members of entitative
groups (R. W. Smith et al., 2013), and prejudice directed at an
individual could seem to harm more people when the individual
belongs to a tightly knit, interdependent group—possibilities that
both suggest that a group’s entitativity could delegitimize preju-
dice against it. Our examination of this issue was thus exploratory.
Study 1: Measured Entitativity Is Associated With a
License to Be Biased
As a first test of H1, Study 1 examined whether members of
entitative groups are seen as having greater standing to be preju-
diced and discriminate against outgroups. We measured partici-
pants’ perceptions of several racial groups’ entitativity, and then
assessed their beliefs about how socially acceptable it would be for
each group to express bias against the other.
Participants
American participants on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk)
service received $.51 to complete the study. Data collected from
MTurk have shown reliability at least as high as data collected
from traditional sources (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011;
Horton, Rand, & Zeckhauser, 2011; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeiro-
tis, 2010). In advance of data collection, we decided to request 250
complete responses. Two hundred sixty participants began the
study, and 253 provided responses that were complete enough to
analyze. After excluding participants who failed an attention check
(described subsequently n  4) and anyone who submitted their
responses faster than an a priori cutoff of 2 min (n  1), the final
sample contained 248 participants (136 females, 111 males, and
one of unknown gender; Mage  32.85, SD  12.40; 80% White,
6% Black, 6% Asian, 3% multiracial, and 3% Latino, 2% other
races). Results were identical in direction and significance when
we analyzed all 253 participants’ data.
Overview
We asked participants to consider a racial group, randomly
selected from the following list: White Americans, Black Ameri-
cans, Asian Americans, and Hispanic Americans. Participants in-
dicated how entitative they found this group, responded to several
control measures, and then completed the same items for a second
group randomly selected from the same list. Next, participants
indicated how socially acceptable it would be for the first group to
discriminate against the second, and vice versa. Finally, they
completed an attention-check question and a measure of social
dominance orientation (SDO—another control variable), and they
provided demographics.
Materials
Independent variable: Perceived entitativity. A six-item
scale used in previous research measured perceptions of each
group’s entitativity (Denson et al., 2006). Each item assesses a
different facet of entitativity: the extent to which group members
interact with each other, can influence each other, have shared
norms, have strong interpersonal bonds, share knowledge, and
have common goals (  .84 for each group). Responses were
made on scales from 1 to 7 anchored at not at all and very much
so.
Dependent variable: Social acceptability of bias. Parti-
cipants read about seven prejudiced or discriminatory behaviors
and estimated the social acceptability of each (e.g., “How socially
acceptable is it for a [Black/White/Hispanic/Asian] American to
avoid shopping at stores owned by [Asian/Hispanic/White/Black]
Americans?”). Because we wanted to measure beliefs about what
others think is legitimate (i.e., perceived social acceptability), the
instructions explained, “We are not interested in whether you
personally think it is ok to perform these behaviors,” and said that
responses should reflect what the “average American” thinks is
acceptable. Appendix A of the online supplemental materials
shows the seven items, which we averaged for analysis (  .88
for the first- and second-group participants considered). Response
options, coded 1 to 6, were completely unacceptable, somewhat
unacceptable, slightly unacceptable, slightly acceptable, some-
what acceptable, and completely acceptable. This measure thus
captures psychological standing, or the perceived legitimacy to
express a view or commit an action (Miller & Effron, 2010).
Control variables. We assessed several additional variables
to control for possible confounds in the relationship between
entitativity and the social acceptability of bias.
Victimization. Three items controlled for the possibility that
groups typically victimized by discrimination would be more
likely to be perceived as entitative: Participants estimated how
common it is for people to be prejudiced against each group, the
extent to which the group is currently victimized by prejudice in
American society, and the extent to which it has historically been
victimized (7-point scales anchored at not at all and very much so).
We averaged these items into a single measure (  .82).
Perceived social status. To control for the possibility that
perceived entitativity would act as a proxy for social status, we
administered a modified version of the MacArthur Scale of Sub-
jective Social Status (e.g., Adler, Epel, Castellazzo, & Ickovics,
2000). Participants indicated each group’s social status by clicking
on one of 10 rungs of a ladder, said to represent “where people
stand in the United States.” Higher rungs represented higher status.
Feelings toward the group. To ensure that perceptions of a
group’s entitativity were not merely a proxy for participants’
feelings toward the group, we administered a “feeling thermome-
ter” measure (Abelson, Kinder, Peters, & Fiske, 1982; Gawronski
& Bodenhausen, 2006). Participants viewed a picture of a ther-
mometer and chose a temperature ranging from 0° (cold) to 100°
(warm) that best represented their feelings toward the relevant
group. Then they used the same scale to indicate how they thought
the average American feels about the group.
Subjective group size. Because the perceived size of an out-
group is potentially related to the threat seemingly posed by it
(Allport, 1954; Craig & Richeson, 2014a; Danbold & Huo, 2014),
we also asked participants them to estimate the percentage of
people who identify as a member of the relevant group.
Social dominance orientation. Generalized anti-egalitarian
sentiment, or the desire to uphold and bolster intergroup inequal-
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237ENTITATIVITY AND INTERGROUP BIAS
ity, has proven one of the most robust predictors of intergroup and
political attitudes (Sidanius, Pratto, Van Laar, & Levin, 2004). To
ensure that our results did not reflect differences in individuals’
levels of anti-egalitarianism, we administered the 16-item SDO
scale (  .94; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994).
Demographics. We also controlled for participants’ own race
and their political conservatism. Participants used a 7-point scale
to identify themselves as very, moderately, or slightly liberal;
neither liberal nor conservative; or slightly, moderately, or very
conservative.
Attention check. For the attention check (adapted from Op-
penheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009), participants read a short
filler paragraph and viewed a list of four racial groups; the last
sentence in the paragraph instructed them to click on an option
labeled “other” and write the word “group” in the blank provided.
As noted, we excluded those who did not follow these instructions.
Results
We hypothesized that participants would judge prejudice as
more socially acceptable when perpetrated by groups high (vs.
low) in entitativity (H1). As an exploratory step, we also examined
the social acceptability of prejudice targeted against groups high
(vs. low) in entitativity. Because each participant made two judg-
ments for the dependent variable (i.e., the social acceptability of
bias perpetrated by a first group against a second group, and vice
versa), we used a multilevel linear regression analysis with a
random intercept to analyze the social acceptability measure, spec-
ifying that pairs of judgments were nested within participants.
First, we entered ratings of the perpetrator and target groups’
entitativity as fixed effects. Table 1 displays the results. Consistent
with hypothesis H1, participants judged prejudice and discrimina-
tion as more socially acceptable when they perceived the perpe-
trator group as more entitative, b  .14, z  2.54, p  .01.
Interestingly, participants showed a marginally significant ten-
dency to rate discrimination as less socially acceptable when they
perceived the target group as more entitative, b  .09, z  1.69,
p  .09.
Next, we tested the robustness of these effects by adding the
control variables as fixed effects. As shown in Table 1, the positive
relationship between the perpetrator group’s perceived entitativity
and the social acceptability of bias remained significant with these
control variables in the model, p  .01; the negative relationship
between the victim group’s entitativity and the social acceptability
of bias did not, p  .21.3
Discussion
Study 1 found robust evidence that entitative groups are given
greater license to be prejudiced and discriminate than are nonen-
titative groups. Consistent with H1, observers thought that, accord-
ing to the average American, bias committed by members of
entitative groups is more acceptable than bias committed by mem-
bers of less-entitative groups. Importantly, this relationship cannot
be explained in terms of a confound between perceived group
entitativity and groups’ history as targets of bias, their social
status, their perceived size, participants’ affect toward them, or
participants’ levels of social dominance orientation or political
conservatism, as we controlled for these variables.
Although the results were consistent with the idea that perceiv-
ing a group as entitative increases the social acceptability of
prejudice committed by its members, Study 1’s correlational de-
sign allows other causal interpretations. To examine causality,
Studies 2A and 2B manipulated the entitativity of novel groups
and measured the social acceptability of bias perpetrated by them.
Study 2B also assessed a potential mediator: perceptions that
anti-outgroup bias is more likely to stem from group interests in
entitative (vs. less-entitative) groups.
3 To address potential concerns about multicollinearity among control
variables, we also ran separate models that each contained only one of the
control variables. The coefficient for perpetrator group entitativity re-
mained significant in each model; the coefficient for victim group entita-
tivity was marginally significant in some models and not significant in
others.
Table 1
Fixed Effects in a Stepwise Mixed-Effect Linear Regression
Analysis in Study 1
Step Predictor b SE (b) z p
1 Perpetrator group
entitativity 0.14 0.06 2.54 .01
Victim group
entitativity –0.09 0.06 –1.69 .09
(constant) 2.55 0.44 5.74 .00
2 Perpetrator group
entitativity 0.15 0.06 2.64 .01
race_black –0.22 0.27 –0.80 .43
race_asian –0.06 0.26 –0.22 .83
race_hispanic –0.15 0.29 –0.51 .61
participant_ingroup 0.09 0.22 0.42 .68
warmth_self 0.00 0.00 0.55 .58
warmth_others 0.01 0.00 2.05 .04
victimized 0.04 0.04 0.93 .35
status –0.02 0.03 –0.88 .38
size 0.00 0.00 –0.37 .71
Victim group
entitativity –0.07 0.06 –1.16 .24
race_black –0.54 0.27 –2.00 .05
race_asian 0.11 0.26 0.43 .67
race_hispanic –0.29 0.29 –1.00 .32
participant_ingroup 0.44 0.22 1.95 .05†
warmth_self 0.00 0.00 0.60 .55
warmth_others –0.01 0.00 –2.43 .02
victimized 0.14 0.04 3.36 .00
status 0.00 0.03 –0.18 .86
size 0.00 0.00 1.56 .12
Participant
SDO 0.27 0.07 4.09 .00
conservatism 0.00 0.04 0.04 .97
(constant) 2.07 0.71 2.93 .00
Note. The dependent variable was the social acceptability of bias. Pre-
dictors are sorted by whether they apply to the perpetrator group, victim
group, or participants themselves. Predictors are abbreviated as follows.
Variables with “race_” prefix are dummy codes for the relevant group’s
race, with Whites as the reference group; participant_ingroup was coded 1
if participants were a member of the relevant group, and 0 if they were not;
warmth_self  warmth of participants’ own feelings towards the relevant
group; warmth_other  perceptions of others’ warmth towards the group;
victimized  perceived contemporary and historical victimization of the
group; status  perceived social status; size  perceived group size;
SDO  participants’ social dominance orientation; conservatism  partic-
ipants’ political conservatism.
 p  .05.  p  .01.  p  .001.
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238 EFFRON AND KNOWLES
Studies 2A and 2B: Manipulated Entitativity
Licenses Bias
Participants
American MTurk users were paid $.51 each. In these and in all
subsequent MTurk studies, we took precautions to prevent sign-
ups from people in our previous studies (Peer, Paolacci, Chandler,
& Mueller, 2012).
In advance of data collection, we chose to request 120 complete
responses for Study 2A. Of the 120 participants we obtained, we
dropped 12 for failing an attention check (described subsequently)
and two who took less than an a priori cutoff of 2 min to complete
the study, leaving a final sample of 106 participants (73 males, 33
females; Mage  27.84, SD  8.32).
We collected data for Study 2B in two waves. For the first wave,
we requested 120 complete responses. The effects from Study 2A
replicated, and the hypothesized mediation effect received some
support without reaching significance. To increase statistical
power, we requested 360 complete responses in a second wave.
We report analyses collapsed across both waves, but results were
identical in direction and significance when we analyzed the
second wave separately. Across waves, a total of 490 participants
began the study; we dropped participants who failed an attention
check (n  17) or who took less than 2 min to complete the study
(n  13), and one person with missing data on the dependent
variables, leaving a final sample of 459 people (279 males, 179
females, and one of unknown gender; Mage  32.23, SD 10.93).
In both studies, the direction and significance of the results were
identical when no participants were dropped.
Overview
Participants in Study 2A read about a pair of groups whose
members differed in their degree of interdependence. After
completing a measure of perceived entitativity, participants
completed the dependent measure—the social acceptability of
each group discriminating against outgroups—and responded to
an attention check. Participants also completed the same tasks
for a different pair of groups whose members differed in their
degree of similarity. Interdependence and similarity are both
cues that a group is entitative (Campbell, 1958; Crump et al.,
2010; Lickel et al., 2000; McConnell, Sherman, & Hamilton,
1997; Rothbart & Park, 2004).
Participants in Study 2B followed the same procedure, except
that we assessed a hypothesized mediator (attributions of prejudice
to collective interests) between the entitativity measure and the
dependent measure. Additionally, to reduce the length of the study,
Study 2B only asked participants about one pair of groups, em-
ploying only the interdependence manipulation.
Materials
Interdependence manipulation (religious groups). Participants
in both studies read about a pair of (fictional) religious groups: the
“Ebbites” and the “Hentites”:
Both groups are relatively obscure denominations of Protestantism,
and each has a similar number of followers. The beliefs of each group
are fairly traditional and conservative, and although they disagree on
some specific doctrines, their religious beliefs are quite similar to each
other.
The remainder of the description used an entitativity manipula-
tion by Crump and colleagues (2010) that varied whether the
individuals within each group pursue its objectives independently
versus interdependently. Participants read that members of the
interdependent (more-entitative) religion
pursue a common set of goals. Since the members of this religious
group are concerned with achieving their common goals, they depend
upon each other to a large extent. For the most part, this group is
described as a tightly structured group.
In contrast, members of the independent (less-entitative) reli-
gion
pursue a variety of goals that are relevant to completing their group’s
objectives. Since the members of this religious group are primarily
concerned with pursuing these goals independently, group members
do not depend on each other a great deal. For the most part, this group
is described as a loosely structured group.
We counterbalanced which group, Ebbites or Hentites, was
interdependent; Ebbites were always described first.
Similarity manipulation (national groups). To increase the
generalizability of our findings, participants in Study 2A also read
about a second pair of groups: “two neighboring nations in Eastern
Europe” that “have similar populations, levels of economic devel-
opment, and forms of government.” We used a different entitativ-
ity manipulation that varied the similarity among group members
(McConnell et al., 1997). Members of the high-similarity (more
entitative) nation
are very similar to each other and do not differ in many ways from
each other. The people of this nation come from similar backgrounds
and have the same opinions, similar important beliefs, and similar
personalities. Across a variety of situations, people of this nation will
act in a similar manner.
Members of the low-similarity (less entitative) nation, by con-
trast,
are very diverse and differ in many ways from each other. The people
of this nation come from different backgrounds, have different opin-
ions, different important beliefs, and different personalities. Across a
variety of situations, people of this nation will act in a different
manner.
Once again, we counterbalanced whether the group described
first was the entitative one. We also counterbalanced which pair of
groups (national or religious) was presented first.
Entitativity measure (manipulation check). To evaluate the
extent to which each manipulation affected perceptions of entita-
tivity, we administered the entitativity scale from Study 1 (  .92
for each pair of groups).
Hypothesized mediator: Attributions of prejudice to collec-
tive interests. Participants in Study 2B read about a member of
each group who felt and acted negatively toward members of other
groups. The specific feelings and actions were the same as those
referenced in our measure of the social acceptability of bias (e.g.,
making “prejudicial remarks,” preferring “not to hire members of
other groups”; see Appendix A of the online supplemental mate-
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239ENTITATIVITY AND INTERGROUP BIAS
rials). Participants indicated their agreement with each of four
explanations for this individual’s feelings and actions he: (a)
thinks that other religious groups threaten his group’s interests,
(b) thinks that other groups will try to take his group’s re-
sources, (c) worries that other groups will interfere with his
group’s goals, and (d) thinks that his behavior toward other
groups is helpful to his own group. Response options ranged
from strongly disagree (3) to strongly agree (3). We aver-
aged these four items into a single scale for each group (s .71),
measuring the extent to which participants attributed an individu-
al’s prejudice to a motivation to defend or promote his group’s
collective interests.
Dependent variable: Social acceptability of bias. The de-
pendent measure was adapted from Study 1. Specifically, partici-
pants indicated how socially acceptable it would be for a member
of each of the religious groups to discriminate “against members of
other religious groups,” and for a member of each of the two
national groups to discriminate and express prejudice “against
members of other national groups.” We provided five response
options: not at all, slightly, somewhat, mostly, and entirely. Par-
ticipants were told that their responses should reflect their judg-
ments of what the average participant in the study finds acceptable
(rather than the average American, as in Study 1). For each group,
responses to the seven items were averaged into a single composite
(s  .92).
Attention check. For the pair of religious groups, participants
were asked to recall “which religion’s members are more likely to
pursue common goals, depend on each other, and form a tightly
structured group.” For the pair of national groups, participants
were asked to recall “which nation’s citizens are more likely to
come from similar backgrounds, have the same opinions and
similar personalities, and act in a similar way across a variety of
situations.” These questions were multiple choice and listed the
two relevant groups as options.
Results
Manipulation check. The interdependence and similarity ma-
nipulations each had the intended effect on perceptions of entitativity
(see Table 2). Participants perceived the interdependent group as more
entitative than the independent group in both Study 2A, paired
t(105) 28.25, p .0001, d 3.77, and Study 2B, paired t(458)
47.28, p .0001, d 3.33. Likewise, they thought the high-similarity
group was more entitative than the low-similarity group in Study 2A,
paired t(105)  20.66, p  .0001, d  2.92 (the similarity manipu-
lation was not administered in Study 2B).
Because our theorizing focuses on collective interests, we sepa-
rately analyzed the item from the manipulation check that captures
this dimension of entitativity (i.e., the extent to which group members
“have common goals”). As expected, participants thought group
members were more likely to share common goals in the interdepen-
dent group than in the independent group in both Study 2A (respec-
tively, Ms 6.56 and 3.63, SDs .86 and 1.67) and Study 2B (Ms
6.50 and 3.79, SDs  .88 and 1.70), ts  17.00, ps  .0001, ds 
2.00. Likewise, they thought that the highly similar group members
were more likely to share common goals than the less-similar group
members in Study 2A (respectively, Ms  6.25 and 2.97, SDs  .90
and 1.27), t(105)  20.08, p  .0001, d  2.98.
Social acceptability of bias. Both manipulations also had the
hypothesized effect on perceptions of the social acceptability of
bias (see Table 2). Specifically, participants thought that their
peers would find bias more socially acceptable if committed by a
member of an interdependent versus an independent religious
group in Study 2A, paired t(105)  7.09, p  .0001, d  .79, and
in Study 2B, paired t(458)  5.63, p  .0001, d  .17.4 Likewise,
participants thought that it would be more socially acceptable for
someone to enact bias if members of his national group were
similar to each other than if they were not, paired t(105)  7.82,
p  .0001, d  1.17, in Study 2A.
Mediation analysis. Why did manipulating entitativity affect
the perceived social acceptability of bias? The manipulation check
showed that participants perceived entitative groups as having
clearer collective interests (common goals) than less-entitative
groups; Study 2B allowed us to test whether participants were
more likely infer that such interests explained bias committed by
entitative versus less-entitative groups. We tested for mediation by
estimating a multilevel structural equation model (SEM) using
Stata 13’s gsem (i.e., generalized SEM) command, which ac-
counted for the within-participant nature of the experimental de-
sign. The hypothesized model, depicted in Figure 1, received
strong support: As predicted, the interdependence manipulation
significantly increased the attribution of the actor’s behavior to
collective interests, b  .32, SE(b)  .04, z  8.10, p  .001,
which, in turn, was associated with perceiving prejudice as more
socially acceptable, b  0.20, SE(b)  .03, z  3.73, p  .001.
Using Stata 13’s nlcom (i.e., nonlinear combination) command, we
found that collective interests mediated a significant indirect effect
of the entitativity manipulation on social acceptability, b  0.06,
SE(b)  .01, z  4.96, p  .01; this indirect effect accounted for
33% of the manipulation’s total effect on acceptability.5
Discussion
Studies 2A and 2B provide causal evidence that belonging to an
entitative group makes the expression of bias seem more socially
acceptable. This appears to be because bias seems more rationalis-
tic—that is, plausibly connected to the ingroup’s collective interests—
when committed by members of entitative groups. Compared with
nonentitative groups, entitative groups more clearly have collective
interests with which outgroups can interfere. Study 2B demonstrated
that prejudiced acts committed by individual members of entitative
groups were more readily attributed to the defense or promotion of
such interests, which made prejudiced acts seem more legitimate.
These results support our prediction that a group’s entitativity
grants it psychological standing to be biased to the extent that (a)
ingroup entitativity provides collective interests, and (b) the out-
4 We computed within-participant effects sizes from means and pooled
standard deviations; calculating them from the t statistic would have
inflated the results (Dunlap, Cortina, Vaslow, & Burke, 1996).
5 We also tested an alternative mediation model, in which the social
acceptability of prejudice mediated the effect of the entitativity manipula-
tion on attributions to collective interests. Although significant, b  .03,
  .01, z  3.99, p  .01, this indirect effect explained substantially less
of the manipulation’s total effect (11%) that in our preferred model (33%).
Thus, collective interests better explain the effect of entitativity on social
acceptability of bias than social acceptability does entitativity’s effect on
collective interests.
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240 EFFRON AND KNOWLES
group could plausibly interfere with those interests. Our next study
sought further support for the second of these criteria by orthog-
onally manipulating ingroup entitativity and the likelihood that
outgroup actions could threaten ingroup interests. We expected
that the licensing effect of ingroup entitativity on prejudice would
be attenuated or even eliminated when the outgroup was unlikely
to interfere with the ingroup’s collective interests.
Study 3: A Plausibility Constraint on the
Licensing of Bias
Participants indicated how socially acceptable it would be for an
entitative or a nonentitative group to perpetrate acts of prejudice.
(Unlike Studies 2A and 2B, Study 3 manipulated entitativity between
participants). This time, we also manipulated (within participants) the
type of group targeted by the prejudice: It was either the same type as
the perpetrator group (i.e., both were religious groups or both were
ethnic groups) or a different type (i.e., one was a religious group and
the other was an ethnic group). We reasoned that collective interests
could more plausibly conflict when the two groups were of the same
type than when they were not. Thus, we expected that the perpetrator
group’s entitativity would provide psychological standing to commit
prejudiced acts against only groups of the same type.
Method
Participants. We posted sign-ups for 150 MTurk participants
(paid $.41 each) because pretesting suggested that this sample size
would provide sufficient statistical power; 154 began the study,
and 151 provided responses to the dependent measure. We
dropped the nine participants who failed at least one of two
attention checks (described subsequently) and the two who took
less than 1.5 min to complete the study (this a priori cutoff was
shorter than in our prior studies because Study 3 contained fewer
questions). The final sample size was 140 people (93 males, 46
females, 1 unknown gender; Mage  31.06, SD  9.27). Without
excluding any participants, the direction and significance of the
results were identical.
Procedure. We used the interdependence manipulation from
Studies 2A and 2B to vary the entitativity of a fictional group (the
“Ebbites”) between participants. We also manipulated, between
participants, whether the Ebbites were a religious group that “con-
tains people from a variety of different ethnic backgrounds” or an
ethnic group that “contains people from a variety of different
religious backgrounds.” Participants responded to the entitativity
manipulation check from Studies 2A and 2B (  .95), and
answered a multiple-choice attention-check question that asked
them to identify whether the Ebbites were an ethnic, religious, or
national group, or none of those options.
The dependent measure was the perceived social acceptability
of prejudice. Seven items administered in Studies 2A and 2B asked
how acceptable the “average participant in this study” would find
acts of prejudice committed by “Ed,” an individual member of the
Ebbites. Participants completed the scale twice (  .91 for each):
once to rate prejudice that targeted “ethnic groups” and once to
rate prejudice that targeted “religious groups” other than Ed’s
own—a within-participants manipulation. Before responding to
these items, participants were reminded about the Ebbites’ reli-
gious and ethnic composition. After the dependent measure, par-
ticipants answered a second attention-check question: If the Ebb-
ites were a religious group, it asked whether being an Ebbite
signaled anything about ethnicity; if the Ebbites were an ethnic
Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations for Studies 2A and 2B
Religious groups National groups
Independent Interdependent
Low
similarity
High
similarity
Entitativity perceptions
Study 2A 3.36 6.28 3.52 5.94
(.89) (.64) (.90) (.75)
Study 2B 3.31 6.22 — —
(1.02) (.71) — —
Social acceptability of bias
Study 2A 2.30 3.02 2.00 3.17
(.81) (1.00) (.90) (1.09)
Study 2B 2.51 2.70 — —
(1.08) (1.20) — —
Attribution of prejudice to
collective interests
Study 2B 5.16 5.48 — —
(.99) (1.02) — —
Note. Values in parentheses are SDs.
Figure 1. Mediation analysis in Study 2B. Coefficients are unstandardized.
N  459. Path in parentheses is the direct effect of entitativity on expressed
prejudice (i.e., controlling for perceived group interests).  p  .001.
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241ENTITATIVITY AND INTERGROUP BIAS
group, it asked whether being an Ebbite signaled anything about
religion. Finally, participants provided demographics.
In sum, the design was a 2 (entitativity: low vs. high; between
subjects) 	 2 (group type: same vs. different; within subjects)
factorial design. The results were not significantly moderated by
whether the Ebbites were a religious or ethnic group (p  .88), so
we do not discuss this factor further. A pilot study confirmed our
expectation that two groups of the same type could more plausibly
have conflicting interests than two groups of a different type (see
Appendix B of the online supplemental materials).
Results and Discussion
As in Studies 2A and 2B, the manipulation check showed that the
perpetrator group seemed more entitative when its members were
interdependent than when they were independent (respectively, Ms
6.24 and 3.27, SDs  .68 and .75, ns  69 and 71), t(138)  24.42,
p .0001, d 4.16. An individual item in this scale showed that the
interdependent group seemed to have “common goals” to a greater
extent than the independent group (respectively, Ms 6.55 and 4.32,
SDs  .88 and 1.53), t(138)  10.51, p  .0001, d  1.79.
Our manipulations affected the perceived social acceptability of
prejudice, as expected (see Figure 2). We analyzed this measure with
a Group Type	 Entitativity mixed ANOVA. Only the main effect of
group type and the hypothesized interaction were significant, F(1,
138)  47.17, 
p2  .25, p  .0001, and F(1, 138)  17.54, p 
.0001, 
p2 .11, respectively. To better understand the interaction, we
computed simple main effects using the pooled error term from the
ANOVA (Howell, 2002). We replicated the effect from Studies 2A
and 2B in the same-group-type condition: Prejudice was seen as more
socially acceptable when committed by a member of a more-versus
less-entitative group (respectively, Ms  2.45 and 2.12, SDs  1.13
and .90), F(1, 225)  4.45, p  .04, d  .32. Adding to these prior
studies, and as predicted, no such effect emerged in the different-
group-type condition; in fact, unexpectedly, prejudice was seen as less
socially acceptable when committed by a more entitative versus
less-entitative group (respectively, Ms  1.58 and 1.91, SDs  .66
and .89), F(1, 225)  4.76, p  .03, d  .42. Perhaps in this
condition, in which prejudice could not plausibly be attributed to
collective interests even in highly entitative groups, people were more
suspicious of the high-entitativity group than the low-entitativity
group, which made them judge the former group more harshly (Ne-
wheiser et al., 2012).
These results further support our contention that entitativity
grants standing to be prejudiced by making prejudice attributable
to collective interests. Two criteria are necessary for observers to
make such an attribution: (a) the prejudice must be perpetrated by
a group with clear collective interests, and (b) the group targeted
by prejudice must have the potential to interfere with those inter-
ests. The entitativity of a perpetrator’s ingroup satisfies the first
criterion, as our manipulation check showed. The second criterion
is satisfied when two groups are of the same type (e.g., they are
two religious groups, as opposed to one religious group and one
ethnic group), as our pilot study demonstrated (see Appendix B of
the online supplemental materials). Accordingly, people in Study 3
thought that it was most socially acceptable for an individual to
express prejudice when his ingroup was entitative and of the same
type as the group against which he directed his prejudice. Thus,
whereas Study 2A used a measurement-of-mediation approach to
demonstrate the role of collective interests in the licensing effect of
entitativity, Study 3 found convergent support using a moderation
approach, providing evidence that competing collective interests
must plausibly explain prejudice for licensing to occur.
Studies 1 through 3 established that observers believe members of
entitative groups to have greater psychological standing to commit
prejudice than members of less-entitative groups. In Studies 4 through
7, we examined a potential consequence of this belief: Membership in
an entitative group increases willing to express prejudice (H2). Rather
than asking participants to assess the entitativity of various target
groups, as we did in our previous studies, we measured (in Studies 4
and 5) and manipulated (in Studies 6 and 7) how entitative they
perceived their ingroup to be, and subsequently assessed their expres-
sion of outgroup prejudice.
Study 4: Ingroup Entitativity Predicts
Expressions of Prejudice
Study 4 tested whether perceptions of ingroup entitativity would
be associated with expressing more prejudice.
Participants
Participants (N  1,035 American MTurk users) completed Study
4 online, embedded in a series of other surveys, for $.75. The other
surveys were prescreening instruments for an unrelated research proj-
ect, which dictated the sample size. Because our measure of outgroup
bias assessed anti-Black prejudice, we did not analyze data from
participants who identified as Black (n  49). Of the remaining
responses, 89 were insufficiently complete to analyze, and we ex-
cluded people who failed an attention check (described subsequently
n  29), but the results were identical in direction and significance
without this exclusion. No one completed the series of surveys faster
than our a priori cutoff of 3 min. (The cutoff was higher than in our
previous studies because the series of surveys required longer to
Figure 2. Mean social acceptability of perpetrating prejudice (SE) in
Study 3, as a function of the entitativity of the perpetrator’s ingroup and the
type of outgroup. The y-axis plots a scale of 1 to 5, ranging from not at all
to entirely socially acceptable.
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242 EFFRON AND KNOWLES
complete.) The final sample size was 868 (466 females, 401 males, 1
unknown gender; Mage  33.25, SD  11.87).
Materials
Participants completed the measures of interest for this study in
the middle of a larger series of surveys.6
Independent variable: Perceived entitativity. Using the
scale from Studies 1 through 3 (Denson et al., 2006), we measured
participants’ perceptions of the entitativity of “African Americans”
(  .82) and “your own racial or ethnic group” (  .86).
Dependent variable: Expressed prejudice. To measure ex-
pressed prejudice, we administered the Attitudes Toward Blacks scale
(ATB; Brigham, 1993; sample item: “I would rather not have Blacks
live in the same apartment building I live in”;   .94). Response
options on a 7-point scale ranged from strongly disagree to strongly
agree, coded so that higher numbers indicated greater anti-Black
prejudice. We varied the order in which participants completed the
entitativity measure and the ATB scale, and this did not affect the
results.
Attention check. An attention-check item showed a Likert-type
scale and instructed participants not to respond; those who did re-
spond were excluded from analysis.
Results
We predicted that perceiving one’s own group as entitative would
be associated with a greater willingness to express negative attitudes
toward Blacks, and that perceiving Blacks as entitative would not be.
A regression model, using expressed prejudice as the dependent
variable and the perceived entitativity of Blacks and participants’
own racial group as predictors, confirmed these hypotheses. The
more entitative participants perceived their own racial group to be,
the more prejudice they expressed, b  .10, SE(b)  .04,   .10,
t(865)  2.53, p  .01. The same relationship was not observed
between Blacks’ perceived entitativity and prejudice. In fact, the
more entitative participants thought Blacks were, the less prejudice
they expressed, b  .13, SE(b)  .05,   .11, t(865)  2.70,
p  .007.7
Discussion
The results of Study 4 are consistent with the idea that perceived
ingroup entitativity licenses people to express prejudiced attitudes that
they would otherwise keep to themselves. Nonetheless, an alternative
explanation is that individuals who perceive their own racial group as
entitative simply have more prejudiced attitudes to begin with.
These two explanations make different predictions about the
relationship between implicitly measured prejudice and the ex-
plicit expression of prejudice. Implicit measures of prejudice are
less susceptible to self-presentational efforts than self-report mea-
sures (Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005).
It follows that when people are motivated to suppress or hide their
biases, self-report and implicit measures should be only weakly
associated, because even the strongest implicit prejudice will not
be explicitly expressed; when people instead feel licensed to
express their biases, the implicit–explicit association should be
stronger (Fazio & Olson, 2003). Our licensing account thus pre-
dicts that the more entitative people perceive their group as being
(i.e., the more licensed they feel), the stronger the positive asso-
ciation between implicit and self-reported prejudice will be; people
who do not feel licensed because they think their group is not
entitative should explicitly express little prejudice regardless of
their implicitly measured prejudice. This pattern should not
emerge if entitativity perceptions are merely a proxy for prejudi-
cial feelings. Study 5 tested these predictions.
Study 5: Ingroup Entitativity Predicts the Explicit
Expression of Implicit Prejudice
Participants
In exchange for $5.00, 98 White students at a large, Midwestern
university participated in the present study. The sample size was
determined by the number of subjects we were able to run before
the end of the academic term. We only recruited White participants
because the participant pool gave us access to a smaller sample
than MTurk, and we wanted to avoid error variance from any
differences in racial attitudes among different racial groups. Data
from nine participants could not be analyzed because of missing
responses, and we excluded three participants who failed an atten-
tion check (described subsequently), two with an error rate of
greater than 30% on the measure of implicit prejudice (Nosek et
al., 2007), and one who took the study despite not meeting our
recruitment criteria (i.e., did not identify as White). No observa-
tions exceeded a speed cutoff on the implicit prejudice measure
(Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). The final sample size was 83
people (58 females, 22 males, and 3 of unknown gender). Results
were identical in direction and significance when no participants
were excluded, except where indicated.
Procedure
Participants, recruited for a “decision-making study,” came to
the lab several at a time and were seated at computer terminals in
private cubicles by a White female experimenter. They completed
an entitativity measure about Blacks and Whites, filler items (i.e.,
a self-esteem measure), a measured of explicitly expressed preju-
dice, and an implicit measure of prejudice.8 Participants were then
paid, debriefed, and dismissed.
6 The other surveys, included to prescreen participants for an unrelated
study, contained measures that are known to correlate with racial prejudice: the
Outgroup Orientation scale (Phinney, 1992), the Implicit Theories of Prejudice
scale (Carr, Dweck, & Pauker, 2012), the Internal and External Motivation to
Respond Without Prejudice scales (Plant & Devine, 1998), and a measure of
orientation toward interracial interactions (Migacheva & Tropp, 2013). Includ-
ing these measures in our analyses as covariates did not alter the results.
Measures of self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1989) and behavioral inhibition/activa-
tion (Carver & White, 1994) were also administered.
7 Because of eight outliers on the ATB scale (defined as 3.29 SDs
away from the mean; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), we reran the analyses
with a robust regression procedure (implemented using the rreg command
in StataCorp, 2013). It produced identical results.
8 The only other measure was the Internal and External Motivation to
Respond Without Prejudice scales (Plant & Devine, 1998), which we
administered after the entitativity measure as an exploratory step. Neither
the Internal Motivation nor the External Motivation Scale significantly
moderated the hypothesized Implicit Prejudice 	 Entitativity interaction.
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243ENTITATIVITY AND INTERGROUP BIAS
Materials
Independent variables.
Perceived entitativity. Participants completed the entitativity
measure used in the previous studies for each of four groups (order
randomized), ostensibly chosen randomly from a longer list of
groups: “your own racial or ethnic group” (i.e., Whites;   .84),
“African Americans” (  .81), and two filler groups (i.e., “teach-
ers” and “people from your hometown”).
Implicit prejudice. We administered the Implicit Association
Test (IAT) as the implicit measure of prejudice (Greenwald,
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). This task requires using a keyboard
to rapidly categorize words as “good” or “bad,” and faces as
“Black” or “White.” By assigning the same keys to prejudice-
consistent (e.g., Black and bad) and prejudice-inconsistent (e.g.,
Black and good) combinations of stimuli, the researcher can com-
pute a score that reflects the relative ease with which participants
complete the prejudice-consistent (vs. inconsistent) trials—thus
implicitly gauging prejudice.
Dependent variable: Expressed prejudice. As in Study 4,
we administered the ATB scale to measure explicitly expressed
anti-Black prejudice (  .85). Higher numbers indicate greater
expressed prejudice.
Attention check. Participants read a paragraph and viewed a
list of 11 groups. The last sentence instructed them to click on an
option labeled “none of the above” and write the word “groups” in
the corresponding blank. As noted, we dropped participants who
did not follow these instructions (Oppenheimer et al., 2009).
Results and Discussion
We hypothesized that perceptions of White entitativity would
predict a higher positive association between implicitly measured
and explicitly expressed prejudice (respectively, IAT and ATB
scores). To test this hypothesis, we first scored the IAT using the
algorithm suggested by Greenwald and colleagues (2003), which
computes the D statistic; higher values represent a stronger im-
plicit association between Black (vs. White) faces and negative
(vs. positive) words. We then regressed explicit prejudice scores
on implicit prejudice scores (D), perceptions of Whites’ entitativ-
ity, perceptions of Blacks’ entitativity (all three of these predictors
were standardized), and the interaction between implicit prejudice
and Whites’ entitativity. (The interaction between perceived im-
plicit prejudice and Blacks’ entitativity was not significant when
added to the model, p  .60.)
Table 3 displays the results. Consistent with Study 4, there was
a trend for perceived White entitativity to predict greater explicitly
expressed prejudice and for perceived Black entitativity to predict
less explicitly expressed prejudice, but with the smaller sample in
the present study neither effect was significant, ps  .12. (The
positive association between White entitativity and expressed prej-
udiced was significant when no participants were excluded from
analysis, p  .04.)
Confirming our main prediction, perceived White entitativity
significantly moderated the relationship between the implicit and
explicit measures of prejudice, p  .03, for the Ingroup Entitativ-
ity 	 Implicit Prejudice interaction (see Figure 3). Simple slopes
analysis revealed the hypothesized pattern: Among Whites who
perceived their racial group as relatively entitative (i.e., 1 SD
above the scale mean), those with higher implicit prejudice scores
expressed more prejudice on the explicit measure, b  .19,
SE(b)  .08, t(78)  2.31, p  .02. By contrast, Whites who did
not perceive their racial group as particularly entitative (i.e., 1 SD
below the mean) tended to express relatively little prejudice on the
explicit measure regardless of their implicit prejudice scores,
b.08, SE(b) .09, t(78) .87, p .39. This pattern suggests
that perceived ingroup entitativity was associated with feeling
licensed to explicitly express biases revealed by the implicit mea-
sure.
Decomposing the interaction the other way yielded further
support for this interpretation. Among individuals with high
implicit prejudice scores (1 SD above the mean), the more enti-
tative they perceived their group, the more prejudice they explic-
itly expressed, b  .28, SE(b)  .10, t(78)  2.68, p  .009. In
contrast, individuals with low implicit prejudice scores tended not
to explicitly express prejudice, regardless of how entitative they
perceived their group as being, b  .01, SE(b)  .11, t(78)  .06,
p  .95. This pattern fits with the idea that when people feel
licensed to explicitly express bias, only individuals who privately
feel such bias will give voice to it.9
We also tested whether perceived Black entitativity significantly
moderated the Ingroup Entitativity 	 Implicit Prejudice interac-
tion. It did not, b  .08, SE(b)  .05, t(75)  1.50, p  .14.
Together, these results provide strong support for the hypothesis
that perceived ingroup entitativity licenses people to express out-
group bias (H2). Perceiving their racial group as entitative appar-
ently gave White participants the psychological standing needed to
give explicit voice to their implicitly measured prejudices. This
pattern supports our argument that the positive correlation between
perceived ingroup entitativity and expressed prejudice in Study 4
reflected a licensing effect, and casts doubt on the alternative
explanation that perceived ingroup entitativity is merely a proxy
for felt prejudice. Casting further doubt on this alternative, per-
ceived White entitativity did not significantly correlate with im-
plicit prejudice scores in Study 5, r(83)  .06, p  .60.
The correlational nature of Studies 4 and 5 limits strong causal
conclusions. Study 6 sought to address this limitation by manipu-
lating the entitativity of participants’ ingroup. We hypothesized
9 As in Study 4, because of an outlier on the ATB scale, we reran the
analyses using a robust regression procedure (see Footnote 7). It produced
identical results.
Table 3
Study 5: Regression Results
Predictor b SE (b)  t p
White entitativity 0.14 0.09 0.25 1.59 0.12
Black entitativity 0.14 0.09 0.24 1.57 0.12
Implicit prejudice 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.92 0.36
White entitativity 	 implicit
prejudice 0.13 0.06 0.25 2.25 0.03
(constant) 2.00 0.06 — 32.69 0.00
Note. The dependent variable was explicitly expressed prejudice (scores
on the Attitudes Towards Blacks scale). Ingroup entitativity, outgroup
entitativity, and implicit prejudice were standardized before computing the
interaction. Implicit prejudice was operationalized as the D score from the
Implicit Association Test. All participants were White.
 p  .05.
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244 EFFRON AND KNOWLES
that reading an article that characterized White Americans as a
cohesive group would increase Whites’ perceptions of their racial
group’s entitativity, which would, in turn, increase their expression
of anti-Black prejudice.
Study 6: Manipulating Ingroup Entitativity Affects the
Expression of Prejudice
Participants
We paid American MTurk users $.51 each to complete the study
online. Based on the results of a rough power calculation con-
ducted after running 60 subjects, we chose to request 600 complete
responses. Six hundred thirty-nine people began the study, and 608
provided sufficient responses for analysis. Because our manipula-
tion targeted perceptions of White Americans’ entitativity, and
because our hypothesis is about perceived ingroup entitativity, we
discarded data from non-Whites (n  89).10 We also excluded
people who identified as both Black and White (n  4), because
the dependent variable was expressed anti-Black prejudice, as well
as people who failed at least one of two attention checks (n  11;
described below) or who had completed a pilot study (n  1), but
the results were identical in direction and significance without
these exclusions. No one took less than our a priori cutoff time of
2 min. The final sample contained 503 White participants (278
males, 225 females; Mage  30.87, SD  10.02).
Materials
Manipulation. Participants read a (bogus) Washington Post
article, ostensibly as part of a study on media coverage of social
science research (see Appendix C of the online supplemental
materials). In the high-entitativity condition (n  244), the article
described a supposed American Sociological Association study
revealing that White Americans are cohesive, similar, and share a
common fate—key features of entitativity (Campbell, 1958; Ham-
ilton & Sherman, 1996). In the control condition (n  259), the
article instead described how the American Sociological Associ-
ation planned to launch a new study examining similarities and
differences among Americans. The articles were approximately the
same length and had the same structure in both conditions.
As a manipulation check, participants used the six-item entita-
tivity measure from our prior studies to rate the four target groups
used in Study 5: “your own racial or ethnic group” (i.e., Whites,
because we retained only White participants;   .87), “African
Americans” (  .85), and two filler groups (i.e., teachers and
people from their hometown).
Dependent variable: Expressed prejudice. As in Studies 4
and 5, we assessed expressed anti-Black prejudice with the ATB
scale.
Procedure
Participants completed the ingroup entitativity measure, filler
items (i.e., whether they had read the article before, whether they
wanted to learn more about the research it described, and how they
would rate the quality of the writing), and responded to a multiple-
choice attention check asking them to identify the main point of
the article. Next, participants completed the entitativity ratings for
the four groups (which we said were randomly selected from a
longer list) in randomized order. Then they completed the ATB
scale, responded to a second attention check (adapted from Op-
penheimer et al., 2009), provided demographics, and read a de-
briefing form.
Results and Discussion
The manipulation check showed that, as expected, reading a
characterization of Whites as cohesive, similar, and sharing com-
mon fate significantly increased perceptions of White entitativity
(Ms  5.17 and 4.78 in the entitativity and control conditions,
respectively, SDs 1.07 and 1.09), t(501) 4.06, p .0001, d
.36. Likewise, an individual item in the manipulation-check scale
showed that reading this characterization significantly increased
perceptions that Whites pursue common goals (Ms  4.88 and
4.47, SDs both  1.47), t(501)  3.06, p  .0001, d  .27. The
manipulation had no significant effect on the perceived entitativity
of Blacks, t(501)  .78, p  .44, d  .07.
As predicted, people in the entitativity condition tended to
express greater anti-Black prejudice than people in the control
condition, but this difference was not significant in our initial
analyses (Ment  2.70, SD  .94; Mcontrol  2.57, SD  .95),
t(497)  1.52, p  .13, d  .13. However, as in Studies 4 and 5
(see Footnotes 7 and 9), we observed outliers on the ATB scale
(i.e., four scores3.29 SDs above the mean; Tabachnick & Fidell,
2007), which could mask real condition differences. To address
this issue, we compared trimmed means between conditions using
Yuen’s test, which is less biased by outliers than the Student t test,
and can thus have higher statistical power, and does not suffer
from the limitations of dropping outliers (Wilcox, 2003; Wilcox &
Keselman, 2003; Yuen, 1974). We implemented the calculations
using the yuen function in the S-Plus software with 5,000 bootstrap
10 As expected, the manipulation of White entitativity did not affect
non-Whites’ perceptions of their own group’s entitativity.
Figure 3. Relationship between implicit and explicit prejudice as a func-
tion of perceived ingroup entitativity in Study 4. The values shown were
derived from the regression model at 1 SD away from the mean implicit
prejudice score and entitativity scores. Error bars indicate 1 SE. Explicit
prejudice scores could range from 1 to 7.
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245ENTITATIVITY AND INTERGROUP BIAS
resamples and 20% trimming (see Wilcox, 2003). Using this more
robust statistical approach revealed that people expressed margin-
ally greater anti-Black prejudice in the entitativity condition than
in the control condition (trimmed Ms  2.65 and 2.47, respec-
tively), Tyuen(302.11)  1.95, p  .052.
Study 6’s results suggest that perceiving Whites as entitative can
cause Whites to express more prejudice against a racial outgroup.
This finding addresses a limitation of Studies 4 and 5, whose
correlational designs limited causal inferences. Although the con-
dition difference in expressed prejudice was only marginally sig-
nificant by a two-tailed test, p  .052, the fact that the manipula-
tion had only a small effect on perceptions of White entitativity,
d  .36, indicates that the test of the manipulation’s more distal
effect on expressed prejudice was highly conservative. Moreover,
it is impressive that even a weak manipulation of entitativity had
a measurable effect despite strong norms proscribing racial prej-
udice.
Study 7
Our final study had two goals. First, we wanted to replicate
the causal effect of entitativity on the expression of prejudice in
a different intergroup context. Thus, Study 7 examined anti-
Muslim prejudice among Christians. Second, we sought to
distinguish the effect of ingroup entitativity from the effect of
another key variable in intergroup research: ingroup identifica-
tion (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, &
Wetherell, 1987).
As we emphasized earlier, our claim is not that membership in
an entitative group motivates prejudice and discrimination against
outgroups. Instead, we posit that ingroup entitativity licenses, or
increases people’s willingness to express, biases that they already
hold. If this is correct, then ingroup entitativity should only predict
expressions of outgroup bias in the presence of factors that do
motivate bias. One such factor is ingroup identification. From our
perspective, ingroup identification provides the “fuel” for bias,
whereas perceived ingroup entitativity opens a “valve” through
which bias can escape.11
Ingroup identification need not motivate hostility toward out-
groups (Brewer, 1999), but under some conditions it does. For
instance, identification with a group defined by claims of moral
superiority or righteousness may stoke prejudice (Brown &
Zagefka, 2005). We surmised that religious groups fit this descrip-
tion (Ysseldyk, Matheson, & Anisman, 2010). Thus, the present
study examined the interactive effect of Christians’ identification
and perceived entitativity on prejudice against Muslims. If we are
correct that ingroup entitativity plays a licensing role in the ex-
pression of outgroup bias, then ingroup entitativity should increase
the expression of anti-Muslim prejudice among highly identified
more than weakly identified Christians. High-identifiers are likely
to privately harbor some prejudice, but inhibit themselves from
expressing it without a license; low-identifiers should harbor less
prejudice and thus express little bias regardless of whether they
have a license to do so.
Participants
We hired a survey company to recruit a panel of American
Christians whose age, race, and geographical location mirrored the
distribution of these variables in the American population. Based
on the results of Study 6, we expected a small effect, so we
requested 1,000 complete responses from American Christians
who passed attention-check questions (described subsequently).12
The company oversampled to allow for exclusions. Of the 2,178
people who completed the study, 768 failed the attention checks,
and we dropped one additional participant for not completing the
measure of Muslim entitativity. No one took less than our a priori
cutoff of 2 min to complete the study. The final sample was thus
1,409 American Christians (65% Protestant, 21% Catholic, 14%
other; 917 females and 492 males; 78% White, 10% Black, 6%
Asian, 6% Hispanic, 1% other racial group; 22% from the
Northeast United States, 36% from the South, 22% from the
Midwest, and 20% from the West; Mage  46.41 years, SD 
15.44, range  18 to 91). Without exclusions, the key results
showed the same patterns but were not significant.
Materials
Manipulation. The present study adapted the manipulation
from Study 6: Participants read either about how sociological
research had revealed American Christians to be highly entitative
(n  716), or about how sociologists would soon launch a survey
of Americans (control condition, n  693). As a manipulation
check, participants rated the entitativity of American Christians
(  .84) and Muslims (  .89) using the measure from our prior
studies.
Group identification. We adapted the eight-item Black Iden-
tity Centrality scale (Sellers, Rowley, Chavous, Shelton, & Smith,
1997) to measure the degree to which participants identified with
their “religious group” (sample item: “In general, being a member
of my religious group is an important part of my self-image”;  
.89).
Religiosity. Group identification is conceptually distinct from
the construct of religiosity, although the two could be expected to
correlate positively. To test the unique effect of group identifica-
tion above and beyond religiosity, we asked participants to indicate
how religious they considered themselves to be (not at all, slightly,
moderately, or very, coded 1 to 4), how often they attend religious
services, and how often they pray (nine response options ranging
from never to several times per week; T. W. Smith, Marsden, Hout,
& Kim, 2013). We standardized and averaged these three items
into a single religiosity measure (  .79).
Islamophobia. As a measure of prejudice expression, partic-
ipants completed the 16-item Islamophobia scale (Lee et al., 2013;
  .98). Participants used 7-point scales (3 strongly disagree
to 3  strongly agree) to indicate agreement with statements
describing negative feelings toward Muslims (e.g., “If I could, I
would avoid contact with Muslims”) and negative beliefs about
Islam (e.g., “Islam is a dangerous religion”).
Attention checks. We administered the same two attention
checks from Study 6. We also administered a third check midway
through the Islamophobia scale, instructing participants to select
11 We thank Brian Lickel for suggesting that ingroup identification
might play this role.
12 To reduce error variance from religious diversity, we requested only
Protestants. However, the survey company oversampled Protestants but
also ran non-Protestant Christians.
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246 EFFRON AND KNOWLES
the highest point on a 7-point scale if they were paying attention.
Failure to follow this instruction would indicate inattentive or
random responding.
Procedure
After providing basic demographics and indicating their reli-
gious affiliation, participants completed the religiosity measure,
the article manipulation, the filler items from Study 6, the group
identification measure, and the Islamophobia measure. (We coun-
terbalanced the order in which participants completed the manip-
ulation checks and group identification measure.) They then pro-
vided additional demographics, including political conservatism
(Likert scale from 1  very liberal to 7  very conservative), and
read a debriefing form.
Results
Manipulation check. As expected, reading a characterization
of American Christians as cohesive, similar, and sharing common
fate significantly increased participants’ perception of their
group’s entitativity (Ms  5.68 and 5.25 in the entitativity and
control conditions, respectively, SDs  .86 and .97), t(1407) 
8.82, p  .0001, d  .47. Likewise, it significantly increased
perceptions that their group’s members pursued common goals, as
shown by an individual item from the manipulation-check scale
(Ms  6.05 and 5.44, SDs  .99 and 1.22), t(1407)  10.36, p 
.0001, d  .55. As in Study 6, these effects were modest in size,
indicating that the test of the manipulation’s more distal effect on
the dependent measure was particularly conservative. (Compare
this effect size to the Cohen’s d of 4.16 observed for the manip-
ulation check in Study 3.) Although the manipulation-check effects
were significant among both low- and high-identifiers, ps .0001,
they were somewhat stronger among low-identifiers. This result
also makes our hypothesis test conservative because we predicted
a larger effect of the manipulation on Islamophobia among high-
identifiers.
The manipulation had a much smaller and marginally significant
effect on the entitativity of Muslims (Ms  5.69 and 5.58 in the
entitativity and control conditions, respectively), t(1407)  1.82,
p  .07, d  .10, but our analyses of the Islamophobia measure
were identical in direction and significance when we controlled for
this variable.
The entitativity manipulation also slightly but significantly in-
creased group identification, t(1407)  2.81, p  .005, d  .15.
Because this effect was small (equivalent to a correlation of r 
.07), we could test group identification as a moderator of the
manipulation’s effect on Islamophobia without concerns about
multicollinearity. In the regression analyses presented next, the
variance inflation factor for all coefficients was less than 1.02—
well below the cutoff of 10 that indicates multicollinearity prob-
lems (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998).
Islamophobia. To test whether the entitativity manipulation
increased the expression of prejudice for high-identifiers more
than low-identifiers, we regressed the Islamophobia scale on the
manipulation (1  control, 1  entitativity condition), group
identification (standardized), and their interaction. We observed no
outliers. The regression results (plotted in Figure 4) showed a main
effect of group identification, b  .24, SE(b)  .05,   .14,
t(1405)  5.18, p  .001, no main effect of entitativity, b  .03,
SE(b)  .05,   .02, t(1405)  .64, p  .52, and the predicted
interaction, b  .10, SE(b)  .05,   .05, t(1405)  2.07, p 
.04. Testing simple slopes revealed that the manipulation margin-
ally increased the expression of Islamophobia among high-
identifiers (i.e., 1 SD above the mean), b  .13, SE(b)  .07,
t(1405)  1.92, p  .056. No such effect was found among
low-identifiers, b  .07, SE(b)  .07, t(1405)  1.01, p  .31;
the slightly negative but nonsignificant slope explains why the
main effect of the manipulation was not significant. Decomposing
the interaction the other way showed that the relationship between
group identification and expressed Islamophobia had a steeper
slope in the entitativity condition, b .34, SE(b) .07, t(1405)
5.07, p  .0001, than in the control condition, b  .14, SE(b) 
.06, t(1405)  2.23, p  .03. This pattern fits with the idea that
group identification can provide the motivation for prejudice, but
that this prejudice is more likely to get explicitly expressed in
entitative groups.
These results are not easily explained by positing that group
identification is a proxy for religiosity or conservatism. The Iden-
tification 	 Entitativity interaction remained significant when we
added religiosity and its interaction with the manipulation to the
model, p  .02, as well as when we instead added conservatism
and its interaction with the manipulation, p  .04 (Yzerbyt,
Muller, & Judd, 2004).13 Moreover, the simple effect of the
manipulation among high-identifiers became significant in each of
the new models, ps  .02 and .04, respectively. (The effect among
low-identifiers was not significant in either model, ps  .14.)
Discussion
Study 7 reveals how ingroup identification can play a role in the
expression of outgroup bias. Magnifying perceptions of ingroup
entitativity increased Christians’ expression of anti-Muslim prej-
udice, but only among Christians whose religious group member-
13 We did not have data on conservatism for 95 participants.
Figure 4. Mean Islamophobia (SE) by group identification and en-
titativity manipulation in Study 7. Islamophobia scores could range
from 1 to 7.
Th
is
do
cu
m
en
ti
s
co
py
rig
ht
ed
by
th
e
A
m
er
ic
an
Ps
yc
ho
lo
gi
ca
lA
ss
oc
ia
tio
n
o
r
o
n
e
o
fi
ts
al
lie
d
pu
bl
ish
er
s.
Th
is
ar
tic
le
is
in
te
nd
ed
so
le
ly
fo
rt
he
pe
rs
on
al
u
se
o
ft
he
in
di
vi
du
al
u
se
r
an
d
is
n
o
t
to
be
di
ss
em
in
at
ed
br
oa
dl
y.
247ENTITATIVITY AND INTERGROUP BIAS
ship was central to their identity. This finding fits with our rea-
soning that high-identifiers privately harbor more prejudice than
low-identifiers, and that entitativity licenses its explicit expression.
Opening a valve (i.e., by signaling an entitative ingroup) releases
more prejudice when prejudice has been stoked by the fuel of
ingroup identification.
General Discussion
Because intergroup prejudice is widely proscribed, people in-
hibit themselves from expressing their prejudices in many con-
texts. The present research reveals how membership in an entita-
tive group can make anti-outgroup prejudice seem more legitimate
to observers (H1) and can increase actors’ willingness to express
it themselves (H2). H1 received support in a correlational study
examining the perceived entitativity of the main racial groups in
the United States (Study 1) and in three experimental studies with
fictional religious and national groups (Studies 2A, 2B, and 3):
People thought that others would find it more socially acceptable
for members of more-entitative versus less-entitative groups to
enact prejudice and discrimination—but only if outgroup bias
could plausibly be explained by group members’ concern for their
collective interests. Supporting H2 with both correlational and
experimental methods, Studies 4 through 7 demonstrated that
perceiving their racial or religious ingroup as entitative led people
to express more prejudice against, respectively, racial or religious
outgroups. These studies also revealed boundary conditions that
supported our theorizing. Specifically, the more that White partic-
ipants in Study 5 perceived Whites as entitative, the more anti-
Black prejudice they expressed, but only if they had high levels of
implicit anti-Black bias to begin with. This finding suggests that
perceptions of entitativity can disinhibit people to give explicit
voice to their implicit biases. Similarly, a manipulation of entita-
tivity in Study 7 increased the explicit expression of anti-Muslim
prejudice among Christians, but only those whose high identifica-
tion with their religious ingroup suggested that they would pri-
vately have higher levels of prejudice to express in the first place
(Brown & Zagefka, 2005). Together, these findings suggest that
membership in an entitative group can provide a license to express
bias against outgroups.
Rationalistic Prejudice Seems More Legitimate
The results support our broader contention that prejudice is
more socially acceptable when it seems “rationalistic”—plausibly
connected to a group’s interests. We suggest that membership in an
entitative group makes prejudice seem more legitimate by in-
voking the possibility that prejudice could be motivated by the
defense or pursuit of collective interests. Study 2B produced
direct, mediational evidence for this claim: Participants more
readily attributed prejudiced acts to collective interests when
the perpetrator was a member of an entitative group, which led
them to perceive these acts as more socially acceptable. Study
3 also supported this claim by demonstrating that entitative-group
membership only increased the social acceptability of prejudice
against outgroups that could plausibly threaten the ingroup’s col-
lective interests. Much like people have greater standing to express
an unpopular view when it relates to their group’s interests (Mor-
rison, 2011), people have greater standing to express a prejudiced
view when they belong to the kind of group that is likely to have
collective interests.
Addressing Alternative Explanations
Our results allow us to rule out several alternative explanations
for the relationship between perceived ingroup entitativity and a
license to express outgroup bias.
Sharp intergroup boundaries justify prejudice. Perhaps en-
titativity makes divisions between groups seem sharper, which
may appear to justify prejudice (Rothbart & Park, 2004; Yzerbyt,
Rocher, & Schadron, 1997). If this were the case, however, then
higher entitativity of both the group perpetrating the prejudice and
the group targeted by it should be associated with greater license
to express prejudice. Instead, we found only that the entitativity of
the perpetrator group was associated with such license.
Ingroup entitativity is a proxy for felt prejudice. Four find-
ings make it difficult to explain our results by positing that people
who perceive their group as entitative simply hold more prejudiced
attitudes (rather than feeling more licensed to express prejudiced
attitudes). First, the stronger association between implicit and
explicit measures of prejudice among Whites who viewed their
racial ingroup as entitative casts doubt on this possibility; second,
entitativity perceptions did not significantly predict implicitly
measured prejudice (Study 5). If perceived ingroup entitativity
were merely a proxy for felt prejudice, then entitativity perceptions
should have been associated with both implicit and explicit mea-
sures of prejudice, but not have magnified these measures’ asso-
ciation with one another. Instead, these results support our view
that perceived ingroup entitativity grants people license to explic-
itly express their implicit biases. Third, if perceived ingroup enti-
tativity is merely a proxy for felt prejudice, then a manipulation of
entitativity should not have been causally related to prejudice, as it
was in Studies 6 and 7. Fourth, it is unclear how this alternative
explanation would explain why manipulating the entitativity of a
novel group in Studies 2A through 3 would have led participants
to rate prejudice committed by that group as more socially accept-
able.
Other explanations. Other alternative explanations for our
findings based on the possible association between a group’s
entitativity and its size, social status, or tendency to face discrim-
ination currently or historically have difficulty accounting for our
findings, as we controlled for these variables in Study 1.
The Role of Ingroup Identification
In certain contexts, identifying with an ingroup can lead to
prejudice against outgroups (Brown & Zagefka, 2005). Our theo-
retical analysis and the results of Study 7 suggest that group
identification can provide prejudiced attitudes, while entitativity
provides a license to explicitly express them. This does not pre-
clude the possibility that ingroup identification also plays another
role in the connection between entitativity and prejudice: Perceiv-
ing an ingroup as entitative could lead to greater identification
(Castano, Yzerbyt, & Bourguignon, 2003; Hogg, Sherman,
Dierselhuis, Maitner, & Moffitt, 2007; Yzerbyt et al., 2000),
which, in turn, could produce greater intergroup bias (Castano et
al., 2002; Feather, 1994). In fact, Study 7 found some evidence for
this possibility: The entitativity manipulation had a small but
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significant effect on group identification, which, in turn, was
positively correlated with prejudiced expressions. However, these
effects were not sufficient to explain the effect of entitativity: We
found that the entitativity manipulation increased prejudiced ex-
pressions when we held identification constant at one standard
deviation above its mean. Moreover, prior research on ingroup
identification and prejudice would not clearly predict that identi-
fication would be associated with a stronger positive association
between implicit and explicit attitudes (Study 5), or that observers
would be more tolerant of prejudice committed by an actor who
does versus does not strongly identify with his or her ingroup
(Studies 1 through 3).
Thus, it may be that identification facilitates the effect of enti-
tativity in two complementary ways. First, by increasing ingroup
identification, entitativity may stoke private feelings of prejudice
against outgroups. Second, entitativity may license the public
expression of this prejudice by granting psychological standing—a
process that will have the greatest effect among high-identifiers
and others who have the most prejudice to express.
Theoretical Advances
The present findings should be of interest to scholars working in
multiple literatures. First, our results provide a novel perspective
on how prejudice gets expressed in societies that generally pro-
scribe it. People appear to relax such proscriptions for individuals
whose group seems like a cohesive unit composed of similar,
interdependent individuals. And members of such groups seem to
be more willing to express prejudices that they would otherwise
keep to themselves. These findings fit with the idea that people
generally try to suppress their prejudices, but will express them
given the appropriate justification (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003;
Norton, Vandello, & Darley, 2004; Pearson, Dovidio, & Gaertner,
2009). For example, research on moral credentials has shown that
the ability to point to nonprejudiced behaviors one has enacted in
the past can provide a license to commit potentially prejudiced
behaviors in the future (Effron, Cameron, & Monin, 2009; Effron,
Miller, & Monin, 2012; Merritt et al., 2010; Monin & Miller,
2001). Our work highlights ingroup entitativity as a novel source
of bias license.
Our results also contribute to the literatures on group percep-
tions and intergroup relations. Although scholars have previously
noted the connection between perceived outgroup entitativity and
stereotyping (Brewer & Harasty, 1996; Spencer-Rodgers, Hamil-
ton, et al., 2007), a paucity of work has examined the connection
between perceived ingroup entitativity and intergroup bias. The
studies that did examine this connection focused on how entita-
tivity can increase positive evaluations of the ingroup (Castano et
al., 2002; Gaertner & Schopler, 1998), whereas our results are the
first to show how perceived ingroup entitativity legitimizes and
increases expressed prejudice against outgroups. This is a partic-
ularly important finding because it contradicts an untested assump-
tion in the literature: that because members of entitative (vs.
less-entitative) groups tend to feel more secure about their group
identity, they will be less likely to enhance their group identity
through outgroup derogation (Yzerbyt et al., 2000). Although our
studies do not rule out the possibility that members of entitative
groups are less motivated to derogate outgroups, our results do
suggest the members of entitative groups are more licensed to
express the prejudices they have. At least in our studies, the net
effect was a greater expression of prejudice among members of
entitative groups.
Finally, our results shed new light on how group membership
can provide psychological standing—a subjective sense of legiti-
macy or entitlement—to express one’s attitudes. Prior research on
this topic focused mainly on how belonging to a group affected by
an injustice entitles one to protest that injustice (Effron & Miller,
2012; Miller, 1999; Miller & Effron, 2010; Miller et al., 2009;
Morrison, 2011; Ratner & Miller, 2001). The present study not
only identifies group entitativity as a novel source of standing but
also reveals how standing may regulate the expression of inter-
group bias.
Prejudice Against Entitative Groups
Our hypotheses focused on prejudice expressed by entitative
groups, but we conducted exploratory analyses to examine preju-
dice expressed against entitative groups. We did not find a reliable
relationship across our studies. Perhaps conflicting processes op-
erating simultaneously explain these inconsistent results. The more
entitative the relevant groups appeared, the more dislikable they
may have seemed (Abelson et al., 1998; Dasgupta et al., 1999;
Newheiser et al., 2009), but the more sympathy they may have
elicited as well (R. W. Smith et al., 2013). Future research should
explore this idea.
We also explored whether a particular combination of ingroup
and outgroup entitativity would license prejudice. On the one
hand, a group’s lack of entitativity may make it seem less threat-
ening to others’ interests. Consistent with this idea, Dasgupta et al.
(1999) found that alien creatures seemed less threatening when
they looked different than each other (i.e., were less-entitative)
than when they looked similar (i.e., were more-entitative). If an
outgroup’s lack of entitativity meant that it could not plausibly
threaten the ingroup’s interests, then our theory would predict that
ingroup entitativity would license prejudice against only entitative
outgroups (see Study 3). On the other hand, when the relevant
groups are nations, religions, or races (as they were in our studies),
rather than novel creatures, even groups that are low in entitativity
could be seen as plausibly threatening others’ interests. In that
case, ingroup entitativity should license prejudice regardless of
outgroup entitativity. For example, a person could perceive Whites
as interfering with racial minorities’ political and economic goals
and thus grant minorities a license to express anti-White prejudice,
even though she also views Whites as heterogeneous, lacking
cohesion, and uncoordinated in performing the behavior that
causes such interference.
Consistent with the second possibility, we did not find consis-
tent evidence that the licensing effect of ingroup entitativity de-
pends on outgroup entitativity. Study 1 and Studies 4 through 7
allowed us to test a statistical interaction between each group’s
entitativity. A significant interaction in Study 4 indicated that the
positive correlation between perceived ingroup entitativity and
prejudice was significantly weaker among participants who
viewed the outgroup as more entitative,   .64, p  .02.
However, this result did not replicate in Study 5,   .16, p .85,
and the relevant interaction did not approach significance in any
other study.
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Limitations and Future Directions
Why do people seem to feel more comfortable expressing their
prejudices when they belong to entitative groups? Given that
prejudice seems more socially acceptable when committed by
members of entitative groups (Studies 1 through 3), people may
expect less opprobrium and punishment for prejudice when they
belong to such a group. Another possibility is that people have
internalized the belief that belonging to an entitative group legit-
imizes prejudice, and they thus feel less compunction about their
prejudice when they perceive their ingroup as entitative. Distin-
guishing between these possibilities is a task for future research.
Our studies focused on prejudice among racial groups, national
groups, and religious groups. Future research should examine
whether entitativity can license bias in other types of groups. For
example, are highly cohesive organizations given greater license to
disparage their competitors? Do academics feel more justified
denigrating their colleagues in other departments when members
of their own department occupy proximate offices, research similar
topics, and depend on each other for resources?
It will also be important to test what forms of prejudice can be
licensed by entitativity. When contrasted against the extremes of
discrimination and violence perpetrated against outgroups
throughout history, the prejudiced behaviors that participants con-
sidered in our studies could be considered mild (e.g., refusing to
shop at stores owned by outgroup members). It remains to be seen
whether more severe forms of outgroup bias can be licensed by
entitativity.
Future research should investigate the interplay between collec-
tive blame and the bias license granted to members of entitative
groups. One implication of our research is that an individual may
receive less blame for prejudice (from others and from herself)
when her ingroup is more entitative. The group as a whole,
however, may receive more blame for her acts when it is more
entitative, in part because entitative groups may be assumed to
have desired and implicitly encouraged these acts (Denson et al.,
2006; Lickel, Hamilton, & Sherman, 2001; Lickel, Schmader, &
Hamilton, 2003). Our research suggests that entitative groups do
bear more responsibility for an individual’s prejudiced acts, in the
sense that entitativity allows an individual to more easily point to
collective interests or desires as a license. This shifting of blame
from the individual to the group could further embolden individ-
uals to express prejudice (cf. Darley & Latané, 1968).
Implications for the Effects of Demographic Changes
An ongoing demographic shift will render non-Hispanic Whites
a minority of Americans by 2042 (Ortman & Guarneri, 2009).
Whites may associate their new minority status with economic
and psychological threat, which could increase feelings of in-
tergroup hostility (Blumer, 1958; Bobo & Hutchings, 1996;
Craig & Richeson, 2014a, 2014b; Fossett & Kiecolt, 1989;
Giles & Evans, 1985; Outten, Schmitt, Miller, & Garcia, 2012;
Quillian, 1995, 1996). And as the proportion of non-Whites in
their social environment grows, they may also come to see their
own racial group as more distinctive, concrete, and, thus, enti-
tative (Voci, 2006). Our research therefore raises the concern
that as the nation continues to diversify, Whites not only may
develop greater hostility toward other racial groups but also
may increasingly regard themselves as possessing a license to
express it.
Conclusion
The present research identifies a novel way in which perceptions
of ingroup entitativity can stoke intergroup conflict: by providing
a license to express and act on private prejudices. We may not only
tolerate the biases of a group that seems highly cohesive, but also
be more willing to express our personal prejudices when that
cohesive group is our own.
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The major aim of the present research was to examine if knowledge of cultural stereotypes about minority groups within society is
virtually universal (Devine, 1989) or whether such knowledge is influenced by the perceiver’s level of prejudice (cf. Krueger, 1996).
In three studies, in which multiple measures of racial prejudice were used, it was shown that level of prejudice does relate to perception
of cultural stereotypes. High-prejudiced people believed that the cultural stereotypes of Moroccan and Surinamese people in The
Netherlands are more negative and less positive in content than low-prejudiced people did. It is argued that previous research may have
failed, at least in part, to detect clear differences between low- and high-prejudiced people because it relied on the relatively insensitive
Modern Racism questionnaire in order to measure prejudice. © 2001 Academic PressIs knowledge of cultural stereotypes about minority
groups within society virtually universal, or is such knowl-
edge dependent on the perceiver’s own level of prejudice?
This question is the concern of the present research.
According to Devine (1989) people do share knowledge
of cultural stereotypes. She argued that stereotypes of social
groups are well known by all members of society, regardless
of the individual’s level of prejudice concerning these
groups. Through exposure and social learning stereotypes
become strongly associated with their target group. As a
consequence, stereotypes will be automatically activated
upon encountering group members, independent of the level
of prejudice of the individual. In order to test whether low-
and high-prejudiced people have equal knowledge of the
cultural stereotype, Devine (1989: Experiment 1) asked
participants to freely list stereotypes toward African Amer-
icans, regardless of their personal beliefs. To measure their
level of prejudice, participants also completed the Modern
Racism questionnaire (McConahay, Hardee, & Batts, 1981).
In line with her model, Devine’s conclusion was that “high-
and low-prejudiced persons are indeed equally knowledge-
able of the cultural stereotype” (p. 8).
Most researchers agree with Devine (1989) that stereo-
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All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.types of minority groups are well known by all members of
society, regardless of the individual’s own beliefs. For ex-
ample, Lepore and Brown (1997) replicated her findings
within the British context by examining whether low- and
high-prejudiced people have similar knowledge about the
cultural stereotype of Black people in the United Kingdom.
Prejudice was measured with a scale that combined the
Modern Racism questionnaire with a few items from the
Subtle/blatant Racism questionnaire (Pettigrew & Meertens,
1995) and a few items from the Resistance to Affirmative
Action questionnaire (Jacobson, 1985). In line with De-
vine’s predictions concerning cultural stereotypes, it was
shown that “high- and low-prejudice people substantially
share the same knowledge of such stereotypes” (p. 278).
Augustinos, Ahrens, and Innes (1994) replicated the find-
ings of Devine within the Australian context. They mea-
sured prejudice with a version of the Modern Racism ques-
tionnaire that was adapted for use in the Australian context.
On the basis of their findings they argued that “knowledge
of the aboriginal stereotype is largely independent of prej-
udicial beliefs” (p. 129).
On the basis of these findings many researchers have
concluded that low- and high-prejudiced people have rela-
tively equal knowledge of cultural stereotypes of minority
groups within their country. However, there is another per-
spective that predicts different outcomes, that is Krueger’s
(1996) model of social projection. According to this model,
“people tend to believe that others feel, think, and act as
they themselves do” (p. 536). Social perceivers are therefore
likely to use their personal beliefs as a basis for their
TYPEestimates about cultural stereotypes. In line with this model,
Krueger showed that people’s personal beliefs about group
characteristics predicted what they believed to be the cul-
tural stereotype of that group. They overestimated the extent
to which others shared their personal beliefs. Thus, self-
reported personal beliefs about stereotypes and perceived
cultural stereotypes are related. When also considering the
fact that level of prejudice is predictive of self-reported
personal beliefs, as Devine (1989: Experiment 3) showed, it
could be inferred that prejudice and perception of cultural
stereotypes are associated as well. If so, why did Devine
(1989), Lepore and Brown (1997), and Augustinos et al.
(1994) not find such a relation?
Perhaps no influence of prejudice level has been found
due to the way it was measured. That is, all these studies
relied on the Modern Racism questionnaire in order to
measure level of prejudice. Although this questionnaire is
the most widely used measure of self-reported prejudice, it
has also been criticized with respect to its validity
(Guglielmi, 1999; see also Kunda, 1999). For example,
Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, and Williams (1995; see also Sni-
derman & Tetlock, 1986) argued that prejudice and political
conservatism are confounded in the questionnaire. As a
result, individuals who are not prejudiced will appear to be
so because they have conservative views. Moreover, Fazio
et al. (1995) showed that the scale is reactive, as it is subject
to social desirability concerns. One reason for this might be
that the Modern Racism questionnaire is outdated (see also
Biernat & Crandall, 1999; Kunda, 1999; Swim, Aikin, Hall,
& Hunter, 1995).
Taking these considerations into account, the aim of the
current research was to test again whether knowledge of
cultural stereotypes is dependent on one’s level of prejudice.
However, in comparison to former studies that have tested
this relationship by measuring prejudice with the Modern
Racism questionnaire, we also measured prejudice using
other recently developed racism questionnaires. For exam-
ple, we included the Subtle/Blatant Racism questionnaire by
Pettigrew and Meertens (1995), who developed this ques-
tionnaire in order to combine different aspects of prejudice.
The more covert aspects of prejudice are (1) the defense of
traditional values, (2) the exaggeration of cultural differ-
ences, and (3) the denial of positive emotions. The more
blatant aspects of prejudice are perceived threat from and
rejection of the out-group and the opposition of intimate
contact with the out-group.
We also included a recently published questionnaire that
was developed in order to measure prejudice-related dis-
crepancies (Monteith & Voils, 1998). This questionnaire
comprises of two separate scales, which measure two dif-
ferent aspects of prejudice: The Prejudiced Standard scale
assesses the individuals’ personal standards with respect to
CULTURAL STEREOhow one should feel and behave towards the minority group
within different situations. The Prejudiced Behavior scaleassesses the individuals’ self-reported actual behavior and
feelings with respect to the minority group within different
situations. Instead of looking at discrepancies, we used
these two scales as independent measures of prejudice, and
examined their predictive power with respect to the percep-
tion of cultural stereotypes.
In Study 1, we replicated Devine’s study (1989: Experi-
ment 1) within the Dutch context by examining whether
low- and high-prejudiced people have similar knowledge
about the cultural stereotype of Moroccan people in The
Netherlands. In Studies 2 and 3, it was examined whether
low- and high-prejudiced people have similar knowledge
about the cultural stereotype of Surinamese people in The
Netherlands. We chose these two minority groups because
we expect that the content of cultural stereotypes about
them will be quite distinct (cf. Dijker, Koomen, van den
Heuvel, & Frijda, 1996). Dijker et al. (1996) argued that this
might be the consequence of the different position Moroc-
cans and Surinamese have in Dutch society. Moroccans
were originally recruited as guest workers in The Nether-
lands in the 1970s for low-wage jobs that Dutch people did
not want to do. However, many of them settled down with
their families, especially in bigger cities such as Rotterdam
and Amsterdam. Moroccans form a quite isolated but salient
Islamic minority, of which many do not speak Dutch. Suri-
namese people, of which the most salient group is Black, are
a more integrated minority within Dutch society. Surinam is
a former colony of The Netherlands. Therefore, Surinamese
people speak Dutch and share to a large extent the same
culture, although their skin color and social economical
background is different. Showing a similar influence of
prejudice on the perception of cultural stereotypes for such
different minority groups will strengthen our findings.
STUDY 1
Method
Fifty Dutch students of the University of Amsterdam (18
males and 32 females; mean age 5 20.88, SD 5 2.60)
participated in the study, for which they received 15 guil-
ders (about $U.S. 7.5). Participants were invited to the
laboratory, where they were seated in front of personal
computers in separate rooms. Because the experiment was
carried out via the computer, all instructions, experimental
information and questions appeared on the screen. Answers
were given via the keyboard. First, instructions were given
about using the computer and participants were asked to
type their age and their gender. For the first task, Devine’s
instructions (1989: Experiment 1) were translated and made
relevant to the Dutch context: Participants were told that the
purpose was to better understand stereotypes. They were
151S AND PREJUDICEasked to list the content of the cultural stereotypes of Mo-
roccan people. It was emphasized that the researchers were
tu
a
e mornot interested in their personal views, but in the views they
think Dutch people have of Moroccan people.
After this task, participants filled in several prejudice
questionnaires that were presented in random order. The
questionnaires were Dutch translations of the Modern Rac-
ism questionnaire (McConahay, 1986: reported in Jones,
1997),1 the Subtle/Blatant Racism questionnaire (Pettigrew
& Meertens, 1995), and the Prejudiced Standard and Prej-
udiced Behavior questionnaires (Monteith & Voils, 1998).
Of course, all questionnaires concerned Moroccans in the
Netherlands. All answers were given on 9-point Likert
scales (1 5 absolutely disagree to 9 5 absolutely agree).
Results
All prejudice questionnaires were reliable (Modern Rac-
ism questionnaire: a 5 .72; Subtle/Blatant Racism ques-
ionnaire: a 5 .85; Prejudiced Standard questionnaire: a 5
.87; Prejudiced Behavior questionnaire: a 5 .88). As shown
in Table 1, all scales significantly correlate with each other.
However, the correlations between the Modern Racism
questionnaire and the other questionnaires are somewhat
lower than the correlations between the other three ques-
tionnaires.
Two independent judges coded individual responses in
relevant categories. Multiple responses in one category were
counted only once. If the same concept was mentioned
using different words, it was coded only once in that cate-
1 Devine (1989: Exp. 1), Augustinos et al. (1994), and Lepore and
Brown (1996) used an earlier version of the Modern Racism questionnaire
(i.e., McConahay, Hardee, & Batts, 1981), which included a seventh item
concerning school desegregation. However, we used a later version of the
Modern Racism questionnaire (McConahay, 1986, as reported in Jones,
TA
Findings of S
Correlations between prejudice scales
Subtle/
Blatant
Prejudiced
Standard
Preju
Beh
Modern
Racism .48** .38** .4
Subtle/
Blatant .75** .7
Prejudiced
Standard .7
Prejudiced
Behavior
* p , .05.
** p , .01.
*** A positive correlation implies that higher prejudiced participants ar
than lower prejudiced people.
152 GORDIJN, KOO1997), which does not include this item. This item was not used in the
translation because it is not relevant to the Dutch context and also because
it has been argued that this item is outdated (Biernat & Crandall, 1999).gory. The judges agreed on 83% of their responses; dis-
agreement was solved through discussion. Because the fo-
cus of the current research was to study the shared
perception of cultural stereotypes, it was decided to carry
out analyses on categories that were mentioned by at least
20% of the participants (i.e., criminal, 70%; unadjusted,
52%; lazy, 42%; sexist, 32%; hardworking, 25%; family-
oriented, 24%; aggressive, 20%).
To examine the relation between the mentioned catego-
ries and the prejudice questionnaires, categories which were
positive (measured on 9-point Likert scales; 1 5 negative to
9 5 positive) according to a post hoc test with 60 other
participants (family-oriented, M 5 6.78, and hardworking,
M 5 6.43) were combined into a positive cultural stereo-
type scale. The negative categories (criminal, M 5 1.68;
nadjusted, M 5 3.52; lazy, M 5 3.08; sexist, M 5 1.62;
nd aggressive, M 5 2.27) were combined into a negative
cultural stereotype scale. Correlational analyses were car-
ried out to examine whether higher prejudiced participants
have a different conception of the Moroccan cultural ste-
reotype with respect to valence compared to lower preju-
diced participants. Results revealed positive correlations for
all prejudice questionnaires between level of prejudice and
the difference between negative and positive stereotypic
categories indicating that higher prejudiced participants re-
ported more negative than positive stereotypic categories
compared to lower prejudiced participants (see Table 1).
However, this correlation was not significantly different
from zero when level of prejudice was measured by the
Modern Racism questionnaire.
Discussion
Study 1 showed that higher prejudiced persons mentioned
1
1 (N 5 50)
Correlations between prejudice scales
and listed stereotypes***
Positive
Stereotype
Negative
Stereotype
Negative–
Positive
2.25 .04 .25
2.26 .22 .35*
2.16 .32* .32*
2.15 .32* .31*
e likely to believe that these categories are part of the cultural stereotype
, AND STAPELBLE
tudy
diced
avior
3**
8**
8**
MENmore negative and less positive categories than lower prej-
udiced persons did. This indicates that knowledge of cul-
e mortural stereotypes is dependent on one’s level of prejudice.
This conclusion is not in line with previous research by
Devine (1989), Augustinos et al. (1994), as well as Lepore
and Brown (1997), who showed that high- and low-preju-
diced persons appeared to be relatively equally knowledge-
able of the cultural stereotype of minority groups within
society.
Perhaps former research was not able to detect differ-
ences between low- and high-prejudiced people with respect
to their knowledge of stereotypes because the Modern Rac-
ism questionnaire was used. In the current research, this
questionnaire did not reveal significant differences in
knowledge of cultural stereotypes, while the other question-
naires did. This may suggest that the Modern Racism ques-
tionnaire is a less sensitive prejudice measure. Still, some
people might argue that the Modern Racism questionnaire
fails to discriminate solely because its items are not appli-
cable to the Moroccan situation in The Netherlands. How-
ever, the correlations between the Modern Racism question-
naire and the Prejudiced Standard and Prejudiced Behavior
questionnaires (.38 and .43, respectively) are almost equal
to correlations that were found between these questionnaires
(.38 and .41, respectively) by Monteith (1996) in the United
States. Moreover, the Prejudiced Standard and Prejudiced
Behavior questionnaires are strongly correlated with the
Subtle/Blatant questionnaire (.75 and .78, respectively) that
was developed in The Netherlands by Pettigrew and
Meertens (1995). Together, this suggests that the Modern
Racism questionnaire is as appropriate for the Dutch context
as it is for the American context.
In order to find more evidence for the conclusions of
Study 1 regarding knowledge of cultural stereotypes and
level of prejudice, Study 2 was carried out to seek to
TA
Findings of S
Correlations between prejudice scales
Subtle/
Blatant
Prejudiced
Standard
Preju
Beh
Modern
Racism .44** .38** .3
Subtle/
Blatant .63** .7
Prejudiced
Standard .8
Prejudiced
Behavior
* p , .05.
** p , .01.
*** A positive correlation implies that higher prejudiced participants ar
than lower prejudiced people.
CULTURAL STEREOreplicate these results with respect to the cultural stereotype
of Surinamese people.STUDY 2
Method
Fifty-eight Dutch students of the University of Amster-
dam (21 males and 37 females; mean age 5 21.14, SD 5
2.37) participated in the study, for which they received 15
guilders (about $U.S. 7.5). Procedures were similar to Study
1. However, this time participants were asked to list the
content of the cultural stereotypes of Surinamese people. As
in Study 1, it was emphasized that the researchers were not
interested in the personal views of participants, but in the
views they think Dutch people have of Surinamese people.
Results
All prejudice questionnaires were reliable (Modern Rac-
ism questionnaire, a 5 .62; Subtle/Blatant Racism ques-
tionnaire, a 5 .81; Prejudiced Standard questionnaire, a 5
.89; Prejudiced Behavior questionnaire, a 5 .89). As shown
in Table 2, and in line with Study 1, all scales significantly
correlate with each other. However, also in line with Study
1, the correlations between the Modern Racism question-
naire and the other questionnaires are somewhat lower than
the correlations between the other three questionnaires.
The same coding procedure was carried out as in Study 1.
The two independent judges agreed on 89% of their re-
sponses; disagreement was solved through discussion. Cor-
relational analyses were carried out on categories that were
mentioned by at least 20% of all participants (i.e., lazy,
59%; criminal, 43%; happy, 43%; good food, 38%; loud,
31%; “gezellig,”2 31%; family-oriented, 24%; hospitable,
21%).
2
2 (N 5 58)
Correlations between prejudice scales
and listed stereotypes***
Positive
Stereotype
Negative
Stereotype
Negative–
Positive
.04 .10 .11
2.11 .36* .36*
2.16 .33* .37*
2.24 .33* .42*
e likely to believe that these categories are part of the cultural stereotype
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diced
avior
8**
2**
7**
TYPE2 Gezellig is a Dutch word that has no direct translation in English,
although “cozy” captures part of the meaning. This word refers to (being
9
p
“
M
a
(
MENTo examine the relation between the mentioned catego-
ries and the prejudice questionnaires, categories which are
positive (measured on 9-point Likert scales; 1 5 negative to
5 positive) according to a post hoc test with 60 other
articipants (happy, M 5 7.50; good food, M 5 6.35;
gezellig” (see footnote 2), M 5 7.40; family-oriented,
5 6.78; and hospitable, M 5 7.38) are combined into
positive cultural stereotype scale. The negative categories
criminal, M 5 1.68; loud, M 5 3.92; and lazy, M 5
3.08) are combined into a negative cultural stereotype
scale. Correlational analyses were carried out to examine
whether higher prejudiced participants have a different con-
ception of the Surinamese cultural stereotype with respect to
valence compared to lower prejudiced participants. Results
revealed that higher prejudiced participants reported more
negative and less positive stereotypic categories compared
to lower prejudiced participants (see Table 2). However,
this appeared not to be true when the Modern Racism
questionnaire was used to measure prejudice. In this case,
no significant correlations were found between level of
prejudice and valence of the categories. Moreover, t tests
for examining the differences between dependent correla-
tions (see Steiger, 1980) revealed that the correlation be-
tween level of prejudice and the valence of the mentioned
categories obtained with the Modern Racism questionnaire
is significantly lower than the correlations obtained with the
Subtle/Blatant questionnaire [t(58) 5 1.86; p , .05], the
Prejudiced Standard questionnaire [t(58) 5 1.82; p ,
.05], or the Prejudiced Behavior questionnaire [t(58) 5
2.23; p , .05].
Discussion
In line with Study 1, it was shown that most prejudice
questionnaires do show differences in knowledge of the
cultural stereotype between low- and high-prejudiced peo-
ple. That is, higher prejudiced people think that the cultural
stereotype of Surinamese people is more negative than
positive in content compared to lower prejudiced people.
This finding disconfirms again earlier findings that knowl-
edge of cultural stereotypes is not dependent on one’s level
of prejudice (e.g., Devine, 1989; Augustinos et al., 1994;
Lepore & Brown, 1997). Moreover, it appears that the
Modern Racism questionnaire is a less sensitive measure of
prejudice than the other questionnaires we used because it is
less able to detect differences between low- and high-
prejudiced people.
One important feature of the first two studies is that, in
line with research by Devine (1989), Augustinos et al.
(1994), and Lepore and Brown (1997), they used a free
response task in order to assess knowledge of cultural
154 GORDIJN, KOOable to create) a good atmosphere between people. Both people and
situations or places can be gezellig.stereotypes. According to Devine (1989), this can be seen as
a rather sensitive way of assessing stereotypes because no
cues, such as a list of possible characteristics, are provided.
As a result, people may be less likely to control their beliefs
regarding stereotypes. On the other, hand, people may be
more hesitant to reveal their thoughts when they are specif-
ically asked to list the content of the cultural stereotype. If
people are indeed motivated to respond in a less prejudiced
manner, it will be more difficult to find differences as a
function of level of prejudice with the Modern Racism
questionnaire, which has been shown to be a reactive mea-
sure (Fazio et al., 1995).
In Study 3 it is therefore examined whether it is possible
to detect differences in knowledge of the cultural stereotype
as a function of prejudice level when the categories, which
were listed in Study 2, are presented as items.
STUDY 3
Method
Fifty-seven Dutch students of the University of Amster-
dam (24 males and 33 females; mean age 5 21.84, SD 5
3.27) participated in the study, for which they received 15
guilders (about $U.S. 7.5). Procedures were largely similar
to those used in Studies 1 and 2. However, this time par-
ticipants were asked to judge to what extent they think that
Dutch people associate several traits with Surinamese peo-
ple on 9-point Likert scales (1 5 Dutch people absolutely
do not associate this trait with Surinamese people to 9 5
Dutch people absolutely do associate this trait with Suri-
namese people). As in Studies 1 and 2, it was emphasized
that the researchers were not interested in the personal
views of participants, but in the views they think Dutch
people have of Surinamese people. Participants had to judge
the five positive and three negative categories that were
mentioned in Study 2 as well as 28 filler categories.
Results
All prejudice questionnaires were reliable (Modern Rac-
ism questionnaire, a 5 .71; Subtle/Blatant Racism ques-
tionnaire, a 5 .81; Prejudiced Standard questionnaire, a 5
.83; Prejudiced Behavior questionnaire, a 5 .86). As shown
in Table 3, and in line with Studies 1 and 2, all question-
naires significantly correlate with each other. However, also
in line with Studies 1 and 2, the correlations between the
Modern Racism questionnaire and the other questionnaires
are somewhat lower than the correlations between the other
three questionnaires.
Comparable to Study 2 a positive cultural stereotype
scale and a negative cultural stereotype scale were com-
puted. Correlational analyses were carried out to examine
, AND STAPELwhether higher prejudiced participants have a different con-
ception of the Surinamese cultural stereotype with respect to
e morvalence compared to lower prejudiced participants. Results,
which are reported in Table 3, revealed that higher preju-
diced participants compared to lower prejudiced partici-
pants believed that negative cultural stereotypic categories
are more strongly associated with Surinamese people than
positive cultural stereotypic categories. Interestingly, this
pattern of results was obtained for all prejudice question-
naires, including the Modern Racism questionnaire.
Discussion
Findings of Study 3 largely replicated the results of the
former studies. Higher prejudiced people believe that neg-
ative cultural stereotypes compared to positive cultural ste-
reotypes are more strongly associated with Surinamese peo-
ple than do lower prejudiced people. In contrast to the first
two studies, this pattern of apparent influence of prejudice
level on knowledge of cultural stereotypes was also clearly
found with the Modern Racism questionnaire. The main
difference between the first two studies and Study 3 is that
in Study 3 the cultural stereotypic categories were presented
to the participants rather than having them spontaneously
list the stereotypic attributes. This method of assessing
cultural stereotypes may have accounted for the fact that the
Modern Racism questionnaire was capable of detecting
significant differences between lower and higher prejudiced
people. For any case, this finding strengthens our conclusion
that the perception of cultural stereotypes is dependent on
the perceiver’s own level of prejudice.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
TA
Findings of S
Correlations between prejudice scales
Subtle/
Blatant
Prejudiced
Standard
Preju
Beh
Modern
Racism .39** .28** .3
Subtle/
Blatant .60** .6
Prejudiced
Standard .7
Prejudiced
Behavior
* p , .05.
** p , .01.
*** A positive correlation implies that higher prejudiced participants ar
than lower prejudiced people.
CULTURAL STEREOThe major aim of the present research was to examine to
what extent knowledge of cultural stereotypes about minor-ity groups within society is virtually universal. It was tested
whether people who are prejudiced with respect to a certain
minority group perceive the cultural stereotype about this
group in a different way than people who are less preju-
diced. In contrast to findings by Devine (1989), Augustinos
et al. (1994), and Lepore and Brown (1997), we argued that
prejudice might have an influence on one’s knowledge of
cultural stereotypes. We based this argument on several
considerations. For one, Krueger (1996) has shown that
personal beliefs are predictive of beliefs regarding cultural
stereotypes. When also considering the fact that level of
prejudice predicts one’s personal beliefs concerning the
stereotyped group (Devine, 1989: Experiment 3), it seems
likely that prejudice level and knowledge of cultural stereo-
types are also related to some extent. In line with this
reasoning, the three current studies showed that high-prej-
udiced people believed that the cultural stereotypes of Mo-
roccan and Surinamese people in The Netherlands are more
negative and less positive in content than low-prejudiced
people did. These findings were obtained both with a free
response method (Study 1 and Study 2) and with close-
ended questions (Study 3).
Importantly, these findings do contradict the argument
that there should be no influence of one’s prejudices with
respect to knowledge of cultural stereotypes because they
are well known by all members of society due to exposure
and social learning (Devine, 1989). In line with this argu-
ment, Devine found no effects of prejudice level on knowl-
edge of cultural stereotypes, nor did several other research-
ers testing this hypothesis (Augustinos et al., 1994; Lepore
& Brown, 1997). What may have accounted for these di-
vergent findings? One possible explanation could be that the
3
3 (N 5 57)
Correlations between prejudice scales
and listed stereotypes***
Positive
Stereotype
Negative
Stereotype
Negative–
Positive
2.34 .07 .37*
2.04 .38* .43*
2.26* .06 .28*
2.22 .07 .26*
e likely to believe that these categories are part of the cultural stereotype
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TYPEDutch situation is different from that in other countries. That
is, one may argue that Americans are more aware of the
MENcultural stereotype of African Americans, and Australians
are more aware of the cultural stereotype of Aboriginals,
than the Dutch are with respect to the cultural stereotypes of
Moroccans and Surinamese. There has been a long history
of intergroup relations between European Americans and
African Americans in the United States and between Ab-
originals and European immigrants in Australia. However,
Surinamese and Moroccan people only immigrated to The
Netherlands after World War II, and therefore, knowledge
of cultural stereotypes may be similar to a lesser extent by
the members of society.
There are, however, at least two arguments against this
line of reasoning. First, Lepore and Brown (1997) obtained
similar results as Devine (1989) regarding the knowledge of
cultural stereotypes of West Indians in the United Kingdom.
The position of West Indians in Britain is quite similar to
the position of Surinamese people in The Netherlands. The
Netherlands and the United Kingdom both had colonies in
South and Central America, and they both used African
people as slaves in these colonies during the 19th century.
After World War II, many people who lived in these former
colonies emigrated to the countries that had colonized their
countries. The history of intergroup relations between im-
migrants from the former colonies and the inhabitants of
The Netherlands and the United Kingdom is therefore likely
to be quite similar, and consequently, also the development
of cultural stereotypes with respect to the immigrants. As
such, it is difficult to maintain that different findings are the
result of different kinds of stereotypes. Second, it should be
noted that the current research showed a similar pattern of
results with respect to knowledge of cultural stereotypes of
two very different minority groups in The Netherlands.
Although the history of intergroup relations with Dutch
people is very different for these two groups, as well as the
content of the cultural stereotypes, influence of prejudice
level on knowledge of these stereotypes is quite similar.
Another explanation for the divergent research findings
may be found in the way in which prejudice is measured.
Previous research which showed that prejudice does not
moderate knowledge of cultural stereotypes questionnaire
(Devine, 1989; Augustinos et al., 1994; Lepore & Brown,
1997) has measured prejudice with the Modern Racism
questionnaire. However, in the current research prejudice is
measured with several questionnaires. In addition to the
Modern Racism questionnaire, the Subtle/Blatant Racism
questionnaire by Pettigrew and Meertens (1995) and the
Prejudiced Behavior and Prejudiced Standard question-
naires by Monteith and Voils (1998) also were included. In
line with former research, the first two studies, which were
replications of Study 1 by Devine (1989), showed no sig-
nificant influence of level of prejudice with respect to
knowledge of the cultural stereotype when prejudice was
156 GORDIJN, KOOmeasured with the Modern Racism questionnaire. However,
when the other prejudice questionnaires were used a signif- Ficant moderating effect of prejudice was found. Moreover,
in Study 2 the correlation between level of prejudice and
valence of the cultural stereotype was significantly lower for
the Modern Racism questionnaire than for the other ques-
tionnaires. Only when positive and negative words had to be
rated with respect to the extent that people believed that
they were part of the cultural stereotype did the Modern
Racism questionnaire show a significant relation between
level of prejudice and knowledge of cultural stereotypes.
When considering the fact that the Modern Racism ques-
tionnaire has been criticized with respect to its validity
(Fazio et al., 1995; Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986), it could be
argued that this questionnaire may not be sensitive enough
to detect clear differences in knowledge of cultural stereo-
types as a function of level of prejudice when the free
response method is used. Only when knowledge of cultural
stereotypes was measured by presenting people a list of
possible characteristics was the Modern Racism question-
naire clearly capable of detecting differences between lower
and higher prejudiced people. Perhaps in this case the Mod-
ern Racism questionnaire is able to clearly differentiate as a
function of prejudice because this rating method is a less
reactive method than the free response method. The free
response method may be a rather reactive method of assess-
ing knowledge of cultural stereotypes, as people may be
hesitant to spontaneously (without being prompted by spe-
cific traits such as “lazy” or “criminal”) reveal their
thoughts. In this latter case, it could be more difficult to find
differences as a function of level of prejudice with a ques-
tionnaire that is subject to social desirability effects, such as
the Modern Racism questionnaire (cf. Fazio et al., 1995).
Future research could further examine this issue.
For now, the most important conclusion of this research
is that level of prejudice does relate to people’s people’s
perceptions of cultural stereotypes about minority groups
within society. This has been shown by assessing knowl-
edge of two different cultural stereotypes both via open-
ended responses and rating scales and by including multiple
racial prejudice measures.
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